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ABSTRACT 
The thesis discusses the history of a black South African 
political organisation, the Pan-Africanist Congress during the 
brief period of its effective influence inside South Africa: 
from 1959 to the mid-1960s. The PAC is identified as a 
populist movement, that is a movement of people who in one way 
or another were attempting to resist the impulses of an 
industrialising society. Its ideology therefore tended to 
stress communal as opposed to class-bound social identities. 
Beginning as a small dissident group within the dominant African 
political organisation, the African National Congress, the PAC 
was born after a decade of mass-based campaigning had distanced 
the ANC from its earlier nationalist position. The PAC acquired 
a following in only a few places, normally where its rival, the 
ANC, was weak and badly organised. It only approached the 
dimensions of a mass movement in the Western Cape where its 
militant, racially assertive rhetoric attracted migrant workers 
who were affected by a twin set of pressures: the efforts by 
the authorities to exclude them from urban society and the 
restructuring of their home communities in the Transkei. After 
the PAC's banning in March 1960 these people began to pl~ a 
crucial role in transforming the organisation from a cluster of 
conspiritorial nuclei drawn mainly from the middle class into the 
popular movement Pogo, in the process inJecting it with their own 
material and ideological preoccupations. In 1963 the PAC's exile 
leadership attempted to mobilise this following in a nation-wide 
insurrection but most of their preparations were known to the 
police who anticipated their plans with thousands of arrests. 
PAC-inspired violence was therefore localised and confined 
mainly to the Transkei and the Western Cape. Two chapters 
examine the local social tensions which underlay PAC/Pogo 
violence in Paarl and the Tembu districts of the Southern 
Transkei. By way of contrast the development of the movement 
amongst a non-migrant constituency is examined in a chapter on 
the PAC's progress in East London and Pretoria. The thesis 
concludes with an examination of the PAC in exile: here 
divorced from its popular base and from the political 
environment which gave rise to its ideological concerns the 
movement lost its vigour and integrity: a classic instance of 
the tragedy of exile politics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study focuses on a black South African political 
organisation, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). The PAC was 
formed in 1959 by former members of the main African organi-
sation of the time, the African National Congress (ANC). The 
PAC could be distinguished from the ANC by the stridency of its 
rhetoric, its appetite for confrontation, and its race-conscious 
ideology. With the ANC it was prohibited in 1960 after police 
killed sixty-nine members of an unarmed crowd which had gathered 
in the southern Transvaal township of Sharpeville in response to 
a PAC-led anti-pass campaign. Despite the banning of their 
organisation, the PAC's adherents continued to be active within 
South Africa with preparations which were intended to culminate 
in a massive general uprising in 196). In anticipation of 
this the police arrested several thousand people whom they 
suspected of PAC affiliation but despite police action PAC-
inspired groups were responsible for a number of violent 
attacks in the Cape Province and the Transkei between 1962 and 
1965. Thereafter evidence of Pan-Africanist activities inside 
the country has been very sporadic and it has functioned 
principally in exile. 
* * * * * 
In South Africa the juxtaposition of ethnically and 
economically determined patterns of social stratification has 
produced complex political responses from the dominated sections 
of the population. In those responses which can be conceived 
1 of as protest or resistance two tendencies have been especially 
1 
noticeable. First there has been the unambiguous political 
expression of specific class interests. These. with the 
development of industrialisation and the progressive limitations 
on African social mobility. were to become increasingly 
proletarian in character. Over time they came to be represented 
by the development of African trade unionism. revolutionary 
socialist groups. and. to an extent, by the longest-established 
2 black political organisation. the African National Congress. 
In general. class-derived political assertions. whether petty 
bourgeois or proletarian in character. have in the black South 
African context adhered to the ideal of a raCially integrated 
society and in consequence have eschewed the tenets of romantic 
nationalism: emphasis on linguistic. racial. cultural or 
religious identity. This abstention has been partly the 
consequence of external influences on the development of African 
political responses) but it has also flowed from the culturally 
integrative effects of a rapid and brutal process of 
industrialisation. 4 
The second tendency has been the obverse of the first. 
While some political actors have been motivated to emphasise 
the social identities created by the swift formation of an urban 
industrial culture, others have attempted to resist the social 
implications of such a culture. Social identity and social 
conflict is understood by them in terms of race rather than 
class and in consequence the African community is ascribed with 
an organic solidarity derived from a pre-industrial past. One 
of the objects of this study will be to establish just why 
certain South African resistance movements developed in this 
direction rather than in the other. In the post-second world 
2 
war period the Pan-Africanist Congress has been the most 
powerful and dramatic expression of such an ideological tendency. 
Though its role as a significant force in black South African 
politics was short-lived, as a principle bearer of the 
nationalist and populist tradition in black politics it was 
important. 
Several commentaries on South African political history 
have referred to two intellectual traditions which have 
characterised the development of African political assertions. 
Gail Gerhart, for example, has distinguished between the 
'integrationist' perspective of mainstream African political 
thought and an 'orthodox' nationalism which placed its emphasis 
on African cultural, racial and organisational autonomy.5 
'Orthodox' nationalism can be detected in a variety of forms: 
religious movements, cultural expressions, and, of course, 
political groups. Gerhart's book traces such an ideology 
through the history of the Congress Youth League in the 1940s, 
the Pan-Africanists during the 1950s, and the Black Consciousness 
movement of the 1970s. To describe this tradition as populist 
as well as nationalist helps to explain its origins and 
essential characteristics. 
Populism is a concept which has invited heterodox 
definition. It has been understood as a movement drawn from 
specific social groups at a particular point in their historical 
6 development; it has been discussed as an ideological reflex 
7 
of opposed classes at moments of hegemonic crisis; it has 
been viewed as part of a developmental strategy employed by 
8 
ruling elites with weak social bases; it has been described as 
an emphasis which can be detected in almost all varieties of 
political discourse. 9 Here the usage of the term will roughly 
conform to its application in its original Eastern European 
10 
context. In this sense populism was an ideology of protest 
emerging from the periphery rather than from the centres of 
political authority. It reflected either vicariously or 
directly ~he'impulses of social classes caught up in the process 
of transition to capitalism. Its referents were of rural origin 
though a populist movement might find its social roots in towns 
amongst the most recently urbanised. A populist vision sees 
society not in class terms but rather as an integrated community 
under threat from outside. In their Eastern European environment 
populist movements idealised the qualities of a (mythical) self-
sufficient peasant SOCiety. Political morality was seen to 
repose in the general will; the task of political movements was 
to refleot the essence of popular preoocupations. The latter 
were charaoterised by populist spokesmen in ideas whioh were 
communi tari an , apocalyptic and reactionary. Society's future 
development was prescribed in terms of a resurrected and adapted 
past in whioh the traumas of industrialisation could be 
ameliorated if not avoided altogether through the evocation of 
small village culture. Emerging on the outskirts of wealth and 
power, populist movements were characteristically anti-state 
and in consequence antipathetic to any form of organisation: 
populist movements tended to be weakly struotured entities 
built around great leaders rather than elaborate bureaucracies. 
As Eric Wolf has put it: 
4 
The peasant utopia is the free village. 
untrammelled by tax collectors. labor 
recruiters. large landowners, officials. 
Ruled over, but never ruling, they also 
lack acquaintance with the operation of 
the state as a complex machinery, 
experiencing it only as a 'cold monster'. 
Against this hostile force, they had 
learned, even their traditional power 
holders provided but a weak shield. even 
though they were on occasion willing to 
defend them if it proved to their own 
interest. Thus, for the peasant, the 
state is a negative quantity, an evil, to 
be replaced in short shrift by their own 
'homemade' social order. That order, they 
believe, can be run without the state; 
hence, peasants in rebellion are natural 
anarchists. 11 
Populist movements emerge as a strong force under conditions 
of 'uneven development', that is the social and geographical 
inequalities and the economic disjunctures resultant from the 
asymmetrical advance of capitalism from its original centres of 
growth. 12 In this sense the socially incoherent nature of 
populist movements is a reflection of the inchoate quality of 
capitalist social relationships in transitional societies: 
other social antagonisms may with some justification be 
perceived by their members as being of greater significance 
than those suggested by the terminology of class. The members 
of populist movements are usually those whom industrial 
capitalism has failed to materially and culturally completely 
encapsulate: 
• • • the social action that forms the basis 
of the populist movement may be viewed as 
motivated by an indirect confrontation with 
problems of economic development. It is 
the fact that this confrontation has been 
indirect which makes populist movements 
distinct from other types of social movement. 
Populism has emerged when ideologies and 
movements which more directly confront 
industrialisation and its consequences have 
come to be regarded as alien or inapprop-
riate or both. 13. 
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Populism has normally occurred in predominantly rural 
societies undergoing the initial stages of capitalist trans-
formation: Russian Narodniks, Eastern European peasant 
political parties, Peronists in Argentine and the Tanganyika 
African National Union during decolonisation are all movements 
which have been categorised as populist. In contrast to the 
societies in which these movements flourished, post-second 
world war South Africa would not at first sight offer promising 
terrain for the growth of populism. By the 1950s South Africa's 
population was relatively urbanised,14 primary and secondary 
industry outweighed agriculture in their contribution to the 
gross national product. 15 there existed a large and evidently 
class-conscious proletariat,16 agriculture had been recently 
restructured on a large-scale capitalist basis,17 and remaining 
peasant cultivation was incapable by itself of sustaining a 
18 
significant section of the population. With such conditions 
in mind some recent marxist historiograPhy19 has ascribed to 
the development of African political movements a steady evolution 
of working class (and hence socialist) orientation disrupted only 
occasionally by petty bourgeois manipulation of ethnic 
consciousness. This argument has a certain merit: it is the 
case that in contrast to anti-colonial movements elsewhere in 
Africa black South Africans have had a much richer socialist 
tradition to draw upon20 and their political parties have a long 
21 history of involvement with organised labour. Nevertheless in 
these authorities' efforts to reduce 'national struggle' to a 
22 form of class struggle there have been considerable simplifi-
cations. A case in point is Bernard Magubane's distinction 
6 
between 'two strains, national and nationalist • • • jockeying 
for control at various times in the history of the ANC'. The 
'nationalist' strain, according to Magubane, in contrast to 
'national' sentiment was 'narrow' and 'chauvinist' and was 'in 
the PAC's scheme of things ••• distorted out of all proportion 
for egotistical reasons,.23 Here the implication is that within 
African nationalism there are two sorts of impulses, one healthy, 
positive, outward-looking, and influenced by class conscious-
ness, and one pathological, destructive and anti-socialist.24 
Such a typology, whatever its descriptive qualities, does not 
really have any analytiC weight. As we shall see, populist as 
opposed to clearly class-oriented ideology has been at times a 
strong force in African politics and the reasons for this cannot 
be adequately understood by reference to only 'egotistical 
reasons'. 
In South Africa the process of industrialisation has been 
distinguished by the state's efforts to halt the progress of its 
social corollary: the urbanisation of an African proletariat. 
While only partially successful, mechanisms such as the pass 
laws, influx control and the political development of African-
occupied rural areas, the Bantustans, did have the effect of 
inhibiting the growth,of the permanent urban African population25 
and of preserving in an urban context for a substantial section 
26 of the labour force the relevance of rurally-derived culture. 
AmonglBouth African urban migrant workers in the 1960s populist 
political ideology could be expected to resonate strongly. Their 
experience of proletarianisation was often recent;27 they came 
28 from relatively socially undifferentiated SOCieties; they 
7 
lived in towns in so far as it was possible with other members 
of their local home communitiesj29 many still attached an 
importance to their claims to land-access;30 they were the 
least privileged and most marginal elements in the urban 
population. 31 
Put in the context of populism a study of the Pan-Africanist 
Congress can assume a wider significance than the filling of an 
historiographical lacuna. 32 For South Africa's particular route 
to a developed capitalist society inevitably generates a 
powerful populist33 as well as class-bound opposition and no 
understanding of South African political conflict can be 
complete without a recognition of this. The PAC offers an 
excellent illustration of a populist movement. Its understanding 
of its social environment was in terms of community rather than 
class, its perception of the world outside the community was 
essentially conspiritorial - a common trait of populist 
movements,34 the values and ideals it endorsed were purported to 
have originated from a pre-capitalist rural social order. Its 
leaders attributed great potential power to a supposed popular 
susceptibility to revolt. In place of structured organisation 
they relied on devination, intuition and a Sorelian concept of 
myth35 as means for general mobilization. Essentially parochial 
and circumscribed in their world-view the Pan-Africanists under-
stood neither the power of the state apparatus nor the complexity 
of the society it rested upon. 
It can be objected that the Pan Africanists were an urban 
Phenomenon. 36 that the movement sprang from the same social 
groups which provided the ANC with its leadership, that its 
8 
petty bourgeois ideologues at most reflected vicariously37 (and 
opportunistically) the political reactions of proletarian1sed 
peasants. In this study it will be demonstrated that however 
socially distanced the PAC leaders were from the groups which 
might be expected to form the base of a populist movement, that 
nevertheless they were to inspire a mass following within such 
a group, a following which infused their sentimental natavistic 
rhetoric with considerable energy and meaning. In the process 
the followers took the grandiose abstractions of the leaders 
and coloured them prosaically with more immediate and localised 
38 . 
concerns. But in as much as the PAC was a mass movement it 
was rooted in a transitional social order and as with populist 
movements elsewhere incapable of producing permanent, deep-rooted 
organisational structures. This, it has been suggested in the 
case of populist movements in general, is because: 
••• populism produces social and political 
movements rather than highly structured 
parties • • • the reason for this is that 
populism is so social, so convinced that 
the political does not really fundamentally 
matter ••• sees politics in a single 
apocalyptic and restorative need; not as 
an ongoing fallible and necessary activity. 39 
Isolated from this order by exile the PAC leaders could only 
degenerate, for they had no organization to sustain their 
influence and integrity and their rhetoric led them only to 
fantasy. 
The following chapters describe the PAC's emergence, growth 
and decline. Chapter One examines early African political 
assertions from the ANC's foundation in 1912. Chapter Two is 
concerned with the development of the ANO between the establish-
ment of the Youth League in 1944 and the fission which led to the 
9 
formation of the PAC. The ANC's acquisition of a mass base in 
the townships of the Witwatersrand, Durban and the Eastern Cape, 
and the infusion into the organisation of men and women with a 
background of activism in the Communist Party and trade unions 
helped to alter the ideological perceptions of the ANC's leader-
ship. Their reorientation away from the original self-determinist 
ethos of the ANC Youth League brought to the surface in certain 
areas latent tensions between lower and upper echelon leaders. 
These resulted eventually in a split in the organisation. 
Chapter Three contains an analysis of the PAC's first major 
campaign. Pre-empting the ANC, which was also planning 
opposition to the pass laws, the PAC instructed its followers 
to offer themselves ~ masse for arrest at police stations in 
contravention of influx control regulations. Because of the 
PAC leaders' neglect of any systematic organisation their campaign 
failed to elicit a national following, but in two very different 
African communities in Vereeniging and Cape Town, local responses 
to the PAC call were impressive and helped to generate an 
illusory atmosphere of political crisis. To explain the localised 
nature of the PAC's following the chapter analyses the structure 
and history ot the African population in Vereeniging and Cape To~n. 
Chapter Four provides an overall narrative framework for 
understanding the developments which succeeded the prohibition of 
the two main African political organisations in 1960. The ANC 
and the PAC both spawned violent insurgencies each of which 
reflected the different characteristics of their parent bodies. 
In the case of the PAC insurgents their development was 
complicated by the dual nature of their evolution. While the 
10 
leaders tried from exile in Basutoland to create from top 
downwards a revolutionary clandestine network, in the Western 
Cape, bands of PAC followers were creating their own movement. 
In the process they reinterpreted externally-derived ideology 
and strategic conceptions in terms of their own particular 
local concerns. 
In consequence in the different areas where the PAC 
developed a following it acquired different characteristics 
which varied according to the circumstances of the various groups 
which participated in its activities. Chapters Five, Six and 
Seven discuss the development of the PAC's insurgent successor, 
Pogo. In four different areas. in each case putting the 
movement in the context of local traditions of political 
resistance. One of the premises of this study is that the 
understanding of African political movement cannot be adequately 
accomplished without a m1crosociological concern. On the whole 
the poverty and mutual geographical isolation of. as well as the 
political restrictions placed on different African communities 
in South Africa have inhibited the growth of sophisticated and 
effective political bureaucracies among them. In such circum-
stances local determinants are frequently crucial to the process 
of popular political mobilization. 
The final chapter describes the Pan-Africanists in exile 
and decline. It serves as a commentary on the transient nature 
and peculiar vulnerability of populist movements. 
11 
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CHAPTER ONE 
BLACK POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS. 1912-1950 
Separatist as opposed to integrationist political 
philosophies are an important theme in the intellectual 
tradition of twentieth century black South African politics. 
Until the second world war, though, because of the generally 
elitist character of African political activity, separatism 
was a position represented by individuals rather than groups. 
It was only with the foundation in 1944 of the African National 
Congress Youth League that exponents of a separatist ideal 
based on notions of racial solidarity began to cohere as a 
distinct political sect. 
The 1940s were a watershed in African politics, a period 
in which a swift expansion of the black labour force, its 
increasing deployment in industry, and the revival of trade 
unionism, all helped to radicalise African political organisations. 
In an environment of popular militancy manifested by industrial 
action and community protest the aspirations of an African 
middle class assumed a fresh significance within the context of 
formal political movements. But a necessary preamble to the 
examination of these processes is the following survey of 
African political responses from the founding of the first 
national organisation until the beginning of the second world war • 
• • • • • 
In January 1912 there assembled in Bloemfontein several 
hundred of South Africa's most prominent African citizenso These 
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men, after -singing Tiyo Soga's Xhosa hymn 'Fulfil thy promise, 
God of truth', unanimously resolved to form the South African 
Native National Congress (SANNC). Its formation marked a clear 
break with the past. Previously African politics had been 
centred on electoral activity in the Cape Province where blacks 
I 
with the required qualifications could vote and stand for office. 
Their voice was significant. In 1900 they constituted nearly 
half the electorate in five constituencies and some believed 
that enfranchised Africans could use their vote to elect 
~ 
representatives who would be sympathetic to African aspiratio~s. 
The years succeeding the Peace of V~reeniging witnessed the 
declining force of this argument. The SANNC's founding marked 
the ascendency in middle-class African circles that African 
interests could best be promoted not through sympathetic 
intermediaries but rather by action by Africans themselves. 
There were several reasons for this change in opinion. 
Among some memQers of the African elite hopes raised initially 
by the British defeat of the Republics had been disappointed. 
Despite African protestations of Imperial loyalty intermingled 
with polite reproach at the prevalent discrimination against 
1 black men of 'training, character and ability', the British 
government made it clear that its paramount concern was with the 
question of white unity in South Africa. African hopes that the 
Cape franchise arrangements would be, extended to the defeated 
Republics were in vain, and preparations for the Act of Union 
indicated that existing rights would not be respected in future. 
, 
The Act not only removed the theoretical right of blacks to be 
. 
elected to parliamentary seats but also provided for the removal 
, 
of the franchise from African voters through a two-thirds vote of 
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both Houses in joint session. Nor, by 1912, was African concern 
limited to constitutional issues. The first post-Union 
administration, responding to mining's labour demands and the 
disquiet of white farmers squeezed between capitalist 
agricultural companies on the one hand and competitive African 
peasants on the other, moved swiftly to consolidate support 
from these groups. Breaking contract was made a criminal 
offence, exclusion of Africans from skilled industrial jobs was 
sanctioned, and in 1911 the Land Bill threatened to prohibit 
African rural land ownership or occupation outside the reserves. 
Obviously there was more at stake here than the interests of 
that small group who initially through education at mission 
institutions had come to form an identifiable petty-bourgeoisie. 
The Land Act of 1913 and complementary labour legislation were 
the legal tools employed to destroy a whole class of peasant 
producers, forcing them into already crowded reserves or driving 
them into new and arduous social relationships. The group of 
men assembled at Bloemfontein in 1912 would have been well aware 
of the wider dimensions of the social tragedy being enacted 
around them. 2 But they had a particular concern, the fear of 
any petty bourgeoisie at a time of crisis, of being thrust back 
into the ranks of the urban and rural poor.3 Above all the SANNC 
was to represent the concerns of the small professional middle 
class. Its first president was John Dube, headmaster of the 
Ohlange Institute in Natal, its Secretary Solomon Plaatje, one-
time interpreter and editor of a Kimberley newspaper, and its 
treasurer Pixley Ka Izaka Seme, a London-trained advocate. These 
were men who retained close ties with the African aristocracy, 
the rural chieftaincy, who, while anxious for the general 
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advancement and 'upliftment of the race',4 were also 
conservatives, interested in protecting a moral and social order 
they correctly perceived to be under attack. Congress was 
intended to function first as a national forum to discuss 
issues affecting Africans and second as an organised pressure 
group agitating for change through 'peaceful propaganda,.5 
Intended methods included the election to legislative bodies of 
Congress sympathisers, protests, and, finally, 'passive action 
or continued movement'o6 
In the first six years of its existence Congress contented 
itself with less dramatic measures. African leaders were keen 
to demonstrate their loyalty for the duration of the first world 
war. The SANNC was dominated by Cape-educated men who 
consistently tended to be less aggressive than their Transvaal 
colleagues. John Dube, born in Natal and educated in America, 
thought in much the same terms as the Cape men, announcing his 
intention to rely on 'the sense of common justice and love of 
freedom so innate in the British character,.7 Delegations went 
to Britain in 1914 and 1919 to request Imperial intervention in 
South Africa. 
In 1918 there was a discernable shift in the SANNC's 
position. On the Rand Congress leaders were supporting striking 
municipal workers, they were involved in a militant anti-pass 
campaign, and in early 1920 Congress organisers were addressing 
public meetings of mineworkers just before the great African 
8 
mineworkers' strike that year. Plaatje came away from the 
annual SANNC conference in August 1918 most disturbed. As he 
put it in a letter to De Beers in Kimberley: 
20 
The ten Transvaal delegates came to the 
Congress with a concord and a determination 
that was perfectly astounding to our 
customary native demeanor at conferences. 
They spoke almost in unison, in short 
sentences, nearly all of which began and 
and ended with the word 'strike'. 9 
What had happened? First of all, wartime industrialisation 
had expanded the black urban population and industrial labour 
force, especially in the Transvaal. With black wages pegged at 
1914 levels, sharp inflation, and municipal reluctance to 
provide adequate services and housing for this population, there 
had been a dramatic deterioration in standards of living. Less 
affluent middle class Africans shared many of the experiences of 
African workers: their incomes were not appreCiably higher and 
they lived in the same miserable urban slums. 10 With the 
expansion of the manufacturing workforce and the example of 
immediate post-war white labour unrest, African workers were 
becoming increasingly class-conscious. Politically this 
situation was reflected in the developing interest taken in 
11 blacks by white SOCialists. It was also expressed in the 
leadership change in Congress. In 1917 the executive was taken 
over by Transvaal men, under the presidency of Pretoria estate 
agent S. M. Makgatho. Hardly revolutionaries, nevertheless 
these men were less immune to the stresses provoked and 
stimulated by wartime industrial and social developments than 
the Cape leaders. And in 1918, this leadership, prompted from 
below, was to articulate the one shilling a day demand 
accompanying the wave of African strikes in Johannesburg that 
12 year. 
Though the apparent radicalism of Congress in the immediate 
post-war period reflected common interests between working class 
21 
and petty bourgeois blacks, the SANNC hardly represented a 
stable class alliance. There was great unease among African 
political spokesmen at the direction Congress appeared to be 
taking in the Transvaal. Plaatje's misgivings were shared also 
by Professor D. D. T. Jabavu: 'Bolshevism and its nihilistic 
doctrines is enlisting many natives up country. Socialism of 
the worst calibre is claiming our peoPle •• 13 Plaatje and Jabavu 
belonged to a group who had for years considered themselves as 
authentic representatives of the African community; now, 
suddenly, their role was being questioned. More conservative 
African politicians were being abused at meetings when they 
counselled moderation and caution. Nevertheless these people 
would succeed in guiding Congress along smoother paths in the 
oncoming decade. But by themselves they could not have 
accomplished the deradicalisation of the movement. There were 
other more powerful forces at work. 
From 1920 until the accession of the Pact government in 
1924 the authorities produced a series of measures which though 
usually incorporating features that offended the integrationist 
and meritocratic principles of leading Congressmen, still 
mollified some of the resentment of petty bourgeois Africans 
and detached them from the movement set in motion by the popular 
classes. The 1920 Native Housing Act was a measure of this 
nature. So too was the provision of first class black railway 
accommodation. In 1923 the Native Urban Areas Act provided for 
municipal housing programmes, leasehold in townships and afforded 
trading opportunities within the new townships. There were 
plenty of objections to the new arrangements: particularly 
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disliked were the municipal brewing monopolies enshrined in the 
Act, but nevertheless they went some way to meeting the SAllNC 
demand for 'some differentiation of treatment 
• • • between those 
who were educated and civilised and those who had yet to reach 
that stage. 14 A final restraining motive among African leaders 
was that the 1919 pass protests introduced a new social element 
- the urban unemployed - more volatile, more violent, and much 
l~ss easy to organise than members of the working class. From 
1920, for a few years, Congress's leaders were to be diverted 
into safer channels; into the Joint Council movement which 
provided a medium for consultation between black and white 
liberals, and the advisory Governor General's conferences in 
which a select group could advance grievances. 
From 1922, however, two other organisations had arrived to 
complicate the African political scene. These were the 
Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU) and the Communist 
Party of South Africa. The origins of the ICU lay in the early 
post-war attempts to organise black labour in Cape Town by white 
socialists. It was founded in 1919 and was quickly to gain 
prestige through leading a,successful dockworkers' strike. Its 
secretary was a schoolteacher from Nyasaland, Clements Kadalie, 
a man of great charm and charisma. The Cape Town ICU's following 
was to spread and link up with other embryonic trade union 
groupings, first in the ports of the Eastern Province and then 
in Durban. In each case the movement was structured around 
powerful and flamboyant personalities, usually from a non-working 
class background, rather than a systematic organisationo A 
branch was established in Johannesburg in 1924 and from that year 
the ICU began to attract the attention of the Communist Party 
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then seeking to expand its African support. The ICU's 
transformation into a mass movement only began with its 
penetration of the countryside, first in rural Natal and then, 
most dramatically, in the Eastern Transvaal. Here despite the 
provisions of the 1913 Land Act, a relatively prosperous group 
of African labour tenants, sharecroppers, and squatters had 
survived outside the reserves on white land. From the 1920s 
these people were to be under savage pressures as white farmers, 
responding to an increased demand for agricultural products, 
sought to convert quasi-feudal social relationships on the land 
into capitalist ones. Labour tenants had their land reduced 
and free labour obligations increased, sharecropper arrangements 
were transformed into rent-paying tenancies and squatters began 
to be squeezed off the land altogether. Rural Africans responded 
in a wave of unrest: refusals to work on the farmer's land, 
mutilation of animals, threats, assaults, and other forms of 
insubordination. In their desperation they turned to the lCU, 
joining it in thousands, attracted by the millenarian undertone 
of much leU rhetoric. But, as one of them said, it 'all ended 
up in speeches,:1 5 rural expectations of freedom and restoration 
of land were to be disappointed. All the ICU had to offer were 
some rather shady land purchase schemes, legal manoeuvres, and 
attempts to improve conditions by negotiations with farmers. 
None of these could halt the advance of capitalist social relations 
or significantly soften their impact. Reaching a peak of 100,000 
members in 1927 the lCU was to speedily decline, crumbling through 
internal dissention and organisational paralYSiso16 
Ostensibly a workers' organisation, because of the 
character and ambitions of its petty-bourgeois leaderShip, the 
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ICU tended to function as a mass-based political party, its 
charismatic leaders voicing a broad range of popular grievances. 
Incapable of organising systematically on an industrial base it 
nevertheless attracted and possibly diverted from Congress 
massive support - indicative of considerable receptiveness 
among the urban and rural poor to political ideas. In doing so 
it freed Congress's elitist leadership from the radicalising 
pressures emanating from below which had helped to condition 
its responses at the beginning of the decade. The ICU had a 
second, more positive effect on Congress. Its spokesmen infused 
into the courtly and often pompous discourse of African politicians 
a fierce anger and apocalyptic imagery. Here, "for example, is 
James Thaele, later a Congress leader in the Western Cape, 
writing in the ICU newspaper, The Workers' Herald, in 1923: 
We are fed up with the white man's camouflage, 
his hypocrisy, his policy of pinpricks in the 
land of our forefathers. I am appealing to 
the racial consciousness of the radical 
aboriginal to use all means to rouse the 
African race to wake from their long sleep 
of many a decade • • • When those in 
authority became so unreasonably notorious 
••• disregard that authority, be blind and 
damn the consequences. 11 
Such sentiments were beginning to resonate among sections of 
the African National Congress (the title adopted by the SANNC in 
1923) amid increasing disenchantment with negotiation and 
moderation in the face of an unprecedently repressive admini-
stration. For by 1926 there was additional reason for 
bitterness. Two years earlier there had been a realignment in 
white politics. With the accession of the Labour/Nationalist 
regime under General Hertzog, an administration more disposed 
to white rural and labour aristocracy interests had come to 
25 
power. It was less inclined to favour co-optive strategems 
with regard to blacks than its predecessor and readier to 
embrace the full political and economic implications of 
segregation. In 1926. two bills. one removing from Africans 
the common roll vote in the Cape and the other expanding on 
the provisions of the 1913 Land Act. were tabled. Though they 
were not passed for another decade the implication for African 
political leadership was clear: existing rights and privileges 
were from then under constant threat. 
Before looking at how the ANC was behaving in the late 
1920s we need to understand something of another radicalising 
influence. the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA). The 
Communist Party had been founded in 1921 after a series of 
discussions between tiny left-wing groups on the Rand and in 
Cape Town. 19 The CPSA was not a large body but it was well 
organised. A few of its members had been involved in earlier 
syndicalist attempts to organise black workers and so though it 
did not have apparently any blacks in its original membership 
it may have had some informal following amongst black workers. 
The CPSA. though. was not a syndicalist organisation - it was a 
political party, prepared, because conditions were not yet ripe 
for revolution in South Africa, to work within and take advantage 
of existing political institutions. This was to cause some 
internal disagreement, as well as, later on, criticism from 
other left-wing parties. Though it could, on occasion, be 
accused of opportunistic expediency over the race issue, in 
general the CPSA adhered to the doctrine that working class unity 
transcended racial divisions. White working class consciousness 
as it developed would. the CPSA leadership assumed, ultimately 
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eschew racialism. In the short term therefore, Communists were 
active in the Rand mineworkers' revolt despite the explicit 
racialism of the mineworkers' leaders. Similarly it supported 
the Nationalist/Labour alliance in the 1924 election - but this 
was to lead to revaluation: the racist overtones of the campaign 
led the CPSA at its annual conference to conclude that 'our main 
revolutionary task is among the natives,.20 
The ICU, gathering strength in the mid 1920s, was the 
obvious target for Party workers. It had a massive working 
class membership, and at that stage explicitly socialist goals. 
Communists joined the ICU and helped it by leaving the field open 
for ICU men to organise industrially. But by 1926 there were 
considerable tensions between the Communists and the ICU arising 
from both tactical and ideological differences. First of all 
thelCU was not functioning as a trade union organisation as the 
Communists understood the concept. Its membership was scattered 
and diffuse and tended to be concentrated among farm workers 
rather than the industrial workforce. Communists within the ICU 
tried to reorganise the movement into industrial branches based 
on individual concerns and this was sharply resented by lCU 
leaders. Secondly the ICU's founders tended to view achievement 
in middle class terms - status, wealth and individual power - and 
hence could with some justification be accused of using the 
organisation to enrich themselves. Kadalie viewed the struggle 
as being primarily political and because of this sought 
institutional respectability for his movement through affiliation 
with reformist European labour organisations. Kadalie understood 
social conflict in South Africa mainly in nationalist or colonial 
terms and did not share the Communist vision of a class struggle 
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complicated only by racist 'false consciousness'. These 
tensions eventually resulted in the expulsion of the Communists 
and a sharp turn to the right by the ICU as it withered and 
decayed. Rejected by the ICU, Communists established their 
own industrial unions and placed fresh emphasis on African 
recruitment into the Party. By 1928 three members of the 
Central Committee were black as were most of the CPSA's 1.750 
members. Concurrent with the emphasis on African mobilisation 
was a re-assessment of policy towards the ANC, hitherto treated 
21 
as a purely reactionary movement. 
By 1927 ANC leaders were increasingly disillusioned with 
the politics of diplomatic (and sometimes downright sycophantic) 
persuasion. Their susceptibility to more radical strategy was 
signified in an abortive scheme in 1926 for jOint ICU/ANC 
demonstrations in protest against Hertzog's legislative proposals. 
In 1927, with the election of Josiah Gumede to the presidency, 
the ANC announced its intention to embark on a course of mass 
organisation involving the construction of branch memberships. 
The Western Cape was already the scene of an energetic recruit-
ment campaign among farmworkers by two Comnlunists working within 
22 Congress, Ndobe and Tonjeni. Here, in contrast to the Transvaal, 
wage labour as opposed to labour tenancy predominated on farms. 2J 
Josiah Gumedehad been influenced in the early 1920s by the 
American negro doctrine of Garveyism - a separatist ideology 
based on race-pride and black exclusiveness. But Gumede, in 
1927 President of the Natal wing of the ANC, was receptive to 
other influences as well; he accepted an invitation to attend a 
Communist-sponsored Conference of Oppressed Nationalities and 
later toured the USSR returning to South Africa much impressed 
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with what he had seen. At Brussels the Conference adopted a 
motion put forward by Gumede and his compatriot, James La Guma 
of the Cape Town branch of the CPSA, endorsing: 
• • • the right of self determination 
through the complete overthrow of capital-
ism and imperialist domination • • • the 
principle of Africa for the Africans • •• 24 
Under pressure from its African and coloured members as 
well as from COmintern,25 the CPSA in 1928 took an important 
step which laid the foundation for any alliance with African 
nationalist organisations. This was the adoption of a vaguely 
worded slogan defining the Party's goal as 'an independent 
native republic as a stage towards a workers' and peasants' 
republic'. This formulation begged obvious questions which 
were never satisfactorily answered. The slogan was to be short-
lived but one of its most important premises would inform CPSA 
policy for a long time. This was that South Africa contained 
within itself a colonial situation and consequently socialism 
would be accomplished through two stages; first a nationalist 
democratic revolution, involving many issues over which it would 
be easy to cooperate with reformist African petty bourgeois 
organisations, and only then a socialist revolution. 
The native republic slogan was produced at an opportune 
moment. First, it coincided with and complemented the impact of 
Garveyism on the ANC. Both Gumede and James Thaele, President 
of the Western Cape ANC, were influenced by Marcus Garvey's 
doctrines. The millenarian accent of Garveyism would have 
reverberated strongly in rural parts of the Cape where there was 
considerable unrest among farm workers and where the ANC had 
succeeded in building country branches. Secondly, 1929 was a 
29 
year of intensification of coercive measures against Africans. 
A bitter election was fought that year on 'native policy' as 
the result of the Pact government's inability to gain the 
required two-thirds majority to alter the franchise arrangements. 
The election was accompanied by a vigorous implementation of the 
pass controls. In response to this Communists established a 
League of African Rights which was intended to agitate for 
freedom of speech, education, the vote and abolition of the pass 
laws. Gumede supported the League on behalf of the ANC and was 
elected its president. But by late 1929 Gumede was almost 
totally isolated from his executive - the ANC failed to support 
the League's proposed mass demonstrations against the pass laws. 
In April 1930, after he had addressed the ANC annual 
conference on the need to mount a massive campaign on the basis 
of the native republic slogan, Josiah Gumede was voted out of 
office. In his place was elected Pixley Ka Izaka Seme and with 
his ascendency the ANC shifted several degrees rightwards into 
almost total moribundancy. Meanwhile the Communist International, 
working on the assumption that 1930 marked a profound crisis for 
the capitalist world, called for the withdrawal of all Communist 
Parties from any association with reformist organisations. The 
League of African Rights collapsedo The CPSA, despite internal 
misgivings as to whether a revolutionary situation prevailed in 
South Africa, called for a general strike and launched itself on 
a confrontationist course which, though heroic, was to lead to 
the Party's decimation (with the assistance of internal purges) 
and the almost total destruction of its trade union organisation. 
The ANC and ICU's refusal to support the pass burning demonstrations 
organised by the Communists in November 1930 in Johannesburg 
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created a legacy of ill feeling between revolutionaries and 
nationalists. Within the Western Cape where the ANC had been 
most radica1ised and closest to the Communists, Congress 
split as dissidents, increasingly distressed by the right~wing 
swing by Thae1e, set up their own, short-lived, Independent ANCo 
The 1930s was a decade when both the ANC and the CPSA 
reached the nadir of their influence. The Communists, from 
being the best organised and most militant group active among 
black South Africans, were to lose much of their popular 
following. This was partly a consequence of the systematic policy 
of harrassment pursued by the state, and particularly the Minister 
of Justice, Oswald Pirow, but the decline in the fortunes of the 
CPSA was not simply the effect of more energetic repression. 
From 1933, with the ascendency of Nazism in Germany, Communist 
parties throughout the world, in conformity with Comintern advice, 
formed 'popular front' alliances with reformist anti-fascist 
groups. In South Africa, confronted with the attempts by 
Afrikaner nationalists to capture the white labour movement, 
Communists from the mid-thirties concentrated on combating what 
they perceived to be fascist tendencies in white workers. An 
all-white 'People's Front' was established and tacit support was 
offered to the Labour Party. Party newspapers carried less 
African news, and according to the memories of some of its 
African memb~rs, increasingly they felt that with the CPSA's 
strivings for a particular type of acceptability it was no longer 
their party. Revival was to come only slowly with the transfer 
of the Party's headquarters to Cape Town in 1931 and its 
reintegration into the Cape radical tradition which had begun 
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amongst African and coloured workers a decade earlier. 
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Meanwhile an ever-shrinking Congress floundered its way 
through the decade. Under the leadership of Pixley Ka Izaka Seme 
tensions between different leadership cliques increased and 
Congress's popular impact dwindled. Seme's philosophy and the 
reason for the ANC's decline are apparent in this extract from 
an article written by him in 1932: 
I wish to urge our educated young men and 
women not to lose contact with your own 
chiefs. You should make your chiefs and 
your tribal councils feel that education 
is a really good thing. It does not spoil 
people nor detribalise them. Most of the 
miseries which our people suffer in the 
towns and country today is due to this one 
factor, no confidence between the educated 
classes and their own uneducated people. 
The former cannot open any business 
relations amongst the latter and get good 
support because to be able to establish a 
business anywhere you want confidence. The 
Indian trader succeeds because he makes 
friends with all classes and ever tries to 
win their confidence. You should try and 
do likewise. ••• Congress can make us 
learn how to produce our own wants as a 
nation. We can learn to grow cotton and 
wool and make our own leather boots and 
blankets in our factories • • • 21 
As well as reflecting the increasing difficulty the ANC was 
having in maintaining the allegiance of a chieftaincy ever more 
dependent for its position on the good will of the authorities, 
the economic message in the speech is also revealing. With its 
narodnlk evocation of small self sufficient rurally based 
industrial communities the general good is identified totally 
with the welfare of an aspirant African commercial class. 
Translated into practical terms, Seme's poliCies included the 
wooing of chiefs28 and the establishment of African Congress 
Clubs, which would function as savings organisations with the 
capacity to make loans to and provide cheap wholesale goods for 
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businessmen. To ensure their smooth operation ex-employees of 
the Native Affairs Department would handle Congress Club 
revenues. 
Even the eventual passage of the Hertzog legislation in 
1936, which removed Africans from the common roll, created for 
them a new set of segregated political institutions, including 
white 'Native Representatives' in Parliament and an elected 
advisory 'Native Representative Council', as well as entrenChing 
the unequal distribution of land, did not provoke a dramatic 
response from African politicians. True, after a conference in 
Bloemfontein, a new organisation was established, the All 
African Convention, with the original purpose of uniting 
opposition to the legislation, but in the face of reluctance of 
establishment politicians to boycott the new institutions (a 
move which was urged by left-wingers from Cape Town) the All 
African Convention and its constituent organisations settled 
down into a familiar routine: wordy protests through consultative 
machinery, delegations, vague calls for African unity, and 
national days of prayer. The AAC was to be dominated until the 
war by conservatives; . its protestations were to be punctuated 
by affirmations of loyalty to South Africa and the Crown, and 
its policy documents, despite some attention to general socio-
economic matters, were largely thought out within the tenets of 
Cape liberalism. 29 
* * * * * 
In contrast to the political lethargy of the previous 
decade the 1940s was a period of ferment as political movements 
adjusted to the new pressures and opportunities created by popular 
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upheavals accompanying the massive wartime expansion of the 
African working class. Here we will focus mainly on 
Johannesburg, for there the developments within African urban 
communities assumed their most complex and dramatic form. Let 
us start by examining some of the socio-economic characteristics 
of South African urban society during these years. 
The disruption of the international capitalist economy as 
a result of the second world war created boom conditions for 
South African industry with the proliferation of more sophisticated 
import substitution and the development of production geared to 
military requirements. There was a rapid growth in the number 
of African manufacturing workers as a consequence. Between 1939 
and 1952 the African urban population nearly doubled mainly as a 
result of the movement of whole families from the countryside 
into the towns. The two most important impulses to this migration 
were the threat of starvation in the reserves and deteriorating 
conditions on white f~s. In the reserves overcrowding led to 
a situation which for many was precarious even in years of good 
climatic conditions. For example, in 1943 a government commission 
found in the Transkei that nearly ten per cent of the households 
within the territory were landless, and in three typical districts 
30 half the population had no cattle. In any case the war years 
were years of drought: in 1942, for example, the crop harvest in 
31 the Transkei was one quarter of its normal size. On the farms 
the general trend towards proletarianisation of labour tenants 
and squatters continued, forcing large numbers off the land. The 
process was accelerated during the war years as a reflection of 
high food prices. 32 
This rural exodus was at first facilitated by a brief 
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suspension between 1942 and 1943 of urban influx control. This 
was one of several measures taken by the authorities to avoid 
confrontation and maintain African political quiescence. Others 
included school feeding schemes, pensions for certain categories 
of African employees and increased educational expenditure. All 
these tied in with manufacturing's requirement of a stable, 
urbanised, and relatively well-educated industrial labour force. 
Urban African poverty, though not as atrocious as in the 
countryside, was nevertheless very widespread. The effects of 
rising wages were offset by unemployment and increases in the 
cost of staple foods and fuel. 33 Unskilled workers particularly 
rarely earned enough to cover the cost of essential food, shelter, 
fuel and clothing. As a consequence many people who depended on 
such wages simply did not survive: for example, in East London, 
six out of every ten African babies born were dead by the end of 
their first year. 34 
Such conditions were not always accepted passively. Where 
there was scope for leverage African communities were swift to 
attempt to resist increased SUbsistence costs or to reduce the 
price of survival. The two most important of such struggles 
were the Alexandra bus boycotts of 1940 to 1945 and the 
Johannesburg squatters' movement of 1944 to 1947. 35 
Alexandra was one of the few areas in which Africans could 
enjoy freehold property rights. It lay twelve miles to the north 
of Johannesburg, just outside the municipal boundary. It was 
lightly administered because of its freehold status and autonomy 
from Johannesburg and was consequently a catchment area for those 
people who had no official sanction to live in a town. It had 
other attractions for the least privileged: the absence of 
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effective building controls meant that landlords could erect 
shacks round their stands making accommodation available for 
people who for economic or bureaucratic reasons could not find 
housing in municipal townships. Like the other freehold suburb 
of Johannesburg, Sophiatown, Alexandra's population had a 
relatively complex class structure, as access to property rights 
had enabled the development of African business interests. 
From 1940 Alexandra appeared to be threatened with expropriation 
as white residents of encroaching suburbs who were opposed to 
its existence managed to obtain an increasingly sympathetic 
hearing from the civic authorities. This background of 
insecurity was an important element in communal responses. 
Transport was an obviously sensitive issue in Alexandra. 
There were no trains and its distance from the city centre made 
the existence of a cheap bus service vital to the continued life 
of the township. African entrepreneurs had initially been able 
to exploit the demand for cheap transport but in the early 1940s 
the last of these, R. G. Baloyi, was squeezed out by better 
capitalised White-owned operations. The insecurity of African 
property owners and their continuing entrepreneurial aspirations 
in the transport field motivated them to playa leading role in 
the bus boycotts, though not always very successfully. 
The first boycott occurred in 1940 nine months after the 
fare to town had been raised from 4d. to 5d. The boycott only 
took place after the failure of negotiations between operators, 
the Council and a Transport Action Committee, which included 
C. S. Ramahanoe, an Alexandra resident and Transvaal secretary 
of the ANC, and Gaur Radebe, also of Alexandra and a Congress as 
well as a Communist Party member. The boycott was brief~ 
successful, and because it was scarcely reported in the press 
little is known of the form it took. 
In 1942 after a second attempt to raise the fare the buses 
were boycotted again, and on this occasion the boycott was 
enforced through pickets and its conduct was decided through a 
mass meeting in one of Alexandra's three public squares. On 
this occasion it was at first the fares which were boycotted 
rather than the buses, passengers simply refusing to pay the 
extra penny. The owners retaliated by moving the terminal to 
the edge of the township, hence shortening the rout'e. Pickets 
were then set up which clashed with bus company employees and 
after negotiations between the company and a committee 
representing the ANC, Alexandra washerwomen and other special 
interests the old fare was restored while an official 
investigation was held. 
The investigation favoured the bus companies and in August 
1943, once again, fares were raised to 5d. This time the boycott 
was longer and attracted much more external attention, lasting 
from August 2nd to the 11th. The boycotters, 20,000 of them, 
walked to work across Johannesburg's north western suburbs. To 
assist these people an Emergency Transport Committee was fo~ed 
composed of members of the Communist Party, white left-wingers 
and liberals and various Alexandra notables. Led by Senator 
Hyman Basner (a native representative and a former Communist) the 
committee organised lifts. This was done with the cooperation of 
the police and the traffic department and the Department of 
Native Affairs went so far as to appeal to employers to reinstate 
workers dismissed for lateness and absenteeism. In this boycott 
the ANC seems to have played an unimportant role in the,day-to-day 
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leadership. In Alexandra Congress tended to be identified with 
Baloyi who was rightly suspected of self interested motives and 
neither he nor Xuma, the President General, were at their best 
on a public platform. Negotiations faltered and were ended by 
Government intervention after a dramatic procession of 10,000 
Alexandra residents marched through the town on August 10th. 
A Commission of Enquiry was set up and for the time being the 
4d. fare maintained. 
Between 1943 and 1944 there seems to have been a significant 
shift in Government policy: whereas in 1943 the State appears 
to have played a conciliatory and defusing role, in 1944 official 
attitudes were more combative. It is possible this alteration 
was inspired by the self confidence engendered from Allied war 
victories. Despite commission evidence which suggested that no 
urban African community on the Rand could afford increased 
transport costs Government assent was given in November 1944 to 
the fivepenny fare. This time the boycott lasted seven weeks 
despite considerable state harassment: liftgivers were 
intimidated by officials, pass offenders were arrested in large 
numbers and a proclamation banned meetings or processions of 
over twenty people. There were attempts to extend the boycott 
geographically and there was even talk of a communal strike. 
The complexities of the various responses by the Government, 
Municipality and employers' organisations need not detain us 
here: eventually a subsidised coupon scheme was improvised in 
which people would buy tickets in advance for the old fare and 
the companies would claim the extra penny from the Council. 
This would be a temporary arrangement during which the bus 
companies were bought out by a Public Utility Corporation which 
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through economies of scale would retain the old fares. The 
conclusion of this final boycott found the leadership which had 
emerged in these struggles in disarray. In 1943 Basner, 
toget~er with various African leaders disenchanted with the 
inability of Congress to function at a popular level, had formed 
an African Democratic Party. This fell apart in the 1944 
boycott over disagreements between its more radical African 
members (who included Trotskyites) and the Senator on the 
acceptability of the coupon scheme. The scheme as it appeared 
in December 1944 was a temporary and uncertain measure, Basner 
himself only favouring it because of his scepticism as to 
whether the boycott would hold after its introduction. The 
Communists involved in the Workers' Transport Action Committee 
had fallen out with their colleagues after opposing the extension 
of the boycott to other centres. In any case, after the entry of 
Russia into ,the war, the Communist Party was, for its duration, 
unwilling to undertake illegal forms of opposition. The ANC 
establishment was totally discredited in the eyes of the 
boycotters: its leaders had avoided involvement and in the case 
of Ramahanoe, was tainted with employment with one of the bus 
companies. During the boycott itself different approaches had 
emerged between the Communists and the far left, the former 
arguing for the ending of the struggle as soon as a concession 
on fares had been offered, the latter advocating continuation 
until the State or the Municipality took over responsibility for 
the provision of public transport to Alexandra. 36 We will return 
to these political tensions. Apart from their influence on the 
politics of opposition the boycotts were important in demonstrating 
the effectiveness of a new tactic which was to be employed 
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repeatedly in the succeeding decade. They also served to promote 
a trend towards increasing state intervention in worker sub-
sistence issues: the form this took in the case of Alexandra's 
transport was modest - the subsidisation (from a levy exerted 
on employers) of the monopolistic Public Utility Corporation. 
In the case of the squatters' movements described below state 
response was to be rather more extensive. 
In 1944 there were four municipal housing schemes in 
Johannesburg: Western Native Township, adjacent to the freehold 
area of Sophiatown, Eastern Native Township, and much further from 
the centre of town, Orlando and Pimville. Orlando was the proto-
type for today's Soweto housing estate, and spartan and bleak as 
its accommodation was, Orlando was considered a 'model' township 
by the City fathers, though as much for the ease of administering 
it as the quality of its facilities. Pimville, on the other hand, 
was conceded to be a horrible place, consisting of 99 former water 
tanks sliced lengthwise each housing a family, and a rather larger 
group of African-constructed shanties. It had been conceived 
originally as an emergency camp for refugees from an inner city 
plague outbreak and had remained as a result of civic reluctance 
to provide alternative housing for its inhabitants. In total 
there were about 14,000 houses in these townships, most of them 
two-roomed. Under the impact of the wartime population increase 
these steadily became more overcrowded. An insignificant number 
of houses were built during the war: skilled labour shortages 
and the meanness of a ratepayer-controlled Council contributed to 
this failure. Instead regulations governing subtenancies were 
relaxed. By 1944 a two-roomed Orlando house normally accommodated 
eight people. 
40 
The housing shortage and consequent overcrowding was only 
one of several factors underlying the sudden emergence of squ~tter 
communities on the outskirts of Johannesburg which ultimately were 
to number more than 90,000 inhabitants. With unskilled workers 
earning about £5 a month and rent accounting for around a fifth 
of this, squatting could be a vital survival strategy; the most 
effective way of meeting the cost of SUbsistence with pauper level 
wages. Squatting could also be a resort of the unemployed, 
especially those who had left behind them the sheer hopelessness 
of a rural existence and arrived to form the most marginal and 
desperate portion of the urban population. But it seems that 
squatters were not characteristically unemployed and indeed their 
importance as part of an industrial labour force helped to protect 
them against municipal attempts to have them removed. Central 
government was to exhibit little enthusiasm in assisting local 
officialdom in its persecution of the squatters. The latter were 
housed at no cost to the state or industry. For the municipality 
though, the squatters represented a direct threat and challenge 
to its authority. 
The squatters' movement began in March 1944 with the exodus 
of several hundred families of SUb-tenants from Orlando to open 
land near the township where they built themselves shelter from 
sacking, scraps of wood and corrugated iron. This first camp had 
a structure which was to characterise those which followed it in 
the course of the next three years. It had a leader, James Mpanza, 
who controlled the camp through a tight organization which 
regulated entry into and membership of the squatter community, 
administered justice as well as its own authority through fines 
and beatings, exerted a levy on traders and with the funds deriving 
from membership fees, fines and trading levies, provided limited 
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facilities (especially water) and an income for Mpanza himself. 
This last function should not be exaggerated: squatter leaders 
were often accused by their opponents of gangster-style behaviour, 
but their subsequent careers demonstrated little evidence of 
great affluence. Power itself could have been an important 
attraction and motive for squatter leaders but there was also the 
vision of community development voiced by Oriel Monongoaha of 
Pimville, who, in 1947, demanded larger sites for rehoused squatters 
so they could keep livestock and vehicles, form transport cooperat-
ives, finance 'Bursuries for Native children and students, and 
eventually contribute to the financial development of the African 
people as a whole,.37 
The contest between the squatters' movements and the local 
authorities was, like the bus boycotts, too complex to do justice 
to in this introductory chapter. It ended in the destruction of 
the Johannesburg communities and their absorption into the massive 
complex of housing estates round Orlando that started to be built 
in the late 1940s. Mpanza today is referred to as 'the man who 
founded Soweto' and in this there is a measure of truth. The 
squatters, like the bus boycotters, were to help shape state policy 
in the direction of greater intervention and control over the 
housing and other basic requirements of the urban African workforce. 
The relationship between squatters and political groups 
was an uneasy one. As far as the ANC was concerned, though the 
President-General, A. B. Xuma, spoke in 1947 in the Alexandra 
38 squatter camp and the previous year the ANC's youth League 
was reported to have assisted Mpanza's movement. 39 there is no 
evidence of any great interest in the squatters by the Congress 
leadership. This is not altogether surprising given the 
personalities concerned. Mpanza, a member of the Orlando 
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Advisory Board, and convicted once for murder, was much closer 
to the syncretic proletarian culture of the township than the 
urbane Congressmen. Converted to Christianity in prison he 
drew on his new faith to inspire his followers: 
The position of the chieftainship is given 
to me like Jesus. Many people thought I 
was arrested, and yet I was not. The same 
as with Jesus. Many thought he was dead, 
and yet he was not. 40 
A good example of the gulf which existed between Mpanza and 
his followers on the one hand and the ANC leadership on the 
other was in an Advisory Board meeting debate over the issue 
of home brewing. P. Q. Vundla, of the M~C, arguing for the 
restriction of brewing, said: 
We hear much about Kaffer beer forming 
part of our 'native customs' but we do 
not want these 'native customs' because 
our township being part and parcel of the 
town we have to follow the white way of 
living. 
Mpanza was forced to leave the meeting after 'daring those who 
opposed homebrewing to express their feelings at a public 
meeting ••• where they would certainly be stoned to death'. 
'The African', he declared, 'when he supplicates his gods, 
slaughters a goat or a sheep, and brews his traditional beverage,.41 
Until 1946, the Communists also held back from involvement 
in the squatters' cause despite initial overtures to them by 
Mpanza. The Johannesburg District Committee's annual report 
mentioned him as a 'figure hardly worth taking seriously', and 
by implication a 'cheap demagogue' 'Urging the people to 
irresponsible actions'. The report nonetheless conceded that 
Communist activity in the townships had been 'almost entirely 
propagandist' and that ~panza 'gave the people what they demanded; 
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something to do about the housing shortage,.42 It was to take 
nearly two years for the Communist Party to reassess the 
squatters' movement. The impetus to do so may have come from 
two sources. First, in late 1946, party members in Alexandra 
helped to lead a squatters' movement. 43 Secondly, a rent strike 
in Moroka, the camp established by the Council to house and 
control squatters, gained the active support of Councillor Hilda 
Watts, the first Communist elected to Johannesburg's city 
council. The Communists in 1947 formed a squatters' Coordinating 
Committee which drew in some of the squatters' leaders. Under 
the secretaryship of Edwin Mofutsanyana, editor of the Communist 
Party newspaper, Inkululeko, this committee achieved little. 
Mofutsanyana himself had never demonstrated any interest in 
squatters before, despite living in Orlando, and moreover had 
opposed Mpanza in Advisory Board elections. But in any case by 
1947 the squatters' movement was on the wane. Probably all along 
the Communist Party would have found it difficult to work with 
the squatters: communists disliked and distrusted spontaneous 
movements and the squatters' leaders jealously guarded the 
sphere of their authority. In 1945 and 1946 Communist 
preoccupations in Johannesburg were elsewhere: in the attempt 
to build an electoral pact with the Labour Party so as to 
influence more effectively white municipal voters, and with the 
trade union movement consolidated during the war. 
Besides the popular (and in certain respects populist) 
subsistence movements, the squatters and the bus boycotts, the 
other spur which was to prod African political leadership in a 
more militant direction was provided by organised labour. The 
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wartime expansion of secondary industry was accompanied by a 
flurry of trade union activity among Africans. Because Africans 
were performing increasingly skilled functions in industry they 
were becoming less easy to replace and hence less vulnerable to 
dismissal. Between September 1942 and February 1943 worker 
exasperation at the falling value of their wages was manifested 
in a sudden rash of strikes on the Witwatersrand; thereafter, 
despite being proclaimed illegal, sixty strikes erupted before 
the end of 1944. Frequently these strikes were independent of 
trade union initiatives; indeed unions under Communist direction 
tended to be restrained by the Party's reluctance to disrupt 
production after the Soviet entry into the war. This notwith-
standing, African unions, through winning substantial improve-
ments for their members at a time when many employers were 
beginning to favour their activities as a favourable alternative 
to industrial anarchy, steadily increased their strength. At 
the end of 1942, the Minister of Labour, Walter Madeley, even 
went so far as to discuss the possibility of African trade union 
recognition. The relatively conciliatory official attitude to 
African labour during the war was reflected in the rush of 
minimum wage determinations; by the war's end the number of 
African workers covered by these had increased sixty-fold. 44 
On the Rand the most important African unions were from the 
end of 1941 affiliated to the Communist-influenced Council for 
Non-European Trades Unions (CNETU). CNETU was to develop into 
the most powerful African trade union grouping ever to have 
existed in South Africa with, by 1945, a claimed affiliate 
strength of 158,000 members. Its 119 affiliate unions 
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represented forty per cent of African employment in commerce 
and manufacture. During the war African labour had reached a 
position of considerable bargaining power yet for political 
reasons CNETU was unwilling to challenge either the state or 
employers on the crucial question of recognition, doing so 
only in 1946 with the mineworkers strike when CNETU no longer 
had the strategic advantage. 
African trade unions provided a significant radicalising 
influence on the ANC, especially in the Eastern Cape. As far 
as the ANC leadership in Johannesburg was concerned, the 
workers' struggle which was to make the deepest impreSSion on 
their outlook was that of the African mineworkers. 45 African 
mineworkers were very difficult to organise. A contract labour 
system, a migrant workforce, and their housing in tightly 
controlled compounds all presented obstacles in the creation of 
durable trade unions. Wages as a result of monopsonic 
recruiting were low - in 1942 less than what they were in 1890. 
The Chamber of Mines justified low wages with the increasingly 
untenable assertion that migrant workers could supplement their 
renumeration through their families' agricultural activity in 
the reserves. Fixed gold prices and high capital outlay in the 
industry served as further rationalisations for its low wage 
structure. 
From 1930 the material position of mineworkers deteriorated. 
They tended to be drawn from the landless portion of the reserve 
popUlation and hence the section most effected by fluctuating 
food prices. In the 1940s the cost of food was rising sharply. 
In 1941, on the initiative of two Communists within the ANC 
leadership, Gaur Radebe and Edwin Mofutsanyana, a conference 
was held under Congress auspices to discuss the formation of 
a mineworkers' trade union. Present at the conference was a 
representative of the Native Mine Clerks' Association. The 
mine clerks were not subject to the same restrictions and 
hardships as surface and underground workers but because of 
their employment within the mining industry they had been 
excluded from the cost of living allowance and this Botivated 
them to affiliate to the African Mineworkers' Union (AMU). As 
union officials were to be prohibited from entering the 
compounds the mine clerks with their access to the workforce 
were to play an important organisational role. 
In early 1943 after sporadic strikes the government 
appointed a commission to investigate mineworkers' wages and 
conditions. The Commission's recommendations wlnch included 
modest wage increases for the lowest paid and some form of 
'collective bargaining' system did not go far towards meeting 
the AMU demands (regular wage increases, union recognition, 
and the abolition of the compound system). The Chamber of Mines 
granted a small wage increase below the level recommended by 
the Commission. Meanwhile, despite harassment of its offiCials, 
the AMU grew, claiming in 1944 25,000 members. In 1945 post-war 
food shortages led to a decline in the quality of rations; with 
the substitution of canned for fresh meat riots broke out on 
many mines. 
In April 1946 the MIID resolved to claim a minimum wage of 
ten shillings a day, family housing, paid leave and various 
other improvements. In May in the wake of wild cat stoppages 
in support of the minimum wage demand a meeting held on the 19th 
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attended by 2,000 miners voted in favour of a general strike if 
their demands were not met. Subsequently an organising committee 
was formed by union officials and the Johannesburg District 
Committee of the Communist Party. In June the CNETU pledged 
itself to give full support. 
On the morning of August 12th between 60,000 and 70,000 
miners refused to go on shift in at least twelve mines. The 
next day CNETU called for a general strike in sympathy. The 
miners held out for a week despite ruthless state response. 
Affected compounds were surrounded by police and the ALW leaders 
were arrested. A sit-down strike at the rockface was broken 
very brutally, the miners being driven up onto the surface and 
back into the compound. Mineworkers who marched from the East 
Rand compounds to the Chief Native Commissioners' Office in 
Johannesburg were savagely repulsed by the police. The strike 
was ferociously suppressed at a cost of 12 dead and 1,200 
wounded. CNETU's efforts to mount a sympathy strike were 
thwarted by a massive police presence in townships at stations 
and bus terminals. 
The strike effectively destroyed the AMU and weakened CNETU. 
In 1947 twenty-two African affiliates were to secede from the 
Council citing as their reasons disenchantment with Communist 
leadership and disillusion with the strike weapon. 46 It also 
signalled the end of any serious consideration of Government 
reformist proposals by African political leaders. In the course 
of the strike the Native Representative Council was adjourned at 
the insistence of its African members, some of whom had conferred 
with miners while changing trains in Germiston on their way to 
Pretoria. The adjournment was an important moment in the 
realignment of African politics which took place in the 1940s 
and it is to this that we now turn. 
The two most important developments in African politics 
during the 1940s were the emergence of the Congress Youth League 
and the consolidation of its influence on the ANC leadership 
and the strengthening of the relationship between Congress and 
the Communist Party. 
In April 1944 after a series of meetings and discussions 
between young ANC members and the ANC leadership a Youth League 
was formally constituted. Membership was to be open to all 
Africans (and those from other communities 'who live like and 
with Africans') between the ages of twelve and forty.47 Youth 
League members over the age of 17 automatically became members 
of the ANC. After asserting that 'no nation can free an 
oppressed group other than that group itself,48 the League's 
manifesto went on to make some fairly pungent criticisms of the 
ANC. The ANC, it argued, with its habit of yielding to 
oppression was unable to advance the cause of African freedom. 
It was weakly organised, represented only the most privileged 
members of the African community and hence was concerned mainly 
with the preservation of rights enjoyed only by an elite. Its 
thinking lacked 'national feeling,49 and its strategy was an 
overwhelmingly negative one of reaction. The Congress Youth 
League's purpose would be to infuse into the national liberation 
movement 'the spirit of African Nationalism' and act as the 
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'brains trust' of the ANC. The manifesto went on to outline 
the Congress Youth League (CYL) 'Creed'. This included a belief 
in 'the divine destiny of nations',51 a rejection of 'foreign 
leadership', the insistence that leadership should symbolize 
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'popular aspirations and ideals',5 2 and the unity of all 
Africans from the Mediterranean to the Indian and Atlantic 
oceans - 'Africa must speak with one voice.,53 
The guiding personality behind the League's inception was 
a former schoolteacher and articled clerk, Anton Muziwakhe 
Lembede. Lembede was born in 1914, the son of a Zulu farm 
labourer. Educated at home by his mother he succeeded in 
winning a bursary to Adams teacher training college near Durban. 
In the late 1930s he taught in the Orange Free State while 
taking correspondence BA and LLB degrees through the University 
of South Africa. In 1943, having given up his teaching post, 
he arrived in Johannesburg to work in the legal office of 
Pixley Ka Izaka Seme. Lembede's intellectual gifts, which were 
formidable, were developed in a very different context from the 
environment in which the !NC establishment had been brought up. 
He was self-educated to a large degree and had never lived or 
worked abroad. His origins lay in an impoverished peasantry. 
His period in the Free State had made him a fluent Afrikaans 
speaker. Contributing to his heightened sense of race-conscious-
ness was the developing assertion of Afrikaner nationalism. This, 
together with the rise of European fascism, helped to shape 
Lembede's developing political views. He was a devout Roman 
Catholic and in 1945 wrote an MA philosophy dissertation for Unisa 
entitled 'The Conception of God, as expounded by, and as it 
emerges from the writings of philosophers from Descartes to the 
present day'. 
Lembede and his co-founders of the Youth League were inspired 
by the popular responses to material deprivation which we have 
just been examining in wartime Johannesburg. Here, for the youth 
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Leaguers, was the potential source of mass support which the 
ANC had so shamefully neglected to exploit. But to link this 
rapidly swelling urban proletariat to Congress a crucial problem 
had to be overcome. With all the puritanism of a recent rural 
arrival in the corrupt urban milieu of Johannesburg, Lembede 
was to write in 1946: 
Moral degradation is assuming alarming 
proportions ••• (and) manifests itself 
in such abnormal and pathological phen-
omena as a loss of self confidence, 
inferiority complex, a feeling of 
frustration, the worship and idolisation 
of whiteness, foreign leaders and ideologies. 
All these are symptoms of a pathological 
state of mind. 54 
What was required to channel the latent energy of working class 
Africans in the direction of Congress was an appeal that would 
overcome the psychological inhibitions produced by racial 
oppression. This appeal should consist of a racially assertive 
nationalism which would serve to nurture sentiments which were 
part of the 'natural' psychological constitution of all Africans. 
The Youth League would therefore place its emphasis on 
indigenous leadership and national self determination. 'The 
leaders of the Africans must come out of their own loins' and 
'Africa is a Black man's country'. Political collaboration with 
other groups could take place only with Africans acting as 'an 
organised self-conscious unit'. In particular, the Youth 
Leaguers were wary of the Left. Quite apart from the suspicion 
that communism simply served to cloak another varient of white 
paternalism, there was the gulf between a class-based analysis 
and one which made ethnicity the vital determinant: 'Africans 
are a conquered race - they do not suffer class oppression -
they are oppressed as a group, as a nation'. 
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There was little philosophically original about the Youth 
League's 'Africanism', as it came to be known. It drew 
extensively on nineteenth century Romanticism and Social 
Darwinism. In any case many of Lembede's disciples were not 
particularly interested in his theories about racial destiny. 
Where Africanism had a lasting impact was in the sphere of 
strategy. Its exponents, while they may not have been profound 
political theorists, seem to have been unusually imaginative in 
their reactions to the social eruptions around them. Alone wnong 
political groupings they attempted to involve themselves in 
Mpanza's movement (the ANC preferred to negotiate on behalf of 
the Orlando squatters with the City Council but with no popular 
mandate to do this while the Communists regarded the squatters 
as irresponsible55 ). In a revealing speech in 1949 a Youth 
Leaguer informed his audience of Kroonstadt teachers: 
A significant thing has happened recently. 
In the tram boycott of Western Native 
Township the lead has been taken by 
African youth who in their enthusiasm even 
use violence to make this a success • • • 
These (sic) are manifestations of the new 
spirit of nationalism. Only these 
youngsters haven't the correct orientation. 
The spirit is there and undeniable. 56 
It was this recognition of the political opportunity presented 
by these spontaneous popular outbursts that was the most 
important contribution made by the Africanists. From such 
struggles they distilled a strategy of mass action, centred on 
the use of the boycott weapon (which had been employed with such 
effect in the economic context of the bus disputes in Alexandra) 
but involving also strikes, civil disobedience and non-cooperation. 
Africanists were never to produce any clear conception of exactly 
how and in what order these tactics should be employed to 
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achieve their goal of 'national freedom'. Rather they assumed 
that in the course of an almost mystical communion between 
leaders and the popular classes the path would become clear: 
Every Youth Leaguer must go down to the 
masses. Brush aside all liberals - both 
white and black. No compromise is our 
motto. We recognise only one authority -
the people, and our leader can only be he, 
who is with the people. 51 
To understand why the Africanist vision was to become so 
influential within African politics in the late 1940s we need 
to look at the overall political environment of the 1940s. 
Whatever hopes and aspirations had been raised by early wartime 
. hints and promises of reform made by the Smuts administration 
were to be disappointed later in the decade. Not that they were 
based altogether on false premises. The shifts in Government 
policy towards certain classes within the African community were 
not the result of mere political expediency but reflected 
important social divisions within white society. Collective 
bargaining rights for African workers, social welfare provisions 
and educational improvements, a degree of material security and 
legal recognition of their permanent status for African town-
dwellers were all concessions which the increasingly powerful 
manufacturing interest viewed as being to its long term benefit. 
These were all under consideration by Government commissions in 
the second half of the 1940s. On the. other hand there were 
powerful groups opposed to any improvement in the material 
conditions, rights and status of the urban African population: 
farmers suffering from a shortage of labour as the result of the 
exodus from the countryside to the cities; white workers fearful 
of the erosions an organised black working class could make on 
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their preserves of skills and protected employment. For the 
first time in South African history the proportional wage 
differentiation between black and white workers was narrowing 
and nascent Afrikaner capitalists were unable to afford the 
concessions being contemplated by established industrial and 
commercial employers. 
It was these groups which threw their weight behind the 
Nationalist Party with its advocacy of an intensification of 
political and social racial segregation, an increased degree of 
coercion of black workers, and the retention, elaboration and 
sophistication of the migrant labour system in the interests of 
a more rational allocation of labour between different sectors 
of employment. 58 In 1948 to the surprise of the incumbent 
administration the Nationalists were voted into power. Were 
any further proof needed of the futility of traditional ANC 
lobbying tactics the Nationalists were ready to supply it; 
unlike their predecessors they had not at that stage the 
slightest motivation to meet the most sectional African 
aspirations. But in any case by then even the most conservative 
African politicians had little faith in the capacity of any 
white administration for more than token reforms. Notwith-
standing the limited integrationist proposals of some United 
Party spokesmen, the brutal treatment of the mineworkers, the 
extension of urban influx controls in the Cape, the creation of 
segregated political institutions for Coloureds and Indians and 
the demonstrable uselessness of the Native Representative 
Council had all .served to undermine any residual faith in the 
tactics of persuasion through deputation, memoranda and 
negotiation via sympathetiC intermediaries. The Africanist 
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emphasis on confrontation accorded well with the political 
climate of the decade. 
d. African political expectations were also heightened by the 
international political context. In common with nationalists 
in other parts of Africa and Asia, black South African 
politicians were to interpret rather more literally the Atlantic 
Charter's endorsement of self-determination than its authors in 
the Allied camp intended particularly as it was enthusiastically 
supported by Field Marshal Smuts. In 1943 a committee of 
leading professionals, educationists, MiC and Communist Party 
members produced a document called 'African claims in South 
Africa'. Calling in its preamble for the application of the 
Atlantic Charter to all parts of the British Empire it went on 
to outline a Bill of Rights. This included provisions for the 
abolition of all political discrimination based on race and the 
extension to all adults of voting rights, freedom of residence 
and of movement, equal rights in the spheres of property and 
occupation, equal pay for equal work, free compulsory education, 
equal state assistance to African farmers and the universal 
extension of a variety of welfare services and social security 
measures. The proposals provide an interesting contrast to the 
economic self help philosophy of Seme one decade earlier and the 
importance attributed to the role of the state was itself a 
reflection of the slightly more enlightened way the state was 
responding to urban African needs in the early 1940s. 'African 
Claims' was summarily rejected by Smuts when it was presented to 
him in 1944. But as well as its importance as a stage towards 
the development of a coherent social alternative to the status 
quo by the nationalist movement the document was symptomatic of 
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an increased interest by educated Africans in the international 
environment. For there, as never before, there was plenty to 
excite them. Quite apart from the stunning defeat of a 
European empire by an Asiatic power there was the gathering 
strength of an anti-colonial movement in India and, from 1945, 
an international forum in the United Nations which would listen 
with some sympathy and interest to their representatives. 
Inducing middle class Africans towards a more aggressive 
political outlook were economic factors which, in some cases, 
they were less well placed to respond to than sections of the 
industrial workforce. Teachers and clerical workers occupy less 
strategically advantageous positions than semi-skilled industrial 
workers at a time of inflation, and the mid-1940s witnessed an 
extraordinary degree of open disaffection by African teachers 
in their angry but vain campaigning for improved conditions and 
wages. 59 Teachers were, incidentally, to form a disproportionately 
large group within the CYL's early membership. Even the 
relatively privileged position of someone like the ANC Treasurer 
General, R. G. Baloyi, was not without general significance. 
His original business was built on African transport, on linking 
Alexandra's commuters with the workplace and Johannesburg with 
its rural hinterland. By 1940, legislation designed to entrench 
the position of South African Railways and competition from 
recently arrived Afrikaner and Italian migrants to Johannesburg 
forced Baloyi and other African entrepreneurs out of the black 
transport business. In the 1940s vdth the gathering force of 
the attack by local white interests on African freehold in those 
citadels of African entrepreneurial interests, Sophiatown and 
Alexandra, petty bourgeois Africans were confronted with fresh 
threats to their security. 
Even before the birth of the Youth League there were 
indications within Congress of a more vigorous reaction to the 
new pressures and challenges created by a rapidly industrialising 
society. In 1940 the ANC elected as its president A. B. Xuma. 
Then aged forty-seven, Xuma was a comparatively young man to 
accede to this position. Up until that time he had not been very 
active in politics though he had helped to organise the first 
meeting of the All African Convention of which he was a vice-
president. His distinction was due rather to his impressive 
professional achievements. After a brief spell as a primary 
school teacher he had trained for fourteen years, mainly at 
American universities but also in Hungary and Britain, before 
starting a medical practice in Johannesburg in 1928. Xuma was 
an energetic and intellectually attractive man, though in manner 
aloof and authoritarian. His major political achievement was to 
streamline the ANC' s organisation. He did this through drawing 
up a new constitution in 1943 which scrapped ex-officio chiefly 
membership and abolished Congress's 'House of Chiefs' envisaged 
in the 1912 constitution, gave full equality to women members, 
centralised authority with the creation of a working committee of 
five executive members who lived within fifty miles of the president, 
and through allowing local retention of a portion of subscriptions, 
attempted to create an effective branch structure. Xuma himself 
was to pay the expenses of full-time organisers until Congress 
finances were on a sound footing, something which was briefly 
achieved in the late 1940s. An attempt was made, with some effect 
in Natal, to build up rural branches, and in the Transvaal, urban 
branches began holding regular weekend open air meetings. By 1947 
membership had reached a peak for the decade of 5,517, over half 
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of which was in the Transvaal. In addition, through its mass 
meetings in locations often attended by thousands of people, 
Congress had generated a much larger less committed informal 
following. 60 
Xuma's talents did not include a popular touch: he was 
no orator and preferred the atmosphere of the committee room to 
that of the mass meeting. It was an indication of his imaginative-
ness that he was initially receptive towards the young men who 
brought to him the proposal to establish a Youth League. There 
is an interesting record of his response to the draft manifesto: 
• • • the deputation went on to say that 
the erratic policy of the ANC was shown by 
the fact there was no programme of action 
- no passive resistance or some such action. 
Dr. Xuma replied that the Africans as a 
group were unorganised and undisCiplined, . 
and that a programme of action such as 
envisaged by the Youth League would be rash 
at this stage. The ANC lacked people who 
were concerned about the movement and knew 
what they wanted. Action would merely 
lead to exposure. The masses of the people 
were unorganised and only committees 
existed in the ~~C. ••• His own feeling 
was that some members of the Youth League 
should be on the executive of the ANC. 
• • • He felt that what was really wrong 
with the manifesto was the tone of the 
criticism and the expressions used. The 
Committee should start off without 
antagonising anyone. 61 
The men of the Youth League were precisely the kind whom Xuma 
was attempting to bring into the organisation: creative, 
committed, well-qualified young professionals. At the same time, 
the exchange indicated what was to persist as the main issue of 
contention between Xuma and the League: the question of 
organisation. The Africanists were uninterested in organisational 
problems - the League itself was to remain small and loosely 
structured - for them the key question was ideological orientation. 
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Xuma was to insist that organisational preparation was a vital 
pre-requisite to any form of mass campaigning and this was to 
lead him to oppose the Youth League's attempts in the late 1940s 
to persuade the ANC to boycott advisory board and native 
representative elections. Xuma's predilection for organisation 
and his pragmatic approach to doctrinal issues are useful in 
understanding his willingness to form alliances with both the 
Communist Party (with which he was in considerable tactical 
agreement) and in 1947 (possibly with an eye on the international 
gallery) the Indi~ Congresses in their campaign of passive 
resistance against the Asiatic Land Tenure and Representation 
Act. Xuma's support for the latter never got beyond a joint 
statement of principles but in the case of the Communists, in 
reaction to the sudden intensification of pass law prosecutions 
he agreed in 1943 to chair a joint CPSA/ANC Anti-Pass Committee. 
The Anti-Pass campaign, though expected to culminate in a general 
strike and pass burnings, was a premature gesture: neither the 
ANC nor the COWEunist Party could muster much enthusiastic support 
and Xuma's partiCipation was essentially rhetorical and half-
hearted. The Africanists were hostile, disliking the degree of 
Communist and Indian participation in the leadership. Africanists, 
by 1941, well represented on the ANC National Executive, combined 
~~th conservative Natal leaders in opposing effective cooperation 
in the Indian passive resistance campaign. 62 
The Indian passive resistance of 1946 to 1948, unsuccessful 
as it was in gaining the repeal of the offending legislation, was 
nevertheless important. It impressed on the ANC National 
Executive in 1949 the need to adopt rather more forceful tactiCS, 
particularly in the light of the 1948 election. Since Lembede's 
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death from an unknown illness in 1947 a document prepared by 
Africanists had been circulating at various levels of the 
Congress leadership. By 1949 this was in the hands of a 
drafting committee appointed by Dr. Xuma and drawn from the 
left, the establishment, and the Africanist sections of the 
AlIC's leadership. At the 1949 annual conference the ANC 
committed itself to implementing the final formulation of this 
document, the Programme of Action. The Programme was the most 
militant statement of prinCiples adopted by the ANC to date. 
Congress was called upon to struggle for the rights of national 
freedom, political independence, and self determination (these 
were not defined clearly) and the rejection of white leadership 
and all forms of segregation. The means employed to reach these 
ends should include: the creation of a national fund and a 
national press; the appointment of a Council of Action which 
would organise a boycott of all differential political 
institutions, plan a 'national stoppage of work in protest 
a~ainst the reactionary policy of the Government', and as well 
as boycotts and strikes employ the weapons of civil disobedience 
and non-cooperation; the expansion of African economic power 
through African-owned businesses, reserve development and trade 
unions; the improvement of African education through the creation 
of scholarship funds, trade union educational programmes and a 
'National Centre of Education'; various cultural activities 
articulated through a 'National Academy of the Arts and the 
Sciences'. Finally Congress recognised 'that ultimately the 
people will be brought together by inspired leadership under the 
banner of African Nationalism,.63 The Programme was the result 
of an eclectic set of influences: the reference to political 
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independence and self-deterrrination being obviously Africanist-
inspired; the strategic component derived from the experiences 
of the Indian Congress and the Communist Party as well as some 
of the popular struggles'of the decade; and the self-help 
theme a throw-back to the economic nationalism of Congress in 
the 19JOs. Simultaneously with its adoption the leadership 
changed hands; Dr. Xuma. with his distaste for mass-based 
political activism. being replaced by the Free State physician. 
Dr. James Moroka. As SOCially eminent as his medical colleague. 
~oroka had the additional advantage of being sympathetically 
inclined towards militant tactics. He was. however, politically 
inexperienced not actually being an ANC member at the time of 
his election and though personally courageous lacked the 
sophistication to hold together the increasingly complex 
organisation the AlJC was shortly to become. 
Joining Dr. Moroka on the new ~rc national executive were 
some of the young men who were to predominate in African politics 
in the 1950s. Of the Youth Leaguers elected to leadership 
positions. Nelson Mandela. Oliver Tambo and Walter Sisulu would 
play the most prominent role in the events of the subsequent 
years. All three had originally come from the Transkei. While 
Tambo and Sisulu were born into fairly modest peasant households 
Nelson Mandela's origins were patrician; his family belonged to 
the Tembu Royal House. After high school and two years at Fort 
Hare university (he was expelled in the aftermath of a student 
protest) Mandela arrived in Johannesburg to study law, first by 
correspondence and then at the University of the Witwatersrando 
He had been a foundation member of the League but not one of its 
main theorists despite his intellectual ability. In the events 
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which followed the ANC's adoption of the Programme of Action, 
Mandela would prove himself to be a pragmatic and astute 
strategist. 
In 1949 like Mandela a law student, Oliver Tambo had also 
been expelled from Fort Hare after a student strike. He had 
then taught at st. Peter's, a prestigious African school in 
Johannesburg, where he was an inspirational influence on some 
of the students who were to assume leading positions in the ANC 
in the late 1950s. Tambo helped to found the Youth League and 
became its treasurer, though, as in the case of Mandala, he was 
never one of its principal ideologues. Less charismatic than 
his future legal partner (he and llandela were to open an ill-
fated legal practice in 1952) he was rather an austere figure, 
then a puritanical christian, characteristically silent and 
thoughtful. 
Sisulu had a very different background. From a poor 
peasant household near Engcobo, before joining the ANC he had 
worked in a variety of labouring jobs in East London and 
Johannesburg, as well as a brief spell on the gold mines. The 
original sources of his political inspiration were in Xhosa oral 
traditions as well as the Wellington Buthelezi millenarian 
movement which had had its main following near his village while 
he was a boy. In 1940 he had tried to organise a bakery strike 
and in 1946 had been involved in CNETU's efforts to instigate a 
general strike in support of the mineworkers. Sisulu was in 
appe~rance a dour-looking figure: short, stocky, often hidden in 
the folds of a wide-lapelled overcoat, bespectacled and with a 
habit noticed by journalists of biting his bottom lip in between 
making terse polemical statements. Behind this guarded exterior 
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there was taking place a remarkable intellectual and emotional 
transformation, for Walter Sisulu, from being one of the most 
fervent exponents of raCially exclusivist nationalism was one 
of the first former Youth Leaguers to advocate alliance with 
political groups dra\vu from other sections of the population. 
Sisulu was elected as Secretary-General of the ANC. 
Though the Youth League, with six of its members on the 
ANC's executive and the adoption of its Programme of Action, 
could with justice represent the 1949 conference as a triumph 
for its guiding philosophy, nevertheless the ANC's leadership 
remained eclectic in its composition and ideology. The 
'Communists were still represented and two of them, Moses Kotane 
and J. B. Marks, would remain influential throughout the 1950s. 
Both about twenty years older than the Youth Leaguers, both had 
been politically active since the 1920s, had received training 
at the Lenin School in Moscow, and unlike some African Communists 
had a long history of commitment and loyalty to the ANC. Of the 
two Marks was the better educated - he had worked for some time 
as a teacher - but Kotane, self taught and educated at a 
Communist Party nightschool, was of the two more at home with 
Marxist theory and more capable of independent thought. The two 
men were widely respected, even by Africanists, as political 
veterans, for their integrity and evident courage. 
Finally there was also the traditional liberal African 
political leadership, after the 1949 executive elections most 
impressively in the dignified figure of Professor Z. K. Matthews. 
One of only two black professors in South Africa, Z. Ko Matthews, 
the son of a Kimberley diamond miner and cafe owner, at the age 
of 50 epitomised the traditional African middle class ideal of 
success. Gentle and apparently lethargic in manner, he was 
thought by some of the younger African politicians as being 
firmly in the ranks of old guard conservative leaders. In fact, 
z. K. ~atthews' aura of respectability and his natural 
conservatism were tempered by personal modesty and a sense of 
honour, Fastidiously courteous in all his dealings with the 
authorities, which until the advent of the Nationalists had 
frequently sought his advice and participation on official 
committees, he was nevertheless an uncompromising political 
leader. Together with his eldest son Joe, who joined the 
executive a few years later, he was to be one of the key 
intellectual influences on the Al~Cts evolution and in particular, 
in the preservation, alongside an apparently confrontationist 
strategy, of a conciliatory and racially inclusive ideal. 64 
Parallel to the development of a populist tendency within 
the ANC the Communist Party had been undergoing a gradual process 
of change of direction. At the beginning of the war after six 
years of popular front activity and with the adoption in 
conformity with the Soviet Union of an anti-war stance, its 
influence was at its nadir. Membership had sunk to 280, 150 of 
these in Johannesburg. In the following years it was to achieve 
a remarkable recovery, particularly with regard to its African 
membership. The outstanding feature of its development during 
the decade was an increaing involvement with the affairs of Congress. 
During the war itself the extension of the Party's influence 
was chiefly through the indirect means of building industrial 
trade unions among African and Indian workers and, on the white 
political front, in municipal elections. The Party was assisted 
after 1941, with the entry of the USSR into the war and its 
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subsequent 'Defend South Africa Campaign', by a certain 
institutional respectability. Its press was allowed extra 
newsprint and the circulation Qf two communist controlled 
newspapers, Guardian and Inkululeko, soared to a weekly total of 
67,000. During the war itself membership grew to nearly 2,400. 
This was first mainly due to trade union work which remained the 
chief source of the Party's strength amongst blacks in Durban 
and the Cape, though in the Transvaal, particularly in the East 
Rand, the party from about 1943 began to play quite a prominent 
role in township politics taking up basic bread and butter issues. 
On the East Rand, though not in Johannesburg where local leader-
ship tended to be preoccupied with white municipal elections, 
the Communists managed to establish themselves a foothold on 
most of the Advisory Boards. In Johannesburg itself, through 
its success in winning a seat on the Johannesburg City Council, 
the local branch still cherished the illusion that it could 
increase its white working class following. The lack of any 
recent activism in local township politics was at the root of 
the failure of the Communist anti-pass campaign to generate any 
65 
enduring support in its centre, Johannesburg. 
African members of the Communist Party as a result of the 
lack of interest the CPSA leadership showed in African political 
affairs in the 1930s and early 1940s had begun to work more 
energetically within the ranks of Congress. In certain instances 
there were tactical reasons for this: with its access to 
66 traditional leaders in the reserves Congress would be useful 
in the organisation of mineworkers. In 1945 three leading 
African communists, Moses Kotane, J. B. Marks and Dan Thloome 
were on the ANC's national executive. These men influenced the 
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Party, in the post-war period of final disillusion with white 
labour, to promote causes which would appeal to a wide range 
of African opinion rather than just the working class: the 
pass laws and the franchise being at the centre of CPSA national 
campaigns after 1945. On the whole Communists enjoyed the 
support of the more conservatively inclined members of the ANC's 
leadership: in 1945 and 1947 the Africanists were narrowly 
defeated in their bids to have communists expelled from the ANC. 
At the 1947 ANC annual conference communists and the establishment 
joined forces in repudiating the Africanist policy of boycotting 
advisory board and native representative elections! both were 
agreed that these provided a useful platform which should not 
be yielded to political opponents. 
In 1950 the CPSA's still predominantly white Central 
Committee in its annual report for 1949 discussed the problem of 
the Party's relationship with the nationalist movement. The 
report argued first that with the election of the Nationalist 
Party, South Africa was entering a period of bitter national 
conflict, in which, with the promotion of 'exclusive nationalist 
consciousness' by an intensified racial oppression, the objective 
reality of class divisions was hidden. In such circumstances 
the Party should be careful to avoid dogmatic hostility to 
nationalism. The report went on to argue the case for working 
with and through the national movement: 
From the analysis here presented, the 
conclusion must be drawn that the national 
movements can develop into powerful mass 
movements only to the extent that their 
contents and aims are determined by the 
interests of workers and peasants. The 
national organisations, to be effective, 
must be transformed into a revolutionary 
party of workers, peasants, intellectuals 
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and petty bourgeoisie, linked together in 
a firm org~~isation, subject to a strict 
discipline, and guided by a definite 
programme of struggle against all forms of 
racial discrimination in alliance with 
class conscious European workers and 
intellectuals. Such a party would be 
distinguished from the Communist Party in 
that its objective is national liberation, 
that is the abolition of race discrimination, 
but it would cooperate closely with the 
Communist Party. In this party the class 
conscious workers and peasants of the 
national group concerned would constitute 
the main leadership. It would be their 
task to develop an adequate organisational 
apparatus, to conduct mass struggles against 
race discrimination, to combat chauvinism 
and racialism in the national movement, to 
develop class consciousness in the people, 
and to forge unity in action between the 
oppressed people and between them and the 
European working class. 67 
With the development of this formulation Communists had finally 
recognised that the path to a socialist revolution lay through 
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a nationalist struggle and from 1950 the South Afric~n . 
revolutionary left was to devote its energy to influencing the 
course of the 'national movement'. As we shall see, this was 
to give rise to bitter conflicts within the ANC. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE ORIGINS AND FORW~TION OF THE PAN-AFRICANIST CONGRESS 
The Pan-Africanist Congress's origins lay in the tensions 
that developed within the African National Congress during the 
1950s. This chapter first examines changes in the ANC's 
ideology from 1950 as well as discussing certain features of 
its organisation. This will provide a context for understanding 
the disaffection of the Africanists and their secession to form 
their own organisation in 1959. Their progress is discussed in 
th~ second part of the chapter. 
In 1950 the ANO was led by a coalition drawn from the two 
separate traditions of African political assertion which had 
shaped its history: populist racial romanticism and working 
class radicalism. The coalition was a frail one and in the first 
two years of the decade tensions were at times very evident, 
especially in the Transvaal. Here in 1950 Youth Leaguers under 
the direction of Mandela opposed the Communists' efforts to 
mobilise the townships in a May Day stay-away protest against 
Government restrictions on Communist leaders and low wages. The 
Communist Party itself went into dissolution shortly thereafter 
in anticipation of the provisions of the Suppression o~ Communism 
Bill. The issue of its influence upon the !NC continued though 
to be a source of dissention and controversy. 
The Simons remark that with the dissolution of the Communist 
Party on 20 June 1950 and the absorption thereafter of its 
activists in the affairs of Congress, 'the class struggle had 
1 
merged with the struggle for liberation'. This was precisely 
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what the Youth Leaguers had feared, with their belief in the 
oppression of Africans 'by virtue of their colour as a race' 
rather than through their class positions. Some Youth Leaguers 
were to join older conservatives within the Transvaal Congress 
to oppose the successful election of J. B. Marks as president 
of the provincial organisation in November 1950. However, the 
most bitter opposition to Marks came not from those who opposed 
'imported' ideologies and 'obscure' influences but rather from 
people who looked back with nostalgia to an era when politics 
was more socially exclusive. 
Congress wants a leader with simple methods 
of teaching the masses how to live; a man 
who has proved a success in life as apparent 
from their (sic) economic, social and 
political well being. 2 
The similarities between the conservative and Youth League 
opponents of Marks were superficial. Both stressed race-pride 
in their popular appeal. But the former placed their main 
emphasis on the virtues of African upward social mobility - a 
major preoccupation being opposition to Indian trading activity 
within African residential areas. 3 The latter saw an ethnically-
derived nationalism as the key to mass-mobilisation. For a time 
the conservatives, banded together as the 'National Minded bloc', 
appeared a serious threat to the ANets new leaders. In the first 
months of 1951, J. B. Marks and other Transvaal leaders devoted 
much energy to establishing their authority at public meetings 
in the Johannesburg and Reef locations. 
The youth League was going through an important transition. 
Collaboration with other national executive members modified the 
Africanist position of Mandela and Tambo. 4 youth League spokes-
men began to pay more attention to class-based analyses. 
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Dilizantabe Mji, president of the Transvaal Congress Youth 
League from early 1951, was a good example with his reference to: 
• • • foaming racialist slogans that have 
peverted the minds of their fellow white 
men ••• driving the white workers away 
from the ranks of the toiling masses • • • 
the ordinary white man must be forgiven 
• • • he is not an oppressor • • • the 
people never to be forgiven are those who 
build round the lives of simple people 
this facade of a black peril. 5 
Mji's position was not shared by everyone - in 1952 his 
re-election took place despite Africanist criticism of his 
'ideological unreliability,.6 In the early 1950s the League 
was to divide into two camps: one was to promote in the words 
of Joe Matthews, a 'healthy, democratic, non-racialist, anti-
colonial, anti-imperialist nationalism,.7 The other was to 
adhere to Africanist orthodoxy. The former camp was closer to 
the decision-making levels of Congress. Its leaders tended to 
have greater professional status and hence economic independence 
than the latter, many of whom were teachers, and hence less 
politicallyactive.8 For the time being, the Africanists were 
to content themselves by issuing ephemeral newsletters from 
their centres in Orlando and East London. 
African communists were often ideologically rather eclectic 
and hence in 1950-1952 a more sensitive issue than their presence 
in Congress's leadership was that of cooperation with the Indian 
Congresses. 
Anti-Indian sentiments were not confined to African 
businessmen. In 1948 the Newclare Youth League passed a 
resolution calling on the Minister of the Interior to tighten 
African/Indian residential segregation.9 In Benoni, in July 1952, 
Indian shopkeepers were attacked and their stores looted after one 
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of their number had fatally beaten up an African boy he 
- 10 
suspected of stealing. Conservative opponents would often 
accuse the ANC leadership of being under control of Indians. 
However, though cooperation between Indian and African 
organisations would remain a contentious issue in some ~uarters, 
several factors by the beginning of the decade made it 
considerably easier than before. First of all, like the ANC, 
during the 1940s, the Indian Congresses in Natal and Transvaal 
bec~e more popularly oriented. This reflected the increase in 
the size of the Indian industrial working class and its 
corollary, the spread of Indian trade unionism, the development 
of a professional non-commercial middle class the spreading 
influence within these groups of the CPSA, and finally especially 
in the Transvaal, the growing vulnerability of small retailers 
threatened both by legislation and Afrikaner nationalist 
11 trading boycotts. In 1946, in protest against the new Asiatic 
Land Tenure Act, the Indian Congresses embarked on a two-year 
campaign of civil disobedience in which over 2,000 volunteers 
were arrested, usually for illegal crossing of provincial 
boundaries or the occupation of selected sites in 'white' areas 
of Durban. By the late 1940s, there seemed less to be gained 
than before from isolating Indian struggles from those of other 
blacks, but in any case, the new Marxist leaders of the Indian 
Congress for moral and ideological reasons were eager to form 
links with other communal struggles. This was achieved at a 
symbolical level with the 'Joint Declaration of Cooperation' 
signed by A. B. Xuma, G. M. Naicker and Yusuf Dadoo which promised 
• 
a combined struggle by Africans and Indians against all forms of 
• discrimination as well as by the participation of a small band 
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of African volunteers in Germiston in one of the final acts of 
civil disobedience. 12 
A more final commitment to alliance with the Indian 
Congresses by the end of the decade was stimulated by the Durban 
race riots, which in highlighting the tense everyday relation-
ships between Africans and Indians, helped to persuade leaders 
of both communities of the dangers of their polarisation and the 
virtues of collaboration. The Defiance Campaign itself would 
tangibly demonstrate the benefits of communal cooperation; small 
retailers apparently provided an important financial contribution13 
and newly independent India's influence at the United Nations 
helped to attract international attention to the campaign. Two 
other factors served to bring the movements closer. In both the 
African and Indian Congresses by the end of the decade. Marxists 
had become influential at the level of leadership. In both, the 
influence of well-established (and hence mutually competitive) 
groups of businessmen had lessened with the adoption of a mass-
based strategy. In the case of Natal and Transvaal Congresses 
the decline in their influence was accelerated by the withdrawal 
in 1946 of the Indian High Commissioner in South Africa and 
hence the end of the favoured tactic of the wealthy, lObbying.1 4 
In the case of the ANC. the formation of the National Minded 
bloc was an important development. The bloc's influence was 
greatly exaggerated by the Bantu World, the editor of which, 
Selope Thema, was the bloc's president, but its emergence was 
nevertheless significant for this reason. 
The above discussion helps to elucidate what were rather 
dramatic developments given the racial isolationism of young 
African politicians in previous years. On the 28th June, 1951, 
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a five man planning council was established consisting of 
Moroka, Sisulu, Marks, Dadoo and Yusuf Cachalia. The Council's 
purpose was to establish the appropriate strategy of mass 
resistance to six 'unjust laws'. It reported in November 
recommending that an ultimatum should be presented to the 
Government to repeal the 'unjust laws' by the end of February. 
If the ultimatum was not met a campaign should begin either on 
6th April (van Riebeeck's Day) or 26th June. The struggle 
would involve the courting of arrests by trained volunteer corps 
acting in violation of selected laws and regulations. 
The ANC's 'Defiance Campaign' which was put into motion in 
June 1952 needs only a brief mention here. It confirmed the 
growing trend in the ANC away from Africanist communal politics 
and the uneven character of its impact helped to confirm the 
effectiveness of class-based political mobilisation. In general 
the ANC was organisationally strong in those areas, such as 
Port Elizabeth and Durban in which ANC leadership and following 
overlapped with those of the trade union movement. The rejection 
of the Africanist heritage of the 1940s was completed in 1955 
when representatives of the ANC, the Indian Congresses, and two 
new organisations, the South African Coloured People's Organisation 
and the Congress of Democrats met in Kliptown to attend a multi-
racial 'Congress of People'. 
The tone of this gathering had been set by the racially 
conciliatory ANC presidency of Chief Lutuli. With Chief Lutuli's 
election as President-General in December 1952 the rhetoric of 
'self determination' and 'National Freedom' which distinguished 
the Programme of Action from previous ANC policy documents 
appeared less often. 
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Lutuli himself saw the ideal future in terms of African 
'participation' in Government rather than absolute control of 
it15 and his nationalism was of a considerably gentler quality 
than that of the Africanists who had supported him in his 
original ascendency. He spoke of a 'progressive and liberal' 
nationalism with a goal of 'African partnership in the Government 
16 
on the basis of equality', an 'all-inclusive' position based 
on the acceptance of the 'fact of the multiracial nature of the 
country,.17 Where Lutuli differed from his predecessors was not 
so much in his concept of a perfect society but rather over the 
means to attain it. Mass demonstrations, suffering and 
sacrifice were all needed to induce a change of heart amongst 
whites. But unlike his executive colleagues who were former 
Youth Leaguers Lutuli still placed much faith in the moral impact 
of African struggle. 
In 1953 the ANC did not have a clearly articulated ideology. 
The Programme of Action's emphasis was on means rather than ends, 
on strategies as opposed to social goals. The ideological content 
of the document was vague and ambivalent lending itself to 
differing interpretations so that opposed factions could each 
legitimise their position by reference to it. In the wake of 
the Defiance Campaign ANC leaders were confronted with the problem 
of how to sustain the enthusiasm of their vast new following. 
The National Action Council (successor to the ANC/SAlC Joint 
Planning Council) reported a 'disquieting lull which has descended 
over the mass activities of Congress'. It advised that future 
campaigning should be based on strengthened organisational 
machinery and should arise from 'the concrete conditions under 
18 
which people live'. In August at the Cape Provincial Congress 
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Professor Z. K. Matthews suggested the summoning of a 'national 
convention at which all groups might be represented to consider 
our national problems on an all-inclusive basis' to 'draw up a 
Freedom Charter for the Democratic South Africa of the future,.19 
The Provincial Congress's adoption of the idea was endorsed at 
the ANC's ~ual conference in September. In the light of later 
controversy it is worth pointing out that the initial impulse 
to formulate a Freedom Charter came from within the ANC, from 
one of its less radical leaders, and that the proposal did not 
at first attract enthusiastic support from the SAlC and COD. 20 
On M~rch 23rd, 1954 the executives of the ANC, SAlC, COD 
and SACPO met near Durban to discuss plans for a national 
convention. At this meeting it was decided to establish a 
National Action Council for the Congress of the People. It 
would consist of eight delegates from each of the organisations 
sponsoring the convention. A national organiser was appointed, 
T. E. Tshunungwe, one of the Eastern Cape Youth Leaguers who had 
become prominent during the Defiance Campaign. Ideally, the 
arrangements for the creation of a Freedom Charter were to have 
three phases. First, provincial committees would have to be 
established on the model of the National Action Council. At the 
same time the recruitment of a huge army of 'Freedom Volunteers' 
should begin. The volunteers were to publicise the Congress and 
collect demands for the Charter. The provincial committees should 
then work to establish committees in every workplace, village 
and township. The final stage would involve the election of 
delegates from each locality who would then meet and assist in 
the drafting of the Charter. 'The Charter will emerge from 
countless discussions among the people themselves. It will truly 
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be, in every sense of the word, the Charter of ordinary men 
21 
and women'. 
Many of the Charter's critics were to charge that the way 
the campaign unfolded fell short of these expectations. 
Certainly by August provincial committees had been formed in 
the Cape, Transvaal and Natal. In the case of the Transvaal 
committee, members included a representative of the Liberal 
Party and Arthur Blaxall, a well-known Anglican priest, as well 
as people from the four Congresses. In Cape Town 27 of the 200 
organisations invited to attend the meeting at the City Hall 
sent delegates. They included six trade unions, the Federation 
of South African Women, the Cape Peace Council, a number of 
location vigilance associations and the Liberal Party. However, 
the next step, the formation of local committees, never really 
got off the ground and much of the work of collecting demands 
was done through Congress branches and visits by provincial 
organisers. Not that the campaign did not succeed in evoking a 
popular response: by May 1955 the Natal committee described 
itself as being flooded by suggestions for inclusion in the 
Charter22 and from the description of the content of some of them 
the feelings they expressed were spontaneous enough: 
Dr. Arthur Letele, for example, has said 
that messengers to tribal locations near 
Kimberley naturally asked leading questions, 
such as 'What is your idea of being free?' 
One reply was 'ten wives'. One of the non-
African members of the NAC has stated that 
a committee of the council received 
'Thousands of little bits of paper, many 
of them with specific demands, for example, 
"The District Commissioner is not fair to 
us; we want his removal"'. 23 
That there were organisational inadequacies in the 
preparations leading up to the Congress was admitted quite 
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openly by the NAC and the pro-Congress newspaper, New Age. 
Bannings under the Suppression of Communism Act restricted an 
ever-growing number of the most experienced activists: for 
example, by November 1954 nearly the entire Natal Indian 
Congress elected at the end of the previous year had been 
banned. 24 At the same time the ANC was attempting to mobilise 
resistance to the Western Areas Removals and Bantu Education. 25 
But organisational shortcomings of the Congress of the People 
were not the main reason for hostility towards it from some 
quarters. More important was the prominent role COD members 
seemed to have in its convening. This attracted criticism from 
outside the 'Congress Alliance' from people who initially had 
been willing to participate in the campaign; in particular from 
members of the small multi-racial Liberal Party which had been 
launched after the 1953 election. 26 From within the ANC there 
was also concern over the role of their new allies. This arose 
partly from tactical considerations: Tshunungwa, reporting after 
a visit to the Western Cape, complained of the 'extreme confusion' 
that was created when people discovered 'the COD men are taking 
a lead in the ANC meetings ••• a politically raw African who 
has been much oppressed, exploited and victimised by the 
Europeans sees red whenever a white face appears,.27 There was 
also fear among the Africanists in the Youth League that white 
participants had the deliberate intention of diverting the ANC 
away frOm 'clear cut' African nationalism. 28 We will return to 
these anxieties in a moment. 
While the rather hurried process of electing delegates at 
public meetings called in different centres was taking place in 
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April 1955. sub-committees of the NAC began sorting out the 
various demands and suggestions that had flowed in into different 
categories. A small drafting committee was eventually to 
produce the Charter drawing on the material prepared by the 
sub-committees. The document that emerged had a rather 
distinctive poetic style. possibly the influence of Lionel 
Bernstein, one of the drafters. 29 The Charter was presented to 
seven members of the ANC's national executive on the eve of the 
Congress of the People. Neither Chief Lutu1i (immobi1ised by 
his ban) nor Professor Matthews saw it then. 
The Congress itself was a dramatic affair. It lasted two 
days and was held in an open space near K1iptown, a coloured 
township near Johannesburg. It was attended by 3,000 delegates 
from allover the country. The various clauses of the Charter 
were introduced, there was an opportunity for impromptu speeches 
from various delegates, they were then read out and acclaimed by 
a show of hands. The proceedings were brought to an exciting 
close by a large detachment of policemen bearing sten guns who 
arrived in the afternoon of the second day. They took over the 
speakers' platform, confiscated all the documents they could find, 
announced they had reason to believe that treason was being 
contemplated, and took the names and addresses of all the 
delegates before sending them home. Quite obviously, the State 
was confident that with the Congress the ANC and its allies had 
been given enough rope to hang themselves: hence the degree of 
toleration with which it had been treated up to that point. 
Read out of its context, the Charter itself appears a bland 
enough document. It contains a list of basic rights and freedoms. 
Beginning by reaffirming the multiracial character of South African 
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society ('South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and 
white'), it went on to promise equal status for 'all national 
groups', to argue for the transfer of the mines, the banks and 
monopoly industry to the ownership of 'the people as a whole', 
to guarantee equal opportunities to all who wished to trade or 
manufacture, to advocate the redivision of land 'among those who 
work it', the ending of all restrictions on labour and labour 
organisations, unemployment benefits, a forty hour week, a 
minimum wage, free compulsory education, and other welfare 
provisions with regard to health, housing, the aged and the 
disabled.)O 
What was the significance of all this? As far as its 
critics were concerned, the Charter and the process which 
produced it were the results of manipulation and conspiracy. 
Peter Hjul, one of the Liberal members of the Cape Town local 
committee until his resignation from it at the beginning of 1955, 
contends that his function along with other committee members 
was merely to endorse pre-arranged decisions.)1 To Liberals the 
dominant influence in the campaign was the COD which, as far as 
they were concerned, was merely a front for the Communists. 
They found especially offensive the efforts of white Congressmen 
to align the nationalist movement with the Soviet bloc in the 
Cold War. The Liberal Party itself disassociated itself from the 
Congress of the People in January 1955.32 The socialist 
implications of parts of the Charter appeared to them to be a 
vindication of their apprehensions. Africanists were at first 
less concerned about the contents of -the Charter though later 
their objections would centre on the sections dealing with rights 
and guarantees for all national groups. It was rather the role 
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allowed to representatives of the other Congresses in the 
leadership of the campaign that they found disconcerting. In 
particular the structure of the National Action Council with 
its equal representation of the four sponsoring organisations 
despite their numerical disproportion was for them ominous. 
They viewed the Council as a vehicle through which the ANC 
could be influenced and even controlled by non-Africans. 
There was some substance to both sets of accusations, the 
COD, not surprisingly, given the background of many of its 
activists, tended to identify itself rather more strongly with 
the Soviet bloc than did its partners in what had become to be 
known as the Congress Alliance. New Age, for example, under the 
editorial control of COD members, would devote much of its space 
to descriptions of Soviet achievements, justifications of 
Russian foreign policy, and criticism of Soviet dissenters. 
Bearing in mind their tiny following COD personalities did appear 
to exercise a disproportionately important function, playing a 
leading role at most public meetings and contributing significantly 
to the drafting of the Charter itself. This was predictable; 
many COD leaders were highly experienced politicians with 
considerable intellectual gifts. Whatever their colour, one 
would expect such people to playa dynamic role. Finally, it is 
true that the formulation of the Charter only involved a limited 
amount of consultation: certainly popular demands were canvassed 
but the ultimate form the document assumed was decided by a 
small committee and there were no subsequent attempts to alter it 
in the light of wider discussion. The forum provided by the 
Congress of the People was scarcely suited to any kind of debate. 
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As it turned out the Charter was not adopted immediately by 
the ANC. The executives of the four organisations met together 
at the beginning of August and agreed to recommend the adoption 
of the document by each respective Congress. A 'million 
signature' campaign was conceived to popularise the Charter and 
the 10,009 'Freedom Volunteers' apparently succeeded in collecting 
nearly 100,000 signatures to the Charter, half of them in the 
Transvaal. The campaign was administered by a National 
Consultative Committee, a permanent successor to the National 
Action Council. Though the new committee was to have important 
functions running the signature campaign wasn't one of them: it 
petered out towards the end of the year without much enthusiasm 
being generated for it outside the Transvaal. The police 
confiscated many of the forms during raids of volunteers' homes. 
The 1955 annual conference was shortened by a day because of 
initial objections to it being held at all by the Bloemfontein 
authorities. Many important leaders could not come because of 
their bans and branches had not received copies of the National 
Executive Report. Much time was wasted by a debate as to whether 
the conference should exclude a report from the Bantu World and 
there was considerable acrimony between Africanists and the 
National Executive. The former now had the indirect support of 
Dr. Xuma who had written an open letter to the ANC accusing it of 
losing its identity and turning against the nation-building 
programme of the 1940s. In the end there was no conclusive 
discussion of the Charter as the Transvaal delegates had to cut 
the conference short so as to catch their trains on Sunday morning. 
Four months later a special conference was held mainly for 
the purpose of discussing ways of opposing the introduction of 
women's passes. Despite noisy protests trom a small group of 
Africanists from the local Orlando youth League branch the 
Charter was accepted by the majority to the delegates. If any 
of them had any misgivings about the economic clauses (there 
was some unease among certain Natal delegates»)) they were 
reluctant to associate themselves with the Atricanists' dogmatic 
advocacy of the Programme of Action and hostility to 'foreign' 
allies and ideologies. It is likely that lack of interest was 
more widespread than any antipathy towards the Charter; as the 
National Executive complained in its annual report of 1955: 
In the Congress of the People campaign 
although the ANC was responsible for the 
creation of the Congress of the People 
many of its leaders and many of its 
branches showed a complete lack of 
activity as if some of them regretted 
the birth of this great and noble idea •• )4 
The ANC's endorsement of the Freedom Charter reflected the 
changing character of the movement's leadership: in contrast to 
the decade before it was younger, less affluent, and more likely 
to be drawn from a legal, trade union or non-professional back-
ground than the politicians of the 1940s who tended to be 
churchmen, doctors, or sUbstantial businessmen. But despite 
a more radical leadership the ANC was often slow and ineffective 
in its efforts to resist fresh infringements on existing freedoms 
and rights. Part of the problem arose from social tensions 
within existing local communities)5 which could be reflected in 
the resistance movement itself. There were also at times 
strategic differences within the National Executive - this was 
the case, for instance, during the efforts to mount a boycott of 
Bantu Education. The main difficulty, though, lay in the field 
of organisation. 
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In the course of the Defiance campaign, the ANC had become 
a mass movement with, by its close, approximately 100.000 members. 
Its estimated following fluctuated during the 1950s. paid-up 
members diminishing to about 30,000 in the course of 1953 but 
then reviving in numbers from 1957 so that the Transvaal member-
ship passed its 1952 peak in 1958 and being swelled by thousands 
of new followers in N~tal in 1959. 36 Such figures are an 
unreliable indication of the extent of the ANC's influence: 
subscriptions were only occasionally collected and not always 
reported accurately to the Treasurer General and a large number 
of people would have identified with Congress and participated 
in various campaigns without always holding a current membership 
card. In response to this expansion as well as to the prospect 
of legal constraints being placed on Congress activities, a new 
organisational system was proposed in late 1953 by Nelson Mandela. 
Critical of the 'old methods of bringing about mass action 
through public mass meetings, press statements and leaflets,37 
and anticipating a time when the ANC would not longer be permitted 
to mobilise so openly, Mandela proposed the division of branches. 
some of which in the course of the Defiance Campaign had grown 
to a size of several thousand members, into 'cells' based on 
single streets and headed by a 'cell steward'. Seven street 
cells would make a 'zone' and the 'chief steward' of each zone 
would unite with four others in a 'ward'. One of their number 
would be a 'prime steward' and the prime stewards would form a 
branch secretariat itself administering the ANC within the 
township. 
As it turned out the 'M Plan' was only implemented in a few 
instances, particularly in the Eastern Cape urban centres which 
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began early in 1953 to divide themselves up. A National 
Executive report was to comment that in contrast to the 
Eastern Cape very few branches in Natal or the Transvaal had 
been restructured. 38 
In December 1955, the National Executive reported that: 
The national liberation movement has not 
yet succeeded in the organisational field 
in moving out of the domain of mass 
meetings and this type of agitation. 
Mass gatherings and large public activities 
of Congress are important, but so is house 
to house work, the building of small local 
branches, the close contact with members 
and supporters of their continual education. 39 
It was a comment that held good for the decade. The 
reasons for this failure are not difficult to discern. The new 
system would have involved an immense amount of work, in many 
cases beyond the capacity of spare-time volunteers. As a Natal 
leader pointed out 'most people were so busy with their ordinary 
work that they could not find time for Congress duties,.40 Long 
working hours, poor public transport, and residential areas far 
away from places of employment mean there was little time in the 
evenings for political activity. Shortage of money was another 
obvious impediment: the Eastern Cape was estimated by the 
National Executive to need 35 full time organisers to implement 
the scheme. They received in 1953 £100 from Johannesburg to 
pay them. 41 Membership subscriptions were 2s. Gd. annually, 
and even at this modest level were difficult to collect in a 
desperately poor community, for such a sum, if collected all at 
once, could make a significant inroad into a weekly household 
budget. The ANC had very few full time workers. It was still 
stressing the need for them in 1959. 42 The M Plan also could 
help to lessen the standing of local political personalities as 
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part of its purpose was to reduce the size of the 
administrative units. 
Therefore many branches remained cumbersome and difficult 
to administer because of their numbers, communications 
internally and between them and national leadership remaining 
poor. Throughout the decade in National Executive reports 
there were references to letters not answered and policy 
decisions ignored by branches. The movement had expanded 
swiftly and many of its activists were·not people who wrote 
letters easily. Contributing to the weakness of communications 
was the fact that the strongest ANC centres were outside the 
Transvaal whereas the National Executive was Transvaal-dominated 
and effective decision-making in any case was in the hands of a 
working committee of those Executive members who lived within 
50 miles of Johannesburg. 
State harassment added to organisational difficulties. By 
the end of 1955 42 ANC leaders had been banned, many of them 
being forced to give up office and membership of the ANC. Bans 
affected 11 of the 27 members of the National Executive elected 
or coopted in 1952.43 One year later 156 prominent figures in 
the Congress Alliance were arrested and subsequently charged 
with treason. For the next five years the State would vainly 
attempt to prove in court that a communist-inspired conspiracy 
to violently overthrow the state had been prepared by the Congress 
Alliance. The Treason Trial served as a drain on the energy and 
resources of the accused (many of whom suffered a total disruption 
of their livelihoods during its proceedings). It also removed 
from active politics some of the ablest and most experienced men 
and women in the ANC leaving their places to be filled by less 
able people. 
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The consequences of these difficulties were first that 
effective campaigning had often to depend on local initiatives 
and therefore on the personal qualities of local leaders to a 
much greater extent than had an efficient administrative 
machine existed. This was not always to Congress' detriment: 
both the education protest and the 1957 Alexandra bus boycott 
provide examples of occasions when cautious national leaders 
were pushed into a more militant posture by rank and file 
44 
assertion. But it did mean that c~~paigns were localised and 
uneven in impact. It also meant that the movement was built on 
strong personal loyalties rather than bureaucratic control and 
for this reason the ideological conflicts which could strain 
the movement at the centre had a limited significance for the 
mass of its followers. The extent to which the ANC interested 
itself in questions of everyday life was in the ultimate analysis 
more important in sustaining its support than its attitudes 
towards whites, socialism, or the Cold War. Only if such issues 
could be shown to have an immediate relevance did they have much 
popular significance. As we shall see the fashion in which, in 
certain contexts, the Pan-Africanist Congress was to draw upon 
ordinary people's experiences with whites in articulating its 
racial exclusiveness was an example of this link being demonstrated 
successfully. 
Nevertheless, ideological issues were important as they 
had significant bearing on strategy and methods used by the 
movement to evoke and control its mass following. During the 
1950s the ANC was not a revolut~onary organisation and it did 
not have a carefully worked-out long term strategy. The Freedom 
Charter itself, though it proposed a society which inevitably 
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would have necessitated the capture or at least the sharing 
of state power by the nationalist movement, gave no indication 
of the means through which this should be accomplished. To 
have spelt these out would, of course, have been impractical 
had they been known but there is substantial evidence of 
considerable uncertainty over methods within the ANC's leader-
ship. As Oliver Tambo put it in 1955: 
We shall not have to wait too long for the 
day when only one method will be left to 
the oppressed people in this country -
precisely what that method will be is 
impossible to say, but it will certainly 
be the only method, and when that has been 
employed and followed up to its logical 
conclusion, there will be no more struggle 
- because the one or the other of the 
conflicting forces - democracy or fascism 
will have been crushed. 45 
Of course some of the younger leaders, as in the case of 
Mandela with his organisational reforms, were anticipating a 
period when the ANC would be forced to operate clandestinely. 
Joe Matthews, national president of the Youth League, saw these 
reforms as a preparation for the broadening of the 1952 civil 
disobedience into 'a mass campaign and industrial action,46 but 
his views do not appear to have been representative of main-
stream Congress thinking. 
Consistently through all the major campaigns of the 1950s 
a common underlying motive seems to have been to influence a 
section of the white population so as to weaken ruling class 
hegemony. For example, as late as 1959 the Congress Alliance's 
Anti-Pass Planning Council was to argue: 
It is essential that the European public 
should be given a systematic and thorough 
introduction about the evils of the pass 
laws. It is evident that many are ignorant 
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of these evils and not sufficient work has 
been done to educate them. Many sympathetic 
Europeans cannot imagine what the country 
would look like without the pass laws and in 
particular without influx control. The 
Planning Council recommends that a pamphlet 
should be written specifically for the 
European public and that certain leading 
personalities amongst the Europeans should 
be approached to raise and discuss the pass 
issue with various institutions and to lead 
deputations to government and local 
authorities. We should regard this as a 
second front in our anti-pass struggle. 47 
Similarly, in 1958 the ANC attempted to sway the behaviour 
of the white electorate by planning a demonstrative stay-aw~y 
from work to coincide with the general election. Hopes of a 
massive disaffection of whites from Nationalist policies did not 
simply arise from the encouraging experiences of 1950s multiracial 
political and social activity; both liberal and marxist orthodoxy 
then held to the view that economic expansion and apartheid were 
essentially in contradiction with each other. 48 Politics was 
understood in terms of exerting enormous pressure on the system 
rather than seeking its systematic destruction. From 1953 onwards, 
protest was preferred to disobedience. There were of course 
excellent tactical reasons for this. Congress was organisationally 
too weak to withstand the sanctions of the state, but nevertheless 
the style of protest was indicative of a desire to persuade 
through moral example. For instance, in 1958 the ANC Women's 
League and the Federation of South African Women were instructed 
to call off the deliberate courting of arrest by women anti-pass 
demonstrators. Thereafter proposals for women's action on passes 
would characteristically advocate nation-wide prayer meetings.49 
Otherwise ANC strategy appears to have been to use every 
possible means to construct a large and disciplined following 
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which would allow it to exercise the decisive weight in a 
crisis of political authority which was only vaguely concept-
ualised but which all were sure would shortly arrive. At the 
time it was difficult to resist the exhilaration resulting from 
the victories of anti-colonial movements elsewhere in Africao 
Contributing to the certainty that sudden and dramatic change 
was imminent was the fresh international interest in South Africa 
(which itself provided another motive to trying to maintain the 
moral advantage in opposing the Government). To this end Congress 
leaders were to employ a far greater degree of tactical flexibility 
than was allowed for in the 1949 Programme of Action. For 
example, the Programme insisted that all differential political 
institutions should be boycotted and for Africanists this became 
a cardinal principal. By 1957 it was argued that the boycott of 
such institutions as advisory boards merely deprived the ANC of 
a platform for communicating with people in an environment in 
which alternative methods of communication were becoming 
50 increasingly restricted. The ANC participated in advisory 
board elections on the Rand throughout the 1950s and succeeded 
in gaining control of three of them. This appeared to be a 
symptom of its popularity rather than its isolation from ordinary 
people: it two cases Natalspruit and Benoni, the local ANC 
branches which dominated the boards were powerful and militant. 51 
The reason underlying the ANC's position concerning 
electoral boycotts appears in retrospect sound enough: partici-
pation did not cause loss of following. But in some instances 
the ANC did demonstrate considerable tactic~ inflexibilityo In 
1957 a stay-at-home call evoked a gratifying working class 
response. The following year workers were called upon to make a 
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similar response despite the fact that the main issue had 
shifted from wages to the election. With localised e~~ptions 
the 1958 stay-away was unsuccessful in keeping workers out of 
the factories. In 1959 the ANC succeeded in organising a 
highly successful consumer boycott of potatoes in protest 
against the treatment of farm labourers. This led its leader-
ship to conclude, somewhat mysteriously: 'the economic boycott 
c~n be used effectively against the pass laws. 52 In certain 
respects the lack of a clear pre-determined strategic programme 
was a virtue; it did encourage leaders to respond creatively to 
spontaneous upsurges of popular revolt. On the other hand it 
could lead to an unimaginative reflex type of reaction, in which 
no clear relationship existed between means and ends. But 
perhaps, given the historical context in which this leadership 
emerged, a unanimous and coherent approach to strategy would 
have been impossible. Ideologically it was eclectic and in 
terms of the class forces represented in the socially complex. 
Attempts to hammer out a common long-term strategy would have 
succeeded only in splitting the movement and thus weakening it. 
Its social diversity and ideological eclecticism were the ANC's 
strengths. 
Many of the existing treatments of African politics during 
these years have placed much emphasis on conflict over ideological 
questions within Congress. The foregoing argument suggests that 
ideological issues did not have a great deal of significance in 
many branches: the two main areas of Congress strength by the 
end of the decade, Port Elizabeth and Natal,53 were unaffected 
by serious internal disputes. This was not the case in the 
Transvaal or the Western Cape. In particular the branches around 
Johannesburg appear to have been divided and demoralised. The 
ANC itself suggested that this contributed to the unevenness in 
the public response to the 1950 stay-at-homeo54 It was here that 
one could have expected most tension for the Johannesburg town-
ship and location branches were not characterised by the same 
degree of unifying interpenetration between the political and 
labour movements as elsewhere. It was in Johannesburg that the 
Youth League had always had its main base. Johannesburg had the 
largest black population in the country, that population probably 
being socially differentiated to a greater extent than elsewhere. 
Finally, in Johannesburg the white left played a more prominent 
role in the affairs of the Congress movement than in any other 
centre with the exception of Cape Town. 55 
. By 1952 the Congress youth Leaguers were divided into two 
camps and with the election of Dilizantaba Mji as CYL president 
in 1951 and Joe Matthews as national secretary (both incidentally 
students at the 'open' University of the Witwatersrand), the 
left-wing non-Africanist faction was in the ascendent. Matthews 
was to write in the CYL journal in 1953: 
••• of a struggle within the League ••• 
to smash those forces which under the cloak 
of protecting 'the sacred principle of 
African Nationalism' have taken a right-
wing reactionary path. hampered the mass 
struggles, sought to cut off contact with 
the masses, and maintain the League as a 
body in the air, periodically issuing 
political statements. • • 56 
Africanist dissent coalesced round a group of youth Leaguers in 
Orlando. one of Johannesburg's South-Western townships (today 
part of Soweto). Its leading figures included Potlake Leballo, 
Zeph Mothopeng, and Peter Raboroko. All three were teachers who 
had lost their jobs during the Defiance Campaign. Leballo was 
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born in 1924, in Modderpoort near Basutoland, enlisted during 
the war and by his own account led an army mutiny in North 
Africa, was later expelled from Lovedale teacher training college 
after a student strike, completing his teacher training at the 
Evaton Wilberforce Institute. After his dismissal from his 
teaching post he settled in Orlando working as an insurance 
salesman. Leballo was no intellectual but a colourful and 
effective orator, dogmatic and energetic. Mothopeng was a 
little older than Leballo, born in 1916 in the Eastern Transvaal, 
professionally better qualified holding a correspondence course 
B.A., a president of the Transvaal African Teacher's Association 
in 1950 and for a short time on the CYL national executive. He 
lost his post at Orlando High School after campaigning against 
the Bantu Education proposals. 57 Thereafter he held a variety 
of jobs before serving articles in 1957. Peter Raboroko, a Free 
State farm labourer's son, a youth League founder and Defiance 
Campaign volunteer, was the theorist of the movement, his 
impassioned advocacy of the revival of African culture or the 
need for a syncretic vernacular national language first appearing 
in Bantu World in the early 1950s. All three men's backgrounds 
had features which seemed to distinguish the Africanist dissenters 
from the mainstream ANC leadership: a rural upbringing in the 
more harshly polarised racial climate of the Free State and the 
Transvaal (in contrast to the Transkei Cape origins of many of 
the ANC leaders); relatively modest professional qualifications 
and career achievements; at best superficial social contacts 
with whites. 58 
The Orlando East youth League and ANC branches together 
formed after Sophiatown the largest concentration of ANO members 
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in the Transvaal. It was not, however, one of tte most militant 
groups. This may have been a reflection of the difficulties of 
mobilising people in a municipal location as opposed to a free-
hold community such as Alexandra or Sophiatown as well as the 
social characteristics of a significant proportion of Orlando's 
population. 
Orlando was established as a 'Model Native Township' by 
Johannesburg municipality in 1932.59 Its distance from the city 
and consequent transport costs and its high rents tended to limit 
the attraction of living there to those who could afford the 
relative comfort of its single and semi-detached houses (except 
during the war, the normal practice of taking in lodgers to 
augment the family income was prohibited). The poor were also 
discouraged from living in Orlando by the high levels of municipal 
regulation and police control as well as the Council's practice 
of screening its prospective tenants. Discontent within Orlando 
over rent rises and similar SUbsistence issues was channelled into 
a strong tradition of parochial political activity dominated by 
the Sofosonke Party and the Asimimali Party, both of whom kept 
the ANC at arm's length. The ANC adherents tended to be among 
Orlando's unusually SUbstantial middle class section of the 
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community. A Bantu World reporter in 1951 chided readers living 
in Orlando for 'isolating themselves from the masses'. In a 
recent study, McIntosh has argued convincingly that Orlando's 
degree of internally perceived class differentiation and the 
relative size of its middle class provided a 'social base 
conducive to quiescence and likely to insulate leaders from 
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working class pressures. 
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Instead of popularly oriented activity local Congress 
members preferred conspiracy. The leadership of the ANC 
branch was involved in 1953 in a secret intrigue known as the 
'Bafabegiya' ('those who die dancing,>.62 This, under the aegis 
of Macdonald Maseko, Chairman of the Orlando branch and a member 
of the ANC's national executive, aimed to supplant the Transvaal 
leadership, sever any links with the Indian Congress, and 
commit the movement to more confrontationist strategies. 63 
Maseko and his co-conspirators were expelled from the ANC in 
1954. Meanwhile the Orlando East Youth League had also become 
increasingly rebellious under the Chairmanship of Leballo. His 
speeches criticising the ANC's linkages with non-African 
organisations and charging those Youth League officers who had 
accepted invitations to the 1953 World Youth Festival with being 
'Eastern Functionaries' were enthusiastically reported in Bantu 
World. The ANC, said Leballo, had repudiated the principles of 
the Programme of Action by participating in Advisory Board 
elections and succumbing to 'foreign ideologies'. In May 1953 
Leballo was expelled by the League's Transvaal executive but 
subsequently was reinstated by his branch. In November Leballo 
and his confederates began to produce a cyclostyled journal, the 
Africanist, in which, under such pseudonyms as 'Black Savage', 
'UmAfrika', and 'Pele en Pele' the dissidents unleashed a torrent 
of abuse against their former associates in the Youth League: 
Go to the conferences of the ANC. What do 
you find? Fraternal Greetings. From? My 
dear friend, you are old and intelligent 
enough to know where they come from. They 
are the greetings that usually take place 
about sixty per cent of the time of Congress 
at conferences. No more of fraternal greetings. 
What brothers are these who loath and destroy 
our ideology. 64 
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In the next few years the Africanists were to remain a 
small coterie, most influential in some of the Soweto branches 
but with support in Evaton and Alexandra as well. In Alexandra 
the ANC branch was chaired for a while by Josias Madzunya, a 
hawker from Vendaland, with little formal education but a 
strident and persuasive demagogue beloved by the press and even 
regarded with some affection by the targets of his street corner 
polemics, the liberal and left-wing white Congress sympathisers: 
These whites are just bluffing you by saying 
that they are friendly to you. They will 
never be friendly • •• Europeans are like 
lice. They are parasites, busy sucking on 
blood by means of work for unequal pay. 65 
Madzunya was exceptional in operating within a very different 
social milieu from most of his fellow Africanists, and the only 
one with a popular personal following (see Chapter Three). 
In 1957 a crisis of authority developed in the Transvaal 
provincial ANC of which the Africanists were swift to take 
advantage. Because of the spate of bannings as well as the 
involvement of much of the senior leadership in the Treason Trial 
many provincial office bearers were politically inexperienced and 
in some cases incompetent. Banned leaders who exercised behind-
the-scenes authority sometimes appointed nominees to take their 
position, rather than enacting the cumbersome procedure of 
electing new office bearers. In October 1957 the provincial 
executive at its annual conference insisted that it should be 
re-elected en bloc as a show of unity and defiance against the 
government. This and other administrative irregularities led to 
the formation by certain branch leaders of a 'Petitioners" 
committee which drew up a list of complaints against provincial 
leaders, accusing them of rigging elections, financial malpractices 
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and contempt for grass roots membership. Leading the 
Petitioners was a Sophiatown politician, Stephen Seghali, who 
was reputed to have Africanist Sympathies. 66 He was reputed 
never to carry a pass, had served a prison term on a Bethal farm 
and often tinged his speeches with racist invective. The 
Petitioners combined forces with the Africanists to demand a 
second provincial congress which under pressure from the National 
Executive provincial leaders were forced to concede. It was held 
on February 23rd 1958 and was an undignified affair, with brawling 
between Africanists and executive supporters, and ending 
inconclusively. Two days later the provincial executive were 
replaced with a temporary leadership chosen by the national 
leaders and of course including no Africanists. Bitter disputes 
continued throughout the year. In April Africanists campaigned 
against Congress's stay-at-home which they said: 
••• was conceived by an amorphous multi-
racial gathering at Gandhi Hall in 
September 1957. Launched by an amorphous 
SACTU meeting in Newclare. Popularised 
by a mysterious £1 a day committee. Then 
directed by a steering committee whose 
creation is still a mystery to us and 
finally called by the ANC. 67 
As a consequence of their opposition to the stay-away as well 
as a bizarre exploit in which Congress headquarters was raided 
and the ANC motor car removed, Madzunya and Leballo were deprived 
of their Congress membership. This did not deter them from 
establishing an 'Anti-Charterist Council' which in anticipation 
of fresh elections at the November provincial conference ran 
Madzunya as a candidate for Transvaal president with a manifesto 
penned by Peter Raboroko. The Africanists, however, were to be 
frustrated at the conference. Many of their delegates had their 
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credentials refused and on the second day they were prevented 
from entering the hall by Congress youths armed with sticks and 
iron bars. Sensibly the Africanists withdrew announcing their 
intention to form their own organisation which would function 
as a 'custodian of ANC policy as formulated in 1912,.68 
Now although the Africanists' influence has been considerably 
exaggerated in the press it was nevertheless a more serious 
rupture in African politics than those disaffections which had 
occurred in the past. First, it took place when the movement 
in the provinces which were affected had already been weakened 
through organisational breakdown and campaign reversals. Second, 
unlike for example the National Minded splinter movement, it was 
led by young militants eager to see Congress embark on a more 
adventurous course. The aggressive and vengeful mood they 
evoked in their speeches had a particular attraction for the 
young and, as we shall see, in Cape Town accorded well with the 
embittered feelings of Xhosa migrant workers. There had always 
been a potential constituency for a political leadership which 
played upon violent emotions and identified oppressors in racial 
terms. Impressionistic evidence suggests that such a constituency 
was beginning to include young and well educated middle class 
Africans to a greater extent than before. 69 It was one which ANC 
leaders by virtue of their social background and consequent morality 
had not cared to exploit. The Africanists were to show no such 
inhibitions. 
The Africanist social landscape was painted with harsh and 
glaring colours. Their sensitive and sympathetic historian, 
Gail Gerhart, traces their vision back to an essentially peasant 
outlook uncomplicated with the moral dilemmas posed by emotional 
involvement in a western urban industrial society: 
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'What can you do with the white man?' That's 
what they would tell you. 'The white man is 
all right; there is nothing that we can do. 
They would also use some of the texts from 
the Bible, some of them, in order to show 
how God dictated things to be; there's 
nothing to be done about them. But here you 
would have to use powers of persuasion. You 
draw examples from as many different sources 
as you can, show the fight that went on in 
our country • •• The question of land, for 
instance, touches the African to the core of 
his heart. Now if you draw from the fights 
of Moshesh in defence of the land, every 
Mosotho respects Moshesh very much o Once you 
talk of Moshesh • • • he is bound to listen. 
Or you talk of Hintsa, you talk of all the 
other heroes, Sekhukhuni and Tsahaka and his 
warriors, that the land is the central point. 
Let us get back the land that was given us by 
our forefathers.' 70 
Of course their appeals were self-consciously made in the 
knowledge that: 
The masses do not hate an abstraction like 
'oppression' or 'c~pitalism' • • • They make 
these things concrete and hate the oppressor 
- in South Africa the white man. 71 
but this need not imply they were made cynically. As we have 
seen the life histories of principals in the movement could 
reinforce a parochial and polarised outlook. They had two major 
disagreemen~with Congress leadership as it was developing in 
the 1950s. The first was with the role the latter allowed whites 
in the Congress Alliance. Africanists felt that white Congress 
sympathisers had mainly sectional interests, the proof of this 
they said was in the Freedom Charter with its clauses guaranteeing 
the rights and status of all national groups. Their influence 
had succeeded in dissolving the racially assertive nationalism 
which Africanists believed to have been adopted by the ANC 
with the acceptance of the Programme of Action in 1949. 
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In doing so they had deprived the ANC of the most effective 
ideological means of inspiring a mass following. 'Multi-
racialism', as they termed it, served to perpetuate the 
psychological subservience and dependency on whites upon which 
minority domination rested. The second disagreement was over 
the question of spontaneity. The difference in the approaches 
of the ANC and the Africanists is evident in the following 
passages: 
• • • when a spontaneous movement takes 
place the duty of leadership is not just 
to follow spontaneously but to give it 
proper direction. 
(ANC national executive, 1958) 
We must be the embodiment of our people's 
aspirations. And all we are required to do 
is show the light and the masses will find 
the way. 
(Robert Sobukwe, 1949) 72 
From these two positions flowed most of the other elements in 
Africanist thinking. Racial nationalism was a natural pre-
disposition among the masses; all that was needed was an 
effective ideological articulation of popular consciousness by 
leadership for the masses to rise; organisational questions were 
of lesser importance. South Africa was a colonial society no 
different from any other African country, its basic internal 
contradiction was a racial or communal one and could only resolve 
itself through racial conflict: 
The bitter fundamental truth is that we 
have not reached a class struggle stage. 
We remain an oppressed nation committed 
to winning our freedom via the African 
National Liberation movement whose basic 
demand is to recover lost African 
sovereignity • •• The secondary economic 
exploitation we suffer as workers does not 
supersede the colour discrimination • • • 
all Bosses in this country are white and 
all workers are black • • • Africans have 
a deep seated suspicion of all white 
political groups. 73 
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All attempts to win the sympathy or at least the neutrality of 
a section of the white population were futile and would detract 
from the effectiveness of any African political movement. 
With their emphasis on communal rather than class-based 
social distinctions, their faith in popular spontaneity, their 
own certainty of being the authentic interpreters of the general 
will, and their essentially conspiritorial preception of their 
enemies,74 the Africanists had many of the features of a populist 
movement. Unlike European populists, though, they did not have 
consistent or coherent views on economic questions. It was 
their effort to identify with what they felt to be indigenous 
African political traditions rather than any systematic economic 
and social policies that was to generate their following among 
people with rural antecedents. Taking their cue from Anton 
Lembede PAC ideologies would talk about the creation of a new 
society which would draw inspiration from 'the continuity from 
older tribal democracies of present day forms. ,75 Their 
deliberate nativism, constantly reinforced with references to 
the era of primary conflict between Africans and whites and 
buttressed by social and intellectual xenophobia, was the final 
element in their populist identity. 
Four months after their secession the African1sts held the 
inaugural conference of their new organisation, the Pan Africanist 
Congress (PAC), in a highly charged atmosphere in Orlando. The 
conference was opened by the chairman of the Federation of 
Independent African Churches,76 the Reverend W. Mo Dimba, who 
began his address by denouncing those 'hooligans of Europe who 
killed our God' and proceeded to salute 'a black man, Simon of 
Arabia, who carried Jesus from the cross,.77 The delegates then 
elected a president, rejecting, rather to the surprise of 
observers, Josias Madzunya (who had disgraced himself by calling 
for '''God's Apartheid", that is Africa for the Africans and 
Europe for the Europeans'), and choosing instead Robert Sobukwe, 
a lecturer in African languages at the University of the 
Witwatersrand. 
Sobukwe had been a prominent fiture in the Fort Hare Youth 
League, rising to be the League's national secretary in 1949. 
In a graduation address he had distinguished himself in a bitter 
attack on the paternalism of the university authorities, equating 
'broadmindedness and reasonableness' in Africans as 'treachery to 
Africa,.78 He lost his job at a rural Transvaal school as a 
result of participation in the Defiance Campaign though later he 
was reinstated. In 1954 he obtained his university post in 
Johannesburg. A self-effacing man with considerable intellectual 
gifts he remained in the political background, chairing an ANC 
branch at Mofolo in Soweto, and contributing anonymously to 
The Africanist. It was Sobukwe who was chiefly responsible for 
the refinement and degree of intellectual depth in the Africanist 
position which emerged at the PAC conference. Sobukwe did not 
subscribe to the crude racialism of Madzunya: in the columns of 
The Africanist, he had called upon sympathetic whites to adjust 
their outlook in such a fashion that the slogan 'Africa for the 
Africans ••• could apply to them even though they are white·. 79 
But despite his comparative subtlety and thoughtfulness he shared 
with his colleagues their romantic belief in the political 
integrity of the masses. 
Sobukwe's presidential address outlined the basic principles 
of the new movement. The PAC stood for government by the Africans 
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for the Africans - 'everybody who owes his loyalty to Africa 
being regarded as an African'. Whites, however, were for the 
present unable to owe their loyalty to Africa, even if they were 
'intellectual converts' to the cause of African freedom, 'because 
they benefit materially from the present set up' and who 'cannot 
completely identify themselves with that cause,.80 Pan-Africanists 
were opposed to 'mu1tiracia1ism' in as much as it implied insuperable 
differences between various national groups and tried to safeguard 
minority interests, 'there is but one race, the human race'. 
Sobukwe went on to stress his admiration for Kwama Nkrumah's and 
Tom Mboya's non alignment, rejected South Africa's 'exceptionalism', 
and affirmed its common destiny with the rest of Africa and 
looked forward to the establishment of a 'United States of 
Africa'. Similarly, the PAC manifesto condemned the 'capture' 
of a portion of black leadership by a section of the 'white 
ruling class' and called upon the movement 'to forge and 
consolidate the bonds of African nationhood on a Pan-African 
basis' as well as to: 
• • • implement effectively the fundamental 
principle that the domain of sovereignity 
over the domination or ownership of the 
whole territory rest exclusively and 
inalienablyin the indigenous people. 
The manifesto also prescribed 'an Africanist socialistic democratic 
social order' and cited the Pan Africanism of the All-African 
Peoples' Organisation's Accra conference (which had excited 
great interest among Africanists when it was held in December 
81 1958) as the PAC's guiding philosophy. 
The founding conference optimistically set a target of 
82 100,000 members to be recruited by July 1959. In fact, the 
PAC itself was to admit at the end of the year that less than a 
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third of this target had been achieved and even this was disputed 
by the ANC and members of the Liberal Party.83 In the columns of 
The Africanist of November 1959 a total of 24,664 members was 
broken down thus: 
Transvaal 
Cape 
Natal 
Orange Free state 
13,324 
7,427 
3,612 
301 
Low formal membership did not preclude great expectations. The 
ANC during the Defiance Campaign had demonstrated how a movement 
could swell rapidly to many times its original size if it 
succeeded in catching the popular mood. Leballo was to claim 
84 that the PAC had 101 branches. If each of these had consisted 
only of a few energetic activists this would have been sufficient 
in launching an effective mass campaign provided the PAC could 
inspire the crowd with its exhortations. 
The PAC did not build its bases in traditional ANC strong-
holds. It never had much impact in Natal. In the case of the 
Transvaal, while it did not extend its support in Johannesburg 
beyond the original Africanist groups in Orlando and Alexandra, 
it succeeded in acquiring a following in the Vereeniging area. 
Similarly, in the Cape, the PAC was to grow, not in the Eastern 
Province towns at first but rather in the Cape Peninsula where the 
ANC was troubled by tensions which paralleled those which existed 
in the Transvaal. The ANC in the Western Cape was traditionally 
weak for here Africans were a minority in the population in the 
area and a large proportion of them were contract workers from 
the Transkei, a group to which the local political leaders had 
never paid much attention. It was in this part of the country, 
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for reasons which will become clearer in the next chapter, that 
the PAC succeeded in establishing a strong following. 
For the next eight months the PAC's strategy was to remain 
indefinite. Sobukwe himself announced in August a 'status 
Campaign' which would take the same form as some of the ANC-
inspired consumer boycotts in Port Elizabeth and exert pressure 
for more courteous treatment of Africans in shops. Its more 
fundamental purpose was to exorcise any traces of 'slave mentality' 
85 
and encourage the assertion by people of their 'African personality'. 
Such modest intentions fell short of the expectations of rank and 
file members of the PAC, and under pressure from them as well as 
being motivated by a desire to keep the initiative from the ANC. 
the PAC's national executive at its first annual conference in 
December decided upon a more dramatic course of action. The ANC 
at its annual conference had resolved to step up its anti-pass 
campaign and the PAC followed suit. 
Their plans were very different. The ANCproposed a series 
of demonstrations on days of symbolic importance, leafletting and 
other educational activities, and the use of 'industrial action' 
led by the SACTU factory committees. The Anti-Pass Planning 
Council also considered the possibility of civil disobedience but 
concluded ambiguously: 
• • • a thorough study of the meaning of 
civil disobedience should be made, since 
there are so many interpretations of what 
it is. And before we can embark on any 
form, we should be specific as to what we 
contemplate doing. 86 
The PAC plans were specific: on an appointed day all African men 
should heed the call of their leaders, leave their passes at home 
and present themselves for arrest at their local police station. 
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People should stay away from work and soon there would be a 
complete paralysis of the economy and the administration. All 
that was required was for heroic leaders to set the pace and the 
necessary conditions for a spontaneous popular uprising would be 
present. 
From the history surveyed in these first two chapters. the 
course can be charted of two different types of political movement. 
The first would ostensibly appear to be the logical outcome of 
capitalism. urbanisation. proletarianisation and industrialisation: 
the development of political organisations motivated by the class 
interests of different groups engaged in different ways with the 
operation of a modern industrial economy. In a slow and spasmodic 
fashion the history of the ANC demonstrates the unfolding of 
this process. Important stages in its development included its 
formation by members of an emergent professional elite; the 
foundation of the Communist Party and the shifts in its relation-
ship with Congress; the banning of the CPSA in 1950 and the 
infusion thereafter of its cadres into the ANC and allied move-
ments; the adoption of increasingly etatist and radical social 
and economic programmes in 1943 and 1956; and defections from 
the organisation of members of the more socially privileged 
strata of the African population. 
In the rest of this study our preoccupation will be with a 
representative of the second type of movement. those movements 
which in one way or another are fuelled by the impulse to resist 
the social implications of a developing capitalist economy. As 
such they can be labelled as populist. Because of the pace'of 
economic development in South Africa. because of the existence 
of racially as well as class determined social inequality. and 
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because of the state's efforts to contain and restrict the 
scale and effects of African urbanisation, movements in this 
second category have enjoyed a substantial following. Beginning 
first where we might expect to find them, among the despairing 
sharecroppers who were drawn by the millenarian undertones of 
leU rhetoric, populist ideology was to be more deliberately 
articulated by young intellectuals on the Rand in the 1940s. 
Some of these were themselves recent migrants from rural society 
and unlike more experienced urban political activists they were 
to empathise with and draw inspiration from the Johannesburg 
squatters and other poor people's movements. The latter derived 
little of their vitality from systematic organisation and owed 
much to a leadership which could excite a popular imagination 
which was still influenced by non-industrial rural culture. From 
the direct action of the wartime poor the Africanists distilled 
a popular strategy which attributed great potential power to a 
supposed popular susceptibility to revolt and which attempted to 
synthesize what they felt to be the motivating force in popular 
assertions in formal terms of a nationalist programme. 
In the 1950s, under the influence of both Marxist and 
liberal leadership, as well as through the acquisition of an 
increasingly working class ethos in some of the centres of its 
activity, the ANC tended to define its goal as African partici-
pation in a democratic industrial civilisation rather than 
African self-determination. Mounting disaffection among remaining 
Africanist adherents culminated in the formation of the Pan-
Africanist Congress. The PAC was a populist movement led by men 
who had an inadequate understanding of the complexity and strength 
of the political institutions and social structure they sought to 
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destroy. Nurtured on a millenarian and spontaneitist political 
tradition they hoped to transform society by calling upon 
their compatriots to withdraw from its corrupting embrace. 
While their rivals contented themselves with demonstrative 
protest, the PAC's populist leadership turned to the weapon 
which had been threatened so often in preceding displays of 
African strength: the general strike. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE SHARPEVILLE CRISIS: SHARPEVILLE AND THE CAPE PENINSULA 
In December 1959 both the ANC and the PAC announced their 
plans for a campaign against the pass laws. The ANC's proposals 
consisted mainly of massive protests: March 31st, the anniversary 
of the 1919 pass burnings, Africa Day, April 15th, Union Day, 
May 31st, and June 26th should all be the occasions for nation-
wide demonstrations against the passes. In cities the ANC should 
combine with other sympathetic organisations in leading deputations 
to government and local authorities. Research would be conducted 
into the mechanics and effects of influx control and the findings 
publicised in pamphlets so as to arouse 'the indignation of all 
sections of our people' including whites. Many of the latter were 
'ignorant of these evils (the pass laws) and not sufficient work 
has been done to educate them'. As well as the white population 
who were to form a 'second front' in the campaign, special 
attention was to be devoted to mobilising women (nation-wide 
prayer meetings on 9th August) and workers. Industrial action 
'should. • • be considered as a form of struggle in this campaign'.' 
With the exception of the last provision these plans were 
tame stuff. They were especially disappointing when viewed in 
the context of the explosive situation in urban and rural 
2 
communities in Natal during that year. While the Anti-Pass 
Planning Council was considering prayer meetings and street 
processions, Natal activists were talking in terms of a province-
wide general strike to halt the Cato Manor removals.) Many of the 
ANC leaders (including Chief Lutuli) had a principled abhorrence 
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for the violence of the Natal unrest. Though there was much 
talk of using economic and industrial power 'to defeat the 
government,.4 it was never explained quite how this was going 
to be achieved without violence. Part of the problem stemmed 
from the absence of any serious analysis of the society Congress 
leaders were confronted with. Typical were the assumptions 
contained within Lutuli's Presidential Address of December 1959: 
It is no mere rhetoric to say that apartheid 
is proving to be a frankenstein • • • 
oppression in any guise cannot pay any 
country dividends • • • Industry and 
Commerce are beginning to squeal • • • We 
are not without strength. White South 
Africa is vulnerable. 5 
This type of thinking was not limited to liberal Congress 
spokesmen. In response to a peSSimistic prognosis of the 
likelihood of revolutionary change in South Africa in the 
journal Africa South, a leading theoretician of the South 
African Communist Party (SACP) had this to say: 
Industrialisation is incompatible with ••• 
group or class monopoly of political (and 
ultimately of economic) power. • • Nowhere 
outside the Union does a privileged minority 
claim to govern by divine right. This type 
of despotism (is) a freak, an anachronism 
which cannot have much longer to survive. 6 
Bearing in mind this conviction of the fundamental irrationality 
of Apartheid it is not altogether surprising that Congress's 
leaders were persuaded of the potential educative protest 
campaigns could have in swaying a section of the white public. 
Allied to this belief was the feeling, especially among older 
ANC leaders, that political activity, if it was to be effective, 
should have a moral dimension. As Chief Lutuli had put it in 
1951 the road to freedom was 'sanctified with the blood of 
martyrs - in other words, no cross, no crown,.1 
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Obviously not everyone within the ANC leadership held to 
these tenets as seriously as Lutuli, but because of the social 
contradictions within the movement and its lack of ideological 
coherence, a show of unity was felt to be more important than 
any sustained debate over strategic problems. In the absence 
of any rigorous analysis long term planning was next to 
impossible. Campaigning was increasingly in the course of the 
decade more a matter of protest than resistance. 
But while the Pan-Africanists' conception of their Pass 
Campaign was more in tune with mass disaffection in certain 
areas its intellectual foundations were equally shaky. Ideology 
(in the crude sense of a defined programme and accompanying set 
of slogans) was seen as a weapon, a crucial ingredient which up 
to that point had been absent from the spontaneous upsurges of 
popular rebellion of recent years. All that was required was 
the correct message expressed in terminology with which ordinary 
people could identify, and popular rage would cohere into 
revolutionary uprising. The PAC leadership was convinced that 
Africanism made articulate a deeply rooted racial~nationalist 
popular consciousness. A political appeal founded on such 
sentiment would immediately attract a massive support. Heroic 
and self-sacrificing leadership would inspire a similar degree 
of courage and selflessness in the masses. The fundamental 
problem of mounting an effective campaign was in the style and 
content of leadership offered to the African population. Few of 
the Pan-Africanist leaders had played an activist role in ANC 
campaigning and it is not surprising that they paid so little 
attention to the problem of organisation. Such community 
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struggles as the bus boycotts of the 1940s and 1950s that 
provided them with such convincing evidenceS of the possibilities 
of mass spontaneity had been conducted round immediate, tangible 
material issues. They ignored the difficulty of linking the 
resolution of these issues with the development of a more far-
reaching political struggle, a difficulty which had defeated 
Congress on numerous occasions. As shall be seen the response 
to the PAC campaign in the Western Cape appeared to vindicate 
their optimism. This response, however, was conditioned by the 
particular situation of a section of the Cape Town African 
community. By defining South African oppression in terms of 
race and psychology the Pan-Africanists had a belief in the 
uniformity of African political behaviour which was naively 
idealist. Their narrow introspection led them, like the ANC, 
to grossly underestimate and simplify the power and coercive 
capacity of the state. The PAC's campaign for resisting the 
pass laws reflected their assumptions about South African society. 
On an appointed day PAC followers would leave their passes at 
home and tollow their leaders to police stations and present 
themselves for arrest. Women were told to stay at home. 9 The 
PAC's action would inspire massive participation and as prisons 
filled up and industry and commerce were paralysed by a general 
strike of national proportions (and indefinite length) 
irresistable pressures would build up forcing the Government 
to abolish passes. This victory would be succeeded by a 'never-
ending stream of campaigns' culminating in a struggle for 
political 'independence' to be concluded by 1963. The pass 
campaign itself would be conducted in a strictly peaceful 
fashion so as to offer no unnecessary provocation of violent 
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police reaction. PAC leaders privately conceded that in the 
future violence would probably be unavoidable; their 
10 insistence on its avoidance in the pass campaign was tactical. 
Just over three months were to elapse between the adoption 
of a campaign strategy at the PAC conference and its launching 
on March 21st. This haste can be attributed partly to the 
disregard many Pan-Africanists had for organisational matters. 
But there were other factors which may have contributed to the 
PAC's impatience. First, since the movement's inception, the 
pass laws had been a central preoccupation in speeches made at 
township meetings and indeed the characteristics of future PAC 
action were made quite clear well before December 1959. For 
example: 
and: 
People are being assaulted daily for passes 
which have been introduced by the Europeans, 
but come to the PAC to get a medicine to 
cure you and show that a European is an 
enemy. I will pass a resolution in December 
1959. What you should do away with is 
criminality. Don't kill your own people. 
We are going to throw the pass away because 
we are prisoners. 
(Joshua Mashaba, 20 September, 1959) 11 
I will lead you, I will be in front. • •• 
The thing is (for) the mothers to put food 
away, put money away, we will call you. We 
may not come back from where we will be 
going to. Passes, permits, that is their 
waterpipe, ••• close that waterpipe. we 
want to fight those acts one for all. 
(Robert Sobukwe. 1 November, 1959) 12 
As the first excerpt indicates, the idea of a pass campaign came 
from below, from the ordinary members of the PAC, for whom 
Sobukwe's 'Status Boycott' mooted originally in August 1959 and 
launched formally in February 1960 had little appeal. Jordan 
Ngubane, a prominent African critic of the ANC and a member of 
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the Liberal Party on good terms with the PAC leadership, has 
suggested that the PAC decision to swiftly embark on a con-
frontationist course was externally prompted. According to 
Ngubane's account, shortly after the PAC conference, while the 
PAC executive was divided over the timing of the proposed 
campaign, letters were sent through a foreign contact of 
Ngubane's to various African governments to ask for assistance. 
The Ghanaian authorities replied encouragingly, urging the 
necessity for a showdown with apartheid, and promising financial 
13 
and diplomatic support. Ngubane suggests that this served to 
weaken the position of the more cautious leaders like Sobukwe, 
who were concerned the campaign should not be mounted 
precipitately. A final motive for urgency was the desire to 
pre-empt the ANC whose first mass demonstration was to take 
place on March 31st. 
Outside the Cape Peninsula and the Vereeniging district of 
the Southern Transvaal, where, for reasons which will be 
discussed below the PAC had begun to constitute itself as a mass 
organisation, there was little evidence of systematic attempts 
to mobilise grass roots support for the movement. Fairly 
frequent open air meetings were held in Alexandra, the home of 
the one PAC leader who had a significant popular following, 
Josias Madzunya. Josias Madzunya was one of the leading 
political personalities of Alexandra. Arriving from Vendaland 
in 1931 he attended a Communist Party night school and later 
took a correspondence course in public speaking. He earned his 
living selling cardboard boxes on a Johannesburg street corner 
where he would deliver lengthy political harangues. He was an 
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energetic political activist, belonging to various marxist 
groups in the 1940s before joining the ANC. By 1955 he had a 
reputation as a committed Africanist which led to his expulsion 
from the ANC branch of which he had been chairman. Undismayed, 
Madzunya and his confederates constituted themselves as a rival 
ANC branch and proceeded to provide determined and effective 
leadership to the Alexandra bus boycott of January-April 1957. 
The boycott only temporarily united the various rival politicians 
of Alexandra, by its conclusion they were once again bitter 
enemies, Madzunya and his confederates charging that the ANC 
had sold out to the bus company and employers. Madzunya was a 
striking looking man, large, bearded, dressed regardless of 
weather in a shabby black overcoat and an imaginative and 
powerful orator. He was known by the press as the "Black 
Verwoerd" because of his frequently racist invective, but this 
did not diminish his standing in Alexandra. The more genteel 
Orlando Africanists were alternately grateful for and embarrassed 
by the publicity he attracted to their cause; Madzunya the 
street peddler was no thinking man's Africanist. 14 In early 
1960 Madzunya and other main PAC figures absented themselves 
from the Rand on two occasions: once in early January to attend 
the annual conference of the Basuto Congress Party (support from 
15 Basuto politicians was going to be useful later on), and for 
two weeks the following month when Sobukwe, Leballo and Madzunya 
toured Durban. the Eastern Cape and Cape Town. With the 
exception of Cape Town attendance at the various meetings called 
on their behalf was disappointing. 16 In Durban espeCially, they 
might have expected a more excited reception. Just over a week 
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before their arrival, in the Ezinkawini area of Cato Manor, 
when the inhabitants were being screened and resettled, nine 
policemen were attacked and killed while on a liquor search. 
The incident which provided the initial provocation was when a 
policeman stepped on a woman's toe while searching a shebeen 
but underlying the conflict were all the unresolved tensions 
arising out of poverty, fear of resettlement and official 
harrassment which had lain behind the previous year's unrest 
in Cato Manor. In Natal, however, the ANC was too strongly 
entrenched for the PAC to make any significant impact. Here 
the ANC was sensitive to the popular frustration and anger 
reflected in the Cato Manor riots: on February 18th, a 4,500 
strong meeting called by Congress at Durban City Hall made 
plans for a general strike and a bus and beer hall boycott in 
protest against the removals to Kwa Mashu. 17 
Undeterred by the uneven impact of the movement on March 4 
Robert Sobukwe sent out final instructions for the conduct of 
the campaign to PAC branch and regional executives. Two weeks 
later Sobukwe wrote to the Commissioner of Police, General 
Rademeyer, warning him of the campaign's launching on March 21, 
and assuring him of its non-violent intentions. In particular 
he stressed that crowds should be given adequate time when asked 
to disperse by the police. Two days later, simultaneously with 
the Cape leadership, Sobukwe held a press conference and outlined 
the PAC's intentions as well as exhorting his followers to refrain 
from any violent or emotional behaviour. The next day, Saturday 19, 
at a meeting presided over by the African clothing workers' 
leader, Lucy Mvubelo, the Federation of Free African Trade Unions 
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of South Africa (FOFATUSA)'s chairman and the PAC's Secretary 
for Labour, Jacob Nyaose, promised the support of FOFATUSA 
affiliates who would go on strike for the campaign's duration. 
The Federation was a group of African trade unions which had 
held back from affiliating with the South African Congress of 
Trade Unions, the ANC-aligned trade union grouping. The most 
powerful of its nine affiliates was the African Clothing Workers' 
Union. The FOFATUSA members had been until this meeting opposed 
to political affiliations and it was unlikely that their leaders 
could be depended upon to provide wholehearted support for the 
PAC's campaign. Nyaose was a veteran trade unionist who, since 
his break with the Communists in the 1940's, had been a bitter 
critic of involvement by the white left in African politics. 
FOFATUSA was funded by the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions and that body, according to Nyaose, tried to 
persuade him to attempt to postpone the pass campaign. None of 
the FOFATUSA affiliates, notwithstanding Lucy Mvubelo's presence 
at this meeting, called their members out on strike during the 
18 following weeks. , 
Meanwhile, at a less public level other preparations were 
completed. As response to the campaign would indicate, except 
in the case of Cape Town and Vereeniging, the PAC had made little 
effort to create strong committed branches in different centres. 
Instead successive layers of leadership were prepared, each of 
which would take over the functions of the one above it as each 
echelon of the organisation was arrested. This was consistent 
with overall PAC strategy which hinged on the quality of leader-
ship rather than organised mobilisation. A final precaution was 
taken on Sunday 20th, when two members of the national executive, 
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Nyanga near Cape Town did the PAC's call to action seem to have 
attracted a popular response. The events in the Cape will be 
examined shortly. First we will look at impact of the Pan-
African1sts in the Vereeniging district, starting with the 
structural factors which helped to shape the African community's 
response to their campaign. 
The industrial centre of Vereeniging, fifty miles south 
of Johannesburg had grown up round the Union Steel Corporation, 
a steel works based on wartime surplus scrap-iron founded in 
1912, conveniently near the Vaal River coal deposits. The town's 
industrial importance was confirmed in 1941 when the state 
controlled Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR) established its 
second plant ten miles from Vereeniging, at a new township called 
after the ISCOR chairman, Vanderbijlpark. Round these two steel 
works there developed a wide range of steel based industries 
which rapidly expanded during the Second World War as Vereeniging 
became the centre of South African munition production. By the 
end of the war Vereeniging's population included 12,000 whites 
and 30,000 blacks, a threefold expansion over the past decade. 
Originally Vereeniging's African population was concentrated in 
the Top Location founded in 1912 on what was then the municipal 
boundary. On stands rented from the council African landlords 
built houses and lean-to shacks which they rented out. As the 
location's population expanded living conditions became 
increasingly unhealthy: in two months in 1946 out of a 
population of 15,000 nearly 150 had died of pneumonia, 85 of 
gastro-enteritis, and a further twenty-four from tuberculosis. 22 
In 1937 socio-economic tensions sparked off by liquor raids had 
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exploded into a violent riot in which two police were killed. 
Following the recommendations of the subsequent government 
commission of inquiry but motivated also by the potential value 
of the Top Location land, as well as a typhus epidemic the 
Council began to negotiate the purchase of a new site from the 
Vereeniging Estate Company. The first houses of the new town-
ship were built in 1942 on a site two miles from Vereeniging, 
named after the Mayor, John Sharpe. At roughly the same time 
the two townships of Bophelong and Boipatong were constructed 
to house the ISCOR African labour force at Vanderbijlpark. 23 
By the standards of the time these were model townships, their 
neat rows of boxy dwellings being supplied with street lighting 
and running water, sanitation, and, in some cases, bathrooms. 
Sharpeville was tightly and effectively administered, with its 
own police station and a superintendent, as well as other 
facilities provided by the municipality: a brewery, clinic and 
weekly film shows. By official criteria the new location was a 
glowing success: compared to the Top Location the incidence of 
disease was minimal and in the first quarter of 1946, whereas 
over 500 crimes were reported in the Top Location, only thirty-
eight were brought to the attention of the Sharpeville police. 24 
The resettlement of the population of the Top Location was 
a gradual process taking place over a period of fifteen years 
as houses became available in Sharpeville. There are no reports 
of resistance to the' removals: compensation to the landlords was 
paid at a rate determined by the Advisory Board and the Council 
and they did not make any protest. 25 It would have been unlikely 
that they would have aroused much sympathy: in 1951 the mean 
rent for a lean-to shack in the Top Location was 15/- on a stand 
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which on average was shared by twenty-one peopleo The Council 
was renting its new houses at 27/6d. and because the removals 
were so gradual, if people could not afford the higher rent they 
could always stay on in the Top Location for the time being. 
Not all of Vereeniging's African population lived in Top 
Location or Sharpeville. Many of the major employers housed a 
large section of their workforce on their premises in single 
male hostels. In 1960 in the Vereeniging District (which 
included Vanderbijlpark) nearly 50,000 people lived in municipal 
townships and another 11,000 in employers' compounds. 27 
Despite its size, proximity to Johannesburg and industrial 
importance. Vereeniging had never been an important centre of 
political activity among Africans. Municipal officials again 
and again throughout the 1950s would proudly assert the "peace-
loving and law-abiding" character of the Black population, and 
the absence in its townsbips of the "riots and boycotts 
instigated by the Bantu" which had marred the recent history of 
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so many other urban centres. And indeed the available records 
support their testimony. In 1950 pamphlets did circulate in the 
Top Location and Sharpeville itself calling on people to support 
the May Day strike and a meeting was held in the Top Location. 
but with a subsequent ban on gatherings and threats of dismissal 
29 by employers, May 1st passed uneventfully enough. Two years 
later, the only local reactions to the Defiance. Campaign reported 
were a well-attended meeting held in Sharpeville in July by the 
Society of Young Africa30 at which its spokesman attacked the 
ANO, and a second SOYA meeting held two months later after which 
SOYA claimed that its support in Sharpeville was "very large".31 
Further evidence of SOYA activity appeared in 1953 when the 
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superintendent informed the Advisory Board of a secret meeting 
at which plans for a boycott of the coronation festivities 
were discussed. The shocked members of the Board advised the 
ejection from the township of these mischievous agitators who 
in any case were almost certainly outsiders. 32 Whether this 
advice was followed is not known but the Coronation was 
celebrated with picnics and souvenir mugs distributed to school-
children without protest or interruption. 
For the next six years there were no further reports of 
"agitation". The degree of local political quiescence was 
evident in the lack of any resistance to the issue of women's 
passes; indeed, "so many presented themselves for registration 
that the number had to be controlled daily.,,33 This obviously 
requires some explanation. The apparent local political apathy 
was particularly surpriSing, bearing in mind the liveliness of 
nearby Evaton during its two year bus boycott. Yet in Sharpeville 
it seems that the ANC had failed to establish a token presence. 34 
One reason for this may have been the controlled environment in 
which so many workers existed which made the organisation of 
trade unions very difficult thus depriving the ANC of a normal 
source of energetic activists. Of the total African employment 
in Vereeniging manufacturing, nearly 15,000 out of 16,798 worked 
in industries which relied chiefly on migrant labour recruited 
from the nearby Free State reserves and housed in inaccessible 
compounds. 35 Other inhibiting factors may have been the relative 
newness of the township communities and the strict official 
supervision under which they lived. The local authorities were 
unusually hostile to manifestations of African political life: 
even contestants for positions on the compliant Advisory Board 
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were prohibited from canvassing votes at public meetings. 36 
By the end of the 1950s, for various reasons, unemployment, 
influx control, poverty and police activity were having a 
peculiarly forceful impact on the Vereeniging African population 
contributing to its receptiveness to militant political leader-
ship. Sharpeville's population comprised nearly 21,000 children, 
nearly 7,000 adult women and 8,600 men. 37 It was therefore a 
predominantly youthful population. In the late 1950s youth 
unemployment was an increasing problem. The main local 
industries wit~ their requirements for cheap heavy manual labour 
preferred to recruit from the reserves38 and industrial wage-
levels and conditions did not appeal to township school-leavers. 39 
To exacerbate this in 1959 there were not enough high school 
places in Vereeniging to accommodate Junior Certificate holders. 40 
According to The World "scores of youths roamed the streets" and 
in Bophelong 7,000 residents had gathered to warn the authorities 
of the dangerous situation created by the Pass Laws which 
prevented their children from seeking work on the Rand and 
helped to turn them "into jailbirds and criminals".41 
This was not the only reason, however, why influx control 
might have aroused an unusually intense degree of antipathy in 
Vereeniging in 1960. In September 1959 the resettlement of the 
inhabitants of Top Location was finally completed. Whereas 
over the decade they had been moved out at a rate of a few 
families a month towards the end of the process the pace 
quickened so that during August the final removals affected 3,000 
people. In the last few months of the removals the official 
statistics indicate that not all the people moved out of Top 
Location were being accommodated in Sharpeville: the discrepancy 
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in the declining population of the one and the rising 
population of the other amounted to 213 in December 1959, 15 in 
February 1960, 61 in March, 182 in April, 436 in May, 48 in 
June, 642 in July and 3,060 in August. 42 The Council's 
Director of Non-European Affairs explained the disparity by 
referring to the large number of families in Top Location who 
were unable to pay the higher rentals of Sharpeville and so 
could not live there. These people, accordingly, had been 
endorsed out to the reserves. 43 So what had happened was that 
in under a year, 5,000 people, all of whom would have had close 
links with the recently settled element of the Sharpeville 
population, had been driven out of the area. 
For those who remained there were other difficulties. 
Many of the new tenants in Sharpeville were hard put to pay 
their rent, particularly as the new houses were the most expensive 
in the location at £2 15s. a month. If people were in arrears 
they were without warning locked out of their homes and refused 
certain services: in one case a family was not permitted to 
bury a corpse in the township graveyard. 44 In January 1960 the 
Town Clerk reported that in Sharpeville there were 2,310 rent 
defaulters - accounting for over a third of the households. An 
angry protest meeting took place at the beginning of March 
outside the township offices, at which, according to the news-
papers, women stoned the Superintendent. 45 The authorities 
denied the stoning and went on to allege that there was nothing 
spontaneous about the protest; people had been intimidated 
into attending after receiving threatening leaflets issued by 
both the ANC and the PAC. 46 In addition to high rents 
Sharpeville residents were affected by the presence of a 
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vigorous local police force: liquor raids were a daily 
occurrence and statistics indicate a rise in the level of influx 
control arrests and prosecutions in the first part of 1960. 
Unemployment figures were also increasing.47 
All these conditions provided fertile ground for the first 
PAC activists who reportedly arrived from Johannesburg in mid-
1959 to establish branches in Sharpeville, Bophelong and 
Boipatong. They need not have been particularly well-informed 
about local grievances for the Vereeniging area was an obvious 
place for them to choose. No opposition to their work would be 
forthcoming from the ANC, and in Evaton, twelve miles away, 
Africanists for some years had played a prominent role in the 
affairs of the commuhity.48 The visitors from Johannesburg had 
their entry permits withdrawn after a couple of days by the 
Superintendent for "talking politics" but this did not inhibit 
the progress of the new organisation. 49 Its local recruits 
worked with caution and discretion, avoiding public meetings, 
and working instead through door to door canvassing with small 
. 50 groups gathering indoors at night to discuss future strategy. 
They were thus able to escape unwelcome attention though complaints 
began to be received by the authorities in September of PAC 
incitement against members of the Advisory Board. 51 The Board was 
an easy target on which to focus popular discontent; judging 
from its minutes its members either ignored or were unaware of 
the recent tensions and difficulties which have been described 
above. By the end of 1959 the PAC in Sharpeville had approximately 
150 fol1owers. 52 If its local leadership was typical it was an 
organisation of quite young, comparatively well educated, working-
class men and women. Members subsequently interviewed by a 
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Commission of Enquiry were all in their twenties and included 
an unskilled labourer, a seamstress, a dry cleaning worker, a 
delivery man and a chauffeur. Most were junior certificate 
holders. 53 In contrast to the Reef, PAC preparations on the eve 
of the pass campaign were systematic and extensive in the 
Vereeniging district. On Thursday, March 17 a crudely 
reproduced typed leaflet was in circulation in the townships 
telling people to stay away from work the following Monday. On 
Sunday afternoon PAC activists approached bus drivers and 
warned them: 
We beg you, our people, tomorrow we must be as 
one. We are not going to fight the Europeans. 
We just want to alter this pass law because it 
is hard on us • • • if you run away you might 
get hurt • • • We will lay our hands on the 
one that does not • •• 54 
One bus driver testified to the commission of enquiry that 
he and some of his colleagues were taken away from their homes 
in the middle of the night and not released until after sunrise. 55 
The evident attention PAC activists in Sharpeville paid to 
disrupting public transport may have been inspired by the 
experiences of the Evaton bus boycott. Telephone wires linking 
Sharpeville with Vereeniging were cut during the night of the 20th. 
Police patrolling the township on Sunday evening on several 
occasions interrupted large gatherings of young meno 
Early on Monday morning the first passengers began forming 
queues at Sharpeville's Seeiso Street bus terminal, near the new 
police station. PAC pickets appeared and told them they should 
not go to work, but in any event no buses arrived. PAC groups 
were also posted on the road to Vereeniging to stop pedestrians 
and cyclists. By eight o'clock a large crowd had formed in the 
open space in the centre of the township. Similarly in Bophelong 
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and Boipatong a large group of people gathered in both locations 
and then joined forces to march, 4,000 strong, in a procession 
to Vanderbijlpark police station. At Evaton 20,000 people 
assembled outside the police station. 
The degree of success the PAC branches had,had in 
mobilising the populations of these townships can of course be 
attributed partly to their success in halting public transport 
and picketing. But this could not have been the only explanation. 
The PAC even where it was strong was not a large organisation and 
did not have the capacity to coerce support. Police evidence of 
intimidation does not accord with the eyewitness accounts of the 
character of the crowds which had formed: these were expectant 
and cheerful rather than browbeaten and resentful. In any case 
the Vanderbijlpark commuters did not depend on public transport 
as the locations were within easy walking distance of the town. 
For pedestrians a few scattered pickets would not have presented 
unsurmountable obstacles to getting to work. Response to the 
PAC's campaign in these townships was surely a reflection of 
local conditions and in particular disruptive and aggravating 
impact on the lives of sections of Vereeniging's African population. 
The size of the crowds took local police officers by surprise. 
Their subsequent reaotions were to be conditioned by the relative 
novelty for them of handling large political demonstrations (more 
experienced reinforcements arrived late in the day) and an aoute 
(if mistaken) consoiousness of their vulnerability. Their 
behaviour may have been influenced by the memory of the recent 
attack on policemen in Cato Manor (the commission report aocepted 
police testimony to this effect). In the cases of the crowds at 
Vanderbljlpark and Evaton, these were dispersed by 10 o'clock 
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after a baton charge in the former and low-flying Sabre jets in 
the latter. In Vanderbijlpark one man was killed when police 
fired on a group of men whom they alleged were stoning them. 
At Sharpeville the aircraft failed to intimidate people. The 
police had already declined to arrest those PAC supporters who 
had presented themselves at the head of the crowd. According to 
the police the PAC officials refused their order to disperse the 
branch secretary, Nyakane Tsolo, saying "We will not call them 
off until Sobukwe has sPokenn • 56 Many members of the crowd 
believed that an important announcement concerning passes was 
going to be made and this contributed to their determination to 
remain where they were. Police reinforcements arrived through 
the course of the morning, some of them in Saracen armoured cars. 
At 1.15 p.m. with nearly 300 police facing a crowd of 5,000 a 
scuffle broke out at the gate which breached the wire fence 
around the police station. A police officer, accidently or 
deliberately, was pushed over. The attention of the front rows 
was focussed on the gate and they surged forward pushed by people 
behind them who wanted to see what was happening. At this stage, 
according to police witnesses, stones were thrown at them. The 
more inexperienced constables began firing their guns spontAn-
eously. The majority of those killed or wounded were shot in 
the back. Altogether sixty-nine people died, including eight 
women and ten children. 180 people were wounded. 57 
In the days which followed the shootings while the population 
of Sharpeville mourned Vereeniging was held in the grip of a 
general strike by the workers from the townships. The steel and 
metal industries with their compound labour-force managed to 
maintain production but the smaller industrial and all the 
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commercial employers were affected. Domestic servants stayed 
at home (ironically they had been forbidden to live on their 
employers' premises the year before). Only after the mass 
funeral had taken place on Wednesday, March 30, did the people 
of Sharpeville trickle back to their jobs.58 
With the Sharpeville shootings the police had effectively 
broken the back of the PAC campaign in the Transvaal. In the 
Cape Peninsula, however, a similar sequence of events marked 
only the opening act of a drama which was to reach its climax 
the day the African people of Vereeniging buried their dead. 
The events of March 1960 came closest to representing a 
crisis for the South African state in its political capital, 
Cape Town. To understand the way this crisis developed and the 
fashion in which it was resolved an understanding of local 
political relationships, and in particular of the two political 
groups most directly involved in the events, the PAC and the 
Liberal Party, is essential. 
Most members of the tiny and at that stage predominantly 
white Liberal Party were repelled by what they took to be the 
inherent racism of the PAC's rhetoric. Only a minority among 
them believed that the PAC's position was closer than that of 
the ANC to Liberal ideology. In particular, there was the group 
which by 1958 had taken over the leadership of the Cape division 
of the Liberal Party, and which though radical, was also anti-
communist. The Liberal Party itself had been founded in 1953. 
Its founders had expressed a faith in the traditional institutions 
of Cape liberalism and they announced their intention to employ 
democratic and constitutional means, stating at the same time 
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that they were opposed to all forms of autocracy, including 
communism. At first the Liberals advocated a qualified 
franchise and though they dropped this policy in 1954 they 
continued until 1959 to insist on the desirability of 
progressive stages of enfranchisement. Though they were well 
to the left of established parliamentary opposition, to black 
and white Congressmen the Liberal Party appeared to be 
gradualist, moderate and patronizing. Increasingly, however, 
the Liberal Party came to be composed of people who rejected 
constitutional strategies and an important figure in this 
respect was Patrick Duncan. 
Since his participation in the Defiance Campaign (for which 
he served part of a three month prison sentence) Patrick Duncan 
had steered an idiosyncratic political course. Disappointed in 
his efforts to join the ANC in 1953 and unable to accept the 
left-wing stance of the Congress of Democrats he finally joined 
the Liberal Party, serving as its national organiser in 1956-57. 
In 1958 he sold up his farm on the Lesotho-Free State border 
and moved to Cape Town to edit Contact, a fortnightly newspaper. 
Contact, like its owner-editor, was to be a constant source of 
controversy. It embarrassed the Liberal leadership as much by 
its criticism of Chief Lutu1i's alleged susceptibility to 
Communist influence as for its enthusiastic championing of 
African political aspirations. From the perspective of the 
revolutionary left Duncan appeared at best as misguided. But 
eccentric and undisciplined as Duncan's behaviour may have seemed 
to his contemporaries it was nevertheless motivated by deeply 
held moral and political principles. From the early 1950s he 
had been a Gandhist and it was his belief in the efficacy of 
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passive resistance and the morality of Gandhi's Satyagraha 
which was to influence his response to the PAC. For when the 
PAC called for "absolute non-violence" in the execution of its 
campaign, Duncan recognised in this the spirit of the Mahatma. 59 
Though Contact was not a Liberal Party newspaper those who 
worked on it were Liberal Party members. They shared with 
Duncan his anti-communism, a dislike of gradualism and a desire 
to make the Liberal Party a considerable force in black politics. 
Though they were not all as inclined as Duncan to openly criticise 
the ANC they were far less willing than Liberals elsewhere to 
work with COD, with whom they were competing for influence. 
Several of Duncan's associates felt before he did, that the Pan-
Africanists' misgivings about the Congress Alliance were the same 
as their own and that the PAC's emergence was a promising 
development. They felt that the PAC could be persuaded to be 
less ambiguously non-racial. It was this group based around 
Contact which had managed to supplant the old Cape leadership of 
the party with its hostility to mass action and its penchant for 
franchise qualifications. 
The PAC, in its public statements, was as critical of the 
Liberals as it was of white Congressmen, for it held that both 
groups, whether they meant to or not, could only dilute the force 
of the struggle. The PAC leaders pointed to the disparity 
between the living conditions of the black man and the most 
committed and radical white political activist and concluded 
that "no white man can identify himself with the struggle of the 
60 black people in this country." The PAC president, Robert Sobukwe, 
warned his followers in May 1959 about their "so-called friends" 
who were out to confuse them; in particular he mentioned Bishop 
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61 Ambrose Reeves, Trevor Huddleston and Patrick Duncan. 
Despite this, the PAC was prepared to accept help from white 
groups - provided it was given unconditionally. Peter Hjul, 
Liberal divisional chairman in Cape Town, remembers that the 
PAC had made an approach to the Liberal Party National Executive 
in February 1960 to ask for money to support dependents of those 
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who were going to take part in the PAC campaign. Hjul also 
thinks that Sobukwe told Kgosana. the secretary of the Cape PAC, 
that only two organizations would provide disinterested help: 
the Liberal Party and the Black Sash, a movement of white women 
who concerned themselves with black civil rights and social 
welfare. Certainly PAC leaders had been willing to discuss 
their policies with Liberals in Johannesburg in the months 
leading up to the campaign. 6) The fact was, the PAC was short 
of money, and while it was publicly hostile to and privately 
wary of the Liberals, at least the latter, unlike the COD, had 
no formal connection with the AMc. 
The relative success the PAC had in attracting support 
in the Cape Peninsula should be understood in the context of 
the especially aggravating situation of the local African 
population. Africans were traditionally a minority in Cape 
Town, 109,804 inhabiting the Greater Cape Town area in contrast 
to over half a million coloured people and )1),000 whites. 
This population had undergone a swift expansion recently: 
fourteen years earlier the number of Africans in Greater Cape 
Town totalled )5,000 and the dramatic increase in this population 
can be linked to the town's growth after the war as an 
industrial centre. Most of the African labour force was 
employed in the building industry (ten per cent), manufacturing 
(eighteen per cent), as service workers (thirty one per cent), 
as domestic servants (twenty per cent) and in the railways and 
harbour (seven per cent). It was an unusually unskilled and 
recently urbanised African workforce, its status attributable 
to the presence of a large coloured population whose members 
filled the positions occupied in other urban centres by Africans. 
A high proportion of the male workforce (42 per cent, nearly a 
quarter of the whole African population) were migrant workers 
on one year contracts. 64 
Notwithstanding its small size, the Peninsula's population 
was the object of much official harassment. In 1955 the Minister 
of Native Affairs announced the curtailment of African migration 
to the Peninsula. Ideally, he said, there should be no 
Africans in the Western Cape. Coloured workers should be 
employed in their place. The Coloured Labour Preference Scheme 
became effective from 1958. A year earlier the Urban Areas 
Amendment Act tightened influx control. As a result, between 
1955 and 1962 the official number of registered male African 
workers fell by nearly twenty per cent. 65 The process of 
'endorsing out' quickened towards the end of the decade. 
Between January 1959 and March 1962 18,931 and 7,280 women were 
transported to the already overpopulated reserveso 66 Increasingly 
the African community was male migrant labourers and anything 
that might strengthen the tendency towards a settled balanced 
African urban community was discouraged officiallyo Between 
1953 and 1960 the proportion of men to women in the African 
population increase~ from 1.43 : 1 to 2 : 1.67 In 1960, there-
fore, the African population of Cape Town was suffering from 
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recently imposed government measures more severe in their 
effect than restrictions on urban Africans anywhere else in 
the country. 
This population lived either in the officially designated 
African townships of Langa and Nyanga or in a number of squatter 
camps which had developed with the post-war influx of people 
from the Transkei and the Ciskei seeking employment and relief 
from rural poverty. The largest of these settlements was 
Kensington in the Windermere area. Together with men and women 
who dwelt on employers' premises, the inhabitants of the squatter 
camps comprised nearly half the African population. The camps 
had been built on what was originally private land but in 1954 
the sites were taken over by the municipality. Approximately 
),000 families lived in Windermere and in 1960 they were 
confronted with the prospect of enforced resettlement in Nyanga. 
Resettlement held the risk of 'endorsement out' as well as the 
possibility of having to find another job. This was because 
part of Nyanga was outside the municipal area and consequently 
people who had formally worked in the city would now have to 
68 find jobs in the suburbs. 
Langa was the oldest established municipal township in Cape 
Town, its construction beginning in 1927. By 1960 it accommodated 
25,000 people, 19,000 of them adult men of whom 17,500 contract 
workers lived either in 'barracks' and 'zones', grim single storey 
dormitories arranged around dusty yards or in the 'flats', eight 
blocks of double rooms. The remaining 1,500 men in Langa lived 
with their families in the small houses provided by the 
municipality. 69 Just over a quarter, then, of Langa's inhabitants 
were 'townspeople'; that is, people who had been born in Cape Town 
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or some other town. The rest were migrant workers, mainly 
Xhosa-workers. Anthropologists have divided Langa's population 
into four categories: migrant labourers, semi-urbanised, 
urbanised 'townees', and 'decent people·. 70 In brief, migrants, 
though working for a large part of their lives in an urban 
environment remained socially and culturally oriented to rural 
life. The semi-urbanised originated as migrant workers but 
aspired to become townsmen while retaining some links with the 
countryside for the sake of bringing up their children and their 
own security in old age: 
The semi-urbanised man behaves very much as a 
townsman while he is in town, and seeks to move 
out of the barracks or zones into the flats or 
a room in a private house, but he does not cut 
his ties with the country. His wife mayor may 
not join him, but he still thinks of country 
life as better for an older, settled man. Many 
women remain semi-urbanised in their attitudes 
and values even though they have lived in town 
for some years and their husbands have become 
real townsmen. 71 
The townees were distinguished both from the professional or 
lower middle class "decent people" by their flashy clothes, youth, 
preference for certain types of factory work, violent "wild" 
behaviour, and contempt for the rural conservatism of the 
migrants and the middle class "respectability" of the decent 
people. In Langa the majority of the population belonged to the 
first category and lived in the barracks and zones where they 
could live in dormitories with people from their home region. 
The aspirant townsmen tended to concentrate in the double-roomed 
flats. Whereas people in the migrant group were thought to make 
up a third of the Greater Cape Town African population it is 
likely that the rurally urbanised men attempted to avoid the 
barracks and zones though as the flats had room only for 1,300 
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many still lived as lodgers in the squatter camps. In 1960 
this option was becoming closed off to them. The townees and 
decent people of Langa lived in the family housing. These 
categories are vague conceptually and statistically, but they 
are the most useful available in helping us to determine amongst 
whom the Pan-Africanists were to develop their following. 
Although Langa was thought to be a serene African community 
compared to those around Johannesburg, conditions were deteriorating 
during the 1950s. From 1954 the government had refused to 
sanction the construction of any more family accommodation in 
Langa. 73 Government policy was that eventually all families 
should be "repatriated" to the reserves. At the same time there 
was an influx of "bachelor" migrant workers who were being 
rehoused in the "zones" as the squatter locations were concentrated 
and eliminated. Endorsing-out and its concomitant, influx control, 
required progressive restrictions on movement and employment 
opportunities for migrant workers. Migrant workers who had 
previously remained aloof from townspeople's preoccupations 
began to concern themselves more with political issues. Moreover 
rural opposition to land rehabilitation and Bantu Authorities 
also affected the reactions of workers from the reserves. 74 
Nyanga, formally established in 1946, had by 1960 become 
the second major concentration of the Cape Peninsula's African 
population. In 1956 former squatters, flood victims and families 
evicted from Langa began to be housed in the Nyanga "Emergency 
Camp". The social links between townships created by these 
"resettlements" were to be important in contributing to the 
solidarity of the different African communities. By 1960 over 
20,000 people lived in Nyanga of which less than a quarter were 
14:6 
accommodated in proper houses. 75 The rest were allotted plots 
of land at £1 a month ground rent on which they had to construct 
shacks from whatever material they could find. People who had 
to resettle in Nyanga received no assistance to build new homes. 
Many had to do without running water, fetching water from 
communal taps on the far side of the townShip.76 In 1959 1,200 
families were brought from Windermere to a new annexe of Nyanga, 
Nyanga West (the older part of the township becoming Nyanga East). 
The seething resentment flared into open anger after their 
arrival. Former squatters in Nyanga West attacked policement on 
a liquor raid and shortly thereafter 200 women protested against 
the raids, rents and poor conditions to the Bantu Affairs 
Commissioner. 77 His reply to them was as brusque as his treat-
ment of a more decorous delegation from the Advisory Board. If 
people disliked living in Nyanga they could go to the reserves; 
nothing was going to be done to encourage Africans to remain in 
78 Cape Town. 
On the whole migrant workers had been neglected by 
established political parties. Migrants were commonly criticised 
for their apathy about working conditions and their lack of 
political motivation. By 1960 it is probable that social 
conditions were such that the migrant population was far more 
politically receptive than was popularly believed. Quite apart 
from the pass system on which the increasingly repressive 
apparatus of influx control rested, there was also the simple 
fact that 50 per cent of the black population were living on 
incomes barely adequate for SUbsistence and certainly not enough 
to cope with rent or price rises. 79 
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It has been suggested that the PAC in Cape Town was 
predominantly a movement of 'townsmen, frequently unemployed 
sons of the working class or middle class families that had 
lived in the Western Cape since the mid-1920s,.80 In fact, as 
shall become evident later in this chapter, the Cape Pan-Africanists 
were more broadly socially representative than this description 
implies. All groups in Cape Town's African population found 
themselves in deteriorating situations in 1960. The migrants 
were threatened with losing their jobs to coloured workers. The 
modest social ambitions of the semi-urbanised had recently been 
harshly denied by government policy. The towndwellers also 
faced the possibility of 'endorsement out' and together with 
the semi-urbanised many of them had been affected by enforced 
local resettlement and the expulsion of their wives and families 
from the Western Cape. It should be borne in mind that the PAC's 
style was heroically and traditionally orientated. This might 
have had a considerable attraction for Xhosa workers from the 
culturally conservative Transkei and Ciskei. As we shall see 
the PAC did manage to establish a following in the 'bachelor' 
hostels and flats. In the context of increasing social tension 
even a slight degree of organisation could be sufficient in 
obtaining a mass response to the PAC's call to do away with 
passes. In 1960 the grievances of both urbanised and rurally 
oriented Cape Africans were especially acute and it can be 
conjectured that migrant workers were beginning to share the 
political concerns of the black townsfolk. The disturbed and 
unbalanced nature of Langa society, and the government's deliberate 
sabotage of any social stability in Nyanga and the squatter 
communities had created a mood which was volatile, angry and 
desperate. 
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The ANC was not a powerful force in the Western Cape. 
In the 1950s the movement was bedevilled by squabbles between 
those who favoured the Congress Alliance and those who felt, 
with the Youth Leaguers of Orlando, that multiracialism 
weakened African control of their political destinyo The 
stronger branches were outside the metropolis, in the 
agricultural centres of the Boland where the SACTU-affiliated 
Food and Canning Workers' Union had its greatest support. In 
Cape Town itself there had been only token participation in 
the major ANC campaigns of the decade. Not surprisingly, 
bearing in mind Cape Town's demographic features, multiracialism 
was an important dimension of Congress activity, and in 1958 
three ANC branches broke away declaring themselves to be 
81 Africanists. Apparently inspired by the proceedings of the 
Basutoland Congress Party conference at which some of them met 
82 prominent Transvaal Africanists, the secessionists formally 
constituted themselves as PAC members in May 1959.8) The 
original nuclei of Africanists were in Nyanga, Kensington and 
probably Langa.84 Additional PAC branches were established in 
Langa Flats and in the squatters camp at Crawford. The most 
detailed information available concerns Kensington branch of 
which the minute books of the original Africanist Committee and 
the PAC executive have been preserved. These records shed a 
little light on the movement's character in the squatter 
community. It was led by a group of fairly experienced former 
ANC members; the two leading office-holders, Madlebe and Bomali 
were described in a court record as 'labourers' in their forties 
and fifties.85 Apparently until September the membership of the 
86 branch consisted entirely of 'old men' though soon after the 
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branch began to attract the 'youth,.87 In common with other 
PAC branches in the area most recruitment was done through 
public meetings, though there was a plan to 'zone' Kensington 
for a 'door to door campaign' in order to construct a 'cell 
system'. This was only beginning to be put into effect in 
88 
early 1960. As well as organising public meetings (held from 
February 1960 in conjunction with the Nyanga West branch which 
was composed of people evicted from Kensington) Kensington's PAC 
activists journeyed to Worcester, Somerset and Stellenbosch to 
build up support for the movement. Their conception of the 
movement's ideal social character is revealed in this comment 
from the minute book: 
(The' organisers travelled) to Worcester with 
the intention of organising. They arrived at 
1 p.m. They succeeded and left a promise to 
the effect that they would be coming and join 
all the parties they have lectured and see to 
the intellectuals who would be legible to take 
posts. (my emphasis) 89 
In terms of the social categories described above the 
Kensington leadership fitted somewhere between the 'townees' 
and the 'decent people'. Peter Bomali, for instance, the branch 
chairman, aged fifty-five, had worked on a farm in the Free 
State before arriving in Cape Town in 1940. He had received 
no schooling and lived in great poverty with his diabetic wife 
and a son who suffered from epilepsy.90 The Kensington branch 
was the largest of the Cape Town branches with a total strength 
in November 1959 of 154 members. 91 It would be unwise, though, 
to generalise about the PAC in the Cape Peninsula from the 
evidence provided by the Kensington branch. From its establish-
ment in July 1959 there was a flourishing PAC branch in the Langa 
Flats, home of the 'semi-urbanised' migrants. 92 A special 
'conference' was held in the Flats in January 1960 to encourage 
the affiliation to the movement of more migrants. 9) The 'youth' 
of Langa Township contributed to the movement's socially 
heterodox character by forming an especially energetic and 
effective PAC 'task force,.94 According to the memoirs of one 
of the PAC leaders the best organised branch was in Nyanga West, 
among the displaced squatters.95 Here again the Kensington 
minute book is revealing when it notes that 'Mr. Mgweba saw 
this influence, no work, no passes, amongst the women in Nyanga 
West,.96 It would appear from the very incomplete evidence 
available that the PAC succeeded in evoking support from a broad 
cross-section of the Cape Town African community: the only group 
from which it did not attract a significant following was the 
middle class 'decent people', the 'intellectuals' mentioned 
perhaps rather wistfully in the above-quoted passage from the 
Kensington minute book. The substantial migrant component of 
its membership, that of the Langa Flats branch, gave the local 
movement a distinctiveness. Certainly many of the PAC speakers 
had this constituency in mind with their evocation of the spirits 
of Makana, Hintsa and Mghayi97 and their rejection of Western 
dei ties: 
We should always remember our customs so that 
we should always be lucky, in what we are 
doing. Now we belong to different churches 
and have forgotten our God, Qamata. Why do 
we worship another nation's God. 98 
Also relevant to migrant preoccupations were the frequent 
denunciations of 'the traitors, the African chiefs at the 
reserves, that is why there was culling and selection of cattle,.99 
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It was in the bachelor flats of Langa that Philip Kgosana, a 
young university student, began to meet Pan Africanists. 
Philip Kgosana was a political novice. The son of a 
Transvaal village priest, he had managed to obtain an Institute 
of Race Relations scholarship to pay his university fees. He 
lived in great poverty in one of the Langa flats. He wrote to 
Patrick Duncan for help and was given £2 and a Contact sales 
commission. But it was his friendship with an Africanist which 
provided a measure of security: 'When I needed money I just 
100 told him like a child and he gave it to me'. Drawn into the 
PAC he failed his first year exams and decided to abandon his 
studies. 
Much of the organisation of the PAC in the Cape peninsula 
was the work of Nana Mahomo, also a University of Cape Town 
student, but a politician of some experience as well. He had 
helped lead the 1957 bus boycott in Johannesburg's Western 
101 Native Township and was a member of the PAC's national 
executive. He left Cape Town on the eve of the pass campaign to 
raise support abroad for the PAC. Mahomo and Kgosana were 
untypical in their social backgrounds; most of the Cape Town 
PAC leaders would have been more comfortable in the company of 
Madzunya than with the Orlando intellectuals. While only seven 
of the thirty-one men put on trial for incitement after the 
campaign came from migrant workers' quarters none worked in a 
white-collar job. Twenty-nine of them were described in court 
as 'labourers' though in most cases they were men with some 
education and work-skill. 
Philip Kgosaba was not the only Pan-Africanist in Cape Town 
to have had some contact with Duncan and his friends. Nana Mahomo 
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had lodged with Joe Nkatlo, a leading member of the Liberal 
Party (and a former Africanist within the ANC). Nkatlo was a 
close friend of Duncan's. Christopher Mlohoti, one of the 
original Nyanga East Africanists, had been to the Liberal Party's 
office early on to put the PAC's case and so impressed one of 
the Liberals he met there, Randolph Vigne, that Vigne sent a 
motion in favour of supporting the PAC to the Liberal national 
executive in February 1960. The Cape Town Liberals, especially 
those like Duncan and Vigne who were associated with Contact, 
102 
were perceived by local PAC men as sympathetic. 
By December 1959, the PAC had established a few branches and 
103 
recruited perhaps 1,000 men in the area, but they did not 
appear to have had an enormous impact on the African population. 
Initial enthusiasm seems to have waned. Kgosana found, after 
returning from the first PAC national conference in Orlando, 
that the Regional Executive had adjourned until 20 January, this 
despite the fact that the national leadership had announced 
their programme of 'positive action'. On 24 January the Regional 
Executive was dismissed and a more energetic group assumed control. 
The new executive was dominated by men from Nyanga East and the 
Langa bachelor quarters and it included Kgosana and Mlohoti 
among its officeholders. Kgosana was appointed Regional 
104 secretary. By late February, after a visit from Sobukwe and 
Leballo, the PAC was capable of drawing 300 people to a meeting 
in Nyanga. 105 Leballo had been in especially good form as he 
addressed a crowd in Kensington on the subject of the impending 
campaign: 
Everybody felt the electricity as Potlake 
Leballo, National Secretary, climbed on to 
the platform and waved his pipe in the air. 
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His powerful voice r~ out in Sesotho: 
'Ke Potlake wa ho Leballo u gu thweng oa 
bona lefatshe es glno le thopilwe ka 
badischabo'. (This is Potlake of the 
Leballo, of whom it is said 'hold your 
shield lightly, your father's land has 
been looted by foreigners'.) 106 
On 18 March, simultaneously with Sobukwe, Kgosana announced the 
pass campaign would begin on the following Monday. Like 
Sobukwe he was emphatic the campaign should eschew violence: 
'We are not leading corpses to a new Africa'. He went on to 
warn that if: 
• • • violence breaks out we will be taken 
up with it and give vent to our pent up 
emotions and feeling by throwing a stone at 
a saracen or burning a particular building 
we are small revolutionaries engaged in 
revolutionary warfare. But after a few days, 
when we have buried our dead and made moving 
graveside speeches and our emotions have 
settled again, the police will round up a few 
people and the rest will go back to the 
passes, having forgotten what our goal had 
been initially. 107 
There is some evidence that in the weeks immediately 
preceding the campaign PAC workers had systematically attempted 
to mobilise African resistance in the Cape. The diary of one of 
the organisers, Ralph Mbatsha, had entries which included a 
mention of a visit to Worcester on 13 March. 108 The entry was 
perhaps significant; Worcester was an important centre for the 
Food and Canning Workers' Union, which was composed both of 
African and Coloured workers, and was one of the few places where 
Coloured workers were to join Africans in striking during the 
109 following weeks. PAC men were able to enter the Cape Town 
docks on 19 March and with the tacit consent of the watchmen 
distribute their leaflets and persuade dockers to stay away from 
110 
work. A 'Task Force' of young volunteers had been formed in 
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Nyanga and Langa. These were aged between ten and seventeen 
and their proposed function was to control crowds and prevent 
. 1 111 v~o ence. 
On the eve of the campaign, Sunday 20 March, large meetings 
were held in Langa and Nyanga - both addressed by Kgosana, who 
claimed afterwards that he had spoken to 5,000 'sons and daughters 
of the soil': 
At the end of the meetings, the massive crowd 
poured their hearts out when I led them in 
singing 'Unzima Lomthwa10 Ufuna Madoda'. 
(The burden is he~vy, it needs men.) 112 
On Monday it was raining. This was understood as a good 
omen for the campaign by those men in the bachelor zones who 
began assembling outside the Langa New Flats early in the 
113 
morning. By Kgosana's arrival at 6.00 ~.m., 6,000 men had 
gathered to listen to his instructions to march to Langa police 
station and surrender themselves for leaving their passes at 
home. 114 Then M1ami Makwetu, a docker and the Langa Flats branch 
secretary repeated the earlier insistence that there should be no 
violence. When the police arrived, they warned Kgosana that a 
march on the police station would be interpreted as an attack. 
Kgosana agreed to disperse the meeting, but also informed the 
police that no one would be going to work that day. In dispersing 
the crowd Kgosana allegedly told people to reconvene at 6 p.m. 
where there would be 'word from the national 0[[iCe,.115 The 
police station was subsequently picketed by PAC 'Task Force' men 
116 
who kept demonstrators at a safe distance from it. 
Similarly at Nyanga PAC supporters congregated on the rugby 
field. Women stood around bus stops mocking those who went to 
work. At 7.30 a.m. the first batch of volunteers started for 
155 
Philippi police station. A Liberal, who lived in Nyanga, 
Collingwood August, wrote in his diary: 
I am surprised at the large number of peasant-
type demonstrators. Normally they take 
little interest in politics. They are the 
migrant labour and they are the section of 
Africans hardest hit by the pass laws. But 
it is still surprising and a revelation that 
at last a political call that appeals to them 
has been raised. 117 
The Police station at Langa was reinforced: by the evening 
there were to be over 60 police armed with sten guns, riot sticks, 
118 
revolvers and Saracen armoured cars. At one o'clock the PAC 
leaders heard over the radio that over 40 demonstrators had 
been killed outside Sharpeville police station. 119 
Kgosana then went to Cape Town to visit men who had alre~dy 
been arrested at Philippi. In town he called at the Contact 
office where a very excited Patrick Duncan told him: 'You have 
poked the bees but you must be careful. Anything can happen 
tonight.,120 According to Duncan, Kgosana 'understood the 
dangers of the situation and the ever present possibility of 
121 
violence erupting.' Certainly Kgosana was anxious to keep his 
men in check. He told Contact: 
The senior officer in charge of the police 
refused to arrest me. He wanted to know 
who would control the demonstrators when I 
was in goal. I told him that our demon-
stration was opposed to violence. At this 
he shook my hand in congratulation. 122 
Kgosana's accounts of this meeting have changed over the 
years. When he wrote his life story for ~ in 1961, small 
details had already begun to differ from the statements he made 
to newspapers (notably Contact) in March 1960. In 1963 he again 
outlined the events in angry denunciation of Duncan123 and more 
recently he has written to the author repeating and amplifying 
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the accusations he made in 1963. 124 Vfhereas his ~ account 
depicts Duncan as enthusiastic about the campaign from the 
beginning, in his 1975 version Kgosana claims that Duncan 
advised him on 19 March not to participate in the campaign and 
was annoyed and surprised to learn that Kgosana was a PAC member. 
But Peter Hjul (Liberal Party Provincial Chairman) says this is 
nonsense.
125 Not only did the Liberals know that Kgosana was a 
member of the PAC but the radical Cape Liberal faction had 
deliberately helped him previously for that reason. That Duncan 
was enthusiastic and hopeful about the campaign is borne out by 
126 an article in Contact published just before the campaign begun. 
Kgosana does not mention that Duncan took him over to the Cape 
Times office to make a statement which emphasized the PAC's 
peaceful intentions. Judging by the ~ story and the diaries 
and memoirs of others present at the time,127 Kgosana and Duncan 
were on good terms that day. 
The Contact Liberals' exhilaration was understandable. 
Their enthusiasm for the PAC arose from a complex set of 
ingredients. They mistook the PAC's tactical injunction on 
violence for a principle. The Pan-Africanists' hostility to 
communism suited them too, particularly as they chose to ignore 
(or were unaware of) the lack on any doctrinal objections to 
communism in the speeches of PAC spokesmen (who mainly 
concentrated on the "foreignness" of communism and its exponents 
in South Africa). There was emotional reason for identification 
with the PAC cause among younger members of the Liberal Party. 
Like young black intellectuals (with whom there was more social 
contact than had ever taken place before) whites of radical 
sympathies were infected by the end of the 1950s with a sense of 
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crisis and of imminent change. As Lewis Nkosi has commented: 
It was a time of infinite hope and possibility; 
it seemed not extravagant in the least to 
predict that the Nationalist government would 
collapse ••• it was a time of thrust, never 
of withdrawal. 128 
The circumstances which stimulated this mood included the 
experience of a decade of mass political campaigning, the 
apparent inability of the state to suppress African opposition, 
the swelling chorus of international criticism of South Africa 
and the euphoria produced by decolonisation. It led some 
Liberals to take up rather illiberal positions: an admiration 
for mass militancy, for toughness and for confrontation. 
Duncan's adherents had little faith in the pressure-group tactics 
favoured by many of their Liberal Party colleagues. They sought 
involvement in a popular struggle and saw in the sudden mushrooming 
success of the PAC the appropriate vehicle for this. 
While Kgosana was in Cape Town 6,000 people gathered in the 
New Flats area in anticipation of the evening meeting. The 
police, who had toured the location in loudspeaker vans during 
the afternoon broadcasting a ban on public meetings arrived in 
force with Saracens and sten guns at 5.45 p.m. After giving an 
inaudible command to disperse they mounted two baton charges on 
the crowd. This only had the effect of transforming a peaceful 
gathering into a furious one. Some people began stoning the 
police and a large number surged forward. The commanding officer 
ordered his men to fire. Two people were killed and the rest fled. 
That night rioting broke out in Langa: police patrols were 
atta~ked; four churches were destroyedj129 municipal offices 
were burnt to the ground; African policemen's houses were looted; 
telephone wires cut and roads blocked to prevent the entry of fire 
engines. The mutilated body of a coloured man who had driven 
two white journalists into Langa was discovered the next day.1 30 
The strike was to gather momentum throughout the week. On 
Tuesday at 8.00 a.m. the hostels in Langa were raided and 
policemen burst into rooms and beat up anyone they found in 
them. 131 Kgosana spent the morning in hiding132 but visited 
Duncan in the afternoon.'33 The PAC erected road blocks in 
Nyanga and the bus crews stayed at home. 134 On Wednesday, Duncan 
held a bizarre dinner party to which he invited Kgosana, Thomas 
Ngwenya of the ANC, Randolph Vigne, and Anton Rupert, the tobacco 
magnate. Duncan's diary is cryptic: itA useful and friendly 
meeting", but Randolph Vigne remembers Rupert, a committed 
government supporter, being heavily patronising, drawing 
comparisons between immature African political development and 
unripe fruit and telling Kgosana that these days were likely to 
be the great moments of his life and he had therefore better get 
on and enjoy them. 135 Duncan had believed that Rupert, whom he 
saw as a figure with some influence, was open to persuasion to 
act on the PAC's behalf. Kgosana himself was to declare that the 
aim of the campaign had been to put pressure on industrialists 
who could appeal to the Government to lift the pass laws so that 
136 the work force would return to work. But the meeting was 
inconclusive: by all accounts neither Kgosana nor Rupert made 
much impression on each other. 
On Thursday, March 24, Kgosana spent much of the day in 
Cape Town, both in the Contact offices and those of New Age,1 37 
despite his own warning to his followers not to heed what New Age, 
138 in particular, said about the campaign. Duncan warned Kgosana 
that if he had anything further to do with the Congress of Democrats 
159 
he would have to cease counting on Liberal support (the day 
before, Duncan had agreed to arrange for the Liberals to obtain 
food supplies for strikebound Langa).1 39 Kgosana did not tell 
Duncan that he had already negotiated through Brian Bunting for 
the COD to deliver a truckload of food. 140 At the time, he 
ostensibly accepted Duncan's contention that to approach COD 
people was to contravene Sobukwe's orders. 
That evening Wilson Manetsi, a PAC regional executive member, 
left Langa, and presented himself with 100 volunteers at Cape 
141 Town police station for arrest. By now the Cape peninsula 
was the only area in which the PAC campaign was continuing. 
While workers were beginning to trickle back to their jobs in 
Vereeniging in Cape Town the stay-away was increasing its impact; 
the next morning fifty per cent of the African labour force was 
on strike. 
The PAC leaders, Makwetu, Kgosana, Nxelwa and Ndlovu, led 
a demonstration outside Cape Town's Caledon Square police head-
quarters. Estimates of its size varied between 2,000 and 5,000. 
Here there are different versions of what subsequently happened. 
Duncan's diary states that at 9.30 a.m. a telephone call came 
from Philip Kgosana who was on the Grand Parade in the middle of 
Cape Town, which warned him that the people of Langa were on 
their WfJ-Y to hand themselves over to the police. 
They have seen yesterday the police had room 
to arrest 101 men and they want to join them. 
Come quickly. 142 
At the time of Kgosana's telephone call only a small group had 
arrived, but soon the street was dotted with groups of men and 
when Kgosana approached the police station from the Grand Parade 
they gathered in a crowd in front of it. Kgosana's different 
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accounts have it that the crowd had come merely to demand the 
release of those already mentioned (which contradicts what he 
told reporters at the time) and he does not mention phoning 
Duncan. 143 But Hjul, like Duncan, remembers that Kgosana asked 
Duncan to join him outside the police station. 
Duncan arrived to find a 'good-humoured and relaxed crowd'; 
he noticed many dockers and saw approvingly that 'Task Force' 
runners were preventing the demonstrators from blocking the 
pavements or disturbing the traffic. 144 Ndlovu and Kgosana had 
already been arrested and taken inside the police station. 
Duncan then persuaded the police chief, Colonel I. B. S. Terblanche, 
who was facing the crowd, to negotiate with those PAC leaders 
still at liberty. This he agreed to do and at 11.40 a.m. five 
PAC men, Terblanche and Duncan went into the building. What 
happened then was subsequently transcribed in the record of the 
trial of the PAC leaders: 
Duncan: • • • these people have come to be 
arrested for failing to carry their 
passes. Is there no way in which you 
can satisfy them - even if it is just 
by tru{ing their names? They are 
peaceful and the crowd is under control 
of their leaders. 
Terblanche: But I am not going to arrest anyone 
of them. 
A little later: 
Terblanche: Do you see any room here to accommodate 
all the people? 
Makwetu: But yesterday you have arrested 101 of 
our friends and we want them to be with 
us. 
Terblanche: But I'm telling you here and now that I 
do not want to arrest any African for 
not carrying a reference book. They 
will, as in the past, be warned to appear 
in court. 
Makwetu: This is not good enough for us - we will 
never carry passes again. 
A little later: 
Terblanche: What will you do to get the people home? 
Makwetu: Let me tell them on your instructions 
that they need not carry passes any more. 
Terblanche: I cannot give you that permission but 
I'm willing to give instructions to my 
men that for a period of one month they 
will not ask for reference books. 
Makwetu: But Colonel, we never want to carry passes 
again. 
Terblanche: Look, this position cannot go on as it is 
at present, the locations are in disorder, 
road blocks have been put up to hamper the 
police in the execution of their duties, 
the people are hungry and children will die 
of hunger in the locations if this 
position is allowed to continue, but your 
men are responsible for it. Why are you 
bringing yourselves into disrepute? 
Makwetu: But Colonel, we are willing to go to work 
right now but we do not want to carry passes. 
Duncan: Your problem is to get the people away from 
the street and back home. 
Duncan: On what the Colonel said, that he is willing 
to give you a month's time to sort this 
position out, will you not try to take your 
people home. 
Makwetu: Two of our friends are here, we do not know 
where and we cannot go back without them. 1~ 
Duncan interceded again at this point and succeeded in persuading 
Terblanche of the wisdom of releasing Kgosana and Ndlovu. It 
is worth noting at this point the key role MIami Makwetu played 
in these negotiations. Makwetu was the leader of the migrant 
worker members of the PAC: that he should have had the stature 
to argue on behalf of his colleagues is indicative of the 
importance of the PAC's migrant following. With Kgosana and 
Ndlovu released the PAC leaders left Terblanche and went out in 
front of the crowd, which was told by Makwetu to return home. 
The crowd shouted him down but marched off chanting and singing, 
146 
carrying Philip Kgosana shoulder higho 
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That evening Terblanche's local ~ hoc suspension of the 
pass laws was dramatically extended to cover the whole country 
by General Rademeyer of the police and J. M. Erasmus, Minister 
of Justice. It was the first time that a Nationalist Government 
had conceded to an African political initiative and the action 
reflected the uncertainty of the government's handling of the 
crisis. 
Kgosana said later that he was furious Duncan had taken it 
upon himself to negotiate for the PAC. 147 There is no 
contemporary evidence for this and subsequent events suggest no 
break in their friendship at this point. After all, the PAC 
had won a considerable victory; they had succeeded in compelling 
the police to negotiate and offer concessions and Duncan's part 
in persuading both sides to talk to each other was crucial in 
this. Duncan helped to create the relationship which was 
emerging between the PAC leaders and the police, but it was also 
the result of Kgosana's own concern that tension should be 
avoided when dealing with the authorities. In the short term 
this relationship was to strengthen the PAC's hold on the town-
ships. Hjul claims that Duncan's object was to enhance the 
importance of the PAC - to establish a ~ facto recognition of 
the PAC's control of the locations and to restrain the police 
from interfering in them. Judging by the increasing success 
of the strike in the days that followed it is probable that 
police harassment did lessen. An indication of the degree of 
PAC control is given in August's diary: 
I put in a brief appearance at the Contact 
office, I must leave soon. The permission 
given to be by the task force, the youths 
of the PAC who have complete control of the 
townships, is due to expire. 
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In Langa this was probably consolidated by the closeness of 
the PAC to the Langa Vigilance Committee; the two organisations 
together arranged the funeral of police victims and money was 
collected by PAC men on behalf of both groups.1 48 Duncan's 
diary says that by March 26 "PAC committees were completely in 
charge of Nyanga and partly in charge in Langa." PAC influence 
was further strengthened over the weekend when they assumed 
control of the distribution of food supplies. Duncan, with the 
aim of prolonging the strike and with it PAC ascendancy in the 
townships, had energetically canvassed businessmen for funds as 
well as persuading wholesalers to replenish trading stores. 
Relief supplies were taken in by lorries driven by Black Sash 
women escorted by Kgosana and his task force. Duncan's support, 
though, was not altogether uncritical: 
The Nyanga East Committee came into the offices 
of Contact • • • They asked us to introduce 
them to the police. •• Before the committee 
went off to see Terblanche I told them I had 
sensed, on the Wednesday, that the police were 
very worried about the road blocks that had 
been built in Nyanga. I said it was difficult 
to see the point of them, that the police could 
only regard them as a provocation and as a 
challenge to their authority and that it might 
be wise to pull them down. They claimed that 
they had been put up by the tsotsis but that 
they would do what they could. 149 
Contemporary sources suggest that by the beginning of the 
second week the strike involved 95 per cent of the African 
labour force. 150 The strike was given extra impetus by Lutuli's 
call for a one day stay-at-home to mourn the dead of Langa and 
Sharpeville. The Johannesburg ~ reported that coloured 
people were blacklegging in Cape Town but at Worcester, where 
the coloured and African workers were integrated into a single 
union, coloured workers joined the strike. On the day of the 
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strike legislation was introduced to ban the PAC and ANC. 
Nyanga PAC had been rendered leaderless earlier in the 
campaign by the arrest of its chairman, Mlohoti. The committee 
sent a message to Duncan asking him to discover from Terblanche 
what had happened to Mlohoti. We do not have Terblanche's 
reply; Duncan does not mention what happened when he raised 
this matter. We do know that Duncan used this opportunity to 
assure Terblanche that the Liberals were behind the police so 
long as they kept the peace "by reasonable and humane methods".151 
Terblanche must have suitably impressed because he helped 
Duncan and Kgosana persuade an electrical goods supplier to 
lend a public address system to the Langa PAC committee. 
Terblanche also agreed that no uniformed police would be at the 
funeral for which the electrical equipment was needed. 152 The 
50,000 people who attended Monday's funeral in Langa included 
many ANC men who joined the singing of "aphi no majoni?" (Where 
is the Soldier?).1 5J The Cape Times recorded that apart from 
sporadic stoning of cars on Vanguard Drive, the major highway 
out of Cape Town, the occasion was peaceful. People arrived 
from all parts of the Western Cape to be greeted with shouts 
of "Afrika" and the clenched fist PAC salute. A small group of 
whites were seen to give the salute tooo PAC speakers told the 
crowd that the strike should continue, repeated their earlier 
warnings against violence and declared that in spite of recent 
events the Africans had no hatred for any other racial group.1 54 
Up until Monday, the three PAC committees in Nyanga East, 
Nyanga West and Langa were unable to co-ordinate their efforts. 
The Contact group succeeded in creating liaison between them. 155 
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Food deliveries to the townships organized by Duncan and other 
Liberals provided some relief to the strikers, although it is 
difficult to estimate their impact. Contact claimed that the 
Liberals raised £1,500 worth of food. 156 The South African 
Coloured People's Organisation sent food donated by Indians into 
Langa,157 and the COD provided a lorryload. As political 
gestures they were important: it must have enhanced the PAC's 
influence to be food distributors, but the food could not have 
gone very far in meeting the needs of 60,000 workers and their 
dependents. 
On Wednesday, over 1,500 people were arrested allover the 
country and the government declared a state of emergency. Most 
of the detainees were members of the ANC or allied organisations 
though their numbers included a few Liberals as well. No 
Liberals were arrested in Cape Town;1 58 apparently the Minister 
of Justice had requested Duncan's arrest, but Colonel Terblanche 
had advised against it. Without Liberals providing him with a 
link with the townships he could not guarantee law and order. 159 
Hjul thinks that Terblanche had a special regard for Patrick 
Duncan because Duncan's father, the Governor General, had been 
responsible for his early promotion. This may have been true 
but it was not enough to prevent Terblanche's men from repeating 
their attempts to break the strike. Police had broken into 
houses in Langa on March 28 and they had shot at those attempting 
to escape. 160 Early on Wednesday the police raided Langa with 
immense brutality. 
It was this last action which provided the immediate 
provocation for the march of the 30,000. It came after ten days 
of political crisis, after a strike which had brought Cape 
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industry to a standstill, after mass demonstrations had wrung 
concessions from authority, and after black people in Cape Town 
had had a chance to feel their power in a way that had never 
happened before. The march is thought to have been spontaneous. 
That is, it seems there was no elaborate organization for it, 
it had not been planned in advance and it could not really be 
said to have been led. The impression one gets is that the march 
was as much the result of the growing groundswell of political 
confidence amo~g Cape Town Africans, as a reaction to the police 
cruelty that morning. The Langa committee did claim at the 
time that such a march had been planned - but for Thursday 
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rather than Wednesday. Perhaps this explains the "stewards" 
marshalling "the crowd with wonderful control", observed by the 
162 New Age correspondent. Another indication of preparatory 
work was that the marchers were not only from Langa; a contingent 
from Nyanga also began the long journey into Cape Town - though 
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somewhat later in the day. According to eye-witnesses the 
mood of the crowd was peaceful, "almost jOyful,,164 and they 
marched in total silence. 165 
Whatever plans had been made beforehand, the PAC leaders 
were taken aback when it began. Kgosana admits that when he 
first heard the men were marching he was in bed and he had to 
be given a lift by an American reporter to get to the head of 
the procession. He caught up with the marchers as they came to 
the Athlone-Pinelands railway line, asked them why they were 
marching and was told it was to protest to the police in Caledon 
Square about the attacks of the morning. Kgosana then suggested 
that the objective should not be Caledon Square but the Houses 
of Parliament where they could find the Minister of Justiceo 166 
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This was agreed upon but in the event the march upon Parliament 
was called off. 167 Afterwards there were those who argued that 
had the marchers stuck to their decision the day would have 
ended differently. But had Parliament been besieged would the 
Government's resolve to continue have been broken? This is 
very doubtful and in any event the mood of the crowd was hardly 
likely to provoke a confrontation. Kgosana, after all, continues 
to insist on the limited objective of the march and the campaign 
in general. 
I think we did our best to demonstrate our 
opposition to white domination and 
oppression. We were shot at, we never 
fired back, we never killed a soul. 168 
The march ended, therefore, at Caledon Square. Thousands 
of people joined the procession at Mowbray railway station and 
the procession then took the De Waal Drive route into the city. 
The choice of route is significant: Kgosana was anxious not to 
169 disrupt traffic. Again this makes nonsense of the claim 
that the situation had a revolutionary potential. One witness 
remembers that the line of marchers good-humouredly made way 
for cars containing whites. At an early stage of the march a 
Liberal Party member had tried to persuade Kgosana not to take 
the procession to Parliament - the police reaction, she insisted 
would be too ruthless. 170 Kgosana refused to reassure her, 
saying the matter was out of his hands. But when he was 
confronted by Detective Head Constable Sauerman at the Rowland} 
Buitenkant streets intersection he agreed after some discussion 
to alter the destination of the marchers. 171 
The next decision was the most controversial. Kgosana had 
another meeting with Terblanche when he reached the police 
station and again he agreed to send the marchers home - this 
time in return for a promise of an appointment with the Minister 
of Justice, at Caledon Square at 5.00 p.m. that day. Janet 
Robertson states that Liberals persuaded Kgosana to disperse 
his men and praises them for doing so.171 Writers less 
sympathetic to Liberals see this as a betrayal, suggesting that 
they persuaded Kgosana to negotiate and turn back the men, and 
were thus instrumental in the surrendering of Kgosana's power.17J 
But the overwhelming weight of evidence suggests that no Liberals, 
and especially not Patrick Duncan, were involved on this occasion. 
Kgosana cannot remember Duncan or any other Liberal being present 
during the negotiations. 174 Duncan's diary does not mention 
any involvement - and as he publicly praised Kgosana's actions 
that day, it is unlikely that he would have failed to record any 
part he had played in directly influencing them. 175 Collingwood 
August remembers Liberals meeting in "secret conclave" in their 
office building but he does not mention any contact between them 
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and Kgosana. Hjul insists that Duncan was not at Caledon 
Square. Nor does Terblanche mention Duncan in his version of 
the meeting. Today the Colonel claims that he was ignorant of 
177 Kgosana's identity. 
There was a similarity in the pattern of events on March 25 
and March JO, and indeed on the latter occaSion, when the decision 
to turn back became known amongst those at the back of the crowd 
the rumour began to circulate that Kgosana had been swayed by 
178 Duncan and Terblanche. 
Liberals advised PAC men that Kgosana should not keep his 
appointment. 179 But Kgosana turned up at Caledon Square and 
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was arrested. He never did see J. M. Erasmus. 180 Finally 
after ten days of indecision, the Government reacted. Cordons 
were thrown around Langa. Not enough police or military units 
were locally available and sailors and soldiers were flown in. 181 
182 The cordon could only be extended to Nyanga three days later, 
but from the moment Langa was sealed off, black Cape Town had 
lost the struggle. 
Despite these events both Hjul and Duncan believed that 
their faith in Terblanche had been justified and that Terblanche 
had been overruled by the Union police chief, General Rademeyer 
and the Government. 183 But Terblanche said later that he was 
so afraid that the blacks would try and release their leaders 
that he himself asked the army to put cordons around Langa. 184 
It could be argued that although the Contact group wanted the 
PAC strong, and that some of their actions helped towards 
strengthening it (the food deliveries, Duncan's part in 
persuading Terblanche to suspend pass laws), their advice lost 
the strong negotiating position which the Cape Town PAC had 
temporarily won. Whatever the marchers might have achieved by 
staying in Cape Town that day, one thing is certain: they lost 
everything by going home. Liberals had, by contributing to the 
creation of an "understanding" between the PAC leaders and the 
police chief, strenghened the impression that the police were to 
be trusted, and that Terblanche would act in good faith. All 
along they had sought to eliminate tension, to remove any 
possibility of violence. Duncan was even prepared to defend the 
forces of law and order: 
Today a State of Emergency was declared. In 
my view the Government was compelled to do 
this, and I defended their moderation (up to 
date) in dealing with the Cape Town situation. 185 
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Moreover the Contact group had contributed to Kgosana's isolation 
from his followers. They had seen him as the key man, as the 
young messiah. Kgosana did have a hold on his followers, but, 
when he should have been with them, sharing their feelings, 
assessing their strength, working out a strategy of resistance, 
sensing the extent of their will to resist, he was elsewhere 
being interviewed and advised by well-intentioned whites. 
One has a feeling that throughout the crisis there was a four-
cornered relationship: the police chiefs, the Contact Liberals, 
the Kgosana group and finally the people of Langa and Nyanga. 
It was these last who had least say in the decisions. 
Resistance continued for over a week. By April 2 both 
townships were cordoned off by Navy, Army and Police units. 
Before Nyanga was totally surrounded 1,000 men were prevented 
hi C T 186 A t i h d i from marc ng on ape own. s ens on s owe no s gns of 
ebbing the Government mobilized the reserves. 187 . On Tuesday, 
April 4, the police moved, determined to break the strike. 
Liberals had been forbidden to bring in any more food the day 
before. Men were beaten without restraint on the streets of 
Langa. On April 7 the suspension of pass laws was revoked and 
the situation in Langa was "normal" enough for the cordon to 
be lifted. However the men surrounding Nyanga needed 
reinforcing. By now PAC leaders who were un-arrested and many 
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of the Liberals who had been involved were lying low. It 
took the police four days of continuous brutality to break the 
strike. They used sticks, batons, crow bars, guns and Saracen 
armoured cars to comb the townships and force the men back to 
work. On Wedesday, April 6, PAC men in Nyanga told foreign 
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journalists that the strike would go on until Sobukwe gave 
the word. The next day the police took the location by storm, 
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arresting 1,500 people and detaining 250. By the following 
Monday the strike was virtually over. For nearly three weeks 
the people of the Cape Town locations had presented the biggest 
challenge that had faced the South African government since the 
Defiance Campaign in 1952. 
As resistance gathered impetus in Cape Town and reached 
its apogee on March 30, elsewhere in the country an upsurge of 
protest began to assume national dimensions. On Thursday, March 
24, Chief Lutuli, responding to a suggestion by a ~ 
journalist,1 90 called for Monday, March 28, to be observed as 
a Day of Mourning with a worker stay-at-home. At the same time 
the ANC executive, antiCipating the suppression of the Congresses, 
decided to send an ANC representative abroad: Oliver Tambo was 
chosen and was driven from Cape Town to Bechuanaland by Ronald 
Segal, the editor of Africa South. Tambo was on a brief visit 
to Cape Town at the time to help co-ordinate local ANC responses 
to the PAC campaign. On Sunday Chief Lutuli, then in Pretoria 
giving evidence in the Treason Trial and staying with the branch 
chairman of the Liberal Party, burnt his pass. 
The next day response to the ANC strike call was almost 
total amongst Africans in many large towns. The stay-away was 
90 per cent effective in Johannesburg and similarly successful 
in Port Elizabeth and Durban. In Port Elizabeth the local PAC 
men circulated a leaflet telling people to ignore the ANC 
protest; this conflicted with a message, apparently smuggled 
out of prison from Sobukwe and publicised by the acting leader 
of the PAC in Johannesburg, William Jolobe, which advocated a 
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week long strike. 191 On the Rand participation in the protest 
was facilitated by employers who allowed their workers to do 
double shifts on Saturday to make up for the wages they would 
lose on Monday.1 92 
Despite the ANC's insistence on the peaceful conduct of 
the stay-away, in the late afternoon of the 28th violence broke 
out in many parts of Soweto as "tsotsi" gangs attacked homecoming 
workers who had ignored the strike call. Large groups of teen-
agers gathered outside the railway stations and manned road 
blocks to stone alighting passengers. Municipal buildings were 
set alight and the Rediffusion radio system's wiring ripped out. 
As the Tsotsis' attacks continued into the night the railway 
service was suspended the remaining commuters spending an 
uncomfortable night on the platforms of Johannesburg railway 
station. 193 Meanwhile small,groups of ANC supporters stood 
in streets and backyards and lit small fires in which they 
burnt their passes. Similar demonstrations were organised by 
the ANC during the next few days in other centres. 
The final eruption took place in Durban. On March 31 and 
April 1 huge processions attempted to march from Cato Manor 
by various routes through Durban's suburbs to the centre of the 
city. On both occasions the marchers were intercepted by police 
and driven back to the accompaniment of shooting by white 
civilian onlookers. One group of 1,000 people succeeded in 
getting through the police cordon and marched through Durban's 
shopping area to end up outside the central gaol demanding the 
release of ANC men detained on March 30. Unrest continued in 
Durban over the next week or so as ANC activists tried to mount 
a ten day stay-at-home which was fiercely contested by the 
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authorities. Interestingly the main support for the strike 
came from the migrant hostel dwellers rather than the 
inhabitants of the municipal townships.194 
The Sharpeville crisis has been viewed as an historical 
moment when, to quote R. W. Johnson, extraordinary chances 
were missed, when: 
Allover rural South Africa small and even 
medium-sized towns were suddenly denuded 
of their police, who were rushed to the 
urban centres. In almost no case did local 
Africans attempt to exploit the vacuum thus 
created in the countryside. 195 
Leaving aside for the moment the question of neglected 
opportunities, could the occasion when the authorities were 
confronted with the greatest potential threat, a defiant 
African crowd capable of occupying the central institutions of 
the state, have been exploited by African politicians to 
better effect? There were obvious flaws in the leadership 
provided by the PAC. Its strategic vagueness hardly prepared 
its followers for the inevitable confrontations with the police 
provoked by the campaign. Insistence on tactical non-violence 
ducked the issue of how to respond to the use or threat of 
violence by the authorities. There was also the organisational 
inexperience of many key men within the movement: in the case 
of Philip Kgosana this contributed to his dependence on the 
Liberals and in consequence the degree of influence, direct and 
indirect, Patrick Duncan had on his behaviour on both occasions 
at Caledon Square. The lack of involvement in activist politics 
during the 1950s of the Soweto leaders may have helped to reduce 
the potential impact the campaign had in Johannesburg. The 
failure to effectively picket public transport terminals in the 
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Johannesburg townships was especially neglectful. The 
impromptu action of teenage gangs one week later is an 
indication of one constituency which the PAC omitted to 
196 identify and harness. 
Possibly, had Kgosana refused to disperse his followers 
at Caledon Square, more significant and long lasting concessions 
could have been negotiated. This has been argued by the social 
anthropologist, John Blacking: 
Kgosana invoked the traditional idea of a 
peaceful protest in which the numerical 
strength of people and their implied 
threat of non-cooperation should have been 
sufficient to produce a just response; 
but he did not follow the idea through by 
waiting patiently until their demands had 
been satisfied, as did, for example, a 
famous Venda chief and his followers, who 
surrounded the Government's administrative 
offices with an orchestra of over three 
hundred reed-pipes and accompanying drums, 
and also the followers of a head women who 
resisted another Chief's autocratic attempt 
to replace her with a favoured rival ••• 
his fault was rather that in dealing with 
whites, he invoked the idealized knowledge 
of European thought and society that he had 
learnt at school and university ••• rather 
than following the logic of traditional 
African politics which had started the march 
and moving no further than he could see 
clearly. 197 
In this context it is interesting that Colonel Terblanche 
claims that: 
I could not see my way clear to using force 
in the heart of Cape Town • • 0 I was 
determined to find a peaceful solution and 
I was prepared to stand there and argue for 
days if necessary to avoid bloodshed. 198 
With better organisation the PAC might have succeeded in 
mobilising a larger following on the Rand. But it is unlikely 
that much more would have been achieved. Unarmed demonstrations, 
however large, were a poor match for aggressive and well-armed 
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police. The main thrust of the PAC campaign developed within 
the townships: here revolt was easiest to control and suppress. 
Many urban Africans still thought in terms of protest rather 
than resistance - the double shifts worked on Saturday, March 26, 
were a telling instance of this - so revolt was in any case, 
outside Cape Town and Cato Manor at least, unlikely. Johnson's 
suggestion that while the State was concentrating its resources 
on securing control over the main urban centres, African 
nationalists should have unleashed rebellion in the smaller 
towns and the countryside overestimates the real extent to 
which the power of the administration was challenged. As one 
contemporary analysis pointed out, during the Sharpeville crisis 
18,000 people were arrested in the countryside for normal legal 
199 infringements. It also ignores the way that the nationalist 
movement had developed during the 1950s: this derived much of 
its strength from urban concentrations of industrial workers 
and both ideologically and in terms of its structure was scarcely 
a revolutionary force. 
The significance of the Sharpeville crisis was not that it 
was an occasion when revolutionary political and social conditions 
were present and consequently squandered. Instead it represented 
a turning point in the history of African politics, when protest 
finally hardened into resistance, and when African politicians 
were forced to begin thinking in terms of a revolutionary 
strategy. But this shift in their perception of their role was 
• derived not so much from an accurate reappraisal of the strength 
and inadvisability of white South Africa as it successfully 
contained the challenge presented by African political movements, 
176 
but rather from an illusion of its vulnerability. They were 
not alone in believing in the possibility of imminent 
political change. In the wake of the Sharpeville shootings 
there was a massive withdrawal of investors' confidence giving 
rise to a short-term business slump and a cabinet minister was 
to call for reforms in government policies affecting Africans. 200 
The sense of crisis generated by the Sharpeville shootings and 
their aftermath appeared to be a vindication of advocacy of 
armed insurgency. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE POQO INSURRECTION, 1961-1968 
This chapter provides a narrative of the Pan-Africanist 
Congress's development inside South Africa between 1960 and 
1967. It outlines the extent of the organisation's support, 
as well as offering some generalisations about the PAC's 
sociological character in the different regions where it had 
influence. The chronology is needed for two reasons. First, 
the very detailed local studies which follow in later chapters 
should be understood in the light of a more general historical 
context. Secondly, there are no studies which examine this 
phase of the PAC's development in any depth. Gail M. Gerhart's 
Black Power in South Africa, the most detailed and lengthy 
1 treatment of the PAC, devotes less than two pages to a 
description of the 'Poqo' movement and this perfunctoriness is 
2 
characteristic of the relevant secondary literature. Some of 
the historiographical issues which arise from the analysis of 
this movement are discussed in the conclusion to this chapter. 
After the Sharpeville crisis and a confused period during 
which African politicians adjusted to new conditions of 
illegality a variety of insurgent organisations emerged. Of 
these the two most significant were those linked to the PAC and 
the African National Congress. These were both dedicated to 
revolutionary transformations of society and were both prepared 
to employ violent measures to attain this but there the 
similarity between them ended. The PAC-oriented 'Poqo' movement 
and the ANe's military wing 'Umkonto we Sizwe' reflected in 
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their divergent strategies the fundamental ideological and 
strategic differenc'es which had led to the fission in African 
resistance politics in the 1950s. As well as this the PAC 
insurgents were very much more numerous than the Umkonto 
activists. Whilst the latter operated as an elite within the 
framework of a larger clandestine and sometimes less committed 
'support organisation') the Poqo insurgency in certain 
localities attained the dimensions of a mass movement. 
Reaching the peak of its influence in 1963, the Poqo movement 
was still capable three years later of inspiring violent 
conspiracies: in 1966 in the Eastern Cape alone, 85 men 
accused of PAC activity were convicted in six trials. 4 In 
terms of its geographical extensiveness, the numbers involved 
and its timespan, the Poqo conspiracies of 1962-1968 represent 
the largest and most sustained African insurrectionary movement 
since the inception of modern African political organisations 
in South Africa. 
The word 'Poqo' is a Xhosa expression meaning 'alone' or 
'pure'. The earliest known usage of the word in the context of 
a separatist organisation occurred when the Ethiopianist Church 
of South Africa was established. Its members would describe 
themselves as: 'Ndingum Topiya Poqo' (belonging to the Church 
of Ethiopia).5 The word was used sometimes in the Western Cape 
in 1960 as a slogan by PAC members to describe the character of 
their organisation in contrast to the multiracial dimension of 
6 the Congress Alliance. Leaflets allegedly circulated by PAC 
activists in Port Elizabeth in May 1961 opposing the ANC's call 
for a stay-away in protest against the governments' proclamation 
of a republic bore the legend: 'May demos a fraud, Poqo, Poqo, 
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Poqo,.7 The authorities and the press tended to employ the 
term to describe all PAC-connected conspiracies though only 
PAC supporters in the Cape identified themselves as Poqo members 
at first. Here, for the sake of simplicity, the state's usage 
of the term will be followed, though, as will become clear, 
different regional concentrations of PAC/Poqo affinity had 
quite distinct social characteristics. The first moves towards 
the formation of a violent organisation came in the Western 
Cape and it is here that the narrative will begin. 
The Western Cape, and in particular the Cape Peninsula, 
had been one of the areas of strongest support for the PAC. 
As we have seen this could be related to the particularly 
fierce effects of influx control in the Cape Peninsula, the 
'repatriation' of women and children to the Transkei, the 
refusal of the authorities to construct adequate housing and 
sharply deteriorating living conditions. In addition, in the 
early 1960s the imposition of Bantu Authorities and land 
rehabilitation measures in the Transkei also influenced the 
political responses of Africans in the Cape Peninsula and its 
hinterland. The Pan-Africanist Congress's rhetorical militancy, 
the incorporation into its ideology of themes drawn from 
traditions of primary resistance, and the immediacy of its 
strategic objectives made it especially attractive to the 
increasingly large migrant worker population of Cape Town. 
The Pan Africanists found an important section of their 
8 following in the 'bachelor zones' of Langa. However, of the 
thirty-one PAC leaders who were subsequently put on trial in 
Cape Town after the 1960 pass campaign, only seven men were 
from the migrant workers' hostels in Langa and Nyanga. 
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Unfortunately, the trial documentation only contains full 
details of the backgrounds of a few of the leaders: they 
included a herbalist, a dry cleaning examiner, a domestic 
servant, a university student, a tailor and a farmworker and 
their ages ranged from 22 to 55 (the majority of the accused 
were over thirty). At least seven were former members of the 
ANC and one had once belonged to the Communist Party.9 The 
evidence suggests a not altogether surprising social pattern: 
a political movement with a large following amongst migrant 
workers, but with positions of responsibility held by men with 
at least some education, work skills and political experience. 
During the 1960 pass campaign as well as before and after 
it, there was considerable contact between the local Pan 
Africanist leaders and members of the multiracial Liberal 
Party. This was despite frequent attacks on white radicals 
10 
who had been associated with the Congress movement. Local 
Liberals were seeking a mass base and though wary of the 
racialist undertones of Pan-Africanist ideology, they sympathised 
with and were attracted by the PAC's hostility to left wing 
influences within the Congress movement. Cape Town PAC· 
leaders, whatever their private feelings about the Liberals, 
were glad to accept offers of assistance· that appeared to be 
without strings, and allowed certain Liberals to play an 
important intermediary role between them and the authorities 
during the 1960 troubles in Cape Town. Whereas this relation-
ship had certain advantages at the time, it did have the effect 
of isolating the leaders from rank and file membership, as well 
11 
as the large informal following the campaign generated. 
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In the months following the crisis of March-April 1960, 
this gulf between leaders and followers was to widen and take 
on a factional form. Some of the main leaders, including 
Philip Kgosana, jumped bail and left the country towards the 
end of 1960. This considerably weakened the degree of 
influence of those who remained. Accounts by two Cape Town 
journalists tell of a struggle in the Cape Town locations 
between moderates and extremists. 12 The 'extremists' identified 
the 'moderates' as those PAC men who had flirted with the 
Liberal Party. They were 'Kantangese, the treacherous ones 
who are playing the same role as Moishe Tshombe in the congo,.1) 
These accounts are substantiated by some of the trial evidence. 
In a trial of old age home workers two of the accused in their 
statements to the police (possibly made after they had been 
tortured) mentioned a dispute within the PAC in Cape Town. 
One group was led by two Nyanga leaders, both former members 
of the regional executive of the legal PAC, Christopher Mlokoti 
and Abel Matross. 14 Mlokoti and Matross were the PAC men who 
made the initial contact with the Liberal Party in late 1959. 15 
The other faction was allegedly led by MIami Makwetu and 
16 Wellington Tshongayi. Makwetu had been branch secretary at 
Langa New Flats in 1960 and was a dockero 17 Tshongayi also 
belonged to the PAC in 1960 and was secretary of the Crawford 
18 branch. He was imprisoned after the pass campaign. What the 
evidence suggests is a struggle for dominance of the underground 
movement in early 1961 between upper and lower eschelon leader-
ship with the latter, by virtue of their stronger links with 
migrant hostel dwellers, becoming ascendent. 
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This split in the underground movement (which was 
accompanied by fighting between the different groups)1 9 was 
followed by a period of extensive recruitment and organisation 
by the dominant faction. It seems that it was at this point 
20 that the 'cell system' was established. Within Langa, and 
elsewhere in Cape Town, recruitment and organisation was often 
done by forming groups composed of men who had come from a 
particular rural region. Although this flowed naturally from 
a situation where migrant workers would often choose to live 
with friends or relatives from their homeplace, there was an 
element of self consciousness in the way it was done. For 
example in Langa, there was a special 'Lady Frere' group 
drawn from men who lived in Zones 19, 20, 23 and 24 of the Langa 
21 
single men's quarters. This would have obvious advantages 
22 
when Poqo began to extend its influence into the Transkei. 
It also meant that Poqo cell members would not only live in 
close proximity with each other, they would also probably be 
employed together. 2J Theoretically, each cell was composed of 
ten men: in fact they were often larger and in any case 
individual cells would combine for larger meetings often 
involving over a hundred people. Similarly large groups would 
24 sometimes accompany recruiters on their rounds. Each cell 
would have a leader. 
Langa seems to have been regarded by other Poqo groups 
as the local head-quarters of the movement: certainly it was 
recruiting teams from Langa who played the most active role in 
spreading the influence of the movement. There were recorded 
instances of Langa activists establishing cells or branches 
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in different parts of Cape Town. Men living in employers' 
compounds seem to have been a favourite target for recruiting 
operations: a Poqo group at the Cape Town Jewish Old Age 
Home also included workers from a nearby hotel. Another 
trial, which collapsed through lack of evidence, involved 
staff from the Brooklands Chest Hospital. 25 Poqo activists 
fanned out from Cape Town to the smaller urban centres and 
the farms surrounding them, either starting new cells or 
reactivating PAC branches. Considerable effort seems to have 
been devoted to building cells among farmworkers: according 
to state witness evidence in a trial involving a member of 
Tshongayi's cell, there was an unsuccessful meeting to recruit 
26 people on a farm near Somerset West in February 1961. More 
successful in this context apparently was the establishment of 
a Poqo cellon a farm at Stellenbosch in October 1961 after a 
visit by three Poqo men from Cape Town.27 A Poqo group was 
active between March 1962 and April 1963 on a farm in the 
28 Elgin District. 
Poqo's message was stated in simple direct terms. In 
December 1961 'a leaflet in Xhosa was picked up in Nyanga. 
It read: 
We are starting again Africans • • • we die 
once. Africa will be free on January 1st. 
The white people shall suffer, the black 
people will rule. Freedom comes after 
bloodshed. Poqo has started. It needs a 
real man. The Youth has weapons so you need 
not be afraid. The PAC says this. 29 
Sometimes the message was more specific, farmworkers were told 
that Poqo intended to take the land away from whites and give 
it to Africans. 30 Men in Wellington were told that one day 
they must throw aw~y their passes and take over the houses of 
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the whites. All who did not join Poqo would be killed along 
'with the white bosses'. Men in Paarl were told there was 
no need for whites; the factories and the industries would 
carryon as usual, for was it not the black people who 
worked in them?)1 Chiefs should be killed, for it was they 
who were responsible for the endorsement-out of Africans 
from the Western Cape.)2 Sometimes Poqo members giving 
evidence would repeat some of the old PAC slogans - from Cape 
to Cairo, from Morocco to Madagascar,)) - but often witnesses 
would claim that they knew nothing of the ANC or PA~.)4 This 
may have been prompted by caution on their part, but what is 
noticeable is that many of the distinctive attributes of PAC 
speeches given at a popular level had disappeared: there 
were no references to Pan Africanism, communism or socialism 
and no careful clarifications of the movement's attitude with 
regard to the position of racial minorities. Ideological 
statements had been boiled down to a set of slogans: 'We 
must stand alone in our land,;)5 'Freedom - to stand alone 
and not be suppressed by whites,;)6 'amaAfrica Poqo'; 
'Izwe Lethu' (our land). Poqo's lack of a 'political theory', 
the brutal simplicity of its catchphrases, the absence of any 
social programme save for the destruction of the present order 
and its replacement with its inversion in which white would 
be black, and black would be white, all this has helped to 
diminish its importance in the historiography of South African 
resistance movements. But because the slogans were simple 
does not mean that they were banal; they evoked a profound 
response from men who had been forced off the land, whose 
families were being subjected to all forms of official 
harassment, as well as economic deprivation, who perceived 
every relationship with authority in terms of conflict: 
whether at the workplace, in the compound, or in the 
reserve. These were men who had no place to turn to. And 
hence the all-embracing nature of the movement's preoccupations, 
its social exclusiveness. and its urgency. The undertone of 
millinarianism, the concept of the sudden dawning of a Juster 
era, the moral implications of the word 'poqo' (pure) - these 
are not surprising. For here was a group of men who were 
simultaneously conscious both of the destruction that was 
being wreaked upon their old social world, and the hopelessness 
of the terms being offered to them by the new order. 
The strategy of a general uprising logically developed 
from this vision. The twenty one farmworkers of Stellenbosch 
put on trial in June 1962 were found guilty on a number of 
charges which included making preparations to attack a farm 
manager and his family, to burn the farm buildings and then to 
march to the town firing buildings on the way. For weapons 
the men sharpened old car springs into pangas. 37 The initiative 
for this strategy was probably a local one: most of the 
national PAC leadership was in prison in 1961 and early 1962 
and had only fully regrouped in Maseru in August 1962. 38 But 
by late 1962, judging from the evidence of men involved in the 
Poqo attack at Paarl, Poqo members were conscious of a plan 
for a nationally co-ordinated insurrection, the directives for 
which would come from above. 39 In March 1963, Potlake Leballo, 
the PAC's acting president, told a journalist that he was in 
touch with Western Cape and other regional leaders. 40 Despite 
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this co-ordination of the Congress, there is a strong case 
for asserting that the insurrectionary impetus came initially 
from below and, as I have argued, can be directly related to 
the social situation of Poqo's local leaders and their 
followers. Certainly the violent impetus developed much 
earlier in PAC groups in the Western Cape than elsewhere, the 
first attacks on policemen or their informers beginning in 
Paarl in April 1961 and in Langa in April the following year. 
Before the end of 1962 several groups had travelled from the 
Langa migrant workers' quarters to the Transkei in efforts to 
kill the Emigrant Tembu paramount chief, Kaiser Mantazima and 
a full scale insurrection had taken place in the small Boland 
town of Paarl. These will be described and analysed in 
subsequent chapters. 
While the Western Cape Poqo cells had an internal dynamiC 
and momentum of their own, elsewhere the movement, more 
systematically structured and more heirarchical than in the 
Western Cape, was motivated less by local causes of social 
tension and more by the strategic conception of those members 
of tte PAC's national executive who remained at liberty or who 
had been released from prison. Partly for this reason it was 
less effective. Initially, with most of the main leaders in 
prison there were few signs of PAC activity. With the end of 
the emergency in August 1960 some important PAC men who had 
been detailed along with Congress Alliance people were released. 
In particular, two Evaton leaders, both on the National 
Executive, were once again at liberty.41 One of them, Z. B. 
Molete, was delegated the task of presiding over the underground 
organisation, while the other office-bearers were in prison and 
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he, together with Joe Molefi, began reviving branches. 
The first indication of the re-establishment of an 
operating PAC leadership was the circulation of a typewritten 
leaflet in September in the Transkei with the heading 'A Call 
to PAC Leaders'. The leaflet instructed PAC branches to divide 
into smaller units, cells. Branch leaders were instructed to 
establish contact with the national and regional executives in 
Johannesburg. Finally. the leaflet exhorted PAC members to 
'prepare for mass disciplined action', for a 'final decisive 
phase' with the object of 'total abolition of the pass laws,.42 
Obviously the leafletb authors were still thinking of continuing 
the pre-Sharpeville strategy of mass civil disobedience. There 
was no explicit indication in the leaflet of the possibility of 
violence. That Molete and his colleagues did not at this stage 
share the insurrectionary disposition which was developing in 
the Cape is also indicated by their initial willingness to 
participate in the Orlando Consultative Conference of December 
1961. 43 
The Orlando Conference was prompted by a suggestion from 
the Inter-dominational African Minister's Federation. Attending 
the meeting were representatives from the ANC and the PAC, as 
well as leading African members of the Liberal and Progressive 
Parties. At the insistence of PAC spokesmen whites and 
coloured were excluded. 44 After several speeches, including an 
address by Z. B. Molete on 'The Struggle against the Pass Laws,45 
the meeting resolved in favour of political unity, non-violent 
pressures against apartheid, non-racial democracy, and the 
calling of an 'All-in Conference representative of African 
people' to agitate for a national constitutional convention. 
A continuation committee under the chairmanship of Jordan 
Ngubane, a former Youth Leaguer and a member of the Liberal 
Party, was elected. 
The work of this continuation committee was soon over-
shadowed by conflict between the Liberals and the PAC on the 
one hand and the ANC on the other. Ngubane claimed that the 
ANC with financial assistance from the South African Communist 
Party worked to control the committee and the All-in Conference. 
Without consulting other committee members ANO peopl~ drafted 
publicity for the Conference to ensure its pro-Congress 
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character. Though Ngubane's accusations were probably some-
what exaggerated it is likely that neither the PAC nor the ANC 
had a particularly sincere concern for unity, not if this 
required making concessions to the other side. By mid-March 
the PAC men and Ngubane had resigned from the continuation 
committee and the All-in Conference held in Pietermaritzberg on 
the 25th and 26th March, was, despite the attendance of delegates 
from 140 organisations, a characteristically Congress affair. 
Among the 1,400 participants were whites, coloureds and Indians 
from the allied organisations. Traditional ANC rhetoric, songs 
and slogans predominated. The highlight of the event was the 
appearance of a recently unbanned Nelson Mandela, who made his 
first public speech since 1952. In his address Mandela announced 
the first phase of the campaign for a national convention which 
would take the form of a three-day stay-at-home, the last day 
of which would coincide with South Africa's proclamation of a 
republic on May 31st. Preparations for the strike would 
include an ultimatum to the Government to c~ll a convention. 
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At the time of the Orlando Conference it seems likely 
that the PAC leaders at liberty did not have a very clear 
conception of the future role of their organisation. Hence 
their somewhat unrealistic adherence to the concept of a 
pass campaign which required forms of mobilisation unsuited 
to the operation of a clandestine movement. That they were 
initially willing to participate in the Orlando Conference 
and the continuation committee established in its wake was 
another indication of their confusion. Their withdrawal from 
the committee was prompted apparently by a message from their 
imprisoned colleagues brought to them by Matthew Nkoana, a 
national executive member who was released early as a result 
of his fine being paid. 41 Nkoana left prison with 'instructions 
to crush moves to unity'. Immediately he took the leadership 
out of the hands of Molete who, as he put it, was 'suffering 
from indecision' and rejected an initiative from Mandela to 
participate in the organisation of the anti-republic protest: 
'I met Mandela at that time, he invited 
me to his house ••• in connection with 
these plans for the stay-at-home, but 
when we parted he was in no doubt as to 
where he stood, we didn't (indistinct) 
pre-1960 tactic of demonstration - if 
there had to be any action it had to 
take off from 1961 and not pre-1960 and 
a three day demonstration was really 
going back to pre-1960.' 48 
Accordingly Nkoana devoted his energies to the production 
of a somewhat cerebral broadsheet, Mafube, which inter alia, 
outlined the reasons for opposing the strike. Bundles of them 
were despatched to surviving PAC officials in different centres. 49 
In the case of the Cape Town branches it seems they were ignored: 
in the Duncan papers there is a statement signed by a Langa PAC 
201 
member which condemns the opposition to the stay-at-home and 
accuses the (coloured) Non European Unity Movement of 
distributing anti-strike leaflets in the PAC's name.50 This 
may have been a reflection of the local rift which had at 
this stage developed: apparently in May 1961 an anonymous 
PAC official from Johannesburg visited Cape Town in an 
unsuccessful effort to unite the two factions. 51 
By July 1961 Nkoana's pamphleteering had come to the 
attention of the authorities and both he and Molete were 
arrested and subsequently accused of PAC activities. Both 
entreated bail (pending appeal against their sentences) and 
.----
left the country in early 1962, Nkoana for Bechuanaland52 and 
Molete joining the growing nucleus of PAC fugitives concentrated 
in Maseru. Before Nkoana's trial he visited Port Elizabeth and 
was most alarmed by what he witnessed there: 
I went to a meeting in the Eastern Cape 
where I felt those fellows ••• we had 
great difficulty in containing our 
followers. I was taken to address a 
public meeting - of a banned organisation: 
a public meeting! Hidden in the bushes. 
As we go there we had to be guided by 
scouts at regular intervals along the way, 
and then I addressed a public meeting. 
That's when I came back feeling that the 
PAC were going to be unable to control our 
chaps. Those were the rudiments of Poqo. 53 
At some point between this visit in mid 1961 and early 
1962 the PAC's leadership committed themselves to an insurrec-
tionist strategy for in March 1962 a PAC leader for Johannesburg 
spoke to a meeting of the 'Task Force' in New Brighton chiding 
them for their lack of effort in recruitment and comparing 
them unfavourably with groups in Cape Town and East London who 
were 'ready for the fight' and who were just waiting 'until the 
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day Sobukwe is out of jail·.54 No information is available 
on how and when this decision was made but it is unlikely that 
it involved much heartsearching: the PAC's previous strategy 
had been geared to an apocalyptic concept and Nkoana's concern 
had arisen from a concern for caution and discipline rather 
than any moral reservations about violence. What seems most 
likely is that the violent impulses which were beginning to be 
discernible in the Cape in early 1961 encouraged if not 
prompted the leaders to plan a general uprising. 55 
By late 1962 the headquarters of the movement had been 
transferred from its rather precarious situation on the 
Witwatersrand to Maseru. Potlake Leballo had arrived in August56 
and armed with the authority of a letter from Robert Sobukwe 
established a 'Presidential Council' with himself as Acting 
Chairman. 57 From this point preparations for a popular 
insurrection began in earnest. But before examining these let 
us first look at the nature and the scope of the PAC's 
organisation and support that had developed by the beginning 
of 1963. 
There are two main sources of information on the size 
and location of the PAC's organisation. These are firstly the 
often grandiose claims made by the PAC leaders themselves and 
secondly the evidence emerging from court eases. The former 
provide a rather exaggerated impression of PAC strength, while 
in the case of the latter the evidence is incomplete. Despite 
the unsatisfactory quality of the evidence it is possible to 
reconstruct from it a picture of the surprisingly extensive 
network of PAC supporters. 
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PAC spokesmen in their claims about their organisation 
tended to depict it in terms of a formal bureaucratic 
hierarchy with clear lines of communication and control 
linking leaders with followers. In November 1962 Potlake 
Leballo stated in an interview that the PAC had sixteen 
regions, each with its own regional executive controlling a 
number of branches, themselves divided into cells. These 
regions embraced most of the country including the reserves. 58 
Patrick Duncan, echoing Leballo, in an article in the London 
Times, wrote of\150 'Cells' with it being 'not uncommon' for a 
cell to have 1,000 members. 59 A London newsletter carried a 
60 
report of twelve 1,OOO-strong cells in the Western Cape. 
These figures are likely to have been inflated. In December 
1959 before its banning the PAC claimed a total affiliation of 
61 150 branches with 31,035 members. Even this figure was a 
remarkably rapid expansion, bearing in mind the statistics 
given one month previously for 101 branches and 24,664 members 
distributed in the following fashion: 
Transvaal 
- 47 branches - 1),)24 members 
Cape 
- 34 branches - 7,427 members 
Natal 
- 15 branches - 3,612 members 
Orange Free State - 5 branches - 301 members 62 
As will be obvious from figures cited in the previous 
chapter even this quite modest claim should be treated with 
scepticism: according to the available evidence it is unlikely 
that membership of the Western Cape exceeded 1,000, and this 
seemed to be where the organisation was strongest. 63 A claim 
by Robert Sobukwe that at the time of the launching of the Pass 
Campaign PAC membership totalled 200,00064 should not be taken 
seriously. If, before the banning of the organisation the PAC 
leadership presented inaccurate information on the size of 
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their following then their membership claims produced after 
April 1960 were likely to have been no more reliable. 
Numerical calculations of membership, though, are misleading. 
indications of a movement 'scapacity to mobilise large numbers 
of people. As we have seen in the case of the Cape Town 
disturbances, relatively small numbers of activists could 
function as catalysts for large scale unrest in a volatile 
social context. More important are the questions of where the 
organisation's members were situated, what sort of people were 
they, and what kind of social environment did they live in. 
It is possible to document the existence of sixty-eight 
Poqo groups as functioning in the April 1961 to April 1963 
period (the two dates representing the period between the PAC's 
banning and the time of the projected uprising). These can be 
grouped in the following regional concentrations: 
Transvaal 22 
Western Cape 16 
Eastern Cape 11 
Transkei 14 
Natal 4 
Orange Free state 2 
Table A provides a summary of the evidence upon which this data 
is based. Let us look at each regional concentration in turn, 
beginning with the Transvaal. 
The twenty two Transvaal branches listed in the table 
represent those on which information is available, either from 
first hand testimony of former activists from the Transvaal 
organisation, or from the records of the trials of those groups 
arrested by the police. Obviously the data is incomplete but 
because of the inadequacy of the leadership's security precautions 
(see below) it is unlikely that many other active groups existed. 
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The major areas of PAC activity in this period were first 
in Pretoria and then the townships of the West Rand and the 
Southern Transvaal. Reflecting a previous pattern these 
were areas where the ANC had been relatively weak or inactive. 
The reasons for the PAC's success in expanding its following 
in Pretoria must be left to the historical analysis in 
Chapter Six. Here our concern will be limited to forming 
generalisations about the movement's social character and 
quality of organisation. From the often sparse details 
provided by trial reports and newspaper reports it seems that 
the Transvaal membership was generally youthful - the vast 
majority being in their teens or early twenties - and if they 
were not still attending school were usually employed in 
white-collar occupations. A few examples will have to suffice. 
The eight men convicted for a PAC conspiracy in Davey town 
included a clerical worker, a laboratory assistant, a caterer, 
an insurance salesman and a schoolboy. Their .ages ranged from 
seventeen to twenty-three years. 65 In Pretoria at least two 
groups consisted entirely or mainly of school children. This 
was the case in Atteridgeville Township, where a PAC cell led 
66 by two teachers existed at Hofmeyr High School as well as at 
67 Kilnerton High School. There was also a PAC cell (or branch?) 
68 
at the Hebron African Teacher Training Colleteo Four men 
imprisoned for their activities as part of a PAC conspiracy 
in Orlando, Soweto t included an unemployed clerk, an unemployed 
school leaver and an employee of the Municipal Pass Office. 
All four were aged twenty or twenty-oneo 69 In Dobsonville. 
Roodepoort, the twenty-nine year old editor of a religious 
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newspaper was alleged to be chairman of the local PAC branch. 70 
The chairman of the PAC's Vaal region was David Sibeko, a young 
sports journalist. 71 Even from this very impressionistic 
picture there are obvious contrasts with the movement developing 
in Langa described earlier in the chapter. Noticeable by their 
absence from the list of identifiable Transvaal PAC members 
are industrial or service workers and hostel dwellers. Here 
the PAC was a movement of the young, the urbanised and the 
lower middle class and when educational details are available 
they suggest that most members had had at least a few years of 
primary education and that many had attended or were attending 
high school. The last point is worth drawing attention to in a 
context in which African secondary school enrolment in 1960 
represented less than 4% of total Afric~ school enrolment. 72 
The importance of schoolchildren as an element in the PAC's 
following was often attested to by PAC leaders in the early 
1960s. 73 What evidence exists in the form of trials does not 
suggest an extensive PAC following in the 1960-1963 period in 
Natal. Efforts were made to rebuild the organisation after its 
banning in the Durban area in January 1961 and there were 
attempts to proselytise and recruit in Pietermaritzburg, Howick 
and Chesterville. According to an interview with Jordan Ngubane 
a PAC 'Task Force' at the Ohlanga Institute existed to which 
his son belonged. 74 In 1963 it received instructions to set 
fire to surrounding c~e fields as its contribution to the 
uprising. From the limited information available to attempt 
even tentative generalisations would not be justifiable. The 
same is also the case with the Orange Free State, where only 
two branches can be identified as existing before April 1960, 
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in Welkom and Bethlehem. 75 The goldmining town of Welkom 
continued to be a centre of PAC activi~y with at least three 
groups being active after the banning of the organisation. 76 
The Cape Province and the Transkei contained the main 
centres of PAC activity. In the c~se of the Eastern Cape, 
evidence from the 1960-1963 period suggests that there were 
PAC branches in the two main towns, East London and Port 
Elizabeth, in educational institutions (Bensonvale,77 Lovedale 
College78 and Fort Hare University College79 ), and in several 
80 81 82 of the smaller towns as well: De Aar, Grahamstown, Herschel, 
King William's Town,83 Molteno,84 Queenstown,85 and Steynsburg.86 
With the exception of King William's Town there is very little 
information available on the 196) Poqo groups in the smaller 
towns, though after 1963 teachers played a key role in Poqo 
conspiracies in those centres as well as in Middleburg87 and 
may have done so earlier. Bearing in mind the concentration 
of important African educational institutions in the Eastern 
Cape and the evidence of political activity within them it is a 
reasonable hypothesis that some of their graduates may have 
functioned as political catalysts in nearby communities. In 
King William's Town, for instance, one of the members of the 
88 local Poqo groups had recently been expelled from Lovedale. 
In King William's Town thirty-three men were accused in 1963 
of taking part in a Poqo insurrection. They were led by three 
factory workers, local men who had grown up in the town's 
locations of Zwelitsha and Tshatshe. With the exception of 
seven men most of the accused were under twenty-five years of 
89 
age and the oldest was only fifty. A similar picture emerges 
from a triai concerning four men from New Brighton, Port Elizabeth: 
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they and the various other people cited in the trial as Poqo 
activists were young, with at most a few years of primary 
education, born in the locality, and if not at school 
employed in unskilled capacities in various factories: a 
steelworks and a car spring factory are specifically referred 
to in the record. 90 For the Eastern Province there is most 
evidence of PAC activity in East London. One of the original 
nuclei of Africanists was in East London and the local PAC 
branch had been active in the 1960 pass campaign. One of the 
leading Pan-Africanists in the town, C. J. Fazzie, had been 
involved in Youth League politics in the 1940s. Sentenced for 
incitement in 1960 he was subsequently placed under house 
arrest though he was still understood to be active politically 
by the Rand based leadership.91 During this time he was 
employed as a timekeeper at a local textile mill.92 Four 
trials testify to a relatively high level of PAC activity in 
East London's Duncan Village in the period 1962-1963: once 
again the accused and their identified accomplices were 
predominantly young men or youths, power station, timber yard 
and car assembly workers as well as schoolboys, though one of 
the more important men in the local organisation, C. V. Mangaza 
was a garage proprietor in Duncan Village. 93 As with the other 
Eastern Province centres the available evidence suggests that 
PAC activists were people from an urban background and origin. 
This last point is in contrast to the predominant social 
character of Poqo's following in the Western Cape which was, 
as we have seen, composed principally of the inmates of migrant 
workers hostels, employers' compounds, as well as farm labourers. 
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Poqo influence among Western Cape migrant workers was 
important in generating support for the movement in the 
Transkei, where many of the migrants had their homes. 
Significantly one finds no comparable degree of Poqo support 
in the Ciskeian reserves which form the immediate hinterland 
of East London and King William's Town. 94 In the Transkei 
itself out of the fourteen districts which comprise the 
southern half of the territory (including Glen Grey - until 
1975 part of the Ciskei though adjacent to the Transkei) nine 
were affected by Poqo activity. Trial evidence of Poqo cells 
exists in the cases of Kentani. Willowvale, Mquanduli, Idutywa, 
Ngqeleni. Umtata. Engcobo, St. Marks and Glen Grey ·districts.95 
Ten out of the twenty Transkei trials mentioned in 1963 press 
reports involved twenty or more men who themselves only 
represented a proportion of those said to be implicated in 
conspiracies. Apart from those conspiracies which involved 
Cape Town migrant workers who set out:from Cape Town to the 
Transkei to murder Chief Kaiser Matanzima the most common 
occupation mentioned in records and reports is 'peasant' but it 
is also evident that Poqo membership embraced quite a wide 
social spectrum: unemployed highschool children, teachers, a 
Methodist lay preacher, a shoemaker and even a senior Tembu 
Chief were amongst those convicted for Poqo activity. This is 
not surprising: the several hundred people involved in some 
of the Poqo related incidents96 suggests that in some rural 
locations .the Poqo movement represented or was at least part 
of a fairly generalised revolt with a much wider social 
constituency than was the case in the Eastern Cape towns 
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(predominantly school children and young unskilled labourers) 
and the Transvaal (school children and young clerical workers). 
Just as the social character of the movement varied from 
region to region so too did the nature of its organisation. 
In the Transvaal it seems likely there was quite an elaborate 
hierarchical organisational structure imposed on the movement 
whilst elsewhere organisational patterns were looser and more 
spontaneous in their evolution. The Transvaal arrangements 
came closest to the bureaucratic pattern depicted by Leballo 
with by 1963 there existing two functioning regions, the 
Witwatersrand (including Pretoria), the Southern Transvaal 
(Vereeniging, Vanderbij lpark , etc.)97. 
There was some attempt within township based branches to 
divide up the membership into 10 to 15 man 'cells,.98 These 
would sometimes be based on a particular institution (e.g. a 
school) or locality within the township. In fact 'cells' often 
met together in large meetings to be addressed by branch and 
more senior members. 99 Within each branch a 'task force' 
would be constituted from the younger men in the organisation. 
The 'task force' members would do guard duty at meetings, 
collect and manufacture weapons and explosives and in the event 
of the uprising undertake the initial attacks. Each branch 
would have a chairman and subordinate to him, a task force 
leader. There would also be 'block stewards' with recruiting 
functions within a certain area. 100 A block corresponded to a 
cell. To communicate with the Maseru leadership a clumsy code 
was used in which PAC branches and their activity would be 
described with reference to forms of popular entertainment. 
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Branches were football teams, cinemas or dance-halls and 
their offices and functions would be described accordingly. 
The police were the 'forces of darkness' or 'skins'. The 
uprising itself was called 'the twist session' or 'the jive 
101 
session' • 
Notwithstanding its subjection to the supervision of the 
national leadership and despite the efforts at secrecy it 
seems that the organisation in the Transvaal was weak and 
demoralised. An insight into the general state of the 
Witwatersrand is given in a letter dated 30th March, 1963 to 
the Maseru leadership from the Witwatersrand 'Football Club 
Manager' (Regional Chairman?) which was intercepted by the 
102 police. The letter provides a telling impression of an 
organisation preoccupied with personal feuds and internal 
suspicions, these exacerbated by the arrests of branch 
organisers whom the police had been able to trace through the 
Maseru's leadership's habit of using the post office as its 
main vehicle of communication: 
There has been gross negligence with most 
of our players here instead of them leaving 
addresses with other people when they were 
at HQ they only supplied pseudonyms with 
their proper addresse~ leaving themselves 
open to such dangers. They talk too much. 
They are emotional and not very revolutionary 
in their behaviour. 
We have withdrawn recognition of the Jabu1ani 
team. It was formed by people from Zola who 
did not want to respect their local leaders. 
Even most of the members of the team are from 
Zola and were being told a pack of lies into 
losing confidence and faith in their local 
management by people who do not want to be led 
by others. ••• These people in order to 
destroy me dubbed me as an informer, exploiting 
the sensitivities of players towards skins. It 
is quite clear from reports I have been getting 
of the local intelligence that even the men I 
appointed as my captains believe these things. 
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(The West Rand) • • • are comparatively 
doing better than the central complex. They 
shouldn't at all be drawn into this seething 
cauldron of hatred and personal clashes which 
seems to be our disease. 
Trial evidence suggests that the Wits officials accepted the 
uprising plans only reluctantly103 and this is corroborated by 
the circulars sent to the Transvaal by Leballo in February and 
March reprimanding branches for the failure to prepare for the 
uprising. 
I must warn you very strongly that I shall 
not be intimidated by your failure to obtain 
these arrangements. The Twist MUST just go 
on whether you have these things or not. It 
is not my own fault. You are to blame for 
that. I am going ahead with my plans for 
the Twist or the Tournament. What I do not 
like of you is not to tell me the truth. 
You talk too much but you cannot live up to 
your claims!!! You don't do hard work 
sufficiently. 104 
The Eastern Cape more or less conformed to the Transvaal 
pattern of organisation and there were also signs of low morale 
in some of the branches. In New Brighton, Port Elizabeth, for 
instance, recalcitrant recruits (including a Task Force captain) 
were regularly punished with beatings for poor attendance at 
105 branch meetings. As in the case of Johannesburg groups the 
New Brighton Task Force was reprimanded for being behind-hand 
106 in their organisation. During 1961, incidentally, New 
Brighton's PAC members were under the leadership of Pearce 
Gqobose, the Eastern Cape regional chairman. Gqobose, an ex-
serviceman and social worker, had been involved in Africanist 
politics since 1946. He fled t~e country in 1962 to avoid 
arrest and joined Leballo's 'Presidential Council' in Maseru. 
In the case of the Western Cape and the Transkeian groups 
there is less evidence to suggest a formal defined hierarchy of 
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leadership and as we have noted the structure of the 
organisation was influenced by pre-existing social networks 
provided by thome-boy' groups, burial associations and rurally 
oriented resistance movements formed in the wake of the 
implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act independently of 
the nationalist political organisation. These included the 
101 108 109 Dyakobs, the Jacobins, and the Makuluspan. Such 
bodies served to transmit information and ideas between the 
Western Cape and the Transkei. It seems likely that in the 
Transkei itself the Poqo groups were started by migrant workers 
110 from Cape Town. The more autonomous character of the move-
111 
ment in these areas tended to protect it from police 
interference: a great deal of police information resulted 
from the indiscretions of the Maseru leadership and its 
communication system. A final distinguishing feature of these 
112 Poqo groups was their resort to magical protective measures. 
This last point testifies to the major contrast that can be -
drawn between the Transvaal/Eastern Cape groups and the Western 
Cape/Transkei groups. In the case of the former the movement 
was constructed around an organisational conception and 
strategic idea of a small and SOCially removed group of leaders: 
at base level the Poqo groups had very little vitality of their 
own: their members"main activity was to attend meetings at 
which they were alternately harangued or exhorted to make 
themselves ready for the great day of the uprising. Little 
was said at such meetings which was directly relevant to their 
specific circumstances. The movement's constituency was 
predominantly youthful, often with a limited range of social 
experience. In the case of the latter the movement developed 
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organisationally from the bottom up, adapting itself to the 
social institutions it found around it, generating its own 
ideas and fuelled to a much greater extent by locally relevant 
anxieties and preoccupations, particularly those emanating 
from the countryside. 
To return to our narrative, by the last three months of 
1962 preparations for a national insurrection had begun in 
earnest. Poqo task force members were instructed by their 
leaders to gather materials and manufacture weapons and task 
force leaders and branch chairmen were urged to step up 
recruitment. A thousand recruits were needed for each 'hall' 
113 (cell or block). The weapons were very crude. Bombs were 
improvised from petrol-filled bottles and tennis balls filled 
with ball-bearings, permanganate of potash, glycerin and match 
heads. Swords were fashioned from filed-down pieces of scrap 
114 
metal. Recruitment methods were no more sophisticated. A 
group in Port Elizabeth were told: 
'We must organise right through the towns 
and in the buses. When you sit in a bus, 
the man next to you, you must tell him 
about this organisation.' 115 
Perhaps to compensate for the rudimentary quality of these 
preparations many task force members were encouraged to believe 
that on the great day help would come from outside: weapons had 
been promised by Russia one of the New Brighton task force 
I 116 leaders claimed, though more commonly it was asserted that 
the assistance would be African: 
'The African States would assist us in the 
Revolution by coming in aeroplanes and 
various war vehicles.' 117 
'The independent states are with us - they 
are going to help us. Ben Bella has promised' 
assistance. They will come with aeroplanes.' 118 
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'We would be supplied with arms and 
ammunition from the African States from 
the North and we would also be assisted 
by their soldiers.' 119 
The promise of external aid was a recurrent theme in Leba11o's 
talks to the groups of branch leaders who were summoned to 
Maseru in February and March of 1963. 120 In November 1962 
Leba110 had left Basuto1and for a few weeks to visit the 
United Nations offices, stopping off on his return home in 
Ghana and it is possible that some of the urgency of his 
subsequent communications to his followers was inspired by 
assurances of support from Ghanaian and other African government 
spokesmen. 
Task force members all seem to have had a broadly similar 
conception of how the uprising would begin. In each centre 
different groups would be assigned to attacks on police stations, 
post offices, power installations and other government buildings. 
Groups should then turn their attention to the white civilian 
population which they were to kill indiscriminately. The 
killing should go on for four hours and should then cease, when 
the insurgents should await further instructions. 121 Most of 
the features of this plan were attributable to the instructions 
contained in Leba11o's talks to branch leaders and they formed 
the basic elements in an insurrectionary concept shared by PAC 
122 
conspiracies throughout the country. Exactly when this 
uprising was to take place was not revealed to rank and file. 
It would be in 1963 for that was the original date set by 
Sobukwe for the attainment of South African 'independence', but 
as for the exact date this would be appointed by the leadership 
in the near future. In the Eastern Cape some branches were told 
that the date of the uprising would coincide with Sobukwe's 
release from prison so that he would once again be able to 
123 direct the struggle. This reflected a more generalised 
attribution to Sobukwe of prophetlike qualities of leadership. 124 
Only in April were task force members given a definite date and 
this merely a day or two before the chosen time. 125 Branches 
and regional leaders were sent letters at the end of March 
giving them instructions for an uprising in early April. The 
addressed letters were intercepted by the police when they 
arrested the courier sent from Maseru to post the letters in 
126 Bloemfontein. 
By the end of March the police had a fairly accurate idea 
of the nature and scope of these arrangements. In November 
Poqo insurgents acting on their own initiative had staged an 
attack on the small Western Province town of Paarl and the 
following month several groups travelled from Cape Town to the 
Transkei to assassinate Matanzima and were intercepted by the 
police. In March several branch leaders returning to the Cape 
and the Transvaal from Maseru were arrested and detained. On 
March 24th Leballo gave a press conference in which he announced 
the PAC's intention to mount a general uprising, claiming that 
127 
over 100,000 armed followers were waiting for his signal. 
Final instructions had to be given to twenty-three branch 
chairmen who were now on their way back to South Africa. In 
the last week of March South African police, aided by the list 
of addresses they were able to assemble from Leballo's 
correspondence, began to detain key local activists in the 
Transvaal. On April 1st the colonial authorities in Basutoland 
arrested those PAC leaders they could find in Maseru and closed 
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down the PAC's office confiscating a quantity of documentation 
including membership lists allegedly containing 10,000 names 
128 
and addresses. Leballo prudently went into hiding. 
According to affidavits the Basutoland police raid was carried 
out in the presence of South African security policy and the 
colonial government was later accused of supplying the South 
Africans with information. 129 In the first week of April 
hundreds of arrests took place throughout South Africa. In 
May the Minister of Justice announced that 3,246 Poqo suspects 
130 had been arrested. Despite the arrests Poqo groups mounted 
attacks in several centres in the Eastern Cape and the Transvaal. 
In King William's Town at 2.30 on the morning of the 9th 
a group of fifteen men entered the courtyard of the office 
building which contained the police station and Commissioner's 
office. Their first objective was to free Poqo suspects held 
prisoner before launching a general insurrection. They were 
part of a group of sixty men armed with incendiary bombs, 
knives and clubs. These men threw their bombs through the 
charge office windows and advanced on the cell doors before being 
driven back by police gunfire. They thereupon dispersed and 
subsequently many were arrested and tried en masse. One of the 
accused, incidently, was called Bomwana Bikoo131 
In East London the police successfully anticipated local 
PAC preparations. On the same night as the King William's Town 
attack two to three hundred men walking in groups of four to 
eight congregated in the open veld outside the old section of 
Duncan Village. Many carried homemade swords and axes in 
haversacks and bags. From the moment the men began assembling, 
at 6.30 on the evening of the 8th, they were being watched by 
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police several of whom had arrived at the rendezvous before them. 
Apparently an informant had betrayed the Poqo men. At about 
10 o'clock when the last men had arrived the police watchers 
sent for reinforcements but the advent of these was noticed 
by a task force patrol which fired on the police. After an 
exchange of shots the meeting broke up, eleven men being arrested 
immediately and over a hundred later. Subsequent trials 
confirmed that the men were about to launch an uprising in East 
London according to a pre-formulated plan. The police reinforce-
ments interrupted them while they were waiting for petrol. 
Children evidently played an important role in the preparations, 
young teenage boys being given files, hacksaws and motor springs 
and told to fashion these into swords (a task which took two 
days to produce one blade). Some of the youths were recruited 
by women. In both this trial and the King William's Town trial 
there was evidence that many of the young auxiliaries were 
reluctant conscripts rather than highly motivated vOlunteers. 132 
The following night three small groups of young men 
travelled from Orlando to Johannesburg. Two men from one of 
the groups broke into a clothing store while others stood guard 
and using petrol bombs set alight counters in the old section of 
the building. A similar attack was intended on a sportswear 
shop but the insurgents were interrupted by a police patrol 
after breaking a window. A third group marched to the premises 
of Shell (SA) Pty which accommodated some oil storage facilities. 
Finding the main gates locked and on encountering a night watch-
man the members of the task force decided to go home. These 
events were part of a larger conspiracy for which there is no 
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evidence of any comparably serious attempts to implement, the 
objectives of which included the destruction of Orlando 
police and power stations. The targets in the Johannesburg 
central business district were well chosen. They were old or 
by their nature highly inflammable and they were situated in 
an architecturally congested part of town where the likelihood 
of a well established fire spreading was high. These arson 
attempts in Johannesburg were the climax of several days of 
hurried preparation including several meetings being held in 
the week before the attack at which fresh recruits were inducted 
(some of whom participated in the Johannesburg task force) and 
an all day bomb making session on the 8th. Task forces were 
informed of their targets only i~ediate1y before setting out 
to attack them. There is evidence to suggest several other 
Poqo conspiracies in Soweto, and it should be remembered that 
many of the Rand PAC groups had already been arrested. The 
last minute character of the preparations, however, and the 
fact that the events took place one day later than in the 
Eastern Cape, and the manner in which the attacks were implemented 
helped to strengthen the impression that many of the Rand 
insurrectionists were less than totally committed to the 
conspiracy. 133 
This view is corroborated by details from the trial of 
David Sibeko, the Chairman of the Southern Transvaal region. 
Though the evidence of state witnesses was discounted in court 
and Sibeko was acquitted, he in exile subsequently confirmed 
in broad outline the truth of the prosecution's case. 134 One 
witness claimed that he was nominated at a meeting in the 
Vereeniging area to travel to Maseru. In Maseru he was given 
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instructions concerning the uprising. On returning to 
Vereeniging he was told that the date of the uprising was 
arranged for April 7th. On April 1st he was told to collect 
some bombs from a woman in Pretoria. These were going to be 
. used in an attack on Vanderbijlpark police station and the 
Escom power installation. He allegedly failed to find the 
woman and returned empty handed. The bombs were collected on 
the 7th by Gabriel Sandamela, one of the members of the regional 
executive. The witness was informed by Sibeko on the 7th that 
the uprising had been postponed for a day because of the police 
being aware of the conspiracy. However, when he next saw 
Sibeko and Sandamela they were busy packing and they told him 
they were preparing to .travel 'to Dar es Salaam via Bechuanaland. 
There was no uprising in Vereeniging. 135 
Elsewhere the story was much the same: large numbers of 
arrests frustrated some local conspiracies and demoralised others. 
The Maseru leadership was either in hiding or in prison. Robert 
Sobokwe, probably ignorant of the uprising plan, on completing 
his prison sentence was detained on Robben Island for a further 
six years. In June the Minister of Justice claimed that the 
Poqo movement had been destroyed. By June the following year 
1,162 Poqo members had been convicted under the sabotage act. 137 
Notwithstanding the Minister's claim, Poqo groups continued 
to be active for some years to come, the last recorded incidence 
of a Poqo conspiracy being in Welkom in December 1968. There 
was no comparably ambitious effort by a central leadership to 
organise a national insurrection: Poqo activity after April 
1963 was very localised in character. Until 1965 there was 
some effort by Maseru-based leaders to coordinate the activities 
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of different PAC/Poqo branches. Despite a shift which 
developed in the course of 1964 in the external leader's 
conception of strategy away from insurrectionism in favour of 
protracted guerilla warfare surviving activists within the 
country continued to plot apocalyptic local uprisings. On the 
Witwatersrand, for example, a regional committee was formed 
towards the end of April 1963. It was led by two professional 
golfers and a boxing manager. It succeeded in re-establishing 
links with the Maseru group and conceived a plan to mount an 
uprising on December 16th, the Day of the Covenant. Whites 
attending nationalist festivities in Pretoria were to be 
attacked by bees. Unusually, for a Rand conspiracy, the 
participants intended to deploy witchcraft, though they also 
tried to obtain hand grenades from a man who worked at the Drill 
Hall in Johannesburg. The conspirators were encouraged by 
Edwin Makoti and Leballo (who reappeared in Maseru in September 
1963) for the rising would coincide with the United Nations 
session at which they hoped to mobilise international support. 
Makoti visited Johannesburg in October to make arrangements 
for the passage out of the country of recruits for guerrilla 
training but was informed by the committee that they had failed 
to~:tind people willing to leave the country. Lack of transport 
facilities and a failing confidence in the powers of witchcraft 
persuaded the conspirators to abandon their plans. 138 Mean-
while in May 1963 a group in Lady Frere (Glen Grey district) 
plotted attacks on the magistrates home and the police station 
followed by more generalised arson and killing.139 Elsewhere 
remaining PAC groups in Cape Town, Durban and East London 
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contented themselves with recruiting and sending men abroad 
for military instruction. 140 
The next phase of internal activity followed the 
conception of a plan in July 1964 by the Presidential Council 
for a Lesotho-based guerilla operation. The plan seemed to 
have two separate sources of inspiration. While, in conformity 
with previous PAC strategic thinking it argued that: 
'Insurrection or even minor skirmishes of 
an effective nature, well planned, are 
sufficient to set in motion a full scale 
revolution any time in South Africa.' 
it went on to state: 
'Our struggle is bound to be a protracted 
one. We must not reckon in terms of 
lightning warfare and an immediate Victory. 
Apart from the unpredictable nature of 
warfare itself, the enemy is fully aware 
of our intentions and has been preparing 
himself accordingly for a number of years. 
Ours is a guerilla form of warfare against 
regular army forces. Our indispensable 
condition in these circumstances is to 
wear down the enemy systematically, hitting 
him hardest where he is weakest and then 
retreating where he is strongest.' 141 
The document comprised mainly of detailed plans for launching 
a guerilla insurgency: it discussed escape routes, training 
programmes, the use of explosives, logistics, lines of 
communication, and the role of external diplomatic 
representatives of the movement. Initial operations would have 
two dimensions. Careful clandestine activity would complete 
the groundwork for a long-term rural guerilla insurgency. An 
operational base was to be established in Qacha's Nek, a village 
on the Lesotho border with the Transkei. A boat purchased by 
Nana Mahomo in London would offload arms on to the Transkeian 
coast. 142 PAC trainees would form a nucleus of a locally 
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recruited insurgent force. While these preparations were in 
progress,143 support for the movement would be generated by a 
campaign of terrorism which would include assassinations of 
important white politicians, kidnapping of school children, 
the destruction of symbolically important buildings, as well 
as the seizure of gold bullion, money, arms and ammunition. 
It is difficult to ascertain how seriously the Maseru 
group regarded this plan. Later it was suggested that the main 
purpose of the document outlining it was to persuade the 
Organisation of African Unity's African Liberation Committee 
to allocate funds to the PAC. The equivalent of R100,OOO was 
handed over by the ALC to Potlake Leba1lo in late 1964 and 
subsequently Leballo was charged with fraud when he could not 
account for a large proportion of this sum's expenditure. 144 
Despite this possible motive it seems that various efforts were 
made to implement parts of the plan. A Transkeian based Poqo 
cell active in the Mqanduli district was instructed to locate 
hiding places for arms and insurgents. 145 In September 1964 
activists from East London were taken to various houses in the 
146 Quthing area and shown how to make firearms. Two members of 
the Presidential Council, Let1aka and Mfaxa, were later found 
in a Maseru trial to have administered a guerilla training camp 
near Quthing. Lectures, physical training and weapons 
construction were part of the curriculum. 141 Cape Town based 
Poqo groups were delegated the tasks of reconnoitering the Hex 
River railway tunnel with a view to derailing the 'Blue Train' 
Johannesburg to Cape Town express and searching for guerilla 
hiding places in Namaqualand and the mountainous area near 
Paarl. 148 It seems that since 1963 a new regional organisation 
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had been established in Cape Town under much closer control 
of the Maseru leadership than the previous Poqo network. 149 
In the Eastern Cape rural centre of Molteno a PAC branch was 
revived in April 1964 by a local school teacher, Harry Mathebe, 
after he had attended a meeting with a member of the Presidential 
Council in Herschel. In the course of 1964 Mathebe succeeded 
in recruiting thirty. The branch held its first meeting in 
December 1964 at which plans for a local uprising were discussed. 
Before these were to be implemented it was resolved that a trip 
should be made to Johannesburg to buy guns. Conspirators were 
allegedly told that after the uprising they would be able to 
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'stay in the white houses'. Most of the new branch's 
members were arrested in February. A group with similar 
intentions was discovered in Steynsburg. Once again it was 
led by a school teacher. His fifty-odd followers included a 
shop assistant and a shoemaker but mainly comprised illiterate 
151 
unskilled labourers. 
On 29th April, 1965 the Maseru based members of the 
Presidential Council were taken into custody by the Basutoland 
authorities and shortly afterwards put on trial (Potlake Leballo 
was not amongst these, he had left Maseru in August the previous 
year and was now in Dar es Salaam). The Maseru group was 
acquitted on appeal (it was found its members had committed no 
crimes in Basutoland). Some of them subsequently joined the 
other PAC principals in Dar es Salaam, others fell victim to 
the leadership feuds which plagued the movement and were expelled 
by Leballo, and one, John Pokela, acting national secretary, was 
captured (allegedly kidnapped in Buthe Buthe, Basuto) in August 
1966 by the South African authorities and convicted. 152 
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From 1965 remaining PAC groups inside the country 
functioned independently: there were no longer any lines 
of communication with any leadership centre outside the 
country. Their activity conformed to the established 
insurrectionary pattern: groups in LaingSburg,1 53 Graaff 
Reinet,1 54 Victoria West,1 55 Middleburg,1 56 Steynsburg157 in 
the Cape and Umzinto158 and Esperenza159 in Natal were 
discovered in the course of their preparations for local 
uprisings. In addition insurrectionary PAC cells were formed 
among convicts by 
161 Baviaanspoort, 
160 previous Robben Island inmates of Gamkaspoort, 
162 163 Bellville and Leeukop prisons. With the 
exception of the convicts about whom no sociological detail is 
available from the trial evidence, most of the other conspiracies 
apart from their common strategic intention had a strikingly 
similar social composition: leaders were usually teachers or 
clergymen and their following normally consisted of unskilled 
labourers. A few examples must suffice. In 1964 Jonathan 
Hermanus arrived in Graaff Reinet location as Methodist Minister. 
Initially he was active in efforts to improve the prevalently 
poor local conditions in the location. To this end he formed 
a Wesleyan Guild for church youth. In early 1966 increasingly 
disenchanted with social'work he began to recruit people for 
a Poqo branch. He was transferred in 1967 and the movement 
died out. 164 As well as Hermanus, church elders and a school 
teacher were later tried for leading roles in a violent 
165 
conspiracy. In Victoria West a minister, a school principle 
and various service workers - garage attendants, milkmen, shop 
assistants, messengers and hospital labourers - were involved 
in plans to obtain weapons to attack police stations, cut 
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telephone wires and poison water supplies. According to one 
state witness, it was said at one of the meetings: 
'When the whites come to Victoria West, they 
soon had a house and a new car. They enjoyed 
better wages and privileges and that was why 
whites had to be killed. In this way the 
fatherland could be regained for the non-whites.' 166 
Three of the conspiracies were composed of farmworkers, those 
in Natal and at Laingsburg. The Natal conspiracies were located 
on sugar estates and were led by a PAC activist from Durban. 
The Laingsburg movement was led by a lay-preacher, R. Ndoylo. 
He appeared at a Saturday bible meeting attended by the workers 
from one farm and chose as his text a passage from Lamentations: 
'Our skin was black like an oven because of the terrible famine'. 
He went on to 'explain to us that it was difficult to get food 
and water and that our land was being taken away from us. At 
Vleiland (the farm) we got very little money. We were paid 
70 cents a week and that was very little • • • He said 
according to Poqo they should be paid 70 cents a day'. Ndoylo 
later told his followers that after the arrival of weapons from 
the Congo they would participate in an 'uprising which would 
take place simultaneously allover the country on an appointed 
day. Ndoylo would tell the people at Vleiland when that day 
, 166 
was • 
In Welkom a departure from this pattern occurred in 1968 
when J. Ramoshaba, a former student of Fort Hare, a social worker 
employed on the goldfields, and a member of the Thabang Township 
Urban Bantu Council, presided over a revival of the local PAC 
branch. He and his confederates attempted to raise funds to 
send people abroad for military training. With their arrest PAC 
activity inside South Africa was to cease until the mid 1970s. 167 
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In an analysis of the Poqo movement some useful starting 
points can be drawn from the literature on general theories of 
collective action. Existing treatments of South African 
insurgent movements have on the whole been influenced by the 
social theory emerging from the United States in the 1960s. 
Edward Feit and Fatima Meer both seem to share the premise that 
'order is the normal state of things and that disorder is very 
difficult to sustain,.168 As Meer puts it: 'Revolution, 
though dependent on the populace, is not a popular cause. The 
security of a familiar system, even if limiting, is invariably 
preferable to the risks of change,.169 In such a context 
collective violence is viewed as pathological and hence irrational: 
'The picture of a mass ready for the final 
plunge to liberate itself is deceptive. It 
is observed by abstracting the motifs of 
rebellion scattered through a tapestry, 
which otherwise speaks of reasonable peace 
and quiet. While spontaneous uprisings 
are clear indications of deep sores, they 
are certainly no indication of people's 
intelligent, rational and conscious aware-
ness of these sores. They are rather the 
symptoms of mass psychosis, and like the 
psychotic who is unable to see the root of 
his passion beyond the immediate trifle 
which provoked it, so too, is the vision 
of the mass shallow and blurred.' 170 
The instigators of revolt are motivated not so much by the 
material grievances of the poor but the 'status incongruity' of 
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a middle class minority. 
Meer and Feit's work testifies to the influence of the view 
which understands violence as a consequence of social breakdown. 
A period of rapid social change is seen to erode customary'social 
restraints while simultaneously the material effects of change 
introduce into people's lives insecurity and tension. Mass 
protests occur with the changing political expectations resulting 
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from economic progress. On their fringes minorities drawn 
from the marginal elements of society, those most psychologically 
and materially disoriented by the changes attendant upon 
; 
industrialisation and urbanisation express their anxieties 
and emotions through violence. Writers in this sChool'72 discern 
a statistical coincidence in the incidence of crime, individual 
violence and collective violence'73 and the latter is consequently 
analysed as simply another example of socially deviant behaviour. 
Breakdown theory has influenced the South African government's 
perception of civil disorder as well as that of its liberal 
opponents: the former is concerned to deny the possibility of 
violence being an expression of reasonable social and political 
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aspirations among Africans, the latter are concerned to 
ameliorate the social conditions which they understand to give 
rise to unbalanced behaviour.'75 
Another broad category in the analysis of violence drawing 
its insights from empirical historiography rather than social 
psychology perceives collective violence not as the result of 
social breakdown, normlessness and anomie, but rather as the 
expression of the conflicting interests of coherent social 
groups as they struggle for ascendency. George Rude's work on 
176 the French revolutionary crowd and his and E. J. Hobsbawm's 
analysis of the 1830 'Captain Swing' riots in rural England are 
two of the best known studies in this category.1 77 In their 
and the work of their disciples collective violence finds its 
constituency among social groups whose existence is tightly 
woven into the fabric of their community. The targets of their 
actions are systematically selected for their symbolic or actual 
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function. In its outbursts the behaviour of the crowd 
reflects a distillation of the political and material 
grievances of broad swathes of society. Its violence is 
symptomatic of the inherent contradictions of any society 
characterised by profound inequalities of wealth and power. 
A useful refinement of these ideas is provided by the 
Tilly's study of a century of collective violence in France, 
178 Italy and Germany. They find the explanation for 
specifically violent forms of collective behaviour not so much 
in social change itself but rather in the impact of such 
phenomena as the expansion of the capacity of national states 
and national markets on popular conceptions of justice. 179 In 
their survey of riots and civil disorder in their three chosen 
countries they discern a shift between three different phases 
and types of collective action. In the first phase, competitive 
collective action, group violence normally takes place as a 
result of intra or inter-communal competition over resources. 
Feuds, village rivalries and ritual encounters between competing 
groups of artisans are expressions of competitive collective 
action. In a South African context faction fighting or the 
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activities of the Amalaitas ~t a certain phase in their 
development could be understood in this context. Competitive 
violence predominates on the fringes of the national state or 
economy. When these latter start infringing on local rights 
and resources a second generation of popular violence manifests 
itself. This the Tilly's term reactive violence, essentially 
acts of resistance to attempts from the centre to control the 
periphery. Tax rebellions, food riots, luddism, and the evasion 
of enclosed land are examples of reactive violence. With the 
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triumph of the state and the national market a third set of 
struggles ensues as groups make claims for rights and resources 
not previously enjoyed. Here collective action is geared to 
attempts 'to control rather than resist different segments of 
181 the national structure'. The insurrectionary strike would 
be an example of what the Tilly's call 'proactive' collective 
violence. 
Ostensibly social breakdown analysis would seem easier to 
apply to the Poqo disturbances. The movement was drawn from 
groups which were peripheral rather than central to the 
development of a modern industrial economy, or from people who 
had not been totally socially encapsulated by that process. The 
role unskilled migrant labourers, farmworkers (in an increasingly 
capital intensive agriculture), service workers in small rural 
towns, school children even can be conceptualised thus. The 
conjunction in the movement's constituency between groups 
threatened with or actually undergoing a process of marginal-
isation and such middle class elements as teachers, clerics 
and office workers might be explained with reference to both 
the morally disorienting effects of rapid social change for 
the former and a crisis of rising expectations for the latter. 
The inclusion of magic and witchcraft in Poqo/PAC tactics, 
the impracticality of its insurrectionary concept, the millenarian 
undertones of the movement - its belief in an apocalyptiC 
'great day', its investiture of Sobukwe with biblical attributes 
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of leadership, its strategic dependence on external intervention 
- all these features could be employed to explain the movements 
emergence and following in terms of the transient social dis-
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locations introduced as a by-product of modernisation. In 
such a scheme the 'irrationality' of the movement would 
reflect the hysteria of victims of social progress. 
There are problems though with such an analysis. 
Examining the movement-in its different contexts its appeal 
at times is far more general than such an argument might 
suggest. In Lady Frere, for example, in 1963, a Poqo 
conspiracy involved a major proportion of the adult African 
men in the location. 183 Th - iti f P li e super~mpos on 0 oqo on ear er 
resistance organisations in the migrant society of the Western 
Cape and the peasant communities of the Transkei and its 
drawing upon well established networks and local ideology 
again does not suggest a movement based upon morally disoriented 
people in a situation of anomie. The violent Poqo conspiracies 
took place in a context of much wider incidence of collective 
violence than is obvious from the academic treatments of South 
African insurgencies cited above. To take one example: in 
the time when Poqo cells were being established among school 
children (and in some cases their teachers) African rural 
schools were periodically shaken by waves of pupil violence. 
In 1963, for instance, in three months when there were reports 
of rioting, arson, strikes and mass walkouts or suspensions at 
five leading educational institutions in the Eastern Cape and 
the Transkei, Lovedale,184 the Faku Institute, Flagstaff, 185 
186 187 Bethal College, Butterworth, Sigcau High School, Flagstaff 
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and Healdtown. Once again, this does not suggest, at least 
in its local context, that Poqo's violence was that of the 
socially deviant. 
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A more helpful approach may be found in the second group 
of writers referred to above and in particular from the 
conceptions derived from the Tilly's work. Poqo's social 
complexity does not permit easy causal generalisations; its 
regional variation in both constituency and organisation 
embraced very different political responses which were 
different at least partly because they were responses to 
different things. The political preoccupations of migrant 
workers in Cape Town were to an extent shaped by events in the 
Transkei; despite their involvement in the urban economy they 
still had residual links with rural culture. In the Transkei 
itself peasants (who themselves often had experience of migrant 
labour) were engaged in defending their rights over land and 
their notions of land husbandry against intensifying efforts 
by the state to control and modify these. In such context Poqo 
drew its strength largely from what the Tilly's would call 
reactive and competitive movements though its initial 
inspiration was proactive as would be the case with any 
nationalist Organisation. 189 The historical analysis of 
succeeding chapters will attempt to reconstruct the movements 
following in the local contexts of the Transkei and Paarl. Here 
the actions of its participants were influenced by a communal 
matrix of struggle and within the limits of the knowledge 
available to them their behaviour was rational enough: it can 
be explained without recourse to notions of mass psychosis. 
But this is not the whole story. The involvement of 
Transvaal groups in the Poqo conspiracy did not stem from 
reactive concerns nor did it seem to represent such a popular 
constituency: here the movement's following was much more 
2JJ 
narrowly socially defined. The same too could be said for 
the Eastern Cape groups, unlike the Transvaal organisation 
they included industrial workers but these were commonly very 
youthful. At this point the existence of another violent 
insurgent movement needs to be born in mind, Umkonto we Sizwe, 
which was most active in the two main Eastern Province towns, 
in Durban and in Johannesburg and Pretoria. Umkonto was a 
much smaller organisation than Poqo, technologically more 
sophisticated in its methods, tactically more effective, and 
its strategy reflected an intellectually more complex analysis 
of South African society. While Poqo in its areas of strength 
drew on locally evolved resistance movements Umkonto benefited 
from the modern organisational framework created by a much more 
powerful nationalist organisation than the PAC and as well an 
allied trade union movement. Though Umkonto was in its 
conception and performance an insurgent elite nevertheless it 
was itself the product of a decade of mass-based proactive 
struggles. In two centres, Port Elizabeth and East London, 
there is evidence of a sUbstantial support base for the Umkonto 
insurgents. The local leaders here were men who had been at 
190 the forefront of communal political assertions since the 1940s. 
In this context the nature of Poqo's constituency in such oentres 
as Port Elizabeth, East London or even Pretoria become more 
understandable: it was composed of people who though affected 
by a communal history of revolt belonged to groups which were 
not easily incorporated into the inoreasingly proletarian 
following of the ANC, or who were too young to have been involved 
in the pre-1960 struggles. In the case of young school children 
a study made in 1963 may be of some relevance. From samples of 
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future autobiographies written by African high school students 
in 1950 and 1960 it is possible to trace a declining interest 
in individual economic and social aspirations and a sharp 
increase in commitment to political activity.191 A survey 
conducted among professional people, ministers, teachers, clerks 
and students and school children in the Transvaal showed the 
PAC to be the most popular group among the sample and support 
for the PAC tended to correlate with acceptance of violence. 192 
Within the sample endorsement of violence or some type of force 
reflected the view of a large minority - 43 per cent. As in 
the case of the Transkei and the Western Cape, the Poqo 
conspiracies in the Transvaal and the Eastern Cape should not be 
examined in isolation, for apart from the activities of other 
insurgent movements, there is evidence of quite widespread 
sentiments which while not providing evidence of a popular 
willingness to participate in violent revolt does indicate that 
violent actions were widely seen as legitimate. This will 
become clearer in local case studies. The comparative weakness 
of the Transvaal/Eastern Cape impulse to violence in contrast to 
the behaviour of the Western Cape/Transkeian groups can be 
attributed to the predominant organisational features of each. 
In conformity with the Tilly's thesis, the former proactive 
movement depended on the mobilising capacity of a modern political 
association whilst the latter partly reactive movement drew to 
a much greater extent on communal bases for political action. 193 
Earlier in this chapter the contrast was described as the one 
being an organisational structure imposed from above and the 
other a movement which had developed organically from the bottom 
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up. Given the state imposed barriers confronting Black efforts 
to create large scale political associations it is not 
surprising that the 'organic' movement provided the strongest 
response. 
A final comment on the role of teachers in Poqo will help 
to underscore the argument concerning the movements communal 
legitimacy. As we have seen teachers figured prominently in 
Eastern Cape Poqo conspiracies as well as in the Transkei. In 
this region teachers had been uncharacteristically active in 
political organisations: elsewhere I have discussed the 
political history of the Cape African Teacher's Association as 
a constituent of the All African Convention. 194 With its 
radicalisation in the late 1940s CATA could provide an 
organisation based on the dense network of mission schools 
long established in the region. Teachers themselves had their 
security and status threatened by the Bantu Authorities and 
school boards systems and may also, suggests Colin Bundy, have 
been radicalised by the pupil disturbances in the region which 
accommodated some of the largest African schools and colleges 
in'the country.195 Teachers were especially influential in the 
countryside and small'towns where illiteracy rates were high and 
other middle class elements often absent. Bearing in mind their 
poor pay and recent interference by the state in their profession 
it is not surprising to find radical rural opposition movements 
gravitating around them as leaders. In the Eastern Cape small 
town and rural communities were unusually subject to the 
influence of political organisations. As well as the narodnik 
character of the AAC's activity, Fort Hare and other colleges 
served as local disseminators of political ideas. Interviewed 
~6 
in the late 1960s Tennyson Makiwane remembered: 
'Then I got to Fort Hare where the Youth 
League was very well established. And 
there was the period when the Defiance 
Campaign was being launched and this 
attracted tremendous interest among the 
youth and we used to go to the neighbour-
ing villages and organise people to the 
Defiance ••• as far as King William's 
Town, Adelaide, Beaufort and Port 
Elizabeth. We used to go to them at 
night and sometimes over weekends to 
address meetings of villages. ••• In 
our area we touched most of the villages.' 196 
Relevant in this context also were the activities of the Herschel 
branch of the Congress Youth League in 1949. This branch ran 
an education class for twenty-five herdsboys in the Ndunga area. 
It also had plans for adults and children's literacy classes in 
the Bluegums area and administered a cooperative saving society 
which had accumulated £60. 197 The presence of PAC branches at 
a significant number of Eastern Cape educational institutions 
a decade later may help to explain the part played by teachers 
in small town Eastern Cape Poqo groups. 
The historiographical neglect of the PAC can be related 
to the issues discussed above. The influence of social break-
down theory directly or indirectly has affected much of the 
analysis of Black South African politics. Movements of what 
might be diagnosed as collective madness are not considered 
worthy of sustained analysis by writers concerned with what 
they see as the mainstream of Black political response. Even 
Gail Gerhart, a scholar who handles theoretical issues with 
extreme caution, explains Poqo's behaviour with reference to a 
Fanonist-need for catharsis,198 rather than in terms of the 
specific situation of socially coherent groups. For a writer 
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whose preoccupation is with the development of a natavistic 
black political tradition Gerhart shows a surprising lack of 
curiosity in one of the few popular expressions of her chosen 
theme. Gerhart's and other authorities lack of interest in 
Poqo is mainly attributable though to their preference to writing 
about organisations rather than social movements,199 particularly 
those organisations which produce an abundance of documentation. 
Much of the historical writing about Af~can politics is there-
fore the history of leaders, not followers. Meticulous and 
scholarly as some of this work is it discusses at best super-
ficially the greater social conflicts which underlie the 
biographical and organisational developments which form the main 
focus of study. In this survey it is hoped that the historical 
significance of the Poqo movement is made clear: it was a 
response to crises of a varied but distinctive set of social 
groups and its strategy and ideology only becomes comprehensible 
when these groups and the situation with which they have to 
contend are clearly identified. 
TABLE A: PAC/POQO GROUPS IN SOUTH AFRICA. 1960-1968 
CAPE PROVINCE (EAST) 
Dates Location 
1963 ALIWAL NORTH 
1963 BURGERSDORP 
1964 CRADOCK 
1960-1965 EAST LONDON 
1960-1963 FORT HARE University 
1963-1966 GruuLlMSTOWN 
1966 GRAAFF REINET 
1961-1962 HERSCHEL, Benson-
vale School 
1963 HERSCHEL 
1963 KINGWILLIAMSTOWN 
1962-1963 LOVEDALE COLLEGE 
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Source 
Black Star (London), May 
1963, report on 130 arrests. 
~, 5 June 1963, report on 
unspecified trial of 7. 
Eastern Province Herald, 
11 December 1964, report on 
unspecified trial of 1. 
Daily Despatch, 28 October 
196)-13 November 1963, 
reports on state va. Lwana 
and 25; Daily Despatch, 
13 November 1963-19 November 
1963, reports on State vs. 
Mgoqi and 9; Despatch, 
1 April 1965, report on State 
vs. Loliwe and 3; State vs. 
Mngaza, transcript, CSAS, 
University of York. 
Author's interview with 
former branch chairman, 
Neshtedi Sidzamba. 
Rand Daily Mail, ~7 May 196), 
report on unspecified trial 
of 4; Contact, July 1966, 
report on State vs. Pityana 
and 3. 
Eastern Province Herald, 
2 December 1970, report on 
unspecified trial of 7. 
Bloemfontein Friend. 30 July 
1971, report on State vs. 
Lebese. 
Black Star, May 1963, report 
on 57 arrests. 
Daily Despatch, 28 August 
196)-)1 August 196), reports 
on State vs. Nyobo and )2. 
State vs. Mtshizana, transcript 
SAlRR: Interview with 
Sidzamba. 
1963-1965 MOLTENO 
1966 MIDDELBURG 
1961-1963 PORT ELIZABETH, 
New Brighton 
1963 QUEENSTOWN 
1963-1966 STEYNSBURG 
CAPE PROVINCE (WEST) 
Dates Location 
1965 CAPE TOWN 
1962-1963 CAPE TOWN, Brooklands 
Chest Hospital 
1962-1963 CAPE TOWN, Jewish 
Old Age Home 
1962-1963 CAPE TOWN, Helmsley 
Hotel 
1961-1965 CAPE TOWN, Langa 
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PAC Newsletter (Maseru), 
Report on State vs. Mathebe 
and 13; Evening Post, 
4 September 1965, report on 
State vs. Tyali and 29. 
Evening Post, 24 June 1966, 
report on State va. Silwana 
and 2. 
New Age, 3 August 1961, 
report on PAC activity; 
State vs. Neconga and 3, 
transcript, SAIRR; Cape Times, 
19 June 1963, report on 
unspecified trial of 24. 
Contact, 27 November 1964, 
report on State va. Gwabeni 
and 1. 
Rand Daily Mail, 14 June 1963, 
report on unspecified trial 
of 19; Evening Post, 16 
February 1966, State vs. 
Mapete and 53; Evening Post, 
23 June 1966, report on State 
vs. Silwana and 2. 
Source 
Contact, May 1965, report on 
State vs. Mkhalipi and 3. 
State vs. Budaza and 3, 
lawyer's notes, Sachs papers, 
AS/70, ICS, London University. 
State vs. Mandla and 31, 
lawyer's notes, Sachs papers, 
AS/69, ICS, London University. 
State vs. Mandla and 31, 
lawyer's notes. 
State vs. Mandla and 31, 
lawyer's notes; State vs. 
Ngconcolo and 19, transcript, 
CSAS, York University; Cape 
Times, 26 May 1962, report on 
State vs. Qumbulu; Contact, 
December 1966, report on 
State vs. Mangqangwana and 1; 
1961-1963 CAPE TOWN, Nyanga 
1963 CAPE TOWN, Royal 
Dairy 
1963 CAPE TOWN, Saint 
Columbus House 
1963 CAPE TOWN, Seapoint 
1961 CAPE TOWN 
Windermere 
1963 CAMPS BAY, 
Rotunda Hotel 
1963 CAPE TOWN, 
Wynberg 
1963 DE AAR 
1962-1963 EERSTE RIVER 
1962-1963 ELGIN district, 
Molteno's farm 
1966 LAINGSBURG 
1962 PAARL, 1~wekeni 
location 
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Cape Argus, 17 January 1967, 
report on unspecified trial 
of 8: Cape Times, 23 August 
1962, report on state vs. 
Galela: Cape Arsus, 13 
November 1967 and 23 November 
1967, reports on State vs. 
Siyothula. 
New Age, 9 March 1961, 
report on arrests; Contact. 
6 September 1963, report on 
State vs. Mcapazeli and 23; 
Cape Times, 23 September 1963. 
Stats vs. Mandla and 31, 
lawyer's notes, Sachs papers. 
State. vs. Mandla and 31, 
lawyer's notes, Sachs papers. 
Daily Despatch, 20 August 
1963, report on Stats vs. 
Matanga and 14. 
Cape Times, 8 February 1962, 
report on police interruption 
of PAC meeting. 
State vs. E. Dudumashe and 1, 
charge sheet, SAIRR. 
Rand Daily Mail, 20 August 
1963, report on State vs. 
Roto and Zekani. 
Star, 9 April 1963, report 
on arrest of five PAC 
recruiters. 
Contact, December 1966, 
report on State Mangqangwana 
and 1. 
Cape Argus, 17 September 1963, 
report on State vs. Melwane 
and 22. 
Cape Times, 9 June 1967, 
report on State vs. Ndoylo. 
State vs. Matikela, lawyer's 
notes, Sachs papers, AS/35, 
rcs, London; State VS. 
Makatezi and 20 others, 
transcript, SAIRR; Snyman 
Commission, transcript of 
evidence, CSAS, York University 
1961 SOMERSET WEST 
1961 STELLENBOSCH, 
farms 
1963 STELLENBOSCH, Kaya 
Mandi location 
1966-1967 VICTORIA WEST 
State vs. Xintolo, lawyer's 
notes, Sachs papers, AS 8/14, 
ICS, London University. 
Cape Times, 28 June 1962, 
5 July 1962, report on State 
vs. Cyrus Tolibode and 20. 
Star, 9 April 1963, report on 
arrest of 13. 
~, 4 September 1968, Daily 
Despatch, 19 October 1968, 
Rand DaiLy Mail, 4 September 
1968, Cape Times, reports on 
unspecified trial of 10. 
1962-1963 WELLINGTON, Sakkieskamp. Cape Argus, 11 July 1963. 
WOLSELEY 
NATAL 
Dates Location 
1961-1963 DURBAN 
1964 DURBAN 
1961-1962 DURBAN, Chester-
ville township 
1966 DURBAN 
1961-1963 HOWICK 
1963 OHLANGA INSTITUTE 
1965-1966 UMZINTU, Jimbele 
Compound 
1963 PI ETERMARITZBERG 
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Cape Times, 1 May 1963, 
report on unspecified trial 
of 57. 
Source 
Rand Daily Mail, 28 April 
1963, report on State vs. 
Msomi and 3. 
Natal Witness, 10 June 1964, 
report on State VB. Shabalala 
and 3. 
Rand Daily Mail, 16 July 1964, 
report on State VB. Mohletshe 
and 2. 
Contact, October 1966, report 
on State vs. Mbele. 
~, 18 July 1963, report on 
State VB. Khanyi. 
Interview with Jordan Ngubane, 
Karis and Carter microfilms, 
Reel 13A 2 XN 32: 94. 
Natal Mercury, 1 September 
1966, report on State VB. 
Dlamini. 
Rand Daily Mail, 24 August 
1963, report on State vs. 
Msomi and 3. 
1966 ESPERENZA, sugar 
estate 
ORANGE FREE STATE 
Dates Location 
1960-1965 VIRGINIA district 
1960-1965 WELKOM 
1968 WELKOM 
PRISONS 
Dates Location 
1965 BAVIANSPOORT Prison 
1966 BELVILLE Prison 
1966 GAMKASPOORT Prison 
1964 LEEUKOP Prison 
TRANSVAAL 
Dates Location 
196.3 BENONI, Davey ton 
24.3 
Contact, December 1966; 
report on unspecified trial 
of 8 farmworkers which ended 
in aquittal. 
Source 
~, 2 November 1965, 
Daily Despatch, 4 November 
1965, Contact, April 1966, 
reports on State vs. Ndoni 
and .3. 
State vs. Tangeni, transcript, 
SAIRR. 
Bloemfontein Friend, .30 July 
1971, report on State va. 
Lebeae; Bloemfontein Friend, 
8 September 1971, 14 October 
1971, 16 December 1971, 
reports on State vs. Coetzee 
and 5. 
Source 
State vs. Mabuso and 1.3, 
transcript, SAIRR; Contact, 
October 1966, for report on 
State vs. Bahole and 15. 
Contact, March 1966 and 
September 1966, reports on 
trial of .31. 
Contact, January 1966 and 
April 1966, reports on trial 
of .30. 
Contact, March 1965, report 
on trial of 9; Cape Argus, 
7 August 1965, report on third 
Leeukop trial of 14. 
Source 
Cape Argus, 21 June 196.3, 
report on State vs. Mlambo 
and 7. 
1961-1963 CARLTONVILLE 
1961-1963 EVATON 
1963 EVATON, Wilberforce 
Insti tute 
1963 GERMISTON, 
Natalspruit 
1963-1964 KRUGERSDORP 
Muncieville 
1962-1963 PRETORIA, Atteridge-
ville 
1963 PRETORIA, Atteridge-
ville, Hofmeyr High 
School 
1963 PRETORIA, Garankua 
1963 PRETORIA, Hebron' 
African Teachers' 
Training College 
1961-1963 PRETORIA, Kilnerton 
High School 
1963 PRETORIA, Eastwood 
1963 PRETORIA, Lady 
Selbourne 
1963 PRETORIA, Vlakfontein 
1963 RANDFONTEIN 
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Author's interview with 
former chairman of PAC's 
Vaal region, David Sibeko. 
Sibeko interview and The Times 
(London), 21 October 1963, 
report on state vs. Sibeko. 
Cape Times, 24 June 1963, 
report on state vs. Mthimunye 
and 10. 
Rand Daily Mail, 16 August 
1963, report on state vs. 
Mokoena and 3. 
~, 2 October 1963, report 
on State vs. Motsoahae and 3; 
~, report on State va. 
Majadebodu and 14, 1 September 
1964. 
State va. Masemula and 15, 
transcript, CSAS, York 
University. 
Existence of a student branch 
of PAC mentioned in profile 
of Ernest Moseneke in Azania 
~ (Dar es Salaam), 21 
January 1966. 
Rand Daily Mail, 7 August 
1963, report on State vs. 
Magashoa and 2. 
Cape Times, 12 April 1964, 
report on State va. Malepe 
and 11. 
Author's interview with 
Tommy Mohajane. 
State vs. Masemula and 15, 
transcript. 
State vs. Masemula and 15, 
transcript; arrests reported 
in Rand Daily Mail, 22 March 
1963. 
state vs. Masemula and 15. 
transcript. 
state vs. Ntsoane, transcript, 
SAIRR; Rand Daily Mail, 
24 July 196) on state vs. 
Mbamba and 19. 
1963 ROODEPOORT, 
Dobsonville 
1961-1963 SASOLBURG 
1962 SEKHUKHUNILAND 
TRANSKEI 
Dates Location 
1963 ENGCOBO district 
1962-1963 ENGCOBO district, 
Clarke bury Area 
1963 GLEN GREY district, 
Lady Frere, Ngqoka 
location 
1963 IDUTYWA district 
1963 KENTANI district, 
Makiba location 
1961-1965 MQANDULI district, 
Jixini, Hoabatshana, 
Mgumbe, Ngwane and 
Ntalanga locations 
196) NGQELENI district 
1963 ST. MARKS district. 
Cofimvaba, Qitsi 
location 
1962 ST. MARKS district, 
Cofimvaba. Banzi 
location 
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~, 24 May 1963. report on 
State vs. Pheko. 
Sibeko interview. 
Existence of a PAC region 
alleged in an interview with 
P. K. Leballo, West Africa. 
Source 
Daily Despatch, 28 August 
196), report on State vs. 
Mtirara and )6. 
Daily Despatch. 28 May 1963, 
report on State vs. Dlwati 
and 1: Daily Despatch. 29 
May 1963. )1 May 196), 
unspecified trial of 24. 
State vs. Manisi and 2, 
transcript. CSAS, York 
University. 
Daily Despatch. 8 April 196), 
report on arrests. 
Daily Despatch. 21 June 196), 
~. 18 July 196), reports 
on unspecified trial of 20. 
Daily Despatch, 15-19 January 
1963. 26 January 1963, Cape 
Argus. 29 March 1963, for 
reports on unspecified trial 
of 15 and three other unspec-
ified trials; State vs. Nikolo 
and 1. transcript, York 
University. 
Daily Despatch. 5 September 
1963. 17 September 1963. for 
reports for unspecified trial 
of 38 and unspecified trial of 4 
Daily Despatch, 14 February 
196), for Poqo involvement in 
attack on headman. 
Daily Despatch. 11 January 
196), 15 January 1963, Contact. 
31 May 1963, for reports on 
unspecified trial of 6. 
1962 UMTATA district, 
Baziya location 
1962-1963 UMTATA district, 
Mputi location 
1963 WILLOWVALE district, 
Msendo location 
1962-1963 WILLOWVALE district, 
Ntshatshungu location 
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Star, 16 July 1983, report 
on unspecified trial of 31. 
Daily Despatch, 31 July to 12 
August 1963, reports on State 
VS. Xhego and 29. 
Daily Despatch, 18 June 1963, 
report on State vs. Natusela 
and 2. 
Daily Despatch, 19 June 1963, 
report on unspecified trial 
of 10. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE PAARL UPRISING 
At half past two, early in the morning of Thursday, 
November 22nd, 1962, 250 men carrying axes, pangas and various 
self-made weapons left the Mbekweni location and marched on 
Paarl. On the outskirts of the city the marchers formed two 
groups, one destined for the prison where the intention was to 
release prisoners, the other to make an attack on the police 
station. Before the marchers reached Paarl's boundaries, the 
police had already been warned of their approach by a bus 
driver. Police patrols were sent out and one of these 
encountered the marchers in Paarl's Main Street. Having lost 
the advantage of surprise, the marchers in Main Street began to 
throw stones at cars, shop windows and any police vans which 
they came across on their way to the police station. The 
police at the station were armed with sten guns and rifles in 
anticipation of the attack. At ten minutes past four between 
seventy-five and a hundred men advanced on the station throwing 
stones. When the attackers came within twenty-five yards of the 
station they were fired upon and two of them were immediately 
killed. The marchers then broke up into smaller groups and 
several were arrested or shot during their retreat. Some of 
the men who had taken part in the assault on Paarl police 
station met up in Loop Street with the group that was marching 
on the prison. These men regrouped and embarked on an attack 
on the inhabitants of Loop Street. Three houses and two people 
in the street were attacked: a seventeen year old girl and a 
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young man were killed and four other people were wounded. 
According to police evidence, five insurgents were killed and 
fourteen were wounded. By five o'clock, the Paarl uprising 
was over; police reinforcements had arrived from Cape Town 
and the men from Mbekweni were in full retreat. 
This chapter has two purposes. One is to provide an 
analysis of the causes of the Paarl disturbance. In the 
literature on black South African opposition movements, the 
events in Paarl are scarcely mentioned. This is at least partly 
because the participants were not politically very sophisticated 
or articulate; they are consequently difficult to write about. 
But the neglect of the events in Paarl is also attributable to 
a bias in much of the relevant scholarship: the emphasis of 
historical studies has been on black ideological response and 
has tended to focus on the most fluent articulants of black 
aspirations. There is a tendency for the history of black South 
African opposition to be intellectual history and to concern 
itself with the thoughts, responses and actions of an elite 
group.1 The popular dimension of protest is ignored or subjected 
to vague generalisations. However, though the Paarl events have 
only received cursory attention from academic writers, they were 
the subject of a government-appointed commission of inquiry. 
The incident after all involved a politically inspired 
insurrection taking place in the heart of an important regional 
town and directed against state forces. 
2 The Snyman Commission report, reflecting as it does the 
official ideological concerns of the time, has various short-
comings. The report concludes that there were two basic factors 
in the unrest at Paarl. First there were the problems stemming 
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from inadequacies in the municipal administration. These 
included: deficiencies in consultative machinery; neglect 
of African affairs by the Paarl Town Council; the prevalence 
of corruption among location officials; cultural problems of 
'modernisation' among the migrant community and the lack of any 
sympathetic guidance in a 'strange urban setting'; division of 
responsibility between the municipal and South African police 
forces; the mistreatment of the location's population by the 
municipal police. Most of the popular resentment in Paarl, 
claimed Snyman, was against municipal as opposed to state 
agencies. This situation, Snyman argued. provided a fertile 
environment for the spread of influence of the Pogo movement. 
Snyman declared that there was a direct correlation in meaning 
between the titles Pogo and Pan Africanist Congress: both were 
names for the same organisation. In the report Pogo is viewed 
as part of a national conspiracy also involving • communists' 
and 'white liberals'. Snyman placed great emphasis on the 
atavistic. coercive and irrational characteristics of the 
organisation in its local context. The motivation of many Pogo 
activists. it is alleged. can be traced to their individual 
ambitions: they were men of little traditional status who in 
consequence repudiated and challenged traditional political 
hierarchies. Snyman went on to argue that actions directed 
against 'bantu people' (and their chiefs)formed a more important 
part of Pogo activities than 'crimes directed against the state 
or whites'. 
Snyman. therefore portrayed Pogo as a fairly elaborate 
conspiracy, through which local conditions were exploited to 
further the purpose of, on the one hand, people whose personal 
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political ambitions weranot being promoted by the Bantustan 
structure, and on the other, a national political strategy 
devised by the Pan Africanist Congress leadership in Maseru 
and their allies, the white liberals and communists. The 
conditions Pogo sought to exploit were ones that were fairly 
easy to remedy with reformsG that in any case coincided with 
requirements of government ideology. What was needed was more 
centralised administration with a policy for: 
' ••• the regulating of the influx of the 
Bantu people from their homelands into the 
industrial areas and the concomitant social 
difficulties to which it gives rise.' 3 
Social difficulties which would include: 
• • • In the circumstances some resistance 
from the Urban Bantu. ••• It requires 
speCial effort to persuade them that these 
schemes are not intended to be oppressive 
but are based on social and economic needs; 
and that it is for the good of all that a 
mode of living must be evolved whereby all 
sections of the people can live in harmony 
and prosperity. The men to administer such 
a policy must be specially trained for the 
work.' 4 
On formulating these conclusions Snyman chose to disregard 
evidence submitted to the South African Institute of Race 
Relations. Their counsel argued that first and foremost, 
dissatisfaction at Paarl derived from the migrant labour system 
and the way of life that evolved from it, as well as the threat 
to remove Africans from the Western Cape altogether. These 
basic causes of insecurity were aggravated by a particularly 
harsh and corrupt local administration. As far as the 
political movement was concerned, the majority of Pogo members 
did not have to be coerced into membership but joined 
voluntarily.5 
Much of what is to follow will bear out the SAIRR's 
analysis. However, a detailed study of the Paarl riots has an 
I 
additional function to that of offering an alternative 
interpretation to that provided by a fairly tendentious 
government document. This brings us to the second purpose of 
this chapter. This is to make a modest empirical contribution 
to a current debate on the sociology of liberation. In an 
influential article by Archie Mafeje, political responses of 
migrant workers are explained with reference to the partial 
nature of their proletarianisation: 
' ••• it may be pointed out that the fact 
that the families of migrants are back in 
the countryside, does create an important 
structural predisposition. When confronted 
with a situation such as Soweto, the first 
thing that migrants think of are their 
families back at home and their hopes 
materially. Therefore, the decision to 
strike does not come easily to them. It is 
even worse when we call to mind that in 
accordance with their traditions every 
decision is an outcome of long and tedious 
deliberations by all concerned. This is a 
far way cry from the instantaneous and 
precipitous reactions of urban youth.'. 6 
The stereotyped view of migrant workers as a politically 
apathetic and conservative force has been a common one among 
historians of South African protest. For example, in Karis, 
Carter and Gerhart's From Protest to Challenge it is asserted 
that most Pogo members in the Western Cape were drawn from the 
young unemployed sons of African middle class and working class 
families that had lived in urban centres from the 1920s. Poqo 
activists, apparently, had~emendous difficulty in mobilising 
migrant 'countrymen', who resenting being 'terrorised' used to 
report Poqo organisers to the police. 7 Just where this 
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information is derived from is not clear, but the overwhelming 
weight of evidence suggests a very different situation. For 
example, if one looks at the careers of the thirty-two men 
convicted of plotting an uprising while working at the Jewish 
Old Age Home in Cape Town in 1963 one sees that their ages 
varied between 21 and 63 but that most were in their thirties, 
that over half the accused were married with their dependents 
living in the Transkei and that with four exceptions all had 
been born in the Transkei, mainly in the Tsolo district. The 
8 
majority had first come to work in Cape Town during the 1950s. 
Or, to take another major Poqo trial, there was the group in 
Langa who took part in an attempt to assassinate Chief Kaiser 
Matanzima: most of the twenty men lived in the Langa single 
men's accommodation and had families in the Transkei. 9 
Detailed local case studies of the activities and social 
context of political movements help to correct mechanistic 
assumptions about the political behaviour of certain social 
groups. They also help to show us how ideological formulations 
are interpreted at a popular level. The historiography of 
African nationalism has tended to be the study of intellectual 
traditions with little effort made to examine the ways in which 
political ideas are understood at the social base of a political 
movement. For these reasons a study of the revolt of the men 
from the hostels at Mbekweni seems worthwhile. 
The uprising apart, Paarl during the late 1950s and early 
1960s had a turbulent history. There were four important 
previous occasions when black resentment of authority crystallised 
into open confrontation. In mid-1959 there was a demonstration 
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in Paarl against the issue of women's passes which apparently 
had the effect of delaying the local application of the law 
10 
which required all African female employees to hold passes. 
A few months later, in November 1959. rioting broke out in the 
suburb of Huguenot. Thousands of people, both African and 
Coloured. stoned cars, burnt and damaged shops and attacked 
Whites. One person died in the riot. The crowds were 
reacting to a Government banning order which had been imposed 
on Elizabeth Mafeking, a Paar1 resident and the president of 
the African Food and Canning Workers Union. These disturbances 
were followed a month later by tension in Mbekweni location: 
on several occasions municipal police were attacked during 
early morning searches for illegal visitors and an unsuccessful 
attempt was made to set on fire the location's administrative 
11 
offices. The following year. Paar1 was one of the few urban 
centres in which there was a response to the Pan Africanist 
Congress's anti-pass campaign. Passes were destroyed and a 
12 
school in the Mbekweni location was burnt down. 
Paar1 was not a very large to~n and its African population 
was small; the unusual intensity of opposition to the 
authorities is at first sight rather startling. For an under-
standing of the tensions that underlay these recurrent 
confrontations a knowledge of the development and changes in 
the town's economy and social structure is helpful. 
Paar1 lies in the heart of the Boland region, a rich 
agricultural area traditionally dominated by fruit growing and 
viniculture. The orchards and vineyards extend well inside 
the municipal boundaries to the middle of the town. Paarl is 
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one of the earliest centres of white settlement in South 
African and with its population of 52,000 in 1961 the main 
town of its region. From the end of the second world war 
onwards Paar1 experienced considerable industrial expansion 
both in its traditional industrial sector which had developed 
out of local farming activities, the fruit canning, wine and 
brandy and tobacco industries, and with more recent manufacturing 
which had no links with local agriculture. The late 1940s and 
1950s saw the establishment of jute spinning, plastics, light 
engineering, textiles and packaging concerns1) so that by 1962 
the total labour force employed in the 102 factories in Paar1 
14 
numbered 7,000. Paar1's population, according to Snyman, was 
composed of 17,000 whites, )0,000 co10uredsand 5,000 b1acks. 15 
Since 1950 the Black population had undergone an important 
structural change. Whereas at the beginning of the decade 
roughly two thousand African families had lived in and around 
Paarl, during the 1950s the number of families had been 
systematically reduced, so that by 1962 Paar1's population 
16 included only four hundred families and 2,200 migrant workers, 
who were housed in the Mbekweni hoste1s.'7 
Let us look at the changing situation of the African 
community in Paarl a little more closely. Until the post-war 
period the municipality had had a negligible African population 
and no official arrangements had been made for black housing. 
Labour in the traditional industries was seasonal and the labour 
force and their families tended to squat on farm land surrounding 
the town providing an additional source of income for local 
18 farmers. However, by 1950 the dimensions of the squatter 
population had begun to disturb the municipal authorities. 
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Paarl had been one of the last towns to be proclaimed under 
the Urban Areas Act and for this reason had attracted a large 
squatter population composed of the families of farm labourers 
employed in the Boland.19 The squatters were concentrated in 
four camps: Huguenot, Suider Paarl, Klein Drakenstein and 
Dal Josephat. In 1950 with Paarl's proclamation under the 
terms of the, Act the Municipality assumed control of African 
housing. The land the squatters occupied was destined for 
20 industrial development. The authorities were to rehouse 
the squatter population in two locations, both quite close to 
each other but over four miles from the town. The main 
location was Mbekweni, constructed on 1951. Mbekweni consisted 
of four blocks of barracks divided into rooms, each room 
intended to house six men. Each block had separate communal 
kitchens and washrooms. The blocks were furnished with beds 
and cement floors as well as an entrance at each end (but no 
interior doors).21 In addition to these 'single men's hostels' 
1fuekweni had a group of small houses sufficient to accommodate 
thirty families. The two thousand odd single men paid R2,20 a 
month, and the family units were rented at R4,40 a month. The 
rents, together with other revenue derived from the black 
population, paid for the costs of constructing and financing 
22 the location. 
Langabuya was rather a different scheme. Designated as an 
'emergency camp' it was intended to house, on a temporary basiS, 
those people who could not be sent to the Mbekweni single 
quarters. Consequently, most of the squatters were moved to 
Langabuya with their families. Langabuya was a 'site and service' 
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scheme; in other words the municipality provided refuse 
collection but little else. In the squatter camps, before 
their homes were demolished, people were told they would be 
given building materials in Langabuya. These did not appear 
apparently and people had to buy them. 2) But quite apart 
from the expense of building new homes (and inferior ones at 
that) the move was to involve long term costs. Langabuya's 
inhabitants had to pay R1,OO a month ground rent: previously 
they had paid no rent or had occupied very cheap houses near 
the coloured township in Suider Paarl. Langabuya's 1,200 
inhabitants were going to wait a long time for proper houses: 
the municipality only began to provide family accommodation for 
more than a handful of people in the mid-1960s. In the meantime 
it was a squalid, miserable place of tin shacks exposed to the 
wind on the top of a ridge. Despite this, it had certain 
advantages over Mbekweni for those who lived there. In 
comparison to the neighbouring location it was less easy for 
the municipal authorities to control and for that reason a 
high proportion of those who lived there did so without permits 
and passes. 24 The demolition of the squatters camps proceeded 
in fits and starts through the 1950s and was bitterly resented 
and in some cases resisted. The first removals took place in 
the winter: people's houses were flattened by tractors and 
the families were taken in trucks and dumped out in the open. 
The first camp to be subjected to this treatment was at Dal 
Josephat: many people from there were to join the African 
National Congress. 25 
There was a special reason in Paarl why the move into 
municipally-owned rented accommodation from private (and 
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sometimes free) housing would be a recurrent source of 
bitterness. Much of the employment in Paarl was seasonal: 
the canning factories. the wine and brandy industry. and the 
farms had sharply fluctuating labour requirements throughout 
the year. The canning industry. in Paarl the single largest 
employer of African labour, only hired most of its workforce 
for a third of the year, during the summer. This meant that 
its employees could be assured of a steady income for only 
about four months. The rest of the time they had to rely on 
casual farm work. Opportunities for this were becoming 
increasingly limited in the course of the decade by the 
extension of the prison farm system around Paarl. In addition. 
because of mechanisation, the canning season was becoming 
shorter. Seasonal canning workers had been excluded from the 
Unemployment Insurance Act in 1949. It is not surprising, 
therefore. that many people found it very difficult to keep 
up with their rent payments. The authorities retaliated by 
arranging with employers for the arrears to be deducted from 
pay packets during the peak employment period. Sometimes 
municipal police would actually visit factories and arrest 
26 
rent defaulters. 
Insecurity was not limited to economic issues. The 1950s 
was a period in which the state was in a process of tightening 
its control over labour mobility and implementing the first 
stages of a programme to expand and elaborate the migrant labour 
system. 21 For ideological reasons. the Western Cape, an area 
in which blacks represented a relatively small proportion of 
the population. was to receive the first impact of the programme. 
Its effects were felt in Paarl quite early in the decade. In 
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1955 women whose husbands had not lived in Paarl for fifteen 
years (and who therefore did not qualify for permanent 
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residence) began to be endorsed out and sent to the Transkei. 
Men who, in the slack season, registered as unemployed were 
told to send their wives away gnd move into the Mbekweni 
hostels. 29 Women in Paarl, as mentioned above, did manage 
quite successfully to resist the implementation of the pass laws. 
This was all the more remarkable in the light of what was 
happening in the nearby Cape Peninsula where the process of 
regulating the presence of black women was energetically begun 
in 1953. 30 The existence of a strong trade union with many 
black and coloured women members may have helped. However, by 
1960, with the government banning of Mrs. Mafeking, an important 
women's movement leader, as well as the proscription of the 
Women's League along with Congress, the battle had been lost. 
In 1962, the Mapheele case was to assume a considerable local 
symbolic importance, as an especially heartless example of 
official interference in African family life. 31 The case 
involved the expulsion of a young wife from Paarl who had been 
living all her married life illegally in Langabuya while her 
husband was compelled to stay in a hostel at Mbekweni. Apparently 
quite a lot of 'single' men of Mbekweni had their wives living in 
the nearby 'temporary' camps in constant fear of official 
harassment. There was also a considerable number of men who 
had not obtained passes and lived an anxious existence hiding 
in the bushes near the banks of the Berg river. 32 
In 1962 there was an added ingredient to people's worries 
with the onset of a well-publicised debate concerning the total 
removal of Africans from the Western Cape in conformity with a 
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Government policy that had been first elaborated in 1955. 
Despite the fact that influx control in the Western Cape had 
been extremely stringent since that time and had been 
accompanied, as we have seen, by a systematic restructuring 
of the African community into a largely migrant population, 
this apparently was not enough. In August, Verwoerd announced 
the formation of a special action committee to stimulate 
employers to replace their unskilled black labourers with 
coloured workers (who were at that time mainly employed in 
skilled capacities). The programme was justified in economic 
terms with the argument that it would encourage employers to 
mechanise and in so doing to raise productivity.33 In October 
1962 a concerted drive was begun in the African townships in 
Cape Town to send African women to the Transkei. 34 Paarl 
employers, despite their political sympathies, did not favour 
the government policy. They maintained that quite apart from 
being cheaper, African labour was more productive and efficient 
than coloured labour. 35 Most of the labour force, both on the 
farms and in the factories, was African. 
The implications of the policy were probably fairly clear 
to the African community in Paarl. Employers worries would 
have probably filtered down, there was plenty of press coverage 
to'the debate, and both the Mapheele case and the Langa and 
Nyanga expulsions in October 1962 would have aroused fears. 
Two of the Poqo members who gave evidence to the commission 
mention the proposed removals as a source of general anxiety, 
as did other witnesses. 36 
Let us summarise the situation as it had evolved by 1962. 
In Paarl there existed a fairly small black community which 
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within the previous decade had experienced an exceptionally 
sharp decline in its economic prosperity and social security. 
Black people had lost the degree of independence they had 
enjoyed in deciding where they should live: for many this loss 
represented a significant rise in the cost of living with the 
move into municipal accommodation. Many families were no longer 
permitted to live together. Seasonal workers were finding that 
their opportunities for employment during the slack period had 
diminished while their economic obligations had increased. And 
in 1962, with the removals debate, even migrant labourers were 
confronted with the threatened prospect of being thrown back 
into the pool of landless and unemployed in the reserves. To 
an extent these were factors which were common to all urban 
black communities in South Africa. However in the Western Cape 
towns the effects of overall tendencies in the development of 
South Africa's political economy were magnified and exaggerated 
by ruling class ideological preoccupations. And in a small 
community, such as Paarl's, the structural changes would have 
been especially obvious to the people experiencing them. 
A major source of tension was provided by the venal 
behaviour of the municipal administration. Considerable 
attention was paid to this in the Snyman report. The Director 
of Bantu Administration at Paarl (a post appointed by the Town 
Council) was a former police sergeant in the Transkei, J. H. 
Ie Roux. Le Roux had held the post since the inception of 
municipal administration of the African population in 1950. 
Evidence was submitted to the Commission which suggested that 
for a very long time, both Ie Roux and a black colleague, the 
senior clerk Wilson Mgcukana, had been using their power for 
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private purposes. Accusations included the selling of passes, 
endorsing out of men to create employment vacancies for which 
passes could be sold, the employment of those who could not 
afford the going rate of twenty rands per pass on le Roux's 
private farms, the enforcement of substantial fines for trivial 
infringements of regulations, and various instances of brutal 
behaviour by municipal employees. 37 Le Roux had actually been 
charged and tried for corruption in 1960: his subsequent 
acquittal provoked great dissatisfaction. 38 During the trial 
le Roux apparently succeeded in bribing or intimidating many of 
those witnesses who were supposed to appear against him. 39 
People were completely powerless to act against le Roux: it 
was believed that a complaint to the authorities could easily 
result in the withdrawal of official permission to live and 
work in the area. 40 A report made during le Roux's temporary 
suspension in 1960 noted an 'unprecedented degree of hostility 
to location officials' as well as an ebullient attitude among 
Africans in Mbekweni: 'they now regard themselves as being in 
a position to put whites in their place'. The report also 
mentioned a massive illegal liquor trade, R4,OOO outstanding 
rents and an ever increasing number of illegal residents. 41 
What should be stressed is that the extent of corruption 
in the Paarl administration was not merely the result of the 
individual weaknesses of the personalities involved. Nor was 
it going to be remedied necessarily by their substitution with 
the 'dedicated, kindly and human officials' from the Department 
of Bantu Administration and Development as recommended by 
Snyman. 42 The point was that the prevalence of corruption in 
Paarl's municipal administrators was, if not inevitable, at least 
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made very likely by certain structural conditions. First, the 
municipal control over influx and endorsement out procedures 
made its officials extremely powerful with regard to the 
employers who depended on them for the supply of most of their 
unskilled labour. Consequently, industrial and agricultural 
interests would be unlikely to use their influence in the town 
council to act against any abuses by these men. 43 Secondly, 
the seasonal nature of much of the employment greatly added to 
the power of officialdom to regulate people's lives and so 
considerably increased the opportunity for official venality. 
Thirdly, the political environment, which gave tacit approval 
to the harassment and disruption of the lives of Western Cape 
blacks, created an ideological climate for the illicit actions 
of location authorities such as Paarl's (espeCially when they 
were appointed by a staunChly Nationalist town council). 
Small as it was, the African population in Paarl had a 
fairly complex social structure. At the apex of the community 
were the people who, by virtue of the nature of their employment 
or because of the length of residence in the area, enjoyed a 
degree of status and security. The group included black 
employees of the municipal administration, artisans and skilled 
workers. From this group were drawn members of the advisory 
board. Some of them inhabited the family accommodation in 
Mbekweni. Two members of this group gave evidence to the 
Commission. Mr. Kleinbooi Sokweba, aged fifty-four, a father 
of twelve children, and a resident of Paarl since 1938, had 
taken part in 1960 in a delegation to the authorities to complain 
about the noisy behaviour of the inhabitants of the Mbekweni 
hostels. 44 Mr. Wilson Sonyani, a carpenter and lay preacher, who 
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lived with his family in Mbekweni, was a member of an Advisory 
Board delegation which had tried to warn the authorities of 
the spread of Poqo's influence in mid-1962. Sonyani was also 
the Chairman of Mbekweni School Board. 45 
Then there was the residual group of former squatters 
living in Langabuya with families, numbering altogether about 
1,200 people. Other family groups were scattered in various 
squatter camps still awaiting demolition. The fortunes of 
these people would have varied very widely according to their 
legal status: but all were subject to the fear that they would 
no longer be permitted to live together as families in Paarl. 
Thirdly, there were the migrant labourers, some of whom, 
as we have noted, were former squatters and who had managed to 
find illegal accommodation for their wives in the emergency 
camp. Among the migrant workers there were also more recent 
arrivals to Paarl, drawn there by the expansion of employment 
in the new manufacturing industrial sector which had developed 
in the 1950s. Judging by the evidence· submitted 't,o the Snyman 
Commission by the Food and Canning Workers as well as the 
contents of the union's reports46 it seems sensible to conclude 
from the Union's evident concern over living conditions in 
both the squatter's camps and the single men's hostels, that 
its members, and hence workers in the 'traditional' industrial 
sector were to be found among both the migrant and the 'settled' 
sections of the African population. Therefore employment 
patterns in Paarl did not coincide with residential divisions 
and the commission evidence suggests that strong social links 
existed between the hostel inhabitants and Langabuya. However 
there was considerable tension between the migrant workers and 
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elite group described above. 
Finally, there was a transient population of particularly 
vulnerable people: those who had recently arrived to seek work 
without any official sanction. 
As we have seen black response to deteriorating conditions 
had on occasions been expressed in the form of prolonged and 
violent riots. But Africans had also defended their interests 
through a variety of formal organisations. The oldest of these 
in Paarl was the African National Congress, a branch of which 
was formed in December 1927. In the Boland during the late 
1920s and early 1930s the ANC had been untypically energetic 
and had begun to resemble a mass movement. Garveyism and the 
expulsion of Cape Town based Communist Party of South Africa 
activists from the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union 
contributed radical impulses to the local ANC organisation. 
The Boland agricultural labour~force was highly proletarianised, 
probably more than elsewhere in the country, much of it seasonal 
and living not on the farms but in apalling conditions of over-
crowding in the urban centres. In Paarl in December 1927 a man 
was killed in an altercation between a police officer and the 
inhabitants of one of the locations. Cape Town ANC (Western 
Province) activists organised a series of protest meetings in 
Paarl, encouraging Africans and Coloured people to join the ANC 
and advocating communal organisation and a general strike. This 
was the start of a wave of rural and small town disaffection in 
the Boland led by the ANC whose influence soon permeated many 
of the farms as a result of the attendance of farmworkers at 
Sunday'meetings arranged by the ANC in the locations. The 
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popular enthusiasm for the movement was a reflection of the 
decline in labour conditions which resulted from the 1929 to 
1933 world depression. The fall in world prices especially 
affected Boland agriculture, which to a greater extent than 
elsewhere was tied to the export market. The ANC was eventually 
crushed in the region but not before establishing a dense 
network of branches: in Worcester membership exceeded 800. 
The Boland ANC was a thoroughly proletarian organisation in 
terms of its composition and preoccupations. Its membership 
was drawn from Coloured as well as African workers and included 
a large number of women. 47 
Apparently dormant in the late 1930s and 1940s as a result 
of the earlier persecution by farmers and local state agencies 
of local level leadership the ANC in Paarl was to pick up 
support during the early 1950s as a result of popular anger at 
and resistance to squatter removals. The fact that people 
actually destroyed their passes in 1960 suggests that they 
were acting in accordance with Luthuli's call for people to 
burn their passes, rather than the Pan Africanist Congress's 
directive which told men to leave their documents at home and 
surrender themselves at police stations without them. 48 
Contributing to the strength of the ANC's local following 
was the Food and Canning Workers' Union (FCWU), a force in 
community politics in its own right. The FCWU, founded in 1941 
with an African and Coloured membership, was generated by very 
similar social tensions to those which produced the ANC (Western 
Province) a decade earlier. As in the case of the latter its 
membership included a large number of women and embraced both 
Coloureds and Africans: the African Food and Canning Workers 
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Union was formed in response to the requirements for registration 
under the Industrial Conciliation Act in 1947. Paarl had been 
an important centre for the Union since the establishment of a 
branch in 1941. The FC~~ and the AFCWU during the 1950s were 
generally effective in protecting the promoting the economic 
interests of their members. For example, in Paarl in 1957, an 
increase was conceded by the major canning employer after a 
brief strike organised by the uniono 49 But the two unions did 
not merely confine themselves to economic objectives. Both 
organisations were affiliated to the South African Congress of 
Trade Unions, a member of the Congress Alliance. In conformity 
with other SACTU affiliates, the canning workers unions linked 
the struggle for immediate economic benefits with long term 
political goals. Their leading officials often held important 
posts in other Congress Alliance organisations. Elizabeth 
Mefeking, for example, as well as being President of the AFCWU 
was also Vice-President of the ANC Women's League and in that 
capacity had been important in the organisation of local efforts 
to resist the issue of women's passes. The benefits of such 
an overlap could be reCiprocal: though the nationalist movement 
could draw on union organisation to advance political strategies, 
at the same time individual unions could find their bargaining 
power considerably increased by political alliances. For 
example in 1959 the ANC was attempting to organise an inter-
national trade boycott. The fruit industry, especially dependent 
on overseas markets was understandably fairly nervous. The 
FCWU and the !NC were able to extract from the Langeberg 
co-operative (an important Boland agricultural and fruit 
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processing employer) an agreement which included recognition 
of the AFCWU and a promise not to assist the government to 
enforce the Urban Areas Act. In return, the Langeberg 
Co-operative would be left off the boycott list. 50 The Paarl 
branch was the major source of income for the union's headquarters. 
The AFCWU branch had about four hundred members, 200 of whom 
lived in the Mbekweni hostels. 51 With its willingness to take 
up issues not directly related to the workplace (living 
conditions, rents, provision by the municipality of certain 
services, etc.), the local branch of the union was an important 
political force in the community. 
Considerably less influential and effective was the Bantu 
Advisory Board, appointed by the municipality's Bantu Affairs 
Committee on the advice of the Director, Ie Roux. Its members 
were drawn from the most privileged members of the black 
population. Not surprisingly the board members had accomplished 
little in the way of improvements or even in reflecting 
community grievances. As one black witness testified to the 
commission: 'We no longer go to the Bantu Advisory Council 
because it is they who push us around,.5 2 
Having sketched in the social, economic and political 
environment that Paarl's black population lived in during the 
early 1960s we can now turn to the development of the Pogo 
movement there. 
We know from police trial testimony of the existence of 
a PAC branch in Paarl before the organisation's proscriPtion.53 
Unfortunately that source tells us nothing about its members 
or activities. The earliest record of revived activity by PAC 
members in Paarl is documentation from a trial of three men 
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convicted for recruiting on behalf of an illegal organisation. 
All three were originally from Cofimvaba in the Transkei, in 
their twenties, and lived in migrant workers' hostels. Two 
worked in the Bakke plastics factory and one at Rembrandt 
Tobacco. Their recruiting activities, which took place between 
February and October 1961, were concentrated in the Mbekweni 
and New Town locations. 54 Recruiting was a simple procedure: 
men would be approached, told of Pogo, 'an organisation which 
stood alone' and asked to pay an initial subscription of twenty 
five cents. 55 State witnesses at Pogo trials tended to emphasise 
a coercive aspect to recruiting: they would claim that they 
were given little option but to join, for if they did not, 
they were told, they would be killed or at the very least, would 
have to leave the location. 
However, such people would naturally be anxious to 
disassociate themselves from the organisation. One Pogo 
member (who did not seem to be aware of the legal implications 
of turning state evidence) said he joined because: 
'I saw that a lot of people were supporting 
the Poqo organisation at Mbekweni location. 
That's why I joined because a lot of people 
I know also joined.' 56 
Social pressure there may have been, but this does not amount 
to coercion. 
New members were told that the subscriptions (as well as 
the twenty five cents, members paid an additional ten cents a 
month)57 would be used in Langa by leaders 'to buy guns' or for 
burials and the dependents of the dead and arrested. 58 Each 
new member was organised into a cell of ten peOPle,59 the 
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members of which would sometimes live in the same rooms. 
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Once a week the members of the cell would meet in their cell 
61 leader's room. Less frequently there would be much larger 
meetings involving members of several Mbekweni ce11s. 62 
According to age, the Pogo members would also be placed either 
in a 'Task Force' (if they were under twenty five) or a 'general 
force,.63 The younger group would be in the vanguard of any 
attack as well as performing any defensive operations. Members 
of both forces would attend parades together in a plantation 
near the location. Sometimes outsiders, believed to be from 
Langa, would join the proceedings. Here the recruits would 
drill like soldiers in preparation for the great day when they 
would fight for the return of their land. 64 
Other preparation included the fashioning of crude weapons 
and, for those who could afford it, the scarification of their 
foreheads as a measure believed to ensure their invulnerability 
against the police. This was carried out by one of the main 
65 leaders and he would be paid ten rands for the operation. 
There are no firm indications as to how many people 
belonged to Poqo in 1Thekweni or Paarl as a whole. At the final 
meeting before the attack, and in the march on the town, 
witnesses suggest that there were about three hundred partici-
pants. This was the figure the authorities believed at the 
time to have represented the local strength of Poqo. From the 
backgrounds of some of the defendants and state witnesses in 
one of the trials that took place after the uprising the 
following generalisations can be made. These were fairly young 
men who had come to work and live in Paar1 since the mid-1950s. 
They were mainly employed in the new manufacturing industries, 
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in services or at the cigarette factory. They lived in one 
or other of the migrant workers' blocks at Mbekweni (with no 
noticeable concentration in anyone block). Despite testimony 
from witnesses to the Snyman Commission that the leaders were 
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'educated men' this feature does not emerge from the records 
of the trial. 67 From these rather sparse details a few 
tentative points can be made. Poqo's local leaders were 
drawn from the men who formed the most recently arrived section 
of Paarl's population. The absence of any employees from the 
traditional industrial activities in Paarl is interesting;. it 
would suggest that the AFCWU had succeeded in influencing the 
political loyalties and the ideological outlook of its member-
ship. It seems sensible to conclude that Poqo's local 
following was drawn more or less exclusively from the migrant 
labourers employed in the recently established industries rather 
than from the people whose livelihood depended on agriculture 
and good processing - these tended to more long established 
residents of Paarl forming a community over which the ANC and 
the FCWU has exerted a powerful influence for several decades. 
Though the Poqo men in the trial would not have had experienced 
all the hardships described in preceding sections of this paper 
(the removals from the squatters' camps and the fluctuations of 
employment arising out of involvement in a seasonal industry) 
they did come from the group which felt the severity of the 
system most intensely. They were unable to have their wives 
and children living nearby save illegally, they themselves were 
the most stringently subjected to influx control restrictions, 
and they had the most intimate knowledge of deteriorating 
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conditions in the reserves. It is also reasonable to assume 
that the general insecurity of the community and the violent 
tradition of social protest in Paarl would have contributed 
to their motivation. 
Before the uprising there had been at least eight instances 
of violence in Paarl which were eventually attributed to Poqo. 
On the night of 21st January, 1962, eleven men took part in 
the murder of an employee of the municipal administration, 
Klaus Hosea. Hosea was believed by local Poqo leaders to have 
been an informer. He was seen writing down the numbers of 
lorries which had transported Poqo members from Paarl to a 
meeting in Simonstown. Four of the men functioned as look-outs 
and seven took part in the killing of Hosea. The murder took 
68 place between rubekweni and Langabuya. Nearly three months 
later on April 14th, the police were told of a plan to burn 
down the houses of municipal employees and kill the inhabitants. 
Early on the morning of the 15th, a strong police patrol was 
sent to Mbekweni. In the middle of the location they came 
across a crowd of about 120 men who were singing. On being 
intercepted the men attacked the police wounding three constables 
and their commanding officer. According to reports at the time, 
. 6 
guns as well as sticks and stones were used in the attack. 9 
The police were to react by raiding the location in strength 
on the night of May 6th. The raid involved 162 constables led 
by eight officers. By now the police were aware of the extent 
of Poqo's influence, but in spite of arresting a few suspects 
were able to do little to check the movement: they were unable 
to persuade anyone to come forward to incriminate those they 
had arrested. 70 From this time police raids became increasingly 
frequent in ~Thekweni. 
28) 
Two more suspected informers were to be killed by Poqo 
in the following months and in both cases their ending was 
terribly brutal. Then in the middle of June Pogo members 
dragged four women out of various rooms in the hostels and 
took them to the nearby plantation. Three of the women were 
hacked to death, one managed to survive her wounds and the 
attempt to set her body alight. The day after, a pamphlet 
written in Xhosa was found pasted to one of the kitchen block 
walls. It read: 
'Here is something important to all of 
you. Girls must never be present again 
in our single quarters, even the individual 
they may be visiting will not be innocent 
of such charge. Never again must any 
preacher be heard making a noise in our 
single quarters by preaching. One who 
wishes to do so must go and do it in town. 
Those who are going around here with 
pamphlets of Watchtower it must be their 
last week-end, going about approaching 
people with this nonsense. 
People collecting washing for local 
laundries must cease to be seen collecting 
money in the single quarters. We will 
take our washing to the laundry ourselves. 
Christians will be allowed only this 
Sunday, June 24th, after which and until 
December 1963, never will any existing 
church which is calculated to oppress be 
allowed. There will only be one national 
church. All the above things will be 
abolished from next week until December 1963. 
You are being told. These are the last 
warnings of this nature. Therefore please 
tell or inform each.other. The time itself 
tells you. It shines to each and everyone, 
but you teach or preach falsehood to us so 
that the nation must remain oppressed forever.' 71 
Then on September 22nd a white shopkeeper was killed in his 
shop in Wellington. According to police evidence he was 
attacked by a Pogo group from Paarl 'to show (the movement's) 
determination to kill whites'. The group used firearms and 
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emptied the cash drawer. 72 Finally on October 28th a witness, 
who was helping the police in their investigation of the 
storekeeper murder, was killed in a similarly brutal fashion 
to previous victims. 
By the end of October, the police had arrested twenty 
five men whom they believed to have been involved both in the 
murders and in Pogo. 73 Concern over the apparent extent of the 
movements power had also affected the Bantu Advisory Board and 
the location's adm1nistrators. 74 There was a history of 
antipathy between the members of the Advisory Board and the 
inhabitants of the single hostels. Several of them owed their 
position on the Board to the influence of Ie Roux's headman, 
Wilson Ngcukana. Board members had acquiesced in the system 
of pass selling and supported measures taken against people 
who were behind in their rent payments. 75 In 1960, the Advisory 
Board had sent a deputation to the Mayor of Paarl to complain 
about the single men's behaviour. 76 This was during the 
period of Ie Roux's suspension, when control of the location 
was for a period loosened. At the weekends large numbers of 
women and children came into the hostels and lively parties 
were held. The Board members asked for the appointment of 
block supervisors, and more recently requested the erection 
of a fence to prevent unauthorised entry to the location. In 
May, 1962, a deputation, composed of 'leading members of the 
Bantu Community' alarmed by the recruiting and the drilling 
activities going on obviously quite openly in the location, 
complained to the police district commandant of 'unlawful 
meetings' and 'unlawful visitors'. The commandant took up 
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their complaints with the location administration. The 
administration's officials seemed to have been rather piqued 
that the deputation did not channel their complaints through 
them and Ngcukana went so far as to compromise deputation 
members by publicly warning them that Pogo was looking for the 
people who had betrayed them to the police. 77 At the beginning 
of November, the Board asked the administration for permission 
to send a second deputation to the police, but despite the 
urgency of the request, no more was heard of the matter. 78 
Obviously the municipal officials were anxious to maintain their 
power within the location and did not want to rely on external 
assistance. 
However, by this time, the municipal authorities were 
ready to act. Ngcukana had for some months been engaged in a 
series of brutal interrogations of various suspected Pogo 
members. At least one of the Pogo witnesses at the Snyman 
Commission had been in touch with the municipal police since 
the middle of the year. 79 Ngcukana had also been building up 
his own client group in the location: there was talk of a 
group of Mpondo who had been brought into the location recently; 
other members of this group included very young and recently 
arrived migrant workers who had just bought their passes~80 
On Sunday 18th November, at a meeting held at Wilson Ngcukana's 
house during the morning, the decision was taken to isolate 
the Pogo members by driving them out of their hostels and 
forcing them to occupy rooms in Block D of the location. The 
removals took place straight away. Men from Block A (who 
apparently composed the major force of Ngcukana's following).81 
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dragged men out of their rooms, beat them up, threw their 
belongings out after them, and then herded them into Block D. 
The municipal police played a leading part in this operation 
and apparently used the occasion to payoff a number of old 
scores.
82 These removals did not occur all at once but carried 
on until they were completed on Tuesday.8) The municipal 
police then set to work on the new inmates of D Block and by 
Wednesday had succeeded in discovering three men allegedly 
involved in the murders which had taken place during the 
preceding months. These men were handed over to the South 
African Police.84 With this blow, the stage was set for the 
Paarl uprising. 
At 9 o'clock on the evening of May 21st, the Poqo leaders 
called a meeting in D Block. By now they were thoroughly 
alarmed and were convinced of the need for a decisive counter 
attack on the authorities. The meeting was told that they 
should prepare for an attack on Paarl police station and the 
prison later that night with the immediate purpose of freeing 
the Poqo men arrested earlier. Another object of the attack 
would be to obtain weapons and ammunition for the movement. 
Despite Snyman's assertion that the ultimate aim was to launch 
an attack on the white people of Paarl that night, the evidence 
is rather confusing with regard to what was supposed to happen 
when Poqo was in control of the police station and prison. But 
it was stressed by the speakers, that that night was not the 
great night when all Poqo groups were to launch a general 
insurrection throughout the country.85 However, it was planned 
to co-ordinate the assault with the Poqo cells at Langa whom, 
it was hoped, would launch a diversionary attack on the police 
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and prevent Cape Town from sending reinforcements to Paarl.86 
Three men immediately l~ft ~~ekweni in a taxi to contact the 
Langa people for this purpose. While they were away, the 
meeting broke up and people returned to their rooms to collect 
their weapons and get some sleep. The last routine police patrol 
occurred during this lull and the police saw nothing to arouse 
their suspicions that anything unusual was going on.81 
In Langa, there seems to have been some reluctance to 
fall in with the plans of the Paarl group. The Langa Pogo 
leaders first of all suggested that the Paarl men should merely 
kill Ngcukana, but this suggestion was rejected by the visitors. 
Ngcukana slept out of the location and wasn't easily accessible, 
and in any case was working hand in glove with the police. 
By now things had reached a stage where the killing of a senior 
clerk would not in itself provide an adequate solution. But, 
said the Langa men, there were not adequate numbers of Poqo 
members at Paarl to launch a successful attack on the police 
station. Then, Damane, the leader of the Paarl deputation, 
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said 'If we are dead, then we are dead', and the force of 
this argument seems to have convinced the men in Langa for 
their visitors left them with the assurance that the Cape Town 
police would have plenty to occupy themselves with in Langa 
that night.89 On their return, the Poqo members were marshalled 
for another short meeting and then at half past two, on the 
morning of November 22nd, the march on Paarl began. 
The events of the march have been described at the 
beginning of this chapter and are detailed at length in the 
Snyman Commission Report. Just two points about them will be 
made here. First, the sudden transformation of the march from 
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a disciplined attack on the police station and gaol into a 
general attack on any whites in the path of the marchers 
requires comment. The fact that Pogo members actually went 
into houses in Loop Street to kill their occupants suggests 
that this was not merely a panic stricken defensive reaction 
but rather involved an extension of the objects of the attack 
as it was originally conceived in the minds of the participants. 
Pogo members had for months discussed and planned for a general 
uprising. An insurrectionist strategy, as suggested in the 
previous chapter, arose quite spontaneously in the situation 
of migrant labour in the Western Cape in which men were caught 
in a web of pressures and tensions, in which neither the present 
nor the future held out any source of hope. At the point when 
the marchers turned upon the inhabitants of Loop Street, the 
attack which had been primarily a defensive operation, turned 
into an insurrection, and followed the lines of a preconceived 
model. 
The second point worth making here is that, in the short 
term, the march on Paarl very nearly succeeded in attaining its 
immediate objectives. If it wasn't for the observation of the 
marchers by a bus driver on his way to the location and the 
failure of the marchers from stopping him from alerting the 
police it is quite likely that the thirty nine policemen in the 
Paarl district90 (many of whom were off duty) would not have 
been able to cope with the attack. It took over three quarters 
of an hour for reinforcements from Cape Town to arrive. 91 The 
Paarl uprising still represents the occasion which came closest 
to the apocalyptic ideal of Pogo and many other movements before 
them: a black insurrection carried into the heart of the white 
cities of South Africa. 
289 
Both government reports and more socially compassionate 
liberal analyses tend to view political violence in South 
Africa as the result of psychological trauma, hence the emphasis 
is on the apparent irrationality of such actions, an 
irrationality which can only be due to an abnormal mental and 
emotional crisis in the minds of the participants. Snyman in 
his report refers to the cultural problems of modernisation 
and the stresses it could create: 
The migrant Bantu do not understand the 
ways of the white man • •• They are 
steeped in the customs and habits of their 
tribal life. ••• What the Bantu people 
needed in this to them strange urban 
setting was a sympathetic and patient 
administration intent on explaining and 
persuading them of the need for regulations 
• •• The great difficulties which confront 
the migrant Bantu in adapting himself to an 
urban life escape the mind of the average 
white man. He does not realise that the 
Urban Bantu is in urgent need of sympathetic 
guidance in adapting himself to the circum-
stances of urban life. ••• South Africa's 
industrial development has thrown up 
tremendous and diverse problems for it in 
its inter-racial relations. The easy going 
and generally accepted practices of separated 
existences for White and Bantu as obtained 
under rural conditions have had to be revised 
and adapted to the more complicated conditions 
arising in urban areas • •• 92 
Less sententiously the SAIIL~ court3el pointed to the: 
••• housing of men in 'single quarters', 
cut off from the stabilising influence of 
family life and forced to practice an 
unnatural continence - which is bound to 
lead to mental and emotional tensions and 
frustrations. 93 
At a simpler level, a member of the Interdenominational African 
Ministers' Fraternal testified to the Commission that the 'riot' 
was 'not political' and caused by 'the sillyness of children,.94 
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Whilst not disregarding the social distress that provided 
a crucial contributory cause of the uprising, in this chapter 
I have attempted to demonstrate the rationality of the events 
as far as the viewpoints of the Pogo members were concerned. 
Just as it can be argued that the behaviour of a rioting crowd 
has an implicit rationality to it, so too with the marchers. 
The terrible events of the night of November 21st grew out of 
an insurrectionary characteristic of the Pogo movement. For 
its members the reversal of the present social order was the 
only alternative to its perpetuation on increasingly intolerable 
terms. 95 There was nothing irrational nor unbalanced about 
their perception of the world around them. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
PAN-AFRICANISTS IN EAST LONDON AND PRETORIA 
This study has examined the development of the Pan-
Africanists and their movement in the areas of their greatest 
popular impact: in Vereeniging, in the Western Cape and in 
the Tembu districts of the Transkei. In this chapter we turn 
to the remaining centres of significant PAC and Poqo activity 
- East London and Pretoria. In these places the movement did 
not achieve the communal resonance which it acquired in its 
other areas of influence, it was weaker and more narrowly 
socially-based, but nevertheless both in East London and 
Pretoria the Pan-Africanists were active quite extensively 
over a number of years, their history reflecting and 
reinforcing local political traditions. As with previous 
chapters discussion of the local social and political back-
ground will help to explain the PAC's emergence and development 
in these centres. 
In stark outline the PAC's activities in East London 
might not seem to indicate an organisation which had succeeded 
1 in 'penetrating the soul of the multitude'. In the days 
which followed the opening of the anti-pass campaign on March 
21st on at least four occasions PAC supporters held public 
meetings in the main location of Duncan Village and urged 
people not to carry passes. On March 28th a small procession 
of a dozen or so men presented themselves without their boo~s 
for arrest at the police station. PAC leaflets were reported 
to be in circulation on several occasions. A man was convicted 
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for shouting before others 'Africa belongs to the Africans'. 
Between March 21st and the end of April there were five 
attempts to burn down churches, three telephone booths were 
damaged and seven buses were stoned. These events were 
reported in a series of trials in the District Commissioner's 
Courts in May when three groups totalling twenty-six men and 
women were given one year prison sentences for incitement. 
Their identity was not reported in the press and this anonymity 
was reinforced by the status of the court: the cases were 
brief and not defended. 2 Neither these acts nor local ANC or 
PAC calls for a stay-at-home on March 28th and in mid-Apri13 
excited any externally discernable communal response, though 
in the case of the PAC strike call popular reaction to it may 
have been inhibited by five raids on the township by the police 
and army with saracen armoured cars and in one instance a light 
aeroplane. The 1,433 people4 arrested in these raids were 
described as 'mostly young natives with no passes - tsotsis' 
and the raids were expressly conducted with the motive of 
removing the politically volatile. 5 
The apparent political quiescence which.succeeded these 
events was broken only in the latter half of 1962 when between 
July and December five people were the victim of assassination 
attempts. These were the work of a group of African National 
Congress adherents and will be discussed later. Simultaneously 
from September 1962 onwards (if not before) groups of young 
men began to attend Poqo meetings held regularly on Tuesday 
6 
and Thursday nights. On the night of April 8th 1963, a large 
group of men assembled on open ground outside Duncan Village 
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bringing with them home-made weapons. Their plans to mount 
a local insurrection were thwarted by the police who had 
been warned of their intention. Over a hundred men were 
subsequently arrested. Thereafter PAC/Poqo activity in East 
London subsided though a small nucleus continued to recruit 
people for guerilla training in Lesotho. 7 
The significance of these events can best be understood 
when they are viewed in the context of the history of political 
organisations in East London's African community. This in turn 
needs to be examined against a background of an unusual degree 
of communal impoverishment and social insecurity. 
East London, a port City, had undergone considerable 
industrial expansion during the war, much of this involving 
African labour to replace whites recruited in the war effort. 
Unlike many industrial centres African labour was not 
accommodated in municipal compounds or hostels and equally 
untypically the African population displayed an even ratio 
between the sexes and most of its members spoke the same 
language, Xhosa. Whilst the city fathers were anxious to 
limit this population's expansion through various forms of 
influx control instituted from the 1930s, that was where they 
felt their responsibilities ended. The majority of workers 
in East London attempted to maintain their homes in the 
countryside, returning every weekend to the surrounding 
Ciskeian reserves to visit their families. The municipal 
authorities constructed no housing at all between 1926 and 
1940, and when money became available after the City's 
proclamation under the Urban Areas Act. progress on the first 
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sub-economic scheme of Duncan village was so slow that in 
the main location four fifths of the population lived in 
privately constructed wood and iron shacks. 
Despite the balance between the sexes, East London's 
African population was largely one which oscillated between 
working in the town and visiting their families over weekends. 
8 Eighty-six per cent of the population was rural-born, and 
surveys made in the early 1950s indicated that the majority 
of men between the ages of 30 and 50 spent several years of 
their adult lives as peasants before coming to East London. 9 
Philip Mayer found in 1955 that just under half the male 
working population could be categorised as 'Red'; that is, 
having a preference for traditional clothing and ancestor 
beliefs as opposed to Christianity. In East London, then, a 
large proportion of the population was strongly influenced by 
an indigenous rural culture and more still maintained family 
links with the countryside. Christianity and schooling, not 
surprisingly, had a marked effect on political and social 
aspirations. Mayer's survey found a detached attitude to 
white South African culture prevalent among 'Red' workers: 
'I like nothing about the white man being quite satisfied with 
what I am myself'. Among 'school' people the assertion of a 
common cultural identity with whites, combined with resentment 
10 
at white social exclusiveness, was far more common. 
It was a population afflicted by dreadful poverty. The 
40,000 inhabitants of the location on the east bank of the 
Rooikrans River lived mainly in corrugated iron tenement 
buildings, honeycombs of crudely constructed rooms, usually 
)00 
opening on a yard which itself could be dotted with low 
kennel-like structures, used as kitchens by day and as 
sleeping quarters by night for poorer families. Even these 
families were lucky in comparison with the alcoholic bush 
community, some hundreds of men and women who led a terrible 
existence, shivering under sacks each night in the surrounding 
scrubland. The location itself had an ugly social complexity 
arising out of differential access to property. At its social 
apex there was a small group of owners, many of them based in 
the countryside, and supported by rents paid by lodgers; 
sometimes the high rents they charged forced the lodgers to 
share his or her room with sub-tenants. Within each room this 
structure would be reflected in sleeping arrangements; the 
official lodger perhaps having a bed by the window, his first 
sub-tenant, probably an age-mate, making do with a blanket on 
the floor next to the bed, and the last and least privileged 
sub-tenant sleeping in the least comfortable corner. For such 
accommodation people paid on average nearly a pound a month -
11 
approximately ten per cent of their wages. 
There were indications that conditions were deteriorating 
sharply in the late 1940s. East London's population would have 
been sensitive to rural conditions to an extent paralleled only 
by Durban. Between 1945 and 1951 the Ciskei, East London's 
rural hinterland, was hit by a terrible series of droughts, 
destroying crops and pasture and killing large numbers of 
12 
cattle - for many people their only source of economic security. 
In 1949, for example, a quarter of the existing population was 
lost; four years earlier it had been double the size. For 
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people living in the countryside, when the nearest water could 
involve a seven-mile walk, when they had lost their animals 
and crops, if they were not already among the growing number 
who had lost all access to land - even the misery of East 
London's locations offered a ray of hope. D. H. Reader, 
writing in the early 1950s, reported that 'relative to the 
size of the City, the Bantu offer ttemse1ves for work, 
probably in larger proportions than in any comparable centre 
in the Union,.13 Resultant low wages, unemployment, the 
increasing poverty of rural dependents - all intensified the 
horror of location life. In 1945 six out of every ten African 
babies born in East London died in their first year; the 
14 
comparable figure for whites was less than one in a hundred. 
In 1953 there were still only thirty communal lavatories serving 
a population of some 40,000. 15 According to the official 
census an extra 10,000 people had been squeezed into the 
location between 1946 and 1951. But it seems that the 1951 
census was apparently particularly inaccurate in the case of 
East London; an independent survey in 1955 concluded that 
16 
the location housed over 55,000, 141 people to each acre. 
In the oldest section of the village, Juliwe, in 1963 an 
average of seventeen people were sharing each shack and sixty 
each latrine17 whilst infant mortality, though lower than in 
1946, was over thirty per cent (mainly due to ma1nutrition).18 
In the same year administrators claimed that there was a sharp 
. 
increase in the numbers of illegal residents who had recently 
moved into the village. This was attributed to two causes: 
the Western Cape 'endorsement outs' and 'the existence of a 
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certain element encouraging people in the Transkei to converge 
on the location in large numbers with the hope that the large 
influx would hamper administration,.1 9 The mass police raids 
conducted on the location after the pass campaign were novel 
only in terms of their exceptionally large scale: for years 
East London's African population had been subjected to the 
harassment of irregularly administered (and hence unpredictable), 
often savagely effective influx control measures. 
In the absence of first-hand oral testimony one has to 
use one's imagination to recapture the feelings of rural 
people, forced out of the countryside by starvation and land 
shortage (or in the case of squatters and labour tenants, by 
white farmers), confronted with the glaring discrepancy between 
urban white affluence and black poverty: and bringing with 
them a world-view in which whites were representatives of a 
bitterly resented officialdom. It is not altogether surprising 
to find that the most vigorous political group in the location 
throughout the 1950s was an Africanist inspired branch of the 
Congress Youth League. Gerhart has argued that the intellectual 
evolution of Africanism was influenced by the peasant background 
of its original exponents. Certainly its emphasis on racial 
dichotomy, cultural self-sufficiency and a heroic past would 
have found a special resonance in the bitter antecedents of 
many of East London's proletarians. The East London youth 
League was exceptional in the history of political groups in 
the town in that it brought both 'Red' and 'School' people 
20 together. The Cape Youth League was unusual in that it 
developed first in a rural context, round Herschel (the home of 
)0) 
A. P. Mda, a founder of the Youth League), thereafter 
spreading to the coastal towns. Many of its original 
nucleus at Fort Hare had initially been close to the All 
African Convention,21 whose leadership looked to the 
peasantry for their political base. Accordingly young student 
Youth Leaguers in the Cape had begun by organising literacy 
classes for farm labourers and peasants. 22 
The Youth League branch in East London was founded in 
1949 and assumed an immediate importance in local communal 
politics. Though East London had a history of ANC and 
Communist Party and ICU activity at the time of the Youth 
League's founding neither of these bodies exerted much local 
influence. 
The ANC itself was divided into two groups, Congress A, 
the longer established group and by the end of the war 
virtually moribund and Congress B, a branch started in 1947 
by V. M. Kwinana, a secondary school teacher at Welsh High 
School. The rift in local Congress politics seems to have 
been due to personality differences rather than over questions 
of ideology or strategy: Kwinana was relatively conservative 
though willing to cooperate with Communists in the 1946 
Advisory Board elections in 1946. 2) In the next few years he 
was to oppose the use of boycott and civil disobedience tactics. 24 
The followers of Congress B were to be described by the 
anthropologist D. H. Reader as 'the older and more law-abiding 
element' of the location's inhabitants. 25 
While Communists appear to have been more active in 
location affairs than the ANC during the mid-forties, their 
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ninety African members26 being responsible for a rejuvenation 
of Advisory Board politics, most of their energy seems to 
have been devoted to building a trade union movement in East 
London. 27 Notwithstanding their success in this (the Congress 
of Non-European Trade Unions claimed the allegiance of ten 
unions and 15,000 workers in East London in 1945)28 they 
failed to produce out of it a working class oriented political 
movement. Advisory Board politicking tended to involve the 
better off and all the trade union work was done outside the 
location. The party's local leadership was multiracial and 
strictly enforced curfew laws made it difficult for many of 
them-to enter the location. 29 In the decade which followed 
East London was to lack that organic relationship between 
political organisation and trade union which was to distinguish 
the main centres of Congress strength. 30 In East London 
Communists also faced competition for workers' affiliation: 
a local rump of the ICU presided over by an aging Clement 
Kadalie had organised textile, railway and harbour workers - in 
1947 textile workers came out on a wildcat strike to reinstate 
an ICU shop steward. 31 The ICU was scarcely militant: its 
leaders lived on past glories (which were remembered annually 
on Kadalie's birthday at beachside picnics) and otherwise 
concentrated on improving location amenities. One of Kadalie's 
final acts before his death was to start a subscription fund 
to build a community hall. 
The small cluster of high school graduates, many of them 
teachers, who decided in 1949 to found a branch of the Youth 
League in East London were immediately to provide a more 
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vigorous political voice than had been heard in Duncan 
Village for a long time. Three men formed a leadership 
triumvirite: C. J. Fazzie, A. S. Gwentshe and J. Lengisi. 
By 1949 these three men were in their mid to late twenties. 
Fazzie was working as a teacher and had been a member of the 
ANC since 1947 when he had joined Congress B at the behest of 
his school's vice-principle, Kwinana. J2 There is less 
information available on the background of the other two: 
Gwentshe was shortly to open a shop while Lengisi some years 
later would work as an attorney's clerk. J3 According to Fazzie 
the decision to found a branch of the League in East London was 
inspired by developments at Fort Hare; the East Londoners 
were stimulated by contacts they had with such students as 
T. T. Letlaka, Ntsu Mokhehle and Robert Sobukwe. 34 As a 
result of such influences the three became 'Diehard African 
Nationalists,.35 They set about their new role with 
enthusiasm, collecting food and blankets for a nurses strike 
at Victoria East hosPita136 (Fazzie later married one of the 
nurses involved), advocating the boycott of Advisory Board 
elections (to the annoyance of Fazzie's original mentor, Kwinana)J7 
and in June 1950 organising and leading a successful stay-away 
strike in concert with the ANC elsewhere. The June 26th stay-
away confirmed the local youth League's ascenQency for it was 
38 
acrimoniously opposed by the older men in Congress A and B. 
Political ascendency did not modify Youth Leaguer doctrine: 
in 1952 Fazzie was to write a sharp letter of reproof to the 
B~ntu World which had employed the phrase 'Mandela/Mda' axis 
to describe the dominant ideological influence on the ANCts 
J06 
national leadership. This was, Fazzie wrote, a slur on Mda 
'who had worked for years for the cause of African Nationalism,.39 
This was at the point at which the ANC in alliance with the 
Indian Congresses was to embark upon the Defiance Campaign, 
a point at which orthodox Africanists were to discern a 
deviation from 'clear out' African Nationalism. But whatever 
reservations they may have had about the ideological complexion 
of national ANC leadership the East London Youth League were 
enthusiastic and effective advocates of defiance: under their 
leadership nearly 1,500 local volunteers were arrested between 
June and November 1952 making East London after Port Elizabeth 
the second most important centre of the civil disobedience 
40 
campaign in the country. Fuelling the campaign in East 
London was the acute social distress which had sharpened 
during the 1940s as a result of the location's overcrowding 
as well as youth League rhetoric which was especially well 
suited to the emotional needs of East London's African 
population, a population which, like the Youth Leaguers 
themselves, was of predominantly a rural origin. In other 
centres the youth League remained an intellectual coterie, 
here for a while it acquired a popular follOwing and this. 
together with the proximity of the Fort Hare-based intellectuals 
helps to explain its adherence to Africanist dogma. 
During the Campaign the East London Leaguers who had 
been joined by T. T. Letlaka, a teacher from Fort Hare, set 
up the splendidly named Bureau of African Nationalism. The 
Bureau was based at East London for there the local youth 
Leaguers had access to a roneo machine but its members were 
drawn from a wider group who were to include A. P. Mda, next 
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to Lembede one of the most important early exponents of 
Africanism41 and throughout the 1950s a high school teacher 
in Herschel and Ellioth Mfaxa an interpreter from near King 
Williams Town and the ANC's organiser for the Border region 
during the mid 1950s. The Bureau was founded with high hopes. 
As its first newsletter proclaimed: 
The present campaign of Defiance of Unjust 
Laws is merely a development in detail of 
an aspect only of the 1949 Programme of 
Action. The campaign only marks the 
beginning of a long mass-based struggle 
for national emancipation • • • 
Tremendous strides have been made since the 
emergence of a new conscious African 
nationalism. But much more remains undone: 
firstly, the trmendous democratic forces 
which have been unleashed must be given a 
clearer direction and goal. The objectives 
of the struggle, both immediate and long 
range, must be more clearly defined and pin-
pointed. The dynamic energies of the vast 
millions must be harnessed to the nation-
building and liberatory tasks. Secondly, 
the people's understanding of African 
nationalism must be deepened, and its far-
reaching implications clarified with greater 
vigour and zeal. Thirdly, the wiles and 
machinations of the enemies of African 
nationalism both inside and outside' the 
general movement must be exposed and foiled 
and defeated. Fourthly, the struggle must 
be intensified on the basis of the 1949 
Programme of Action, and on the basis of 
African nationalism. Fifthly, a new Africanist 
people's leadership must be produced, and the 
claims of the outlook of contemporary Renascent 
Africa - 'Africanism', must be established once 
and for all. And lastly, the African nation 
must be consolidated and its spiritual and 
material resources mobilised and harnessed to 
the great tasks of freeing 'Africa in our life 
time' on the basis of African nationalism and 
its higher development, AFRICANISM, 
REMEMBER AFRI CA! 
Issued bu AFRICANUS 
for the Bureau of African Nationalism, East London. 
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In East London, though, the exhilaration produced by the local 
success of the Defiance Campaigri was to lead to a crushing 
disappointment. On 9th November 1952 a police baton charge 
broke up a public meeting and in the shooting and rioting which 
followed eight people were killed, some as a result of police 
bullets. A white Dominican nun was killed and mutilated by 
rioters, many of whom, it was subsequently discovered, were 
young teenagers from the poorest part of the location. 4J In 
the aftermath of the riots shock at the violence and fear of 
reprisals caused 5,000 people to leave East London, mainly 
shack dwellers with homes in the Ciskei. The Defiance was 
brought to an abrupt halt. Notwithstanding its spontaneity 
the riot was immediately associated with the ANC and people 
were no longer willing to publicly identify themselves with 
the Congress cause. Lengisi, Fazzie and Gwentshe had been 
under arrest since September and in March were tried for 
incitement. All three received suspended sentences as well 
as being restricted by banning orders. Lengisi and Gwentshe 
were actually banished from the Eastern Cape and removed to a 
remote village in the Transvaal. 
In the next few years the youth leaguers contented them-
selves with private discussion groups and the issue of a few 
more bulletins from the Bureau. These petered out in 1955. 
There was no alternative leadership group. Few of the former 
local Communist Party members were active politically after 
the Party's dissolution in 1950. Apparently they had never, 
in any case, been political activists having been mainly 
associated with the moribund Congress A group. The trade union 
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base which had been built in the 1940s melted away: the 
only active black trade union that remained was the (Coloured) 
Food and Canning Workers Union and there is no record of the 
existence locally of its African sister union. 46 None of 
the former communists attempted any initiatives in African 
trade union organisation, and the Africanists, teachers, 
interpreters, clerks, traders and messengers, were usually 
from a background which did not provide much insight into 
industrial worker organisation. 44 Instead in 1955 six Youth 
Leaguers stood unopposed for the Advisory Board with 287 voters 
(one per cent of the electorate) demonstrating their support. 
This action did not succeed in broadening their following; 
the new Board members were widely regarded as 'youngsters, 
elected only by youngsters' and in 1957 they withdrew in 
conformity with an ANC call for a national boycott of Board 
elections. 45 Meanwhile C. J. Fazzie, the remaining member of 
the original leadership triumvirite began to attend meetings 
in Johannesburg with the Orlando Africanists, travelling 'in 
disguise' because of his restriction by the authorities to 
East London. 47 It was Fazzie's friendship with the Orlando 
group which was to lead to the creation of a PAC base in 
East London. 
Cornelius Juta Fazzie was born in Queenstown in 1924. His 
father, a lay preacher in the Methodist Church, was a migrant 
worker in Worcester in the Western Cape. He had an uncle 
who helped to lead the 1930 East London ICU strike. Fazzie 
was brought up by his mother in East London. Her family were 
not educated people and he only began attending school at the 
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age of fifteen. By the age of nineteen he entered Welsh High 
School which he was to attend for three years. By this stage 
the Second World War had awakened an interest in politics: 
he 'observed events very thoroughly'. He gave up his 
involvement in rugby football and devoted much of his spare 
time to ANC activity. By 1952 he was secretary of the provincial 
executive of the Youth League and its recognised leader in 
East London. He led a large group of volunteers into the city 
centre one cold July night in defiance of curfew regulations 
and was imprisoned for three months, only to be re-arrested 
on his release in September. Losing his teaching job in the 
aftermath of the campaign he worked as an untrained draughtsman 
in an architect's office in the employ of a Mr. Osmond, a city 
councillor and later mayor of East London. From 1958 he ran a 
general dealer's store in Duncan Village, Mr. Osmond apparently 
using his influence to obtain for him a site. Fazzie could not 
be described as an intellectual and he was dependent upon others 
for ideas and inspiration. By the late 19508 he was a sick 
man affected by tuberculosis. His enthusiasm and loyalty as 
well as his local prominence as an Africanist earned a place 
on the PAC's national executive to which he was elected at the 
April 1959 inaugural conference. 
According to Fazzie most of the remaining membership of 
the local branch of the Youth League followed him into the PAC. 
Fazzie claims that Lengisi and Gwentshe, recently released from 
48 their banishment, joined him in leading the local branch but 
is vague about the details of other office bearers and members 
though they were all, apparently, socially rather similar, 
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reasonably well-educated. in modest commercial or white collar 
occupations. They left a rump of the local ANC branch. about 
ten men who remained loyal to the ANC partly as a consequence 
of friendships with some of the Port Elizabeth Congress 
leaders (there were few defections in Port Elizabeth to the 
PAC). 
Despite the success in creating a local organisational 
base and notwithstanding the impression of Peter Molotsi. a 
visiting member of the national executive. who later claimed 
that East London was 'far readier than any other place in the 
Cape for the pass campaign,49 the PAC did not succeed in 
evoking much popular participation in their 'positive action'. 
The events have already been described at the beginning of 
this chapter. Perhaps memories of the 1952 bloodshed were 
too recent and it is also possible that the PAC men had got 
too used to functioning as a small conspiritorial clique and 
had neglected to broaden their organisation's influence through 
public meetings and house-to-house canvassing in the weeks 
leading up to the campaign. In any case their comparative youth 
as well as their relatively privileged social background might 
have undermined their credibility in the eyes of many of the 
location dwellers. For some the events of 1960 signalled the 
virtual end of their political involvement: Fazzie, for 
instance, came out of a one year prison sentence to find that 
his shop had been ransacked. Suffering now from meningitis as 
well as consumption. he was out of work for several months 
before he found a job as a time-keeper at a textile mill. 50 
Though sporadically in touch with PAC leaders he felt increasingly 
remote from their cause. In February 1962 he visited Maseru 
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when he heard that some of the people he had recruited into 
the PAC had been involved in a lorry incident. They had 
gone to Maseru (in obedience to directives from the Basutoland-
based leadership) against Fazzie's advice. By the end of the 
year he had lost his influence. From December 1962 he was 
placed under house arrest for five years. 
Despite this unpromising beginning the Pan-Africanists 
in East London proved to be surprisingly resilient. Three 
trials in 196) involving a total of fifty six men attested to 
the existence of a relatively large insurrectionary movement. 
The first, in February 196), was of twenty men and boys, 
thirteen of whom were under the age of twenty and only one 
older than thirty, charged with illegal meetings. They were 
arrested after one of these meetings was interrupted by 
police on November 8th. The state's case broke down because 
state witnesses were found to be perjuring themselves. One of 
these witnesses mentioned the difficulty of recruiting: 'the 
people were not interested,.51 The next trial which occurred 
after and resulted from the abortive uprising was better 
reported. It began in East London with originally fifty two 
men being charged with sabotage. A large crowd gathered 
outside the magistrate's court shouting slogans and giving 
clenched fist salutes. Slogans included 'Africa is ours, we 
will take it', as well as the more traditional ANC cry of 
'Amandla!,.52 To avoid a repetition of such a demonstration 
the trial was switched to Butterworth in the Transkei and the 
accused were broken down into two groups (charges were dropped 
against some of the men). The state's case included details 
of meetings held from October 1960. The participants in these, 
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as with the majority of the accused, were young unmarried men 
drawn mainly from the oldest and poorest part of the location, 
Juliwe, or from the hostels for male migrant 'bachelors' which 
began to be constructed in the late 1950s as a municipal 
response to the overcrowding of the shacks. Nearer the time 
of the projected uprising meetings began to become more frequent 
and attracted larger numbers - on April 8th between two and 
three hundred men assembled outside Duncan Village. The 
leaders were in regular communication with the Maseru head-
quarters and in response to instructions from John Pokela 
collected weapons, manufactured grenades from glass, charcoal 
and match heads, and organised children to fashion swords from 
car springs and women to hold fund raising tea parties. Women, 
incidentally, were not permitted to attend the main meetings 
for 'they could not keep secrets,.53 As mentioned in Chapter 
Four the occupations of those men who were convicted (the 
majority of the accused) included car assembly, power plant, and 
timber yard workers as well as schoolboys. Many of the state-
witnesses were young teenagers, though there were also indications 
of police infiltration of the group. Several of the principal 
PAC men had been identified by the police as a result of their 
interception of letters from Basutoland. 54 Not all state-
witnesses were young conscripts: a later trial in 1967 relating 
to the same events had several PAC office bearers testifying 
against C. V. 1mgaza, the proprietor of a garage in the location, 
suggestively called Pan-African Motors. The witnesses, who 
included an un-named PAC regional secretary, were discredited 
for they were found to have been in receipt of security police 
favours (including the prOVision of housing) from 1963. The 
)14 
court gave Mngaza the benefit of the doubt and he was 
released. 55 
Before attempting to draw any conclusions from the facts 
emerging from these cases a brief outline of the local ANC-
inspired movement may be helpful. The East London 'Regional 
Committee' of the ANC were responsible for a series of 
assassination attempts, either by shooting or through Molotov 
cocktails tossed through windows, their intended victims being 
Bantu Authority urban representatives, suspected police informers 
and state witnesses. One young girl was killed, the niece of 
Chief Hoyi, one of Matanzima's supporters. Two others were 
badly injured. This violence was undertaken at the local leader-
ship's initiative; this was a period when the ANC abjured 
bloodshed and the national leadership tried to dissuade the 
East Londoners from any further attempts to kill peoPle. 56 
The East London ANC followers had been re-organised in 
1960. After the departure of the Africanists in 1958-1959 (the 
exact date of this is uncertain) a new committee was elected 
presided over by George Koman! and Malcolmness Kondoti. It is 
possible that the split between ANC and PAC adherents may have 
along lines of neighbourhood: apparently it followed a clash 
between Congress followers in two sections of Duncan Village 
over the use of a duplicating machine (possibly the former 
property of the Bureau of African Nationalism), Komani and his 
adherents eventually carrying it off from Mekeni section to 
Tsolo section where they lived. This committee was detained 
during the state of Emergency and was finally dissolved in 
October 1960 at the instigation of a visitor from Port Elizabeth, 
Vuyusili Mini. On his instructions a new clandestine seven-man 
.315 
regional committee was formed and this began the construction 
(after a certain amount of external prodding) of a pyramid of 
seven-man cells, in certain areas consisting of three layers 
of cells, each linked to a superior cell through one 'contact 
man'. Most of the lower cells were recruited from young men-
some still at school, others unemployed school leavers. ~any 
of the cells were formed at large meetings held in the grounds 
of Welsh High School and addressed by members of the Regional 
Committee. Other forms of recruitment included more private 
social functions where ANC songs would be openly sung to 
attract potential supporters. Aside from the assassination 
attempts the activities of these cells included leafletting 
(the reasons for each attack were announced in stencilled 
leaflets), the compilation of a map of police stations in the 
region, the manufacture of bombs, and fundraising from location 
businessmen as well as through tea-parties organised by women. 
The attacks were carried out by various cells, the 'youths' 
helped and supervised by one of the older men on the regional 
committee. Many of the participants were arrested in mid-1963. 
From the very cryptic details contained in trial records 
it is possible to form an impressionistic picture of a movement 
which sociologically was not very different to the local PAC. 
Five members of the original seven man nucleus were put on trial 
in 1964 and the two others gave evidence against them. Five of 
the seven were veterans of the Defiance Campaign, the most 
experienced ANC member joining the organisation in 1950. Two 
much younger men were still at school in 1960 and joined the 
ANC after its banning. The dominant personality in the group, 
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Kondoti, was unusual in that he worked during the previous 
ten years as a casual labourer and domestic servant changing 
employers on eight occasions. Of the rest there is information 
about four: Bongco, effectively second in command owned and 
ran a photographic studio in the village, the two recent school 
leavers worked as clerks and typists, one for an attorney and 
the other at Welsh High School and Bennet Mashiyana, an older 
man who turned state evidence also worked as an attorney's 
clerk. The members of the lower cells were possibly a little 
better educated than the mass of local PAC followers and seem 
to have included fewer manual workers though the leadership in 
April 1961 did try to mobilise stevedores in the national stay-
away strike in protest against the Republic celebrations. 57 
In East London there were formidable barriers to the 
political mobilisation of Africans. Poverty, job insecurity, 
and unemployment together with a well entrenched local tradition 
of authoritarian reprisals after moments of communal assertion 
helped to check the development of widespread involvement in 
radical organisations. Officially permitted channels of political 
participation were even less likely to evoke a popular response: 
this was indicated throughout the decade in the dismal voter 
turnout in Advisory Board elections. The decline after 1950 of 
trade unions meant one of the most important constituents in 
the organisational base of a radical black political movement was 
absent. Job insecurity and the population's oscillation weekly 
between urban and rural society probably also helped to restrict 
the development of proletarian class solidarity. It was 
consequently those who were materially and psychologically most 
immune to the apathy and fear arising from insecurity and 
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repression who were most likely to participate in movements 
like the ANC and the PAC. At best such people represented a 
minority: men in middle class occupations such as teaching 
or clerical work, independent businessmen, and the school 
children and unemployed youth whose imagination had yet to be 
crushed by the experience of East London proletarian life. 
The proximity of East London to Fort Hare helped to confirm 
the early ascendancy of Africanism in Congress politics; in 
the absence of a well-developed alternative tradition its 
polarised worldview retained its attraction for the young 
inhabitants of the Duncan Village schools and hostels. For 
older people the realities of everyday life limited their 
political imagination and sapped their self confidence. In 
such circumstances it is reasonable to argue that the 
insurrectionary vision of a socially unrepresentative minority 
represented wider and more popular hopes and fantasies. 
In Pretoria the Pan Africanists appeared from trial 
evidence to have a rather more extensive degree of support than 
was the case in East London with reports of conspiracies in all 
three major townships, though once again their following was 
generally young with school children playing a predominant 
role. As with East London the genesis of the movement 
becomes easier to understand if it is examined with the local 
social and historical background in mind. 
By 1960 three quarters of Pretoria's 200,000 African 
inhabitants lived in the freehold tovmship of Lady Se1bourne 
and the municipal townships of Atteridgeville and Vlakfontein. 58 
The remainder still dwelt in smaller locations and squatter 
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encampments which the Council had been busy destroying during 
the previous decade. Each had a population of around 50,000 
(Atteridgeville at 45,000 was the smallest of the three) and 
had grown rapidly during the years since the war. 59 In 
character the townships were each different. Lady Selbourne, 
the oldest was founded in 1905 as one of the two places in the 
environs of Pretoria where Africans could buy land. A square 
mile in area situated on a hill side seven miles north-west of 
the city centre by 1960 it was densely overcrowded with an 
average of over thirty people living on each one of its 1,500 
60 
stands. Most of these people lived in a single room in six 
room houses whose back-yards would be fringed by rows of shacks 
providing further accommodation. The 1,OOO-odd Landlords were 
usually old, heavily indebted, and dependent on their property 
for a livelihood; the only people to demonstrate much evidence 
of material prosperity were the tiny core of professional 
people (ten African doctors served the three townships and 
ninety-two teachers worked in Lady Selbourne) and businessmen 
(fifty-four Africans were licenced to trade in the townshiP).61 
Most of the other inhabitants of Lady Selbourne depended upon 
jobs in Pretoria's city centre, mainly in the commercial and 
distributive trades where about 20,000 people from Lady 
Selbourne were employed. Engineering firms and the Iron and 
Steel Corporation, as well as the Railways, provided unskilled 
62 
employment for another 4,000. Approximately 10,000 children 
attended Lady Selbourne's ten primary schools and two high 
schools - about fifty-five per cent of the children of eligible 
age in the townShiP.63 
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In 1960 Lady Selbourne was in the last phase of its 
history. From 1954 a threat to 'rezone' the township as white 
had hung over the community and the legal machinery for its 
destruction existed from 1958. In early 1962 the first 
removals began to a new state-controlled township, Ga-Rankua, 
twenty miles to the west. The prospect of the community's 
dissolution evoked widespread anxiety for quite apart from the 
increased expenses of living in Ga-Rankua or the municipal 
townships the move appeared to young people to involve a 
dimunition of rights: only those people with a previous record 
of employment in Pretoria would be allowed to take up jobs 
within the municipal area. 64 A rise in communal social 
tensions was evident in the appearance of youthful gangsterism 
towards the end of the 1950s, hitherto unknown in Lady Se1bourne. 65 
Atteridgevi11e was a more recent creation than Lady 
Selbourne, Pretoria's first municipal township being constructed 
in 1940 to house the people evicted from the inner-city 
66 Marabastad location. Four basic types of house were built of 
varying sizes, each provided with lights, baths and running 
water: for its time Atteridgevi11e housing was of a relatively 
high quality. Perhaps for this reason the municipality decreed 
that it should be let at 'economic' (non-subsidised) rents and 
these were to be a perennial source of complaint amongst 
Atteridgevil1e's inhabitants. Located to the south-west of 
Pretoria the township was adjacent to the ISCOR iron and steel 
works and it is likely that in 1960 it accommodated the major 
proportion of its 12,000 African workers67 who did not live in 
hostels. ISCOR wages averaged at £14 0 0 a month. In a survey 
conducted in 1954, 611 out of 1,450 families were found to be 
68 
earning less than £10 0 O. 
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Vlakfontein was the newest and largest of the townships. 
The first houses were built in the early 1950s but it grew 
rapidly as its population was swollen by the displaced 
inhabitants of squatter camps and older locations. Fourteen 
miles from the city centre it was located at the edge of its 
Eastern industrial district. Its population was divided 
between those who lived in and could afford to rent one of the 
1,400 houses also available on thirty-year leasehold and those 
who constructed their own shelter on site and service plots. 69 
Vlakfontein was planned according to the principles of Aparthied 
social engineering: the less privileged inhabitants of the 
site and service scheme were subj~cted to ethnic grouping. 
Because of its recent development, Vlakfontein lacked the 
strong sense of communal identity the other two possessed, its 
political culture was less organised, it was more tightly 
administered and for these reasons it will feature less frequently 
in this narrative than Atteridgeville and Lady Selbourneo 
Pretoria's African population was unusually generously 
provided with secondary schools the town accommodating four of 
the schools offering to African pupils instruction up to 
matriculation, quarter of the Transvaal's total and one more 
than in the much more heavily populated Witwatersrand areao 70 
This was an area with rich and diverse political traditions. 
Up to the 1940s the African National Congress had been the 
dominant voice in African politics. One of the forerunners to 
the ANC, the Transva~l Native Congress was founded in Pretoria 
by S. M. Makgatho of Lady Selbourne, a former high school 
teacher, estate agent and newspaper proprietor. 71 From 1917 to 
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1924 he presided over the ANC itself, during the restless years 
after the First World War leading two local civil disobedience 
campaigns, one to obtain for Africans the provision of first 
class railway accommodation and the other to gain the right 
to use the city's pavements hitherto denied to black people. 72 
Both were successful, as was a deputation led by Makgatho to 
persuade the authorities to drop plans to apply night pass 
regulations to women. 73 
In 1930 Pretoria was one of the few centres in which there 
was a significant response to the Communist call for pass 
burnings on December 16th. Here the ANC was exceptional in 
responding to the campaign which it opposed elsewhere. Naboth 
Mokgatle's account of the Pretoria pass burnings does not 
mention communists. The protest was instigated locally by 
four groups: the ANC, the ICU, the 'Radicals' and the 
'Garveyites'. Those who responded to the campaign, according 
to Mokgatle, were mainly members of the unemployed of Marabastad 
whose numbers had risen sharply recently due to the depression. 
The depression had an especial impact on Africans in Pretoria 
where local white politicians urged a boycott of all services 
employing African labour. The pass campaign was succeeded by 
mass arrests and for a few years the ANC 'was no longer heard of' 
in Pretoria.74 But with the threat of impending demolitions in 
Marabastad the ANC once again became active. Ezekiel Mphahlele 
remembers regular Sunday meetings organised by the ANC in the 
location during 1938. 75 It is possible that it spoke with a 
more popular voice and to a more popular constituency than before 
for the 'Radicals' with the death of their leader George Daniels 
had broken up and the ICU had lost heart when its local leader, 
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Isaac Moroe switched allegiances to become compound manager 
76 
of African workers employed in the municipal quarry. By 
1942 the Pretoria ICU degenerated to the extent that it 
could be called 'prima facie merely an eating club,.77 
But it was the Communists with their advocacy of African 
labour organisations who were to inherit the constituency left 
by the Radicals and the ICU men. The Communist Party established 
a branch in Pretoria in 1940; before then Pretoria-based 
members of the Johannesburg District Committee of the Party 
tried to create a local African following through the establish-
ment of a short-lived nightschool. The school was closed after 
losing its premises in 1935. The first efforts to establish 
African trade unions in Pretoria were not by Communists at all: 
for a short period a branch of the Johannesburg-based African 
Commercial and Distributive Workers' Union opened an office in 
Marabastad and collected subscriptions. Its local founder, 
Naboth Mokgatle, a shop delivery worker, had been inspired by 
a public meeting addressed by the AC~VU's Trotskyite leader, 
V-ax Gordon. The Pretoria branch did not prosper: for shortly 
after its formation in 1939 Gordon was interned and the 
administration of its Johannesburg office to which the Pretoria 
subscriptions were sent ground to a halt. Mokgatle then set 
up his own independent Pretoria Non-European Distributive Worker 
Union and shortly thereafter in 1941 joined the Communist Party 
which had recently set up an 'area group' in Marabastad. In 
the year that followed Mokgatle and his comrades formed eleven 
more unions including organisations for municipal, railway, 
cement, building, dairy, iron and steel, laundry, meat and match 
workers. 78 These were all to be affiliated to the Pretoria Council 
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of Non-European Trade Unions, presided over by Mike Muller, 
in 1943 a twenty year old former student from Pretoria 
University. At its peak in 1943 the Pretoria CNETU boasted 
an affiliation of 17,000 workers79 and in March Mike Muller 
led several thousand of these in a city centre demonstration 
for Trade Union recognition. 
For three years the trade union movement flourished, its 
popularity strengthened by a series of minimum wage determinations 
made by the wartime Smuts government. The communists' and 
trade unionists' status was also enhanced by a commission of 
enquiry which exhonerated them of responsibility for a riot 
in late 1942 in the Marabastad Municipal workers' compound. 
In the weeks following the riot the Municipal Workers Union's 
membership swelled from six to nine hundred. 80 After the war, 
though, African labour organisation in Pretoria went into 
decline. By 1948 six of the unions mentioned by Mokgatle had 
evidently ceased to exist and CNETU claimed only 3,)00 Pretoria-
based workers in its affiliated membership.81 This decline 
indicated a less favourable political climate as well as 
organisational weaknesses wi thin the unions and the Party. In 
1945 influx control was vigorously tightened in Pretoria and 
this, together with the end of the war-time industrial growth, 
increased worker vulnerability to dismissal. Mokgatle reports 
that in this year the emphasis of trade union work shifted from 
wages to contesting the powers of the new municipal labour 
bureau.82 In 1946 the unions lost the office they shared when 
they were evicted by the landlord. Falling membership and the 
loss of the office reduced the flow of subscriptions and five 
of the six African secretaries (one for each two unions) lost 
)2.4" 
their jobs. Muller left the Party in 1947 (after quarrelling 
with Mokgatle because of the latter's failure to secure the 
reinstatement of some Central News Agency strikers) and the 
administration of the unions revolved around Mokgatle and 
Stephen Sondag Tefu, a resident of Lady Selbourne who had, 
before his expulsion, been a member of the Communist Party in 
Johannesburg. Though Mokgatle was on the District Committee 
(and from 1949 its chairman) his trade union work was carried 
on at a distance from the Party: he and Tefu hired premises 
independently in Marabastad and launched a 'General Workers 
Union,.83 
The fact that African trade union work was entrusted to 
some of the least experienced and junior party members was a 
reflection of the troubled character of the Pretoria Communist 
Party. A diary kept by one of the more SOCially distinguished 
local members, the advocate George Findlay provides insight 
into some of the essential problems.84 Writing in 1944, 
Findlay depicts a group whose white members were sharply 
divided between advocates of 'Browderism' (followers of the 
American Communist policy of conciliation towards allied 
governments during the war) and those who believed in a 
strategy of confrontation. The Browderites included Muller, 
whereas Findlay himself was highly critical of the policy. 
Ironically, though, Muller was one of the few white activists 
who were doing what the anti-Browderites insisted was imperative: 
mobilising Africans. The weight of the Party's white membership 
and leadership were instead concerned to combat the influence of 
Afrikaner Nationalism in Pretoria's white unions (where it was 
having an especially fierce impact85 ). Some of the tensions are 
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evident in the diary: commenting upon 'the poor quality of 
the European membership' Findlay complains of the 'unconscious 
86 
spirit of evading mass contacts' and also mentions one of 
the leading African members, Eliphas Ditsele, as 'letting rip, 
saying the European comrades were largely indifferent and 
failing all around,.87 In 1945 in February white youths stoned 
the Party's local headquarters while an education and ballroom 
dancing ('very orderly, no mixed dancing, tap-dancing, ballroom,88) 
classes were in session. Police intervened but took the side of 
the insurgents and many of the hundred or so African dancers 
were beaten up or arrested. In the following month the landlord 
withdrew the premises, and there were expulsions and resignations 
89 from the Party. By 1950, when preparations were being made 
for Pretoria workers to be called out for the national May Day 
stay-away to protest against the banning of Communist Party 
leaders, the organisation was apparently entirely in the hands 
90 
of Mokgatle and Tefu. 
It would have taken considerable social sensitivity on 
both sides to bridge the gulf that existed in class and back-
ground between white and black members of the Party. The white 
members were generally from a professional background (in some 
cases quite wealthy) whereas the African communists listed for 
Pretoria in the Government Gazette91 include five shopworkers, 
messengers, or delivery men, three labourers, two bus conductors, 
one clinic worker and one carpenter, as well as Ditsele who 
served as Pretoria agent for the Guardian. Eleven lived in 
Atteridgeville and four in Lady Selbourne. With the exception 
of Ditsele it is unlikely that the rest had an extensive formal 
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education and not surprisingly Findlay's diary only rarely 
mentions Africans as playing a significant role in the discussions 
which took place at party meetings. Mokgatle may not have 
been typical but despite his attendance at a party school in 
1943 his understanding of the Party's policies seems to have 
been limited to its advocacy on an ideal society 'in which all 
children would have free education and equal opportunities ••• 
(and) all ••• would have the right to vote,.92 This is not 
to disparage the achievement of Mokgatle and his fellow trade 
unionists (most of whom were also originally from the shopworker 
group), for their efforts to organise and mobilise a working 
class movement were in the face of determined opposition. 
Before the 1950 May Day strike, for example: 
'On Sunday evening the police accompanied by 
the army, began to transport workers to 
their places of work to sleep there. I went 
to the bus terminus to see what was happening. 
There I found the workers being taken away 
from their families to sleep at work, 
escorted by the army and police motor cycles. 
When the workers passed me into the buses 
their heads were hanging down.' 93 
Popular apathy, a strong police presence and opposition from 
local youth Leaguers all contributed to the fruitlessness of 
Mokgatle's efforts to organise demonstrations of working class 
consciousness. Undaunted he continued his soap-box oratory on 
Market days, advising local ANC activists on how to conduct 
their campaigns, and in 1953 founding an ambitiously named 
'Federation of African Trade Unions of South Africa' before 
going into exile the following year. 
Political radicalism within Pretoria's black community 
had during the 1940s been centred around the Communist Party 
and had found the major part of its following in Marabastad and 
,32·7 
in Atteridgeville to which the majority of Marabastad's 
inhabitants were removed. In the following decade the ANC was 
to fill the space left by the Communists and indeed it is 
possible to trace a continuity of membership between the two 
organisations: at least five people who had been prominent 
in the Communist Party or in the labour movement it created 
held office in the Pretoria ANC branch during the 1950s.94 
These included Mokgatle's collaborator, Stephen Tefu. Notwith-
standing overlaps in membership and officeholders the local ANC 
had a rather different character. Its strength was in the 
freehold village of Lady Selbourne, where for some years it was 
able to maintain an office and a full-time official from money 
regularly donated by the village's Chinese trading community. 
In Lady Selbourne it had a membership of between four and five 
hundred whereas in other to~nships there were only small groups 
of adherents. At the beginning of the decade the ANC was well 
represented on the Village Committee - essentially a vehicle 
for the interests of property owners. However the ANC itself 
was not an organ of the socially privileged: the leading 
members of the Lady Selbourne Committee included two dairy 
workers, a shop worker, a carpenter and painter, and a former 
trade union official. 95 The ANC's strength in Lady Selbourne 
reflected the economic resources which the existence of a black 
propertied class96 made available but the composition of its 
leadership was at least partly influenced by the preceding 
decade of proletarian oriented organisation. What the Lady 
Selbourne ANC appeared to lack were people from a professional 
or well-educated background: here the proximity of Johannesburg 
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worked to their disadvantage. Dr. William Nkomo, for example, 
a local resident, a recently qualified medical practitioner 
and a founder of the Youth League, did not take part in local 
branch activities, attending instead national executive 
meetings in Johannesburg until his resignation from the ANC 
in 1953. 
It is also possible that the location of the ANC in Lady 
Selbourne distanced it for a time from the trade union tradition 
built up by the Communists during the 1940s. Only in the late 
19506 were efforts made to re-create a politically-aligned 
trade union movement. A South African Congress of Trade Union 
local committee was established in 1956 but sent no delegates 
to the 'National Workers Conference' held by SACTU in 1957. 
In 1959 an attempt was made to establish a domestic and 
catering workers' union and in 1961 a full-time official was 
appointed by SACTU in Johannesburg to organise Pretoria's iron 
and steel workers. 97 
The history of the Lady Selbourne ANC in the 1950s was a 
troubled one. Regular meetings, efficient and energetic 
organisation and assistance from the local Indian community all 
contributed to the local impact of the Defiance Campaign in 
which ten batches of volunteers broke railway segregation of 
curfew regulations between August and November 1952.98 The 
following year the branch committee disbanded in protest against 
Dr. Nkomo collecting funds from local traders for the 
Johannesburg office. The branch was only reconstituted in 
1955 after the Congress of the People the initiative being taken 
by Peter Magano, a former dairy worker and Defiance Campaign 
volunteer who had served on the committee in 1952. Local 
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interest in the ANC was considerably strengthened by the 
Federation of South African Women's great anti-pass 
demonstration in Pretoria in 1956: the Lady Selbourne branch 
collected food from local traders and arranged accommodation 
for the visiting women. Thereafter women appeared to play an 
especially assertive role in local political activity. 
At the beginning of 1957 the Lady Selbourne branch 
organised and led a communal boycott of buses in response to 
fare increases. In doing so they were part of a larger 
movement which affected Alexandra, north of Johannesburg, as 
well as Sophiatown. But though the initiative to boycott the 
buses came from outside the protest against fare rises seems 
to have touched upon a raw nerve in a desperately impoverished 
community.99 Magano's memories provide an impression of a 
striking degree of communal mobilisation. The boycott was 
preceded by a house-to-house leafletting campaign, the ringing 
of church bells, the picketing of street corners, and the 
beating of telegraph poles to warn people to rise early so 
they could walk to work. Previously the ANC delegation had 
successfully taken over a Village Committee meeting which had 
initially opposed the concept of a boycott advocating instead 
legal action against the Public utility Transport Company (PUTCO). 
The success of the first few days of the boycott was partly 
e~plained by the option those who could afford it had of using 
the nearby train service. In response to the South African 
Railways System's reduction in the number of railway coaches 
serving the adjacent station the A1~C called an evening meeting 
on January 18th. The meeting was broken up by the Police Mobile 
Unit (a Pretori~-based squad formed to combat rural women's 
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anti-pass unrest) and many people were beaten up and one 
cyclist returning from work was shot dead. His funeral 
attracted most of the population of Lady Selbourne and in its 
aftermath the ANC's branch membership swelled to 3,000. The 
boycott spread picking up an especially militant and sometimes 
violent female following in the squatter communities of Mooiplas 
100 
and Eastwood. 
The boycott's denouement, however, was to be anti-climatic. 
In Johannesburg a complicated arrangement involving subsidies 
from the Chambers of Commerce and the Municipality was worked 
out so that the pre-boycott fares could be retained but the 
negotiations did not cover Pretoria and the local Afrikaans 
Sakerkamer was unwilling to consider a similar settlement. 
From April the Pretoria boycotters were left isolated and 
gradually their resolve weakened as the PUTCO buses shortened 
their routes so as to provide a service to commuters at the old 
fare. For the second time the Pretoria ANC had been let down 
by the Johannesburg-based leadership. Not surprisingly there 
was no response in Pretoria in 1958 to the ANC call for a 
nation-wide three day stay-at-home. 101 
Given this background it is not surprising that splits 
developed in the Pretoria ANC leadership. In 1959 a leaflet 
was circulated by the Lady Selbourne branch calling for women 
to demonstrate against the pass laws. Since 1956 the Lady 
Selbourne branch had been regularly active in mobilising local 
women's anti-pass protests. The leaflet was drafted by a 
relatively new member of the branch committee, Dr. Peter Tsele, 
a prominent Africanist. The language and tone of the leaflet 
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prompted the Pretoria Municipality to ban the demonstration 
and the ANC leadership in Johannesburg counselled the branch 
to heed the ban. A narrow majority of the committee opposed 
the idea of calling off the ban and on the 26th February after 
leading a small delegation of women to protests against passes 
in front of the Native Commissioners' Office Tsele presided 
over a large meeting. The meeting was brutally interrupted by 
the police, many women (including several who were pregnant) 
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were beaten up and Tsele and his confederates were arrested. 
Shortly thereafter Tsele announced his defection from the ANC 
and founded his own Africanist organisation, the Pan-African 
Freedom Movement. 
Tsele's followers included men who had played a prominent 
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role in the Lady Selbourne ANC since 1955 but it is possible 
that their withdrawal helped to strengthen the ANC's local 
organisation. Tsele himself was a wealthy doctor, his leading 
followers included two self employed craftsmen, whereas the 
new ANC branch executive headed by Peter Magano which was 
constituted after their resignation was drawn mainly from manual 
labourers. 103 In 1961 according to the ANC's own account the 
local clandestine ANC leadership in conjunction with the SACTU 
local committee managed to organise a remarkably profound 
response to the 1961 anti-republican stay-away. On the first 
day, the 28th May, fifty per cent of the workforce in Vlakfontein 
and Atteridgeville and eighty per cent of the Lady Selbourne 
workers stayed at home. This was despite three massive police 
raids which immediately preceded the strike ostensibly in search 
for pass offenders and the arrest and 'endorsement out' of 
several organisers (Magano had been subjected to house arrest in 
332 
104 March). SACTU's efforts amongst steelworkers were attested 
to by a high level of participation in the strike amongst 
African ISCOR workers. Other sectors of the Pretoria African 
workforce which the ANC claimed to have responded particularly 
well were dairy workers, railway workers and domestics. There 
was a demonstration in support of the strike at Kilnerton High 
School and Indian shops in accordance with a well established 
communal tradition remained closed for the duration of the 
105 protest. 
In a slow and halting fashion the ANC in Pretoria during 
the 1950s was in the process of constituting itself as a movement 
of the poor and under-privileged. By the end of the decade it 
is possible to discern a social reorientation of the local 
movement away from a dependence upon the resources of a small 
but politically significant propertied class (itself in any case 
throughout the decade increasingly threatened with the impending 
destruction of the freehold township) and towards a working 
class political identity some of the foundations of which had 
been established by local.Communists in the preceding decade. 
The first reports of PAC activity in Lady Selbourne occurred 
very shortly before the pass campaign on March 11th 1960, when 
leaflets were distributed in Lady Selbourne advertising a 
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street corner meeting for 2.30 p.m. the following Sunday. 
The PAC's leaders turned up in force for the meeting, accompanied 
by some members of the Pan-African Freedom Movement which, 
according to a police observer, was in the process of 'being 
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consumed by the PAC'. From Johannesburg came Robert Sobukwe, 
Josias Madzunya, Jacob Nyaose, Z. B. Molete and Potlake Leballo. 
z. B. Molete told the assembled gathering that: 
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••• when a white man set his foot in 
Africa he started land-grabbing, robbery 
and raping our country. The fight of 
Tchaka and Dingaan is now and we are 
starting today. Because Tchaka and 
Dingaan fought on tribal lines their 
struggle failed and they were defeated 
• • • Whites are people that should be 
carrying passes.' 108 
Amongst the local PAC men and their allies who were on the 
platform were Elias Ntloedibe, Stephen Tefu, Solomon Sello, 
S. S. M. Maimela and Isaac Kopanye. We know a little about 
each of them. Ntloedibe, the chairman of the Pretoria PAC 
man was a comparatively young man, aged thirty one. Until 
recently, though a resident of Lady Selbourne, he worked as a 
court interpreter in Johannesburg and had had a local reputation 
as a writer of novels and articles in Afrikaans. 109 The 
previous year he had made a stormy impact at the first African 
Writers' Conference which was held in Atteridgeville (attended 
also by Sobukwe) where he had called upon his fellow writers 
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'to throwaway their blinkers'. Stephen Tefu has already 
appeared in this narrative as Mokgatle's partner in trade union 
organisation during the 1940s. In 1960 he was fifty with 
thirty years of political experience going back to his 
recruitment by the Communist Party in the early 1930s. For a 
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time he was a member of the Party's Central Committee. 
Magano remembers him from the 1950s as 'diehard' Congressman 
in the mid 19508 and the circumstances of his joining the PAC 
are a mystery. Sello, the PAC branch treasurer, had been 
present at the boycotters' meeting on January 28th 1957 and 
112 had been shot that day in the stomach. In 1960 he was slowly 
dying of the after effects of the wound. It is possible that 
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the isolation of the Pretoria boycotters after the Johannesburg 
settlement turned him against the ANC. Maimela and Kopanye, 
former ANC committee members (Maimela had also worked with 
Mokgatle on trade unions11J), were known as associates of 
Tsele. The Pan-Africanists in Lady Selbourne then, included 
some of the more dominant figures in local political activity 
over the previous couple of decades. 
This notwithstanding, their efforts to arouse support for 
the pass campaign were in vain. On the March 21st Ntloedibe, 
Sello and four others, presented themselves at Hercules police 
station outside Lady Selbourne without their passes and with 
lapel badges inscribed 'Africa for the Africans,.114 This was 
after a morning of tramping the streets and holding meetings 
around a green, gold and black PAC flag. The only place where 
they seemed to make an impression was at Lady Selbourne High 
School where a former student of the school held a meeting. 
He was ordered off the grounds by the headmaster, Mr. Bob Leshoai, 
who later claimed that there was a considerable amount of 
unrest among his charges, many of the pupils desiring to 
surrender themselves alongside the PAC men. 115 After leaving 
the school the PAC group marched through Lady Selbourne calling 
upon its inhabitants to throwaway their passes and stay away 
from work. Ntloedibe was overheard by a policeman to remark 
that 'it would have been better if we had gone to Atteridgeville 
116 
- we would have got more support there'. After their arrest 
Ntloedibe and his five comrades were sent to prison for varying 
terms of six months to one year. Little was heard of the PAC 
for some time after this. 
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The local ANC men fared little better. In response to 
Lutuli's call Maganoand his executive burned their passes and 
agitated for a stay at home. Indian shops closed and taxi 
drivers observed a 'day of mourning' but otherwise the only 
departure from normality reported in the local newspaper was 
the emptiness of the Commissioners' Courts because of the 
national suspension of pass laws. 117 Afterwards, though, 
police attributed a certain amount of disorderlyness to local 
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'Tsotsis'. 
Perhaps, though, the events of March 1960 made a deeper 
communal impression than appeared on the surface. On September 
9th 1960 a car carrying two white men collided with a black 
cyclist in Prinsloo Street in central Pretoria. The cyclist 
was unhurt and was roughly told to look where he was going. In 
response he pushed the driver in the face. The white men drove 
off but stopped at a nearby cafe to buy cigarettes. They were 
immediately surrounded by an angry crowd of two hundred. There 
were shouts of 'This is our land. Don't think you are in 
Katanga now'. Before the driver and his passenger were rescued 
by police they were slashed across their arms with knives. 119 
And Lady Selbourne had a new local celebrity. During an end of 
year address at Lady Selbourne High School Bob Leshoai reminded 
the five hundred pupils of a recently distinguished old boy, 
120 Philip Kgosana, and requested them to stand in his honour. 
It does appear that the reorganisation of a clandestine 
PAC organisation began at the high schools. Tommy Mohajane, a 
former pupil at Kilnerton High School remembers PAC posters 
going up in the school on March 22nd 1960. He joined a group 
of PAC adherents numbering about fifty in mid-1961. They helped 
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organise a strike in June that year ostensibly in protest 
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against being kept in class after examinations. Several 
members of the group were thereafter expelled. one of them. 
Ernest Dikgang Moseneke. enrolling at Hofmeyr High School in 
Atteridgeville. at the beginning of 1962 where he immersed 
himself once again in PAC activities. 122 At the Atteridgeville 
school there existed a branch of the African Students Union of 
South Africa which had been formed shortly after Sharpeville by 
PAC loyalists at Turfloop University College outside Pietersburg. 123 . 
In August the Atteridgeville ASUSA members were told that they 
now formally constituted a PAC cell. 124 By now leadership of 
the Pretoria PAC seems to have passed to a new group centred 
in the schools. Ntloedibe. after serving his prison sentence. 
had stayed in the country long enough to issue a leaflet denying 
that the PAC had collaborated with the police in opposing the 
1961 stay-at-home and then travelled to Maseru to join the 
National Executive. Sello was dead; he died shortly after an 
operation in a prison hospital had failed to make good the harm 
caused by the police bullet he had received in 1957. Tefu was 
in prison after breaking his banning order by attending a 
meeting called by the Lady Selbourne Village Committee to 
discuss the impending removals. 125 The strength of the movement 
as well as much of its following had shifted from Lady Selbourne 
to Atteridgeville and the new township of Vlakfontein. both of 
which were being enlarged to accommodate the tenants displaced 
by the demolitions which had begun in the old freehold village. 
In 1963 a series of six trials revealed extensive PAC 
activity in the two municipal townships. the nearby educational 
institutions as well as in Lady Selbourne. 126 A witness in one 
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of the trials, the secretary of the PAC's Northern Transvaal 
Region testified to the existence of three concentrations of 
PAC membership in his region, at Pietersburg, Ne1spruit and 
Pretoria, together numbering over 1,000. To support his claim 
he recited to the court the names of over a hundred of the 
. 127 Pretoria members with whom he was acquainted. If his claim 
was accurate it seems sensible to assume that the greater part 
of the region's membership was in Pretoria. 
Beyond the actions and alleged intentions of those who 
were convicted in these trials there is only very sketchy 
information about them. There seems to have been a well-developed 
cellular structure in the three townships put on a systematic 
organised footing at the end of 1962. At this point delegates 
were sent to Maseru where they were instructed to recruit and 
make preparations for the impending uprising. In response to 
this the Atteridgevi11e cells began the highly hazardous task 
of collecting and caching unexploded mortar bombs from the 
Skurweweg Arti11ary Range. As with other groups elsewhere in 
the country PAC followers were told to buy and store mea1ie meal 
and clothing and manufacture weapons and petrol bombs. A list 
of suitable targets was drawn up. In Atteridgevi11e a group 
named 'The Twelve DiSCiples' was formed and given the task of 
assassinating selected security police and informers. They 
made two attempts upon the life of a local policeman, but on 
each occasion when they approached his house he had company and 
they lost heart. 128 St d t t th H b T h T i i u en s a e e ron eac er ra n ng 
College planned to kill their teachers and then use their cars 
to travel to Church Square where they would join detacr~ents 
from V1akfontein, AtteridgeVi11e and Lady Se1bourne in an attack 
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on the City.129 In Vlakfontein a plan was made to hold up the 
regular dynamite truck which passed by the township on the 
way to the diamond mine. 1)0 Such intentions were resolved 
and cemented in oathing rituals conducted during night time 
meetings in the hills surrounding Pretoria: those who were 
told to cut their wrists as a symbol of their sacrifice for 
Africa. 1)1 Though some state witnesses spoke of being compelled 
to belong to the organisation much of the evidence seemed to 
indicate a strong level of conunitment: before March 1963 the 
Vlakfontein group apparently sent a message to Leballo 
announcing their readiness for the uprising and their unwilling-
ness to be kept waiting. At the same time though, Vlakfontein 
members were reproved by their leaders for 'recruiting far too 
many children,.132 
All these plans were anticipated by the police: the 
organisation was well infiltrated by informers and between 
March 22nd and April 8th nearly seventy suspected PAC members 
were arrested. A large proportion of these received heavy 
prison sentences, five of them for life. 
Apart from their names and ages - the majority were in 
their late teens or early twenties - littl~ can be gleaned 
from the trial evidence concerning the background of these men. 
Many were high school pupils and in Atteridgeville at least 
teachers seem to have played a key role. The Atteridgeville 
teachers included John Nkosi, Jeff Masemula and Peter Rikhotso -
the last a history teacher who in classroom was alleged to have 
told his pupils about the whites' theft of land and the need 
to fight for its restoration to Africans. 1;; The only name 
from the past was the chairman of the Atteridgeville PAC, 
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Simon Brander, convicted alongside Masemula. Brander had 
been the Lady Selbourne ANC's full-time secretary during the 
Defiance Campaign and had later associated himself with Tsele 
during the 1959 women's protest. 
Peter lIagano and other ANC loyalists remained active 
throughout these events. In 1962 they had formed, cells linked 
to Umkonto we Sizwe's leadership in Johannesburg and in the 
course of late 1962 and during 1963 were responsible for at 
least half a dozen sabotage attacks upon government buildings 
and railway lines. In conformity with Umkonto policy care was 
taken to avoid putting lives at risk. The group involved a 
relatively small number of men. Along with Magano one of the 
key organisers was Tseleng Mosupye who from 1959 had led a 
union of catering workers; waiters and other people employed 
in the catering industry made up a significant proportion of 
Umkonto's local membership. With their arrest in 1964 an era 
spanning nearly four decades of radical black dissent came to 
134 a close in Pretoria. 
This sad drama took place against a backdrop of communal 
tension. The removals from Lady Selbourne though not energetically 
contested were widely feared, especially by the young and the 
very old: the former because of the prospect of losing their 
chances of employment in the city and the latter because for 
many of them life in Lady Selbourne was the only life they could 
135 
afford. Many of the inhabitants of the municipal townships 
were forcefully resettled inhabitants of the ring of squatter 
settlements which had grown up round Pretoria during the war 
and had been eradicated towards the end of the 1950s. For many 
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life in their new homes was difficult: in August 1960 anger 
which had been accumulating in Atteridgeville over high rents, 
low wages and poor transport boiled over at the railway station 
when delayed passengers assaulted the drivers and ticket 
examiners on the late trains. Arriving buses were stoned to 
1,36 
cries of 'Azikwelwa' from the crowd. During 1960 and 1961 
anticipating political unrest and to check a growing wave of 
youthful gangsterism the police subjected Vlakfontein and 
Atteridgeville to massive pass raids on occasions deploying 
eight hu~dred policemen. 137 In two days in May 1961, 1,500 men 
and women appeared in the Commissioners' Court on charges of 
illegal entry.1,38 The gangsterism the police complained of 
was itself a relatively new symptom of social distress among 
the young in all three townships.1 39 Even those for whom 
education offered the possibility of escape from poverty had 
fiercely curtailed chances of meeting their aspirations. In 
the 1961 matriculation results 178 out of 958 African candidates 
passed, three out of seven at Atteridgeville, fourteen out of 
thirty four at Kilnerton and none out of a matriculation class 
of sixteen at Lady Selbourne. 140 
It has been suggested above that in the course of the 1950s 
the ANC in Pretoria was in the process of acquiring a definite 
social character with a membership and leadership drawn 
increasingly from a working class background. This created a 
social space for local PAC activists; in very broad general 
terms from the little we know of its local following the PAC 
seems to have a more middle class character. A survey 
conducted in the Pretoria area and on the Rand in 1962 among a 
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small sample of professionals, teachers, clerks, students 
and school children revealed that a 57 per cent majority of 
the group preferred the PAC to the ANC. In the sample, a 
relatively high degree of education, youth, acceptance of 
violent political methods and support for the PAC tended to 
coincide. 141 
Commitment to either the PAC or ANC insurgents in Pretoria 
was socially exceptional. Even during the days of its legal 
existence the ANC was not a powerful movement. The community 
rallied behind it only sporadically at moments when an act by 
the authorities could be seen as a material injustice with an 
immediate effect on their daily lives. Africans in Pretoria 
during the 1950s and 19608 had yet to occupy strategic positions 
in the local political economy. Confined mainly to menial 
employment in commerce and services or in the least skilled 
sectors of industry they lacked the necessary confidence and 
resources for continuous participation in a political movement. 
In a particularly repressive local environment political activity 
of the type undertaken by Mokgatle, Magano, Tefu, Sello, 
Ntloedibe and Masemula to name a few in this narrative, required 
unusual reserves of imagination and courage. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
POQO AND RURAL RESISTANCE IN THE TRANSKEI - 1960-1963 
Between 1961 and 1963 there were indications of Poqo 
activity in nine districts in the South Wes~ern part of the 
Transkei. The support for Poqo in this region was part of a 
wider movement of peasant reaction to state efforts to reshape 
the local political economy. Transkeian peasant resistance 
was not exceptional, the processes which gave rise to it were 
national in their scope and were fundamental features of South 
Africa's economic development. This chapter begins at this 
very general level by surveying the evolution of the economic 
and political strategies implemented by the state in the 
countryside. It will then discuss the local historical back-
ground to the Transkeian unrest before turning to the develop-
ment of the Poqo movement in this region. 
For over two decades, between 1940 and the mid-1960s, 
within the areas designated for African occupation by the 
1913 and 1936 Land Acts, there was a succession of bitter 
localised conflicts between peasants and authority. During the 
1940s, 19508 and 1960s, the state played an increasingly 
interventionist role in the countryside. The reserves were 
needed for new economic and political functions, and a series 
of attempts were made to restructure them accordingly. 
Established social relationships were to be disrupted. in the 
process traditional authority was to be robbed of what 
legitimacy it retained and the hosti~interface between people 
and government was to swiftly expand. Popular reactions to the 
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reshaping of rural societies were widespread and rather 
bloodier than those occurring in an urban context. This was 
partly because the manner in which they were dealt with could 
be considerably more brutal than if they had occurred in 
cities but also because the conditions of rural existence 
were even harsher than those that prevailed in the townships. 
Government policy in black occupied portions of the 
countryside should be understood within the broad context of 
the South African political economy. The boundaries of 
'reserves' (later 'Bantustans' and 'homelands', today 'black 
states') were fixed by two pieces of legislation, the 1913 
Land Act and the 1936 Native Trust and Land Bill. The Land 
Act set aside the swiftly diminishing areas under African 
communal tenure as reserved for African occupation and 
prohibited African land purchase outside their borders. It 
also set out, with limited success, to restrict the growth of 
African squatting on white-owned farmland. The 1936 legislation 
amplified the anti-squatting provisions of the 1913 act, 
actually making squatting illegal (a provision which was not 
enforced until a decade later), and establishing a Native 
Trust to buy up land in 'released areas' to be occupied and 
farmed by Africans under stringent supervision by Trust officials. 
Much has been written about the changing purposes these 
reserves served in the development of South Africa's industrial 
1 
economy and what follows is a very bare condensation. The 
original function of the reserves was to subsidise the costs 
of mine labour. In other words, mine owners could pay migrant 
black mine workers wages which were set below the minimum 
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sUbsistence needs for themselves and their dependents. The 
balance would be made up by agricultural production carried 
out by the miner's family and himself between contracts. 
Moreover the retention of linkages with a rural economy 
obviated the need for employers to pay pensions or to carry 
any other social welfare costs. However, this system had as 
its premise a rising level of production in the reserves. 
The tight limits set on African land occupation, the expansion 
of population within these limits and the removal of the 
healthiest and strongest members of the population for 
increasingly long periods as tax obligations and other cash 
needs grew greater was inimical to rising production. By the 
1920s, agricultural output (both stock and crops) per head 
was falling and though economic historians disagree as to 
exactly when the 'collapse' of reserve agriculture took place, 
by the 1930s, the inability of some of the reserves to provide 
sufficient food for their inhabitants was arousing official 
concern. A confidential report on conditions in the Transkei 
and Ciskei commissioned by the Chamber of Mines concluded that 
'semi starvation is a very insecure basis with which to build 
2 
a permanent labour supply'. Within these reserves access to 
land and stock had become concentrated (so that growing numbers 
of people were landless or stockless or both). Moreover, cash 
agriculture was carried out at the expense of food production: 
wool production for the market which mainly benefited headmen 
and chiefs in the words of the Chamber of Mines report was 
'driving cattle off the land' (as well as substantially 
contributing to its deterioration).3 
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Proclamation 31 of 1939 which outlined a programme of 
livestock limitation and land conservation measures, the 
'betterment' scheme, was together with the Native Trust 
regulations outlined in the 1936 act, the first attempt by 
the state to deal systematically with this situation. Wartime 
manpower shortages delayed the energetic implementation of 
any such measures. Mining was to find other sources of cheap 
mining labour: by 1946 only 41 per cent of mining labour came 
from within South Africa's borders. 4 Meanwhile the labour 
requirements of an expanding manufacturing industry came not 
from the reserves but from white-owned farms when labour 
tenancy arrangements were becoming increasingly disadvantageous 
to the tenants. 
The industrialisation of the 1940s presented South Africa's 
rulers with two sets of problems. First there were the social 
and political tensions resulting from rapid urbanisation and 
proletarianisation. Second there was the imbalance of labour 
supply between different sectors of the economy: farmers were 
unable to offer wages to compete with manufacturing and by 
the close of the decade were experiencing an acute shortage of 
labour. The reserves were affected by the resolution of both 
sets of problems. They no longer had any direct economic 
function but instead performed a crucial role in the process 
of controlling African labour. Responding to the needs of 
commercial agriculture, the post-1948 Nationalist government 
sought to redeploy labour in its direction by centralising and 
streamlining controls on the movement of labour. The 1952 
Native Laws Amendment Act made section 10 of the Urban Areas 
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Act automatically applicable to every municipality and divided 
the country into prescribed (urban) and non-prescribed (rural) 
areas, movement between them being subjected to strict 
official sanctions. Labour Bureaux, which began to be 
established in the countryside in 1949, dictated the channels 
along which labour could flow. Control of labour mobility was 
to be facilitated by a new system of pass documents incorpor-
ating photographs and fingerprints. In recognition of the 
increasingly important role they had in the industrial work-
force this system was to be extended to women under the 1952 
mystifyingly entitled 'Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination 
of Documents Act'. To encourage a more efficient use of labour 
by farmers and the stimulation of mechanised agriculture, anti-
squatting legislation was enacted in 1954 which inter ~ 
relieved the state of the legal requirement to find new land 
for displaced squatters. Squatters in peri-urban areas (that 
is those who lived just outside towns so they could take up 
urban emp~oyment but evade municipal influx controls) were 
prohibited in 1951. The overall effect of these measures was 
to massively enlarge the reserve populations as various groups 
were excluded from the urban economy and forced back into the 
reserves. They were joined by displaced labour tenants, 
squatters and the inhabitants of 'black spots,.5 
To meet these new burdens there would be a substantial 
reorganisation of life in the reserves. Conceding that they 
could no longer provide a significant proportion of the 
subsistence needs of many of their inhabitants, it was proposed 
to regroup people in non agricultural villages, which would 
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function as labour dormitories for decentralised industry. 
For the rest of the population, access to and the use of 
grazing and cultivated land, would be subjected to an increased 
range of controls and theoretically self-imposed voluntary 
measures, such as stock limitation. This would serve to 
check the now alarming ecological crisis apparent in all the 
reserves. To enforce and supervise 'rehabilitation' in the 
face of continued resistance to it and providing a cheap 
repressive administration for a potentially rebellious 
population, local government was reshaped in an authoritarian 
fashion under the 1953 Bantu Authorities Act. As policy 
developed in the 1950s wealth and power became concentrated at 
the local level around compliant chiefs and their acolytes. 
Their political aspirations would be met through the construction 
of quasi-independent administrations of each reserve or group 
of reserves. By the end of the period the main function of 
the reserves would be in the displacement of socio-political 
tensions from the towns to the countryside where they could be 
more ruthlessly controlled and constituted less of a threat. 
To put it more brutally, the problems of the weak, the 
unemployed and the starving would be relocated to where they 
mattered only to those who were personally affected by them. 
Let us look at the effects these changes had on rural life. 
They can be divided into three groups: those arising from 
attempts to regenerate production; the effects of political 
restructuring; and the results of new controls on mobility. 
The scheme for 'reclamation' of the reserves had two main 
features: limitation of stock to what was conceived to be the 
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land's carrying capacity and the redivision of the land into 
residential, cultivation and grazing areas. Kraals would no 
longer be scattered but grouped together 'in convenient small 
6 
villages'. Those people without access to land would live 
in rural townships. Land would be reserved for forestry 
schemes and access to these for firewood would be restricted. 
The betterment scheme was at its inception meant to be voluntary, 
its adoption depending on acceptance by meetings convened by 
chiefs or headmen in each rural location. In many cases such 
meetings could not have been very representative, as one of 
the Ciskeian General Councillors admitted in 1947: 
In some places the people have accepted the 
betterment proclamation but if you ask them 
personally you will find they know nothing 
of the whole affair. 7 
or as another observed in 1951: 
in my location, when the scheme was accepted 
it was accepted by educated men, who went 
behind our backs. 8 
In general support for the scheme came for the 'land-owning 
types of natives • • • 
land and works it from 
definition tended to be 
the man who makes his living from the 
January to December,.9 Such people by 
10 
a privileged minority. 
In 1949 rehabilitation r~gulations were proclaimed placing 
great powers in the hands of Agricultural officers who would 
'excise areas needing special care' and allocate land for 
different purposes. However, despite their efforts, the Native 
Affairs Department in 1954 had to tacitly admit defeat with a 
switch over to a less complicated and more extensive 
conservation system it called 'stabilisation' which had as its 
objective the prevention of further deterioration rather than 
'reclamation'. But by this stage the department was looking 
forward to when conservation measures would be 'linked up with 
the traditional tribal system of government ••• constituted 
under the Bantu Authorities Act', a system which would not 
depend on popular sanction. 11 
Land reclamation was extremely unpopular. Native Affairs 
Department officials regularly complained 'suspicion' and 
opposition from 'recalcitrant tribal communities' to their 
proposals. But hostility to the scheme came often from those 
whom one might have expected to be least conservative: as one 
rural District Commissioner plaintively put it in 1952 'the 
12 younger men are taking control in the districts'. Quite 
apart from emotional or ideological objections to rehabilitation, 
it was regarded with very real fear by people who depended on a 
very narrow margin for physical survival. Stock culling was 
aimed initially at the removal of weaker animals and reductions 
could take place with no regard of size of herd. 13 Dipping 
tanks were disliked as these were sometimes used to enforce 
culling and castration as well as a way for the chiefs to collect 
14 
unofficial levies. 
A minimum of three cattle was needed to ensure a regular 
milk supply for household consumption. 15 Those with such a 
number were relatively fortunate. In seven Transkeian districts 
as early as 1941, 44 per cent of the homesteads were found to 
own no cattle at all. 16 For such people access to cultivable 
land was crucial. But this was becoming more difficult. The 
new demarcation of fallow areas removed from some people a 
vital source of food. 
357 
Landless households were sometimes deprived of access 
to grazing and more generally common pastureland in praotice 
shrunk as officials fenced off forbidden grazing camps. 
Prohibitions on tree felling for people who could not afford 
to buy fuel contravened a customary right of free access to 
firewood. 17 Villagisation policies espeoially among people 
who did not live in villages (suoh as the Cape Nguni) aroused 
resentment. They offended custom and in any case lengthened 
the walk to the fields. Material considerations aside there 
were other objeotions to the scheme. First of all cattle 
represented wealth, savings and security. Secondly, the 
interference of Native Affairs Department officials into 
matters which previously were the concern of chiefs or headmen 
- land allocation or the regulation of the agricultural cycle -
reduced the popular standing of the latter and could conflict 
with the principle that each household had sufficient ·for its 
needs. Meyer, writing of 'red' communities in the Transkei 
suggests that the loss by lineage elders of their function in 
advising headmen in land allocation, undermined 'red' ideology 
and sooial solidarity as elders lost their main sphere of 
18 
authority. Women also suffered from the new system of land 
allocation, losing their customary right to a field of their 
own as land was usually only allotted to men as heads of 
19 households. 
The other main objection to the betterment soheme and its 
suocessors was that they did nothing to solve what many people 
felt to be the most pressing problem. As one of the Ciskeian 
Councillors pointed out in the Council's rejeotion of the 
Reclamation Scheme in 1945: 
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most of the land is given to the few and 
the smallest piece is given to the many 
and the result is that they are grouped 
together with their stock, which brings 
about soil erosion • • • If we reduce 
the stocks we deprive the people of food 
and milk. 20 
Acceptance of reclamation, betterment, rehabilitation or 
stabilisation implied acceptance of the way land had been 
apportioned in the first place. And the injustice of that 
division was being compounded every day as more and more people 
were being forced back into the reserves: the squatters, the 
inhabitants of black spots, the urban employed: between 1955 
and 1969 the average population density in the reserves rose 
from 60 to 110. 21 
Closely related with economic reorganisation was the 
redefinition of political institutions under the Bantu 
Authorities Act. The architects of the new system took as their 
model the British colonial native authority. Local government 
would be based on tribal institutions in which chiefs and 
headmen would have greatly enhanced executive powers. The size 
and composition of each tribal authority would be decided by 
the Department for Native Affairs. The system, in the case of 
the Ciskei and Transkei, replaced a partly elected District 
Council system, and more generally removed the consensual element 
in the relationship between chiefs and their communities, making 
chiefs answerable to the Department rather than their subjects. 
The scope and sanctions of chiefs' judicial powers were 
considerably extended. In brief chiefs were made responsible 
for the local maintenance of law and order and the implementation 
of government-inspired measures - including of course the 
rehabilitation scheme. As far as traditional leaders were 
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concerned, the attractions of the new order were uncertain. 
It enhanced their local powers but detracted from their 
legitimacy as they became responsible for implementing 
unpopular laws. Nevertheless, collaboration with the Department 
brought with it increased wealth and ascendancy for some chiefs 
over less compliant rivals. The system encouraged a trend 
towards despotism: those who profited most were often those 
whose traditional status was at best doubtful. In the self-
conscious oratory of Bantu Affairs Department officials chiefs 
were incited to: 
Be your own police in your own interest, 
find out those men who respect authority 
and tribal institutions and band them 
together as the chief's and headmen's 
impi which will turn out when called to 
help your tribes and locations to be clean 
and well behaved • • • Use moderate 
violence • • • just like a good chief 
should do. 22 
But quite apart from the burdens imposed by abuse of new 
powers, the system was to bring with it less arbitrary 
obligations. 
The Bantu Authorities system included an attempt to cheapen 
for the government the cost of administration through extending 
the rural tax base. 23 In the Transkei direct taxation almost 
doubled between 1955 and 195924 and throughout the whole country 
African convictions for tax defaulting leapt from 48,000 in 
1950 to 179,000 in 1960. 25 
The final element in rural discontent was provided by 
the tightening of influx/efflux controls and the population 
resettlements of the 1950s and 19608. The extension of pass 
laws appeared to rural women as a direct threat to the security 
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and integrity of the household. Such anxieties would have had 
an especial force in communities where because of the prolonged 
absence of male migrant workers, the energetic and active 
members of the community were female. Insofar as the 
reorganisation of agriculture limited access to land it was a 
source of especial concern to those denied by influx control a 
permanent base in the urban economy and compelled to depend for 
their ultimate security on land or stock. For example, in 1951 
a Ciskeian Native Commissioner claimed that opposition came 
mainly from 'the industrial native • • • they do not beneficially 
occupy that land, but they are not prepared to lose their stake 
26 in that land'. With resettlement under the Group Areas Act 
whole districts could be threatened with expropriation and 
incorporation into the ever-growing ranks of the rural landless 
and unemployed. 
Rebellion and revolt in the Southern Transkei should be 
viewed against a background of unrest which affected almost all 
of South Africa's African rural communities between 1940 and 1965. 
The main peaks of this disaffection were in the zoutpansberg and 
Sekhukun1land in the early 1940s (today Venda and Lebowa), in 
the tiny Free State reserve of Witzieshoek in the early 1950s 
(Basotu Qua Qua), in the Marico reserve in 1958 (Eastern 
Bophuthatswanah.Sekhukun11and again in 1958 to 1959, the Natal 
reserves in 1958 and 1959, in Mpondo1and, Transkei, 1960 and in 
the Tembu districts of the Southwestern Transkei between 1960 
and 1963. Also throughout this period the Ciskeian territories 
were in a state of constant ferment. These events have only 
recently begun to attract the attention of historians though 
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27 
already there exists a substantial literature on some of them. 
The Tembu disturbances which provide the focus of this chapter 
have not been among these with the exception of an early 
research paper by this author. This neglect is a little 
surprising; though the Tembu unrest lacks the structured and 
unified qualities of the Mpondo rebellion to its north, it was 
sustained over a relatively long period, it received considerable 
contemporary newspaper publicity, and to a much greater extent 
than any of the other rural resistance movements cited above 
it involved a national political organisation. 
The following Transkeian magisterial districts were 
affected by Poqo activity: Engcobo. Glen Grey, Idutywa, Kentani, 
Mqanduli, Ngqeleni, St. Marks, Umtata and Willowvale. Of these 
five were inhabited by members of the Tembu tribe (Engcobo, Glen 
Grey, Mqanduli, St. Marks and Umtata) while the other four 
accommodated Xhosa, Mpondo and Mfengu groups. The Tembu 
districts were linked with each other administratively by the 
authority of a paramount chief. Tembu, Xhosa, Mpondo and Mfengu 
are culturally similar peoples who speak the same language. 
These districts though classified for administrative reasons 
as, for example, Tembu or Mpondo, were in fact heterogeneous. 
The nine districts form a single block of territory extending 
for about 250 miles from the Southwestern borders of the Transkei 
to the Eastern coastal areas. They encompass the three main 
topographical regions of the territory: the Western highlands, 
undulating flat-country in the centre and the more broken 
28 Eastern coastal region. The especially poor communications 
and acute shortage of cultivable land in the West is reflected 
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in the varying population densities of each district: those 
nearest the coast are most crowded. 29 In conformity with 
this pattern of the nine districts Engcobo was in 1951 the 
most sparsely inhabited with seventy-four people per square 
mile and Willowvale with 117 per square mile the most heavily 
populated. 30 The Transkeian landscape, typically open grassland, 
is often badly eroded because of land shortage and consequent 
over-grazing. The impact of erosion in the nine districts 
ranged from the relatively favourable situation in Kentani 
where 40 per cent of the land was free of erosion to St. Marks 
where 92.6 per cent of the land was eroded, 50.2 per cent badly.31 
Of the Transkei's 1.400,000 inhabitants in 1960, 160,000 
were recruited annually to work on the mines, in industry and 
in agriculture. 32 In 1960, 61,237 were employed as mine workers. 
It seems reasonable to assume that about 25,000 people were 
employed in agriculture (the 1971 figures of 22,383 was after 
a decade of reducing the number of black farm workers in the 
Western Cape).33 The rest would mainly have been recruited by 
Labour Bureaux for industries and services in the urban areas. 
Francis Wilson reports that in 1972, 69 per cent of the men so 
recruited worked in the Cape Town area, 18 per cent in the 
Transvaal and a small proportion elsewhere. The proportions 
would not have been very different ten years before: Hammond-
Tooke reporting from Umtata and Willowvale in 1956 stated that 
the Western Province towns were the most popular centres for 
migrants because they tended to offer higher wages than the work 
available to Transkeians in other centres. 34 Migrants on mine 
labour contracts were restricted by the compound system, but 
the men and women who worked in industry or services were more 
exposed to urban political influences, and it is therefore 
worth emphasising that in the Southern Transkei it is likely 
that the majority of industrial or service migrant workers 
oscillated between the Transkei and the Western Cape. 
With the exception of a small number of government 
servants, the population either depended to a lesser or greater 
extent on wages remitted by migrants or were able to produce 
enough food from farms to subsist. Bearing in mind the density 
of settlement and the rate of labour migration it is reasonable 
to conclude that a very high proportion of the Transkeian 
population were supported by migrant earnings. Of 759 house-
holds in Kentani, Tsolo and Umtata districts consulted in a 
survey carried out in 1974, 467 never harvested enough food 
for their consumption: sixty-two of these undertook no 
farming at all and 613 produced only for subsistence. It is 
unlikely that self sufficiency would have been much more 
extensive in the 1960s. 35 In 1943 landlessness was said to 
affect 25 per cent of the married males (who by definition 
were entitled to allotment) in seven Transkeian districts: 
Butterworth, Idutywa, Nqamaka, Tsomo, Umtata, Xalanga and 
36 Engcobo. 
Until 1955 the Transkei was governed through a complex 
system of administration based upon a heirarchy of magistrates 
responsible ultimately to the ministry of Native Affairs. The 
magistrate of each district presided over a headman who normally 
had the function of allocating land and registering tax payers. 
A limited degree of representation was allowed through the Glen 
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Grey system: from 1927 location boards, district councils, 
and a Transkeian territorial general council (Bunga) were 
empowered to raise and spend revenues for road and bridge 
construction, irrigation schemes and dipping tanks. The 
location boards, appointed from local landholders, elected 
six of the twelve councils in each district and these elected 
108 of the 138 general council members. Opportunities for 
popular participation in such a system were very limited and 
the councils' composition demonstrated the degree to which it 
reflected the concerns of the more affluent. 37 Under this 
system chiefs had little executive power and partly because of 
this retained considerable moral authority. In Tembuland and 
Mpondoland chiefs had a greater degree of influence over land 
allocation than elsewhere.38 Chiefs together with headmen 
contributed to the greater proportion of Bunga members. 
The Bantu Authorities system introduced in 1955 contained 
no provisions for any form of elected representation. Tribal, 
district, regional and territorial authorities were to be 
established. They were to be composed of official nominees and 
chiefs. Chiefs' powers were to be enhanced and headmen were 
placed under the authority of chiefs. The system gave to 
chiefs greater scope to impose local taxes and levies. As we 
have seen, under the system chiefs were now responsible for land 
allocation as well as the administration of rehabilitation 
measures. In Tembuland where chiefs in any case influenced 
the allocation of unsurveyed land and where the implementation 
of the system involved establishing a new paramountcy from 
Glen Grey, Cala and St. Marks districts the chiefs viewed the 
new authorities especially ambivalently. 
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Certainly their new status could bring material benefits: 
for example the new Transkeian Territorial Authority, the apex 
of the local Bantu Authority system resolved to give to chiefs 
an extra portion of arable land 'to enable (the chiefs) to 
provide hospitality,.39 But the new responsibilities for 
land administration whatever the opportunities they offered 
for private appropriation of land were not always welcomed by 
the chiefs. In May 1961 over 1,000 Tembu chiefs condemned 
the rehabilitation scheme (the 'Native Trust') at a meeting 
called by Sabata Dalindyebo, the paramount chief. Tembu1and 
was almost completely free of rehabilitation at that time. 40 
Contact mentions in its report 'good' chiefs who had delayed 
imposing the scheme by insisting that they should act as 
their people required them to. In contrast to this, in the 
district of St. Marks which was under the authority of the 
Emigrant Tembu Chief and Chairman of the Transkei Territorial 
Authority, Kaiser Matanzima, the scheme was 'accepted' at 
meetings held in locations in 1960. The meetings were called 
by the District Magistrate and he later claimed that the 
proposals were accepted by everybody at the meetings. Rather 
inconsistently he also said that after the proposals had been 
accepted '100 per cent' illegal meetings began to be held all 
over the district and a number of people belonging to anti-
41 
rehabilitation groups were arrested. He also made the 
interesting admission that compensation was not paid to those 
who had been removed from the land until the last person had 
moved'vo1untari1y,.42 Matanzima's district was to include 
the site of a large show-piece irrigation scheme. 2,400 
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consolidated farming plots were to be produced, and from trial 
evidence we know that people were being displaced from the 
land from 1962. 43 
Matanzima though was one of the most important beneficiaries 
of the new order. The creation of an Emigrant Tembu paramountcy 
in 1956 elevated him from the position of a minor chief to a 
peer of Sabata Dalindyebo the Tembu paramount. This action 
contributed to Tembu chiefly opposition to the Bantu Authorities 
Scheme: it reduced the extent of Chief Dalindyebo's paramountcy, 
in contrast to chiefs elsewhere the land allocation rights 
were never ones over which they had totally lost jurisdiction 
and it gave to them the unpopular duty of administering land 
rehabilitation. Land rehabilitation proposals, including in 
1960 the concentration of holdings into 'economic units', 
taken to their logical conclusion would have displaced 113,000 
families in the Transkei. 44 A four-man delegation representing 
the paramount was sent in 1958 to Pretoria to protest against 
the implementation of the Bantu Authorities. Members of the 
delegation were deported. 
Whereas it seems likely that Tembu chiefs still retained 
considerable popular legitimacy not all opposition to 
rehabilitation and the new political structures was channelled 
through them. The existence of the African Cape franchise 
before 1956 had stimulated the development of political 
organisations in the area. In the 1940s and 1950s the All 
African Convention a federal coordinating political centre had 
some influence in the Transkei through its affiliates, the 
Cape African Teachers Association and the Transkei Organised 
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Bodies. The TOB itself a federal structure claimed in 1952 
the allegiance of fifteen different organisations, mainly 
farmers associations and location vigilante groups. In the 
later 1950s the AAC campaigned quite extensively in the 
Southern Transkei against the land rehabilitation proposals. 45 
The AAC confined itself to agitation and public meetings but 
from 1960 disaffection began to be expressed increasingly violently. 
From the foregoing analysis this violence can be 
attributed to several factors. In a socio-economic context in 
which human survival rested on a precarious combination of 
subsistence farming and wage labour the threat posed by 
rehabilitation would have sometimes appeared very menacing. 
The refashioning of local government was done in such a way as 
to detract from its legitimacy. It is possible that after 
1960 the pressure on local economic resources was accentuated 
by the impact of Western Cape resettlement and tightening 
influx control. Bearing in mind that Tembu labour migration 
was particularly oriented to the Western Cape it is also 
reasonable to conclude that political events in the Western 
Cape affecting the migrant community there would have had a 
rebounding impact in Tembuland. 
In outline, the Tembu disturbances were sporadic and 
disjointed though they were sustained over a surprisingly long 
period. It is important to remember that much of the unrest in 
Tembu areas occurred under the conditions imposed on the Transkei 
by Proclamation 400. This, from 30 November, 1960, provided 
for a State of Emergency. The regulations included detention 
without trial, the banning of virtually all meetings and the 
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extension of the powers of chiefs and headmen. People who 
challenged chiefs' authority could be fined or imprisoned and 
have some of their livestock confiscated. The proclamation 
was published in immediate response to the Mpondo uprising. 
Before examining the local development of the Poqo 
movement it is useful to have some knowledge of the wider 
context of resistance to rehabilitation and Bantu authorities 
in the region. Attacks on headmen, chiefs, and White traders 
(unpopular because of their effective monopoly and consequent 
high prices) were publicly reported quite frequently after 
1960. For example in 1960 in Tembuland one chief and eleven 
other people regarded as government accomplices were killed. 46 
Nineteen cases of violence against whites, mainly traders, were 
reported as having taken place in the Southern Transkei between 
1958 and early 1963. 47 Much of the violence was concentrated 
in tl:e Emigrant Tembu districts48 in which headmen and chiefs 
under Matanzima's direction had been espeCially officious in 
promoting rehabilitation. Since 1956 several chiefs and 
headmen who had not cooperated with these efforts had been 
replaced, often to accompaniment of popular protest. 49 It 
seems likely that much of this violence was attributable to 
organised groups. An informant who grew up in Cala during 
this period testifies to the development of groups known as 
the Amajacob. The Amajacob were derived from the location based 
groups of youths who before circumcision would withdraw over 
weekends to the mountainous areas near their villages and take 
part in ritual stick fights with groups from other locations. 
These gangs, Amabhungas, would later provide the basis of social 
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cohesion among men from a certain area while they were on 
labour contracts. From 1960, according to this informant, 
these gangs began to oppose land rehabilitation measures by 
destroying fences and killing headmen and their supporters. 
It was at this point that in Cala the Amabhunga took the name 
Amajacob. The Amajacob were based on age sets and different 
groups were composed of men from different generations; the 
gangs were no longer exclusively recruited from young men. 
The Amajacob were especially active in Cala as a result of 
the resettlements arising from the irrigation scheme in which 
previous smallholders were 'packed together like a township,.50 
Contract workers returning from Cape Town during the 1960s 
troubles had frequently been beaten up by Matanzima's men and 
this fuelled popular resentement. 51 The name 'Amajacob' was 
first used by a peasant organisation which was formed in the 
mid 1950s in Glen Grey under the auspices of the All African 
Convention.52 The President of the AAC, W. M. Tsotsi, probably 
suggested the use of the term Jacobite from which the Xhosa 
word was adapted. As with the traditional Amabhungas the 
Amajacob groups existed both in the Transkei and among migrant 
communities in towns. In 1963 it was claimed that there were 
Amajacobs in Langa. 53 This was never confirmed by court 
evidence but it does seem that during 1962 'home boy' associations 
in Langa were being mobilised into resistance. Five Langa 
migrants were found guilty of murdering a Glen Grey chief, 
Mtshiza Mtirara. They had belonged to a 'home boy' group. 
This group, led by men who had been working in Cape Town for 
one or two decades and prompted by reports of opposition to 
'bad laws' and subsequent mistreatment of their people, decided 
to kill the chief. 54 
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From early 1963 the authorities began to systematically 
attempt to suppress the activities of the Amajacob. In doing 
so they often raised the tempo of local violence. One trial 
documents the effects of this process in Qitsi Location, St. 
Marks, a known area of Amajacob activity.55 On the 11th February 
the local headman was provided with some police from Qamata and 
with these and other men he raided the kraals of leading critics 
of the land rehabilitation measures. Their houses were 
destroyed and some of their stock was taken. 56 However, the 
anti-trust men had already left Qitsi and found shelter in a 
kraal in Qulugu, Engcobo district, eight miles away across the 
hills. Quite apart from the headman's action there was 
considerable anger in Qitsi because Matanzima had sent a large 
impi which included fifty policemen to search the area 
(possibly for Poqo men) and the location had had to provide 
food for them. There had also been removals. Though the head-
man was known to be rather reluctant to do so, he had had to 
organise the fencing: he had thus become 'the man who informs 
the people about the regulations,.57 The bitterness of the 
feeling against him can be judged from the fact that among the 
men who killed him were two nephews and a man known to be fa 
very great friend' of the headman. 58 
These men decided to kill the headman when they were at 
Qulugu. In accordance with an established custom, they sent 
him a threatening letter which resulted in him being given a 
bodyguard and a revolver. The group at Qulugu were first 
treated by a herbalist who made incisions on their arms, 
foreheads and cheek-bones. Then, on the night of the 26th, 
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they marched to Qitsi, overpowered the bodyguards, dragged the 
headman out of his kraal and killed him. His family were 
allowed to leave the hut, which was then burned down. There 
had been no attempt at secrecy (the bodyguards were permitted 
to escape) and shortly afterwards the conspirators were arrested. 
This process of resistance emerging from existing social 
networks originally established for quite different purposes 
can also be seen in the transformation of the Makuluspan, an 
organisation which began functioning outside Tembuland but 
which by 1963 was reported to be active in the Engcobo district. 59 
Makuluspan was formed in 1955 in Qumbu and Tsolo districts after 
a recent increase in the incidence of stock theft (itself 
possibly a symptom of the growing numbers of stockless and 
landless people). Local vigilante groups in different locations 
combined into a centralised organisation with a chairman, 
secretary and treasurer which imposed communal levies and 
convicted stock thieves in its night-time tribunals. Thieves 
who failed to answer its summonses had their homesteads burned 
down and were sometimes murdered. Having established themselves 
as an alternative source of justice to the authorities who had 
failed to take decisive action against the stock thieves it was 
but a short step for the Makuluspan to challenge the legitimacy 
of authority. In 1960 three identifiable Makuluspan leaders 
had been deported and from this point while continuing its 
activities against stock thieves Makuluspan began to attack 
60 headmen and chiefs who supported the Bantu Authorities system. 
By the time therefore that the first Poqo groups began to 
form in the Western Cape in 1961 there was already in existance 
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in parts of the Transkei a network of clandestine organisations 
with outposts in the Cape Town townships in the form of home boy 
associations. This extensive sub-culture of resistance helps 
to explain the degree of Poqo influence in the Transkei. 
Poqo inspired action in the Transkei falls into two 
categories. first those actions initiated from outside the 
territory by Cape Town based groups of migrant workers and 
secondly those which depended upon local organisation. In the 
first category were the two attempts by Poqo groups to assassinate 
Matanzima on October 14th and December 13th 1962. Both were 
similar but detail is available only for the one in December. 
On 12th December. a group of between twenty and thirty Poqo 
members travelled by train from Cape Town to the Transkei, with 
the intention of assembling with other groups near Qamata and 
launching a co-ordinated attack on Christmas Day on Matanzima's 
palace. According to the trial eVidence, similar groups had 
61 
already left Cape Town. Most of the twenty men later put on 
trial had been Poqo members since early 1961. but though there 
had been several meetings in the previous months the immediate 
preparations for the attack were only discussed at a meeting 
in Langa township on December 10th. At this and subsequent 
meetings members were told to contribute £6 for the railway 
ticket and to collect weapons. The attack was going to incorporate 
the freeing of prisoners in Qamata jail who had been captured 
in earlier attempts on Matanzima's life. On the night before 
their departure a herbalist doctored the men by making incisions 
62 
on the foreheads and rubbing herbs. Their weapons. which 
included a revolver carried by the cell's leader, were also 
treated. The herbalist was later arrested and tried in 19670 
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According to his own testimony he was the head of the 'White 
Brotherhood Lodge of Nigeria'. He earned money selling 
clothes and canvassing for subscriptions to the Lodge. The 
Lodge was called by some of its members Qamata, the Xhosa 
designation for the supreme being (a concept which preceded 
Christianity and which was not synonymous with the Christian 
GOd).63 Fortified with their medicine, the men entrained the 
following morning. Most of them had not had the chance to give 
their employers any excuse for leaving their jobs and so, as 
well as forfeiting their pay packets, had come away without 
getting their pass books signed. Their trains arrived at 
Queenstown at 7.00 p.m. on the 13th. Here it was obvious that 
the police had been warned because they ordered everybody off 
the train and made them line up on the platform, where they 
began searching the passengers for weapons. On the police's 
discovery of a panga, the Poqo men made a concerted attack on 
the police, killing one of them and wounding several others. 
After a few minutes of fighting, police reinforcements arrived 
and the Poqo men retreated and tried to escape to a nearby 
hillside. Most were captured within the next day or two. 
Another group who had journeyed from Cape Town a few days earlier 
had succeeded in reaching Ntlonze mountain near Cofimvaba, the 
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rallying point for the attackers but by now large impis and 
police units were searching the hills. Twenty Poqo men were 
later captured and a further seven were killed by the police. 65 
The conspirators were all migrant workers; most of them 
did unskilled work in the construction industry or in various 
factories. They were mainly Emigrant Tembu from Glen Grey, Cala 
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and St. Marks districts. Their wives and families were 
mentioned in the evidence as living in these places. It is 
clear that they regarded the Transkei as their home, and the 
evidence describing the various Poqo meetings in Langa indicates 
that they shared the same anxieties and preoccupations as the 
rural Tembu population. One was arrested with a letter from 
his mother in his pocket which contained a reference to his 
66 land being taken away; this was a predominating theme at 
meetings in Langa: 
The first thing he (Matanzima) did was to 
introduce fencing and now he is moving 
huts and kraals to some other place. It 
appears that he has sold the plots where 
the kraals were to the Europeans because 
there are huts there. Now he is assaulting 
us • •• 67 
Chief Matanzima has sold our land; we are 
going to kill him. 68 
The fencing and the activities of the Native Rehabilitation 
Trust in St. Marks began to be discussed at Langa Poqo meetings 
in July 1962. There was also said at these meetings that 
Kaiser Matanzima was responsible for the removal of Africans 
from the Western Cape. 69 
The extent and nature of Poqo's following inside the 
Transkei has already been discussed in Chapter 4. Unfortunately, 
newspaper reportage on Transkeian conspiracies is usually 
cryptic and there are few trial transcripts available. Our 
picture therefore has to remain incomplete. The most prominent 
themes in the discussion at Poqo meetings are ones which should 
now be familiar. In Mqanduli district people were told: 
Whites should be killed. 
the Whites were worrying 
and they wanted to fence 
meeting they talked only 
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It was said that 
us about taxes 
our land. At the 
of these things. 70 
In Engcobo school children were incited to burn down trading 
stores and kill their owners. 71 Not all matters discussed 
were exclusively rural: passes, wages and Bantu education 
were also discussed in meetings in Engcobo and Willowvale 
districts. 72 As with the Cape Town groups the Transkeian 
Poqo members employed magical protections: men in Baziya 
Location, Umtat~ District, had medicine rubbed into scars on 
their foreheads and were told that when they 'fought the 
Europeans the bullets from their guns would turn to water,.73 
The most violent act attributable to Poqo in the Transkei 
was the killing of five white people, two roadmakers and the 
wife and two daughters of one of them, near Bashee Bridge, 
Umtata District, during the night of 4th-5th February, 1963. 
The victims were hacked to death with pangas, axes and assegais 
and their caravans were set alight and their possessions chopped 
up and burned. 
Twenty-three men from Mputi Location, Umtata, were convicted 
and hanged for murder. The roadmakers' camp was on the edge of 
the location. According to the prosecutor the killings followed 
the establishment of a Poqo cell and a succession of meetings. 
The objective of the killings, the prosecutor claimed, 'was to 
test the bravery of the organisation for future operations,.74 
The trial reports tell us little about the identity of the 
accused except that they were residents of Mputi, that some of 
them were farmers, that many were closely related to each other 
and that they were part of a larger body of men, some from the 
neighbouring Tso10 and Engcobo districts. 75 The Poqo cell had 
been started in November 1962 when its founder, Nqaba Memani, 
returned from Langa, Cape Town. 76 
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The Bashee Bridge murders took place in an area which 
was considered by the authorities to have the highest level of 
unrest in the Transkei. 77 Mputi is near the Western border of 
Umtata adjoining Engcobo District. It is mountainous and 
extensively forested. The location had a dense population in 
1956 of 2,000 people, 800 of these men, and was one of the most 
congested and badly eroded in the district. 78 In 1958 the 
location headman had been deported from the Transkei79 for 
opposing land rehabilitation measures (Mputi Location was one 
of five declared as betterment areas in the district). Mputi's 
situation on the Engcobo District border may have been 
significant. Engcobo was known as 'the most lawless area of 
the Transkei,.80 There the Bantu Authorities system had 
virtually broken down: at the beginning of 196) the chief of 
81 the Amaquati had resigned following an attempt on his life 
while the other main chief, Chief Nkosana Mtirara, who had 
jurisdiction over the remaining eighteen locations was to be 
himself convicted of Poqo activities.82 The Makuluspan was 
also in the process of establishing itself in the Engcobo District 
in the vicinity of Mputi Location.8) A visitor to the region 
reported: 
Tembus of Engcobo District are one of the 
best organised groups and are suspicious of 
strangers. After a warning by a Tembu 
tribesman not to travel through the Engcobo 
Locations at night, as we would encounter 
the Makuluspan. we took the warning lightly. 
It was a nightmare journey through the 
locations. We met several people on horse-
back from different locations travelling in 
the same direction. They may have been 
gOing to a private meeting. Who knows? 84 
With this background the Bashee Bridge murders became 
slightly easier to comprehend. They occurred in an area of 
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considerable socio-economic stress, in a context in which local 
authority had been under challenge for several years before the 
inception of Poqo, and where with the Makuluspan there was in 
existence an extensive network of insurgent organisation. The 
precise motivation, though, of the killings or the details of 
the local Poqo structure do not emerge from the trial evidence. 
The unfortunate victims were new to the district, so they were 
chosen for what they represented rather than for whom they were, 
though it is possible that the new road they were constructing 
may not have been locally popular.85 Another roadmaker whose 
camp was three quarters of a mile away had been threatened three 
weeks before the killings.86 But without any knowledge of the 
individual backgrounds of the insurgents it is impossible to 
provide an adequate explanation of their actions. 
In 1963 peasant unrest and Poqo activity peaked in 
Tembuland. Large numbers of people were arrested and accused 
of Poqo membership. Mobile police units were brought in to 
suppress disturbances. 87 Illegal and violent opposition to 
the authorities coincided with elections to a new Transkeian 
88 Legislative Assembly. In Tembuland hostility to Matanzima 
was reflected in an almost total defeat at the polls for his 
candidates. But by 1964, Chief Matanzima had enhanced powers 
through his control of the Transkeian government (as a result 
of support of nominated members of the territorial assembly). 
Chiefs who had stood out against Bantu Authorities were being 
intimidated or induced to support them. A drought which lasted 
until 1969 forced another 35,000 Transkeians onto the l~bour 
market and killed a fifth of the territory's cattle serving 
further to demoralise popular resistance. In any case one 
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immediate provocation had been removed: the semi-autonomous 
Matanzima administration was thereafter to make no attempts 
89 to implement any stock limitation measures. 
Too little information is available to form definitive 
conclusions about the nature of the Tembu unrest. It is 
difficult to situate its constituents in the structure of their 
local society: it is unclear whether they were especially 
drawn from a particular economic stratum or were representative 
of a cross-section of the community. But it is likely that a 
precise fit between patterns of dissent and those of socio-
economic distinction did not exist for the motive force underlying 
the disturbances was a perception of injustice, of rights which 
had been encroached upon as a consequence of a restructuring of 
local politics. The beneficiaries of the new order were a very 
small group indeed and by no means all of them were willing 
recruits. 
A common feature with rural resistance elsewhere was the 
leading role played by migrant workers.90 They brought to the 
Poqo movement their own organisational structures and their own 
socio-political preoccupations. These were not those of a 
developed proletarian consciousness for these men were not yet 
fully proletarianised: they were not completely 'free' of 
access to the means of production. Consciously they still felt 
that land rehabilitation measures were a threat to their 
livelihood. Though the men who set out from Cape Town to attack 
Matanzima would probably have been destined to spend most of 
their working lives in the Langa hostels. nevertheless they 
were going to kill Matanzima because he was taking away their 
land. It has been suggested that different experience of 
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oppression for the worker on the one hand, and his family in 
the reserve on the other, introduces 'a structural division 
in the heart of the proletariat'. The worker would focus his 
opposition on the relations of production in the towns, while 
91 
rural people would attack chiefs and headmen. But in the 
1960s this was not the case; migrants, then, were not so 
detached from rural consciousness. Today things may be 
different: when people are forced off the land completely so 
that their entire SUbsistence depends on migrant wages, and 
when the migrant worker does not have the remotest prospeot 
of ceasing to work in the towns and returning to his cattle and 
land, then perhaps he has become a member of an urban proletariat. 
In the early 1960s his situation was a transitional one. 
It is in this context that his political reactions should 
be examined. At a time when the stay-away from work was the 
chief weapon of the nationalist movement, migrant workers 
hitherto had been considered apathetic politically, and the 
scale of their response to the Pan-Africanist Congress pass 
campaign in 1960 surprised witnesses in Cape Town. Here they 
were responding to the frustrations of urban conditions: low 
wages, influx control, separation from their families and police 
raids. They could also be concerned about agricultural 
conditions: drought, rain, cattle sickness and the state of 
the fields. 92 
In the Transkei, therefore, Poqo was a movement drawn 
from the social periphery of a developing capitalist economy 
and in terms of the concepts discussed at the beginning of this 
thesis it was populist. As such it had all the strengths and 
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weaknesses of a populist movement: an immensely powerful 
insurrectionary impulse but one very difficult to direct and 
organise from above. At its base the Poqo movement was a 
complex synthesis of, to use the Tilly's classifications. 
proactive and reactive movements, and it fed upon social 
networks which were themselves similarly complex. Populist 
movements are inevitably tragic, for they draw .their energies 
from social orders under threats of dissolution and notwithstanding 
its brutality, Poqo was no exception to this. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
PAN AFRICANISTS IN EXILE. 1960-1976 
THis final chapter provides a sequel to the developments 
which form the subject of this dissertation. In examining 
the exile phase of the Pan-Africanists' history it will be 
concerned with their decline as an active force in South 
African politics. It will be argued in this chapter that the 
disintegration of the movement abroad was neither accidental 
nor simply an effect of the circumstances of exile, difficult 
as these were. It can be related as well to the organisation's 
original character which especially ill-equipped it for the 
rite of passage exile represents in the history of so many 
revolutionary movements in Africa. 
This history was enacted during a period which for the 
most part within South Africa was politically at least, 
relatively tranquil. A tentative explanation for this is 
necessary. The most obvious reason was the suppression of the 
nationalist movements and the imprisonment, banning or exile 
of an entire generation of politicians and trade unionists. 
During the 1960s the police were granted unlimited powers of 
arrest and detention as well as increasingly lavish budgets. 
The police recruited an army of informers whose activities 
promoted a climate of fear and distrust, effectively paralysing 
1 
any political initiative amongst Africans. The decade also 
witnessed fresh restrictions on political discussions with 
the silencing of the radical press and the increasingly 
2 
apolitical content of African commercial journalism. 
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As well as legislation specifically intended to contain 
radical protest, other policies effectively served to curb 
any African political dissent. During the decade the 
government worked systematically to reverse the flow of 
African urbanisation and to restructure the industrial work-
force into one composed principally of migrant labour. The 
process set in motion in the late 1950s in the western Cape 
was now enacted on a national scale. Over a million labour 
tenants and farm squatters and 400,000 city dwellers were 
resettled in the Bantustans, the population of which increased 
by 70 per cent in the 1960s. In addition, 327,000 people were 
brought directly under the control of the Bantustan authorities 
as a result of townships being incorporated within the 
boundaries of the reserves neighbouring them.) Nearly two-
thirds of the country's African townships actually declined 
in size. Movement between the reserves and the towns was 
further controlled after 1968 with the completion of the rural 
labour bureaux system. As official regulation of people's 
lives became more and more severe so the prison population rose: 
by 1910 it was nearly twice what it had been in 1960 (out-
4 
stripping an overall population growth of 25 per cent). All 
these changes helped to break down existing networks of social 
solidarity and hamper the creation of new ones. They also 
contributed to the atmosphere of fear and insecurity which 
perpetuated political apathy. 
Finally, and less importantly, the institutions of 
apartheid provided a limited degree of cooption. The 
administrative and political structures of the Bantustans 
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helped to accommodate the career aspirations of a section of 
the African petty bourgeoisie. The expansion of segregated 
educational facilities and the African white-collar employment 
generated by the 1960s may have helped to deflect well-educated 
Africans from political activism. 
The environment of exile politics presented the Pan-
Africanists with fresh problems and difficulties. These can 
be grouped in three oategories: those arising from the need 
to maintain sanctuaries in foreign states and sources of 
external assistanoe; those related to efforts direoted at the 
re-establishment of internal activity and support; and 
finally, the problem of holding the exile group together.5 
Before examining how the PAC exiles coped with these diffioulties 
a few general points about each category can be made. 
Under exile conditions one of the major functions of 
political leadership is diplomatic; at certain points in their 
history the support of foreign powers and international 
organisations was more crucial to the survival of South African 
politioal movements than the existence of active membership 
within the oountry. External help oould involve certain 
obligations: taking sides in international great power 
hostilities, or even the internal political conflicts of the 
host state, were two of the more obvious of these. The 
requirements of diplomatic work and the habits created by it 
could serve to socially isolate leaders from rank and file. 
Liberation movement leaders were often encouraged by their 
hosts to behave in the manner of heads of states and members of 
government and this could help to fuel escapist illusions held 
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by the leaders concerning the strength and importance of the 
movements they represented. Foreign assistance could also 
be in the form of large financial donations providing a source 
of affluence well beyond the scope of the finances of the 
movements in the earlier phase of legal domestic activity. 
So first of all, even in the context of a friendly and 
sympathetic exile environment, there were threats to the long-
term effectiveness of the political movements. 
As far as the problem of reactivating an internal 
organisation was concerned, the exile movements were confronted 
with formidable barriers. In the 1960s and early 1970s South 
Africa was protected by a cordon sanitaire of colonial 
territories themselves engaged in extensive counter-insurgent 
operations. Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland, though all 
independent states by the end of 1968. were nevertheless too 
economically reliant on South Africa to provide secure bases 
for exile South African organisations (though the PAC attempted 
to base its guerrilla operations in Lesotho until 1965). South 
Africa does not provide the terrain or local conditions which 
allowed the establishment of successful guerrilla insurgencies 
in, for example, Mozambique or Angola. There, nationalist 
parties could initially base their struggles in superficially 
administered and economically fairly self-sufficient remote 
rural communities. In South Africa a repressive system of 
controls on popular mobility and political expression extends 
to the reserves where, fo» the most part, people live on the 
edge of starvation, dependent on migrant earnings. There is 
no group comparable to the 'middle peasantry' which comparative 
analyses of rural revolutions have found to be vital to the 
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6 
successful guerrilla movement. In the towns, influx control, 
and an extensive system of police informers served to inh1bit 
political activity, as did the fear and demoralisation engendered 
by new security legislation and police powers. All these 
conditions helped to isolate exiled political leaders from 
the changing reality of life within the country, making it 
all the more difficult to devise realistic strategies. 
Finally, the Pan-Africanists were vulnerable to behavioural 
tendencies arising from the circumstances of exile. In the 
absence of creative and rewarding mobilisation activity, 
political energy could focus itself around hairsplitting 
doctrinal disputes. Removed from the arena of real conflict. 
internal dissent and opposition to factions and personalities 
within the movement could serve as a substitute for externally-
oriented aggression. Tensions between individual personalities 
could assume a reinforced significance and could be 
rationalised by both sides in ideological terms. The 
frustrations and material hardships of exile life (only a 
favoured few could live like diplomats) could promote escapist 
delusions, mutiny, and apathy amongst rank and file. The 
crucial need to engage in propaganda activity (and compete with 
other movements in making extravagant claims) so as to retain 
foreign support, could contribute to the intellectual sterility 
of exile politics. Large sums of money and an unaccustomed 
degree of power over rank and file members (usually the host 
state took the leaders' part in internal dissent) could present 
obvious temptations to men and women with experience of neither. 
The Pan-Africanists in exile have had a turbulent history. 
By 1976, of their original fourteen-man executive committee, 
392 
at least eight were in exile. Of these six, Nana Mahomo, 
Peter Raboroko, Peter 'Molotsi, Jacob Nyaose, Z. B. Molete 
and Abednego Ngcobo, had been expelled from the organisation 
as a result of conflicts between them and the acting president, 
Potlake Leballo. In addition, at least two other men who had 
joined the leadership after PAC's ban, Matthew Nkoana and Tsepo 
Letlaka, were subsequently dismissed, Letlaka eventually 
becoming a member of the Transkeian government. Apart from 
leadership conflicts there have also been frequent internal 
rebellions resulting from the dissatisfaction of men in the 
guerrilla training camps. On several occasions these rebellions 
have taken the form of assassination attempts, the most recent 
being in 1979 when Leballo's successor, David Sibeko, was 
shot dead in Dar es Salaam. In its external relationships 
the PAC has had a disturbed history, incurring the wrath of 
the Organisation of African Unity in 1967 and 1968, and the 
Zambian government in 1968 and 197J: entering ill-starred 
alliances with the Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola 
(FNLA) in 196J and the Comite Revolucionario de Mocambique 
(Coremo) in 1968; and attracting the dubious benefits of 
support from China and the Central Intelligence Agency. Its 
efforts to infiltrate its cadres back to South Africa were, 
in the pre-1976 period, even less fortunate than those of the 
!NC. For the Pan-Africanists, exile has been a traumatic and 
demoralising experience and through it the movement has been 
all but destroyed. 
The following discussion of the PAC's history between 
1960 and 1976 will have two dimensions. First, developments 
J9J 
at the level of leadership will be examined, that is, alterations 
and reformulations of policy, strategy, and ideology, disputes 
and conflicts, and the shifting and sometimes uneasy relation-
ships that existed between the PAC and various foreign powers. 
Secondly, the situation of the movement's followers will be 
described; here the focus will be on conditions in the camps, 
rank-and-file reactions to leadership, and the attempts to 
return insurgents to South Africa. 
Until late 1962 there was very little organised activity 
by PAC members in exile. Refugees from South Africa had 
clustered in Maseru and in various centres in Swaziland and 
Bechuanaland. In Europe and in different African capitals 
Nana Mahomo and Peter 'Molotsi, independently of any direction 
from their colleagues, attempted to counter the influence of 
the ANC and obtain promises of financial, diplomatic and 
military support. Only in August 1962, with the arrival of 
Potlake Leballo, was a formal exile leadership constituted. 
In a letter from Robert Sobukwe dated 25 August, Leballo was 
designated as acting president of the PAC, and national 
executive members - together with the chairman of the regional 
leaderships - were told to form a presidential council. The 
council was to have 'absolute power to rule, govern, direct 
and administer the PAC during the time the movement (was) 
banned and (during) the revolution,.7 Maseru was, from 1962 
to 1964, -the headquarters of the organisation, though in the 
course of the following few months PAC representatives opened 
offices in London, Accra, Cairo, Francistown, Dar es Salaam 
and Leopoldville (Kinshasha). Later the PAC also sent men to 
Algiers and Lagos. Despite the theoretical consideration that 
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all these centres should be subject to the Maseru head-
quarter's authority, they tended to function independently 
and occasionally in rivalry with Maseru. 
The period August 1962 to August 1964 represented a 
fairly distinct phase of the PAC's exile history, characterised 
by strategic ventures which would have been inconceivable in 
the case of an external leadership more remotely situated 
from South Africa. During the Maseru period the PAC's leader-
ship remained ideologically and strategically fairly consistent 
to the movement's origin: statements by its representatives 
featured references to a vaguely conceived 'African personality', 
advocacy of an African socialism derived from a 'continuity 
from older tribal democracies to present-day forms', and 
8 
xenophobia. Its insurrectionary preoccupations flowed from 
the same presumptions about mass behaviour as did the 1960 anti-
pass campaign: the principal shackles inhibiting popular 
resistance were psychological; 'show the light and the masses 
will find the way,.9 The one innovation in its policies was 
the admission of a white man, Patrick Duncan, to membership. 
Patrick Duncan joined the PAC in April 1963, having left South 
Africa the year before in defiance of his banning order. At 
this stage the PAC still hoped for support from the non-communist 
powers and in this context Patrick Duncan, with his reputation 
and social connections abroad, could obviously perform a 
10 
valuable role. 
Initially the Maseru leadership did not anticipate a 
lengthy exile. The original plan was for a massive uprising 
in which, on an appointed day, PAC cells allover South Africa 
would mount attacks on police stations and other strategic 
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targets to spark off a generalised insurrection. Preparations 
for this scheme began in late 1962, but were robbed of their 
crucial element of surprise on 27 March when Potlake Leballo 
staged a boisterous press conference in Maseru. Here he 
announced that the PAC's 155,000 members were impatiently 
awaiting his order to deliver the 'blow' which would end white 
11 South Africa. On 1 April the Basutoland police visited the 
PAC office and questioned those whom they found there (Leballo 
had gone into hiding) and confiscated a quantity of documents, 
including membership lists. Shortly afterwards the South 
African police began arresting several thousand suspected PAC 
men, using, it was alleged, the documents supplied to them by 
the British colonial authorities. For several months the PAC 
headquarters in Maseru were closed down, only to re-open when 
Leballo resurfaced from his hiding in September 196). There-
after the PAC in Basutoland contented themselves with providing 
12 
rudimentary instruction in guerrilla warfare. 
In the next year or so the major PAC initiatives took 
place in the fields of diplomacy and training. In June 196) 
Nana Mahomo and Patrick Duncan (who had left Maseru for London 
in April) began a two-month tour of the United States, visiting 
trade unionists, United Nations officials, churchmen, senators, 
state Department officials and businessmen. Apart from fund-
raising their main purpose was to persuade influential Americans 
in favour of an arms and oil emb~go of South Africa. Patrick 
Duncan succeeded in talking to Robert Kennedy who listened 
sympathetically to a plan for a Basutoland-based South African 
insurgency.1) Mahomo concentrated on the American labour 
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movement and was rewarded with a $5,000 donation from the 
AFL/CIO. 14 Mahomo's contacts with AFL/CIO officials provided 
the basis for rumours that the Pan-Africanists were being 
helped by the Central Intelligence Agency;15 if this was 
the case then the CIA was being unusually miserly, for even 
by the standards of the time $5,000 was not an extravagant 
donation. 
Nana Mahomo was responsible also for negotiating an 
agreement with the FNLA (another recipient of AFL/CIO generosity) 
through which PAC members would receive military training at 
the FNLA's Kinkuzu camp, near Leopoldville in the Congo. The 
incongruously named 'Operation Taperecorder' began in November 
1963 with the arrival at Kinkuzu of a group of fourteen men 
from Dar es Salaam led by Nga Mamba Machema, a former PAC 
organiser in Langa. It was hoped that the South Africans, 
together with recruits from the South West African People's 
Organisation and Mozambican nationalists, would acquire 
practical experience from training and fighting alongside FNLA 
men against the Portuguese. In January the small PAC nucleus 
at Kinkuzu was augmented with a 'plane-load of completely 
untrained men from Francistown. By February the PAC force 
numbered about fifty men. Their strength, however, was rapidly 
dissipated. At the root of the trouble were the uncomfortable 
material conditions at Kinkuzu and the FNLA's ramshackle 
logistical system. In a letter written in April from one of 
the trainees to Abednego Ngcobo, then visiting Leopoldville, it 
was claimed that in the camp there was neither adequate food nor 
proper training facilities, that many of the trainees were 
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afflicted with fever and that eleven had already deserted. 16 
The Angolan troops were hardly an inspiring example: by this 
stage the FNLA had few activists inside Angola, and the men 
in Kinkuzu stagnated - no attempt even was made to get them to 
grow their own food despite the abundance of fertile land 
around the camp. The PAC men would in any case have been 
hardly inclined to do so; most of the recruits were from 
Johannesburg with no knowledge of farming, and the local crops 
and diet had little appeal. Their behaviour rapidly deteriorated: 
those who did not desert resorted to factional conflicts. 
Mutinous sentiments apparently assumed an ethnic/regional 
dimension; the officers (the Dar es Salaam group) tended to 
be Xhosa-spe~ers from the Cape and the lower ranks (the 
Francistown group) mainly from Johannesburg. 17 The nature of 
the leadership of the PAC was also partly responsible for the 
failure of the Kinkuzu project. Whereas Mahomo was reported to 
be in charge of the Kinkuzu office in December 1963,18 by 
January the next year he was back in London. The fact that 
no high-ranking PAC official was sent with the trainees to 
share their experiences was significant and typical: very few 
members of the Presidential Council ever underwent any form of 
training. Not surprisingly the Kinkuzu group felt they had 
been deceived and neglected. By May 1964 the remaining Kinkuzu 
trainees had been flown back to Dar es Salaam. Notwithstanding 
19 their experience, the PAC's links with the FNLA continued, 
and in April 1971 a PAC group under the command of one Mashombe 
was said to be operating with FNLA forces independent of any 
20 
control from PAC headquarters in Dar es Salaam. 
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The PAC's negligence concerning its recruits in the 
Congo can be attributed partly to the first of a series of 
leadership disputes which were to plague the organisation. 
This one concerned the behaviour of the two external represent-
atives who were appointed in March 1960, Mahomo and 'Mo1otsi. 
In January 1964 the Dar es Salaam office was riven by feuds 
which largely centred on the question of who should control 
the PAC's finances. 'Mo1otsi had represented the PAC in Dar es 
Salaam since 1960 and was responsible for initial negotiations 
with the OAU/ALC. Abednego Ngcobo, the PAC's treasurer, had 
no access to ALC or other African-derived funding which was 
banked into an account to which 'Mo10tsi was sole signatory. 
The problem had wider dimensions than simply a personal squabble 
between Ngcobo and 'Mo1otsi: there was considerable discontent 
among PAC men in Dar es Salaam. Some were destitute and several 
had recently been sent back to Bechuana1and by the Tanganyikan 
authorities. 'Mo1otsi's assistant, Gaur Radebe, was in prison, 
suspected of complicity in a military coup against Nyerere. The 
Maseru headquarters, alarmed by the reports of corruption and 
low morale (many PAC men were defecting to the ANC), authorised 
Patrick Duncan to find out exactly what was happening. Duncan's 
efforts, together with those of Ngcobo and Jacob Nyaose, to 
establish which funds had been received and how they were being 
used, ended up with the intervention of the Tanganyikan govern-
ment, which froze 'Molotsi's bank account and withdrew his 
travel documents. 'Molotsi himself was suspended from office 
21 
and control over funds was restored to Ngocobo. 
This incident led to the estrangement of Mahomo from other 
PAC leaders. As in the case of 'Molotsi, Mahomo was responsible 
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for negotiating much of the PAC's initial financial support 
and he too was unwilling to relinquish control of funds to 
the Maseru office. Mahomo was suspended in August 1964 charged 
with 'misappropriation of funds' and 'attempts to create 
22 personal loyalties' and 'sources of personal operation'. In 
neither case was there any evidence of venality: Mahomo and 
'Molotsi may have been Simply motivated to maintain their own 
independent sphere of operation by the increasingly obvious 
reckless incompetence of Potlake Leballo and his colleagues. 
The AFL/CIO, incidentally, continued to provide funding for 
Mahomo's projects. 
The PAC's problems were hardly resolved by the suspensions 
of Mahomo and 'Molotsi. Later in 1963 there were signs of a 
mounting wave of resentment and criticism of leadership in 
Francistown, Dar es Salaam and Maseru itself. In Francistown 
a rift had developed between one group of PAC refugees and 
another mainly as a result of the reluctance of some to undergo 
military training. They had left South Africa, they said, on 
the understanding that they would receive educational sCholar-
ShiPs.23 At the same time the local PAC representative in 
Francistown, Matthew Nkoana, with the support of 24 of the 
recruits, drew up a memorandum calling for a conference so that 
the command structure could be improved. This was rejected by 
Leba1lo in Maseru who claimed it represented a conspiracy aimed 
at his personal overthrow. 24 Leballo had good reason to feel 
personally threatened from within his organisation: in early 
1964 PAC rebels blew up his house in Maseru; fortuitously, he 
was away at the time and escaped injury.25 This took place 
shortly after Leballo had expelled nine of the Maseru-based group 
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so as to forestall a local rebellion against his authority. 
Unrest spread to the PAC forces in Dar es Salaam with the 
arrival of the men from Francistown who had refused to accept 
-military training in Kinkuzu. In August 1964 Potlake Leballo 
finally left Maseru to re-establish the headquarters of the 
exile movement in its centre of patronage, Tanganyika. Here 
the mutinous recruits were informed that no scholarships were 
available and all would have to go on military training courses. 
They were subsequently despatched to Ghana where it appeared 
that the PAC had eclipsed the ANC in obtaining Nkrumah's 
26 favour. Shortly before Leballo's arrival in Dar es Salaam, 
Abednego Ngcobo, Peter Raboroko and Ahmed Ebrahim (the PAC's 
first Indian member) began a tour of China. 27 
The PAC's effort to obtain Chinese support was not the 
result of an ideological reorientation of its leadership. 
Significantly, two of the three men who took part in the 
initial negotiations were later expelled for 'right-wing 
deviationism'. And while they were in China their colleagues 
continued to cultivate the friendship of American millionaires 
28 
and U.S. State Department officials. The fact was that the 
organisation was desperately short of money: of an estimated 
requirement of £148,000 the PAC received from the OAU and other 
sources less than £30.000. 29 The expedient character of the 
PAC's new pro-Chinese sentiment was confirmed by a rebuke from 
Nyaose in Dar es Salaam to Leballo in Maseru: 'Wherefore your 
articles attacking communism when in fact you (should) be 
attacking the diabolical activities of Joe Matthews and other 
fellow travellers • • • (you are) prejudicing our support at 
certain quarters,.30 Notwithstanding such sophistry, the 
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Chinese 'alliance' was to have a profound effect on the 
organisation. 
The following four years were exceptionally divisive 
ones for the PAC's leadership. Any analysis of the conflicts 
which arose in this period is complicated by a tendency by the 
protagonists to characterise any disagreement in polarised 
ideological terms. Of course, conflicts within the movement 
did have an ideological dimension - not all its members found 
the transition to Maoist rhetoric easy or acceptable - but 
tension really centred around the question of who controlled 
the movement and its resources rather than opposed principles 
held by contending factions. Ideology at times appeared to be 
more a matter of etiquette than a system of beliefs and values 
held by leaders and followers. By 1965, after the expulsion 
of PAC's remaining activists from Maseru (where amongst other 
things, they had attempted to organise the sabotage of the Cape 
to Johannesburg 'Blue Train'), most of the organisation's 
energies were devoted to internecine conflict. There is not 
the space here to document this in detail and a brief summary 
of the main events must suffice. 
Most of 1965 and the first half of 1966 were relatively 
tranquil. Through the agency of Patrick Duncan, who had a rare 
attribute for a South African liberation movement representative 
- he spoke fluent French - the Pan-Africanists managed to obtain 
Algerian training facilities. Up to then the Algerians had 
tended to favour the ANC. Their training was considerably 
superior to that offered by the Angolans and Ghanaians, and 
for a time rank and file discontent appeared to subside. 
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(Duncan was soon relieved of his Algerian post; his political 
sympathies and social background were increasingly inappropriate 
to the mannerisms and conventions the PAC leadership was now 
trying to emulate.) Meanwhile his colleagues diverted them-
selves with squabbles over the control and expenditure of 
Egyptian and Chinese funding.)1 At a more creative level, the 
PAC adopted a new name for South Africa and broadened its 
potential appeal by admitting to its ranks former members of 
the Coloured People's Congress. The new name was 'Azania', a 
name favoured by early cartographers for part of eastern Africa 
and derived originally from an Arabic expression. Some PAC 
men were apparently uncertain of its progeny and Evelyn Waugh, 
who in his satirical novel Black Mischief, had called his 
mythical African country Azania, received a courteous letter 
of enquiry.)2 But whatever the inspiration for the name, the 
underlying motive for its adoption was a serious and important 
one - the desire to create an alternative cultural identity for 
black South Africans. Unfortunately for the PAC, this effort 
never really developed beyond the stage of symbolic gesture. 
The "defection of the CPC men to the PAC's ranks was a 
reflection of tensions which existed between SACP members and 
other exiles within the Congress movement in London. The PAC 
offered to non-communist CPC men what the ANC did not: full 
membership and responsibility in an African nationalist 
organisation, the PAC had always held in its policy statements 
that coloured people were African.)) In fact the ex-CPC 
activists did not remain in the movement for long: by November 
1961 they, together with other London-based PAC men, had 
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constituted themselves as a nucleus of 'real revolutionaries' 
within the movement, and were highly critical of most of the 
rest of the leadership.34 By 1969 most had been ejected from 
the PAC after Potlake Leballo had become aware of their efforts 
to challenge his authority. 
Most of the movement's internal tensions were kept below 
the surface until mid-1969. But in August that year, at an 
anti-apartheid conference in Brasilia, the two PAC represent-
atives ostracised themselves from the rest of the Presidential 
Council by reading statements which called for some form of 
international intervention in South Africa. According to his 
critics Lebal10 had approved of these first 35 but they neverthe-
less conflicted in principle with the more self-sufficient 
strategy of an initially rural-based 'protracted peoples' war' 
36 
now advocated by PAC ideologues in the training camps. The 
two PAC men concerned lent weight to the accusations of CIA 
manipulation directed against them by subsequently embarking 
on a visit of the United states. 37 A meeting held under the 
auspices of the OAU/ALC did not improve matters, Raboroko 
arguing for a properly representative 'national convention' 
which would include 'right wing deviationists' and accusing 
38 Leballo of betraying the internal organisation in April 1963. 
In July 1967 Ngcobo and Raboroko attempted to assume control of 
the Dar es Salaam office, and the ensuing scuffle was followed 
by the temporary closure of the office by the OAU/ALC. The 
two dissenters then held a press conference and called for an 
amnesty for all expelled and suspended members of the PAC. 
They were subsequently expelled for being 'on the pay roll of 
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US imperialism' and of conducting a slanderous campaign against 
Leballo's leadership 'with two small voices of evil cherubim,.)8 
Ngcobo, as former PAC treasurer, was for good measure accused 
of embezzling US and European-derived funds. Ironically, 
shortly after these expulsions the demand for a reconciliatory 
meeting was partially acceded to. In a bid to isolate these 
latest critics, the PAC announced the annulment of all previous 
suspensions and expulsions and summoning of a leadership 
conference in Tanzania in September 1967. 
The conference was held at Moshi. It was a small assembly, 
there was no attempt to make the conference proceedings 
representative of rank-and-file sentiment: the guerrilla units 
were represented by one member of the Presidential Council, 
T. M. Ntantala. In consequence it was not altogether surprising 
that despite the tone of 'rigorous but healthy self-criticism' 
which the PAC claimed predominated at Moshi, the conference 
mainly served to endorse the actions and behaviour of the PAC 
leadership. The expulsions of Ngcobo and Raboroko were confirmed 
and an anti-corruption committee chaired by Potlake Leballo was 
instituted to investigate allegations of misbehaviour by other 
senior PAC members. On the premise that 'the masses are ready 
for a long revolutionary war' the Presidential Council was 
replaced by a 'Revolutionary Command' under the authority of 
e 
Potlake Leballo which established its headquarters in Lusaka 
in December 1967 in the hope that Zambia would provide a base 
for infiltration into hostile territory. It was admitted that 
hitherto the PAC had devoted a disproportionate effort to 
'aimless international diplomacy' and that henceforth the main 
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emphasis of its work would be on re-establishing its link with 
the internal struggle. 40 
The transfer of the headquarters to Zambia and the promise 
of greater activism in the future reflected the increasing 
impatience with which the PAC was being regarded by African 
statesmen. Later in 1961 an OAU meeting in Kinshasha called 
u,on the PAC to justify its continued existence and in February 
the following year at a council of ministers' meeting in Addis 
Ababa the movement was presented with an ultimatum: if the PAC 
did not mount any infiltration efforts by June all OAU aid 
would cease. To avert this catastrophe twelve men were selected 
from the group which had established a training camp at 
Senkobo near Lusaka. In April 1968 they were transported to 
the Mozambican border in Zambian government Land Rovers. Just 
before they crossed the border their weapons, which had 
previously been confiscated by the Zambian authorities, were 
restored to them. The intention was that the PAC men would 
cross Mozambique with the guidance of Coremo guerrillas and 
enter South Africa. In return Coremo would receive their help 
in sabotaging the Beira oil pipeline to Rhodesia and would 
receive weapons (without OAU recognition Coremo received very 
little external assistance). The PAC/Coremo group survived 
in Mozambique for nearly two months but were finally intercepted 
at Villa Piri at the beginning of June. Most of the PAC men 
were captured or killed. The Portuguese subsequently handed 
their prisoners over to the South African police. Two managed 
41 to evade capture and return to Zambia. 
The failure of the Mozambique expedition increased rank-
and-file disenchantment with the Revolutionary Commando With 
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the return of the two survivors of the expedition rumours that 
the guerrillas had been betrayed by the Zambian government and 
the Lusaka-based leadership began to circulate in the Senkobo 
base. At this stage, hoping to capitalise on lower echelon 
disaffection, Leballo's opponents, led by Tsepo Letlaka, first 
held a meeting in Dar es Salaam and announced the expulsion 
from the PAC of Leballo and his supporters and then travelled 
to Zambia. Letlaka, accompanied by Ngcobo, Motlete, Nyaose and 
Raboroko visited the Senkobo camp with the hope of obtaining the 
guerrilla's support. Instead they were arrested and locked up. 
At this point the Zambian government intervened, raiding and 
closing down the PAC office in Lusaka, rounding up all the PAC 
members on Zambian territory regardless of their loyalties. 
and returned them to Tanzania. The Zambians then imposed a ban 
on any PAC activity. claiming that the Pan-Africanists had been 
involved in an attempt to overthrow the Kaunda administration. 
In Tanzania the dissidents were housed in a separate camp and 
most of them eventually made their way to Kenya. The OAU/ALC 
resolved to deny the PAC any further assistance until it put 
its internal affairs into order. 42 
What was the significance of all this? The dominant group 
within the PAC normally characterised such conflicts in 
grandiose historical terms, the Leballo faction being identified 
with 'the revolution' or 'the masses' and its enemies with 
'imperialism' and 'counter-revolution' and so forth. The 
dissenters would attribute the organisation's troubles not to 
external interference but instead to the individual shortcomings 
of leading personalities within the movement. Both points of 
view had some justification. Some of Leballo's opponents did 
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appear to have CIA connections. At the same time Leballo's 
behaviour could be vain, autocratic, self-centred and ill-
considered. But neither external subversion nor personal 
deficiencies provide a satisfactory explanation of the PAC 
weaknesses. The PAC was especially susceptible to corruption 
as a result of manipulation and personal failings, and the 
reasons for this can be traced by to the movement's essential 
character. 
Three features of the PAC's development made it particularly 
vulnerable. First, its original ideological cohesion was based 
on the antipathy of its founders to external influences on the 
African National Congress. In particular they were hostile to 
the framework of multiracial alliances, within which the ANC 
conducted its affairs in the 1950s. For most Africanists this 
waS the predominant consideration. 'African nationalism' on 
the whole remained a fairly abstract conception; the Africanists 
had only the vaguest conception of what their social ideal 
should be. In other words, their main basis for unity was 
essentially negative. In exile the issue of multiracialism 
was parochial and increasingly irrelevant. The PAC's previous 
hostility to 'foreign ideologies' made it especially ill-equipped 
intellectually to respond to the fresh challenges of a foreign 
environment. Casting around for new sources of support and 
inspiration, its leaders oscillated wildly between different 
international political camps. In place of any analysis and 
discussion there was substituted a sterile and externally 
derived dogmatism - for example, in a policy document of 1972, 
one finds the PAC advocating a rurally based popular insurgency 
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aimed first of all at abolishing 'feudal relations in the 
countryside,.43 In such circumstances the movement quickly 
shed its intellectual integrity. 
The second source of weakness was the traditional 
indifference of most PAC men to the problems of effective 
organisation. In South Africa their dependence on notions of 
mass spontaneity and the concept of a charismatic leadership 
meant that they did not devote much energy to the task of 
transforming their movement into a carefully structured mass 
organisation. In exile this neglect led to bureaucratic chaos, 
and in the absence of well-defined democratic decision-making 
procedures, an increasing degree of authoritarianism. In such 
circumstances personal rivalries could have an especially 
debilitating effect. 
Finally, in sociological terms the PAC's leaders often 
came from less privileged backgrounds than, for example, their 
compatriots in the ANC. They were thus more susceptible to the 
temptations, pretensions, and delusions of exile politics. The 
melodrama, hysteria, and grandiloquence inherent in their 
behaviour was probably a reflection of anxiety about status as 
well as an attempt to compensate for the insecurity and obscurity 
of existence in an alien environment. In this context it should 
be remembered that in many places the PAC did not have the 
institutional respectability of its rival. 
A second meeting of Moshi of those who remained loyal to 
Potlake Leballo (whose numbers were rapidly diminishing - there 
were a spate of desertions in late 1968)44 confirmed the 
expulsion of five conspirators and once again reaffirmed the 
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'revolutionary leadership' of Leballo. Somehow the PAC 
managed to restore its position with the OAU/ALC, being granted 
recognition once again in early 1969. Because of continued 
Zambian intransigence there were to be no further infiltration 
attempts for several years. While the PAC guerrillas were 
confined in the Zimbabwe African National Union's training camp 
and did nothing (there were no weapons for them to train w1th),45 
Leballo busied himself with political intrigue in Dar es Salaam. 
In 1969 a group of leading Tanganyika African National Union 
politicians, whose business interests had led them to oppose 
Nyerere's Arusha declaration, plotted the overthrow of the 
government. Without access to the military they planned instead 
to draw upon the resources of the liberation movements encamped 
in Tanzania and for this purpose tried to recruit the PAC's 
Azanian Peoples' Liberation Army (APLA) (as it was known from 
1968). The former ALC chairman, Oscar Kambona, then in exile, 
promised that in return for their cooperation, in the event of 
a successful coup, the PAC would receive lavish funding and 
facilities. Leballo, according to the prosecution in the later 
trial, informed the Tanzanian authorities and was encouraged to 
maintain contact with the conspirators so as to elicit more 
information. In 1970 the PAC aoting president was the key 
46 proseoution witness in a lengthy treason trial. From then 
onwards, Leballo could depend on the Tanzanian government's 
support in suppressing any resistance to his authority. The 
first sign of its approval was the inclusion of APLA men in a 
training programme being run from late 1970 by Chinese instructors 
at Chunya. 47 
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Any chance that the APLA guerrillas would be able to use 
their newly learnt skills appeared to recede still further in 
early 1971, when the Basuto Congress Party (the probable victors 
of Lesotho's 1970 election), dropped their connection with the 
PAC in the aftermath of a coup d'etat by the incumbent 
administration. A rump group of the BCP was then offered a 
place in the post-coup administration if it ended any links 
between the BCP and South African liberation movements. 
Confronted with an increasingly hostile administration, the 
few remaining PAC members in Lesotho travelled north to Dar 
es Salaam. 
From 1971 to 1975 the PAC made various attempts to 
negotiate a route back to South Africa for its guerrillas. 
From 1971 to 1973 the Zambians relented, allowing PAC men into 
the country for brief periods so they could then arrange their 
passage through Botswana. In November 1972 talks began with 
SWAPO representatives in the hope that SWAPO could be persuaded 
to guide APLA units through the Caprivi Strip into Botswana. 
The SWAPO people were unenthusiastic and eventually the PAC 
turned to the Uniao Nacional para Independencia Total de Angola 
(UNITA) for a similar arrangement. After the arrest of a PAC 
member for assault, the PAC was again excluded from Zambia. 
By late 1973 the APLA guerrillas had been in the Chunya 
camp for four years, their boredom and sense of isolation 
relieved only by occasional training seSSions, drill exercises, 
the political education classes. Their mood was becoming 
increasingly rebellious and appeared to affect some of Leballo's 
colleagues. 47 Once again the situation was saved by external 
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circumstances. A renewed spate of diplomatic activity had 
resulted in the development of fresh sources of patronage. 
In November 1914 PAC lobbyists succeeded in obtaining the 
expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations General 
Assembly49 and in JUI~ 1915 the OAU Kampala meeting adopted as 
official policy a long document prepared by the PAC arguing 
the case for the illegality of South Africa's international 
status.50 Subsequently, both Uganda and Libya offered 
facilities. Libyan training helped to defuse some of the tension 
which had developed at Chunya, and 100 APLA men were flown to 
Libya. 51 
Frelimo's accession to power in June 1915 opened up fresh 
opportunities for infiltration. The PAC had had a poor relation-
ship with the new rulers of Mozambique but Frelimo was never-
theless prepared to tolerate the passage of Pan-Africanists 
through their country to Swaziland. It was here that the PAC 
mounted its first sustained insurgent effort since 1963. 
Between September 1915 and May 1916 a small group of 
guerrillas from Chunya ran a programme of military and political 
instruction for dissident members of the Mgomezulu tribe. The 
Mgomezulu straddle the South African-Swazi border and from 1910 
had been politically divided by a chieftancy succession dispute, 
which had developed into intermittent fighting between factions 
supporting the two opposed claimants. Ntunja, the chief who 
had been appointed on the death of Mbikiza, was deposed by the 
South African and Kwa Zulu authorities in early 1914 and in his 
place Khatwayo, the rival claimant, was installed. Khatwayo's 
chieftancy began with fighting between his supporters and those 
of Ntunja. With the help of the South African police, Ntunja's 
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faction was driven off their lands, and fled into Swaziland 
with their chief. Here they came into contact with PAC 
representatives who saw in the dissident Mgomezulu faction 
the potential social base for a rural guerrilla movement. The 
~gomezulu were receptive to any offers of help, whatever motives 
underlay them. With only three old .303 rifles and a shotgun 
between them they were anxious to acquire weapons and expertise 
in using them. They were aware that Pan-Africanists were 
concern~d ~th a rather wider conflict than their disputed 
chieftancy but their own political motivation remained locally 
orientated. 
In October 1915 three men from Chunya who had travelled 
from Dar es Salaam by aeroplane and bus to Swaziland began 
training about thirty Mgomezulus. They started with basic 
lessons on firearms, naming the parts of the .303 rifles and 
showing them how to aim and sight the weapon. They were unable 
to begin target practice as the consequent explosions would 
have attracted the Swazi police. The training sessions were 
conducted at Mkalampere. a disputed area on the South Africa-
Swazi border. After a month the PAC men were able to obtain a 
couple of air rifles which they could allow their new recruits 
to fire. Training was suspended for six weeks over December 
1915 and January 1916 because of the presence in the area of 
South Africa soldiers, but was resumed with their departure. 
Meanwhile PAC officials made several fruitless attempts to 
persuade President Machel of Mozambique to allow the transit 
of arms and reinforcements through Mozambique. Machel refused: 
it was known that a small group of PAC men were with UNITA in 
Southern Angola, and quite apart from UNITA's hostility to 
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Frelimo's ally the MPLA, UNITA also appeared to have formed an 
alliance with the South African army. The OAU/ALC was 
reluctant to give the PAC any weaponry unless it could obtain 
the agreement of the Zambian and Mozambique authorities to 
ferry military equipment through their territories. Unable to 
supply the new followers with weapons, the PAC headquarters 
instead sent them some approved literature: speeches by 
Potlake Leballo and Mao's writings on guerrilla warfare. The 
instructors were told to investigate suitable routes and hiding 
places but to do nothing until the arrival of arms and further 
instructions. In April the Swazi police arrested some of the 
Mgomezulus, whom they had discovered in possession of home-made 
weapons. Then in early May South African police arrested the 
three PAC instructors at Mkalampere. With these arrests the 
PAC lost interest in the affairs of the supporters of Ntunja. 52 
The eve of the Soweto uprising found the PAC weak and 
once again divided. In Libya the guerrillas had revolted 
against the stringent code of behaviour imposed by their Islamic 
instructors and had had to be transferred to Uganda. Money 
promised by China had failed to arrive (after the defeat of its 
clients in Angola the Chinese lost interest in Southern Africa) 
and the OAU was being uncooperative. The most telling factor 
against the PAC was the system of alliances it had contracted: 
in the light of the Frelimo and MPLA victories the PAC's former 
connections with UNITA, the FNLA, and Coremo were extremely 
unhelpful. This, together with its failure to implement 
seriously any internal organisational reforms and the continuing 
rift between leadership and rank and file, was to inhibit its 
efforts to exploit the changed circumstances of the late 1910so 
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This discussion of the PAC would be incomplete without 
some reference to the situation of the men in the training 
camps who represented the bulk of the exile movement. In 
examining their plight the tragic dimension of the PAC's history 
abroad becomes clearer. For many of them had spent well over a 
decade in various rural army bases in different African 
countries. The case of Isaac 1fulekwa, one of the men who worked 
with the Mgomezulu people, was fairly typical. Mhlekwa had 
joined the PAC in 1959 while working as a petrol pump attendant 
in Cape Town. Returning to his family in the Transkei in 1960 
to get married he did not participate in the PAC's pass campaign 
in Cape Town. From 1960 to 1964 he was not politically active 
but in early 1964 he was visited at his hostel in Langa by the 
man who had recruited him in 1960. He was told to leave the 
country and report to the PAC in Francistown for military 
training. From February to August he stayed with other PAC 
recruits in Francistown waiting for transport northwards. In 
August a lorry came from Lusaka to fetch them. After two months 
of hanging around Lusaka he and his fellow recruits were sent 
to the Ngulana refugee camp in Tanzania. Then in late 1964 the 
PAC men at Ngulana were flown to Ghana for their initial military 
education. The Gh~aiaatraining was poor: the men were given 
conventional military drill by Ghanaian army officers and were 
badly clothed and fed. At the end of January 1965. after a 
revolt in the camp at Kumasi, the PAC men were transferred to 
Algeria. Here the training programme was considerably more 
sophisticated and the men's material needs more adequately 
provided for. After going on an officer's training course, 
Mhlekwa fell ill with tuberculosis and spent five months in 
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hospital in Algiers. On his release from hospital in 
September 1965 he rejoined his comrades who were now at Mbeya 
in Tanzania. For ten months their military training lapsed as 
the PAC had no weapons for them. Instead the recruits occupied 
themselves with reading texts by Marx, Mao and Lenin and keeping 
fit with physical exercise. In October 1966 Mhlekwa was 
transferred to another camp, Ruanda, and was instructed in the 
use of weapons. Five months later he attended a further 
training session at Morogoro and was then - in June 1961 - sent 
to the Zambian base camp. Mhlekwa spent over a year in Zambia, 
mainly working in the Lusaka PAC office and being treated for 
tuberculosis. He was deported in August 1968 with the other 
PAC members and spent the subsequent years either in Chunya 
camp or receiving treatment of TB at Mbeya. Most of the people 
who had been trained with him remained in Chunya. 
Underlying the frequent desertions, minor revolts over 
food and conditions, and the more occasional full-scale mutinies 
which characterised the history of the camps, was the boredom 
and obvious futility of the daily existence of the training camp 
inmates. Because of their refugee status it was difficult for 
them to take up any form of local employment. There were no 
attempts to make the camps self-sufficient for their food 
supplies. What passed for political education comprised uncritical 
repetition of Maoist catch-phrases: if their public documents 
can form the basis of an accurate judgement, the PAC's strategic 
discussions were conducted within a realm of total fantasy. 
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CONCLUSION 
The literature concerning the development of African 
political organisations in South Africa has been informed 
mainly by the perceptions, experiences and characteristics of 
their leaders rather than their followers. It has been a 
literature which in its analysis of African opposition and 
resistance to government policies has largely confined itself 
to the examination of formal organisational structures: 
committees, hierarchies, parties, congresses, conferences, 
federations, and alliances. Much of what has been written has 
focussed on the chronology of institutions, ideas or particular 
individuals. 
So, for example, the monumental documentary collections 
edited by Thomas Karis and Gwendoline Carter, narrate both 
through the documents themselves as well as the painstaking 
scholarly introductions the evolution of the principal African 
political organisations which existed up to 1965, the African 
National Congress, the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, 
the All African Convention, the Pan-Africanist Congress and 
other more ephemeral bodies. The changing beliefs of their 
. leaderships, the. shifting heritage of ideas which coloured 
their intentions and strategies, their bureaucratic structures, 
their finances and membership statistics, the discussions which 
preceded and produced their programmes and which defined their 
campaigning, all these are minutely detailed with the aid of 
correspondence, internal memoranda, bulletins, conference 
reports, memoirs, and, sometimes crucially, the oral reminiscences 
and opinions of surviving notables and activists. Karis and 
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Carter's work as well as that of their proteges in assembling 
this massive survey represents an historiographical epic of 
heroic proportions: they have laid much of the essential ground-
work for the study of African nationalism in South Africa for 
1 
many years to come. 
Yet notwithstanding the care and attention to detail of 
their work, their methodology with its emphasis on organisations 
which are intellectually articulate through either internal 
documentation or the oral statements of sophisticated and 
educated participants, has certain shortcomings. In common with 
most other commentaries on African protest and resistance their 
record is silent on one of the most dramatic resistance movements 
which involved black South Africans during their chosen period: 
the struggle of rural black people against the imposition of 
Bantu Authorities and land 'rehabilitation' in the reserves. 
This only occasionally and tangentially involved the African 
National Congress (it was more central to the preoccupations of 
the tiny Cape-based All African Convention) and it produced 
little in the way of documentation for its principal actors were 
often men who could neither write nor read. But even in the 
case of the organisations which Karis and Carter choose to 
concentrate upon, they allow themselves to be guided by their 
informants' views and the documentary suggestions of what was 
apparently of significance and what could be relegated as being 
of minor importance. So, for example, the efforts of women to 
resist the issue of reference books, one of the most prolonged, 
widespread, energetic, as well as one of the most successful 
2 
resistance movements which involved the ANC during the 1950s, 
rates two pages and one document in their eight hundred page 
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long third volume. It was not, after all, a movement which 
aroused much enthusiasm from the (predominantly male) Congress 
leadership.3 Similarly, and more centrally to the concerns of 
this thesis, Gail Gerhart, both in the section she prepared for 
the Karis and Carter volume, and in her own treatment of black 
'exclusivist' political bodies, skates hurriedly over sketchy 
evidence in her brief discussion of ~, depending chiefly on 
the perceptions of outsiders, before returning to the world of 
respectable resistance with its educated men and their eloquent 
testimony. Pogo in her analysis of the development of an 
Africanist tradition4 is merely a brutal and tragic sideshow, 
a brief and disreputable interlude in the evolution of an ordered 
and logically coherent intellectual system. 
It might be objected that if one's primary interest is 
in great men and their thoughts this neglect of movements which 
lie outside their domain is perfectly justifiable. Such an 
objection could be sustained if the purpose of works such as 
these was only to chart the progression of ideas. But the 
organisations and their personnel are viewed as actors of 
fundamental social significance, capable of stimulating and 
provoking large-scale popular responses and in their development 
are seen vital elements which will help to shape South Africa's 
future destiny. If such a view is valid then political historians 
need to explain not only the gestation of ideas but also the 
reasons for their relative impact on the behaviour of large 
masses of ordinary people. Here conference agenda, newsletters, 
presidential addresses, annual reports and statements from the 
dock are of very limited utility. 
Of course a way out of this difficulty is to begin one's 
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enquiry with the assumption that in examining movements like 
the ANC or PAC and the social upheavals which accompany them 
the subject of the analysis is a sociological abnormality, a 
pathological condition, the study of which might suggest social 
remedies and reforms. An example of the operation of such 
assumptions can be found in the work of Edward Feit, who next 
to Karis and Carter, has made one of the most substantial 
contributions to the study of black politics in South Africa. 5 
Significantly, while Karis and Carter are predisposed to the 
evidence of the conference hall, Feit's preference is for the 
facts established in the court-room. In Feit's view, the actions 
of a revolutionary and violent minority are the actions of a 
pathological and unrepresentative few attempting to disrupt 
the stable and normally ordered lives of the many. The 
activities and motives of the insurgents can be explained with 
reference to the frustrations and aspirations of a socially 
confined African bourgeoisie and the frequent popular apathy 
which they encountered can best be attributed to the state's 
capacity for providing the framework for an acceptable existence 
for the great mass of urban black people: 
Stability ••• (is) attained not only by 
repression but also by the maintenance of 
order and by economic improvement, some of 
which, at least, spills over to the black 
people • • • to succeed the African insurgents 
would have to maintain an increasing rate of 
disorder, beyond a level which the government 
could control. 6 
Most 'little' people are not much concerned 
with 'big' issues. •• The people like the 
jungle are neutral. They will side with who-
ever can best protect them. Protection means 
order. Disorder makes life difficult. Order 
is, therefore, the crucial issue. 7 
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Therefore for Feit, the main thing to explain is why 
organisations like the ANC do not have the capacity to create 
significant disorder. The problem is defined as an essentially 
bureaucratic one and the analysis is almost tautologous: 
African organisations are ineffective because they are 
inefficient. Part of their inefficiency can be traced to the 
hysterical psychology of their leadership. Many of the prevalent 
assumptions of Feit's work seem to flow from the theories of 
'social breakdown referred to in Chapter Four. From the 
perspective of such an analysis movements like Pogo are the 
responses of the socially marginalised, interesting no doubt, 
but not in the mainstream of proper historical concern. While 
Karis and Carter have little to say about the constituencies of 
African political protest they do assume them to have a popular 
character. For Feit they do not exist at a popular level at all 
- ordinary people are immune from notions of inJustice or the 
desire to participate in the decisions which govern the nature 
of their lives. 
The third perspective offered by scholarly literautre on 
black South African opposition is the one offered by Marxists 
in which the role and character of political organisations is 
determined by their location in the arena of class struggle. 
The South African Marxist 'revisionist' school perceives the 
history of the 1950s as being primarily determined by the needs 
and requirements of a maturing monopoly capital and the efforts 
8 
of the working class to confront this capital. The ANe's 
significance in this context is estimated by the extent to which 
it incorporated a developed industrial proletariat in its ranks 
and the measure to which such a group had their interests and 
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concerns reflected by the ANC's leadership. Within this school 
there is a general consensus that the ANC was based on a 
working class membership though there is considerable disagree-
ment as to whether the ANC's leaders shared this proletarian 
ethos. 9 Not surprisingly, the PAC and Pogo does not have much 
attention paid to it in this historiography, for not only were 
their leaders hostile to class-based attempts at popular 
mobilisation, but the concerns of their followers seem to have 
had little to do with the essentials of the conflict between 
capital and labour. 
From this survey it is easy to understand the scholarly 
neglect of the Pogo insurrection. Yet the examination of the 
Pogo movement does more than simply filling a gap in existing 
historical research. The study of Pogo contained in this thesis 
offers several insights which may be useful for future more 
general analyses of black South African politics. 
First, the dominant concern of this thesis has been with 
followers rather than leaders, with the precise identification 
of the PAC's popular constituents and the factors which 
influenced their political involvement. Examining the PAC and 
Pogo 'from below' has required the collection of information 
about local conditions in a variety of locations and the situating 
of the PAC within the context of local societies the complexities 
of which are often very difficult for an external observer to 
understand. Such a task involves rather a wider range of sources 
than have been used in the authorities discussed above. 
Municipal records, local newspapers, anthropological and socio-
logical surveys, and evidence to government commissions - such 
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sources help to lend colour and substance to the historical 
reconstruction of the base of a political movement in a way 
that party documents do not. Of course interviews with 
participants help but the information gleaned from rank and 
filers can often tell us as much as the memories of leaders 
(who are often more concerned than the former about setting 
the record for posterity). Trial records are another important 
source which do feature quite prominently in the sources of 
existing scholarship as well as in this work. But trial 
records can be used in at least two fashions: to illuminate 
the nature, sequence, motive and character of particular 
political acts (usually the concern of the court) and to 
disclose information about the participants in such acts, 
information which may have no immediate bearing on the acts 
themselves but which may help us to socially identify the actors. 
In this study in contrast to others the second sort of information 
derived from trial reports has been at least as highly valued as 
the first. The vantage point from which this study has examined 
Pogo could also be employed in the cases of other movements and 
organisations. It is possible that conclusions which can be 
drawn from the PAC/Pogo experience may be found to have a wider 
applicability. What, then, are these conclusions? 
First of all the Pan-Africanist Congress was not a body 
which can be understood solely in terms of criteria derived 
from the study of formal organisations. Its leadership was a 
sect, for a long time, a conspiritorial one, an intellectual 
tendency within a larger organisation. Almost fortuitously its 
influence was for a brief time to inspire a social movement - or 
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rather several social movements - the youthful rebellion of 
the schools of the Eastern Cape and Pretoria, the migrant 
workers who were attempting to establish a secure existence in 
the towns of the Western Province, the struggle of Transkeien 
peasants to resist proletarianisation. In such different social 
settings the ideas of the original sect resounded differently 
with varying implications, interpreted according to particular 
needs and expectations. Variations in location and situation of 
its following also involved variations in its historical 
character. In certain contexts the PAC/Pogo was a movement of 
the future aimed at the capture of the state and the creation of 
a differently structured society, in others it was a movement 
hostile to the state and oriented to the recapture of the 
smaller society of the past; in terms suggested by the Tillies' 
analysiS, it was simultaneously a reactive and a proactive 
movement. 
Then it is possible to witness in the location-based study 
of movements like the PAC/Pogo the extent to which such movements 
were central to the lives of ordinary people and the degree to 
which they were popularly understood as legitimate. Certainly 
the evidence derived from the Western Cape and Transkeien case 
studies would negate the view that this was a movement of the 
social fringe. It is also possible, as is suggested by the 
material from East London and Pretoria, that even small political 
groups can represent a distillation of a more generalised anger 
at social injustice. 
The PAC was a popular movement but the popular forces it 
succeeded in marshalling were not proletarian in character. Its 
followers were, it is true, literally speaking workers, but they 
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did not in their political responses manifest a consciousness 
of themselves as members of an industrial working class. The 
motives of migrant workers who joined Pogo draw attention to 
the importance of a residual rural ideology amongst urban 
migrant workers in a context in which many had emotional and in 
some instances material links with the countryside. This did 
not, as is sometimes supposed, inhibit their participation in 
urban-located political dramas, but it was a participation on 
their terms and it shaped such dramas accordingly. It should 
be remembered that in the period discussed in this thesis 
migrant workers made up the substantial proportion of those 
Africans engaged in heavy industry: to look elsewhere for the 
springs of an authentic working class politics at that time 
would be to ignore social and political realities. The evidence 
of the chapters which are centred on the society of migrant 
workers (in Cape Town, Paarl and the Transkei) as well as those 
which are not (the chapters set in Vereeniging, Soweto, Port 
Elizabeth, East London and Pretoria) would seem to indicate that 
the search for the political expression of a working class for 
itself (in the Marxist sense) in the history of the struggles of 
the 1950s and 1960s is an unrewarding exercise. To a very large 
measure at that time working class politics in South Africa was 
populist politics. 
The concept of a 'working class consciousness' may be too 
abstract altogether for the analysis of South African politicso 
Popular classes or groups in such a society reflect a patchwork 
of social identities. They contribute important functions to 
the working of that society but ideologically they are remote 
from it. The ruling class dominates not through ideas but rather 
429 
by force. In such circumstances the dominated classes are 
unlikely to produce a neat proletarian antithesis to a bourgeois 
ideology. The ultimate historical significance of the PAC may 
be that the social presumptions which underlay its populist 
rhetoric were correct. South African racial oppression may 
ultimately have a class-derived logic but there is even less 
reason than in most societies for politics to assume pure class-
determined forms. This in addition to the fact that in the 1950s 
an African industrial working class was still in an early stage 
of formation. People living at the bottom of such a society 
define themselves in politics and ideology not by the economic 
contribution they make to its perpetuation but rather by their 
moral rejection of its entirety: they belong to another people, 
another race, another nation and another country. More through 
intuition and imagination than judgement and analysis the 
language spoken by the men of the PAC accorded with the social 
realities of the time in a way in which that of its rivals did not. 
Finally, more importantly than any other consideration, the 
complexity of the movement which has been partly unravelled in 
this study should serve to remind us how little as yet scholar-
ship has revealed about the history of black South Africa. In 
a situation in which so little is known about the popular 
experience both of oppression itself and of the efforts to 
challenge it, the least social scientists can do is not to 
approach this history with ready-made sociological formulae. 
Here, as elsewhere, theory should be the servant not the governor 
of the historian. 
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